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Abstract 
 
This thesis is about Han Chinese engagement with the ethnically diverse 
highlands west and south-west of the Sichuan basin in the first half of the 
twentieth century. This territory, which includes much of the Tibetan Kham 
region as well as the mostly Yi- and Han-settled Liangshan, constituted 
Xikang province between 1939 and 1955. The thesis begins with an analysis 
of the settlement policy of the late Qing governor Zhao Erfeng, as well as 
the key sources of influence on it. Han authority suffered setbacks in the late 
1910s, but recovered from the mid-1920s under the leadership of General 
Liu Wenhui, and the thesis highlights areas of similarity and difference 
between the Zhao and Liu periods. Although contemporaries and later 
historians have often dismissed the attempts to build Han Chinese-
dominated local governments in the highlands as failures, this endeavour 
was relatively successful in a limited number of places. Such success, 
however, did not entail the incorporation of territory into an undifferentiated 
Chinese whole. Throughout the highlands, pre-twentieth century local 
institutions, such as the wula corvée labour tax in Kham, continued to 
exercise a powerful influence on the development and nature of local and 
regional government. The thesis also considers the long-term life (and death) 
of ideas regarding social transformation as developed by leaders and 
historians of the highlands.  
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Map 1: Sketch map with main places referred to in this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Map 2: Ren Naiqiang’s 
sketch map of Xikang, 
showing territory 
controlled by Liu 
Wenhui’s regional 
government in 1933, as 
well as “lost” territory and 
territory Liu planned to 
include. (With labels 
translated by Lawson). 
Source: Ren Naiqiang 任乃強, 
Xikang tujing: jingyu pian 西康
圖經：境域篇, (Shanghai: 
Shanghai shudian, 1933), 82-83. 
 Map 3: Topographical Map of 
China  
Source: Michael Loewe and Edward L. 
Shaughnessy eds., The Cambridge History 
of Ancient China, volume 1, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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Measures and Currencies 
 
Money  
 
At least five different units are used in the sources for this thesis.  
 
-Copper cash, (wen 文): The small unit of currency in imperial China. 
-Tael, (liang 兩): A weight of silver; a unit of account rather than a currency. 
The exchange rate between copper cash and taels of silver varied 
significantly over time and space. 1,000 copper cash per tael is a 
hypothetical average. 
-Dayang yuan (大洋元):  Often translated as “silver dollar”, but more 
literally “foreign coins”. These coins in circulation in many parts of China. 
In Sichuan the normal silver content was .72 taels, so one dayang yuan was 
worth 2.25 Tibetan yuan.1 
-Tibetan yuan, (Zang yang yuan 藏洋元): A currency produced by the late 
Qing government in an attempt to prevent the circulation of Indian rupees in 
Tibet, circulation appears to have been confined to Kham.2 The Tibetan 
yuan normally had a silver content of .32 taels. So one Tibetan yuan was 
worth .45 dayang yuan. 
-Fabi 法幣: Literally “legal tender”, this was the currency issued by the 
Guomindang. According to the China Agricultural Bank, Han local 
authorities in Xikang tended to use Tibetan yuan rather than fabi.3 In 1935, 
one dayang yuan was worth .8 fabi, but the fabi underwent hyperinflation 
after 1939.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Yang Jianwu 杨健吾, "Minguo shiqi kangqu de jinrong caizheng 民国时期康区的金融
财政," Xizang yanjiu 西藏研究 no. 3 (2006), 103. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Zhong Mu 钟穆, "Minguo shiqi de Zangyang zhuzao 民国时期的藏洋铸造," In Ganzi 
Zhou wenshi ziliao, no. 14 甘孜州文史资料，第十四辑, ed., Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi 
xieshang huiyi Ganzi Zangzu zizhizhou weiyuanhui 中国人民政治协商会议甘孜藏族自
治州委员会, (Kangding: Kangding xian yinshua chang, 1996), 83. 
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Volume measures 
 
Grain volumes are measured in shi 石, which contain 10 dou 斗. In imperial 
and republican China, the size of these units was not standard throughout 
the country. An eastern Chinese shi of grain weighed approximately 75 kg, 
while in Sichuan a shi was usually double this size. Zhao Erfeng’s Kham 
administration and those of the Republican period until 1939 used the larger 
Sichuanese shi, which they called a guan 官  (“official”) shi. Several 
documents explicitly state that a guan shi of barley weighed around 300 jin 
斤 (roughly 150 kg)4. In 1939, the Xikang administration began using the 
Guomindang “market” (shi 市) shi, which was based on the eastern Chinese 
shi, and was thus half the size of the guan shi.5  
 
Distance  
 
The distance measure used in this thesis is a li 里, about half a kilometer. 
 
Weight 
 
The measure of weight used in the sources quoted by this thesis is a jin 斤. 
The weight of a jin was usually around 600 grams, though like the shi, it 
varied in late imperial China. Under Guomindang rule weights were metric-
ized, and the weight of a jin was fixed at 500 grams.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Zhao Erfeng 赵尔丰, and Wu Fengpei 吴丰培, Zhao Erfeng Chuan bian zou du 赵尔丰川
边奏牍, (Chengdu: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 1984), 72. 
5 Sichuan sheng dang'an guan 四川省档案馆, and Sichuan minzu yanjiu suo 四川民族研
究所, eds. Jindai Kang qu dang'an ziliao xuanbian 近代康区档案资料选编, (Chengdu: 
Sichuan daxue chubanshe, 1990), 84. 
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Romanization and names used in this thesis. 
 
Chinese names are romanized using the pinyin system. The only standard 
system for romanizing Tibetan names is the Wylie system, which 
reproduces the spelling of written Tibetan, with the result that it offers non-
specialists little guide to how a name should be pronounced. For this reason, 
most scholars who write for a non-Tibetological readership do not use it. I 
have endeavoured to use the names and orthographies that are most 
commonly used in scholarly literature written for non-Tibet specialists.  
A full glossary of names for places and ethnic groups, including 
alternative versions and spellings is included at the end of this thesis. A few 
basic conventions I have adopted are as follows.  
The indigenous people of Liangshan are called Yi, which is an 
exogenous term that is somewhat broader in scope that any endogenous 
term; but it has become common in English language scholarship.  
The administrative region now called Liangshan Yi Autonomous 
Prefecture (Liangshan Yizu zizhizhou 凉山彝族自治州) was preceded by an 
administrative territory called Ningshu (甯屬  “Ning territory”) in the 
Republican period, and Ningyuan Prefecture (寧遠府) in the Qing. Because 
the boundaries of the three units were somewhat different, I use the period-
appropriate term. 
“Liangshan 涼山” (“The Cool Mountains”), in this thesis refers to the 
geographic region of these mountains, not an administrative region.   
“Tibetan” includes the native people of Kham, even though they were 
sometimes thought of as ethnically distinct from the people of central Tibet. 
This follows current terminology, in Chinese, Tibetan and foreign 
scholarship. 
“Kangding” refers to “Kangding county”, while the main township in this 
county is referred to as Dartsedo (which is now usually also called 
“Kangding” in Chinese). 
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Introduction 
 
To the west and southwest of the Sichuan basin, one of the cores of Chinese 
civilization, are highlands that are ethnically and ecologically radically 
different from the basin. At the broadest level, they can be subdivided into 
the predominantly Tibetan Kham region and the territory now encompassed 
by the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture 凉山彝族自治州, which was 
known in the Qing dynasty as Ningyuan Prefecture寧遠府, and Ningshu 甯
屬  in the Republican period. The latter is home to diffuse groups of 
indigenous people now mostly called Yi 彝, as well as a significant Han 
population around Xichang 西昌. For almost all of the Qing period, the non-
Han regions in the highlands were not governed by the bureaucratic 
structure that administered the Han Chinese parts of the empire, a system 
called junxian 郡縣  in Chinese. They were instead a patchwork of 
chieftainships, micro-states and, in Kham, monastic estates. These were 
theoretically subject to the sovereignty of the emperor, but in practice 
mostly left to their own devices. The Chinese called the secular leaders of 
such places tusi 土司, or “native officials”.  
Despite the considerable diversity of the highlands, Qing and Republican 
era Chinese leaders and writers often conceptualized it as a single space: the 
Sichuan frontier (Chuanbian 川邊).1 Qing administrative geography united 
the whole frontier highland region within the Jianchang Circuit 建昌道. 
This was comprised of the prefectures of Yazhou 雅州  (the nominal 
boundaries of which included the Kham chieftaincies), Ningyuan, Jiading 
嘉定 (present day Leshan 乐山, including non-Han territory Chinese called 
Ebian 峨邊 ), and Qiongzhou 邛州  (a Han-populated region west of 
                                               
1 In the early and mid Qing period “Chuanbian” had another, overlapping but slightly 
different meaning: the half of Tibet that was to be governed by Sichuan, i.e. ‘the Sichuan 
parts’, as opposed to Zangbian  藏邊 ‘the Tsang parts’ governed by the Tibetan 
government in Lhasa. See for example Wu Guangyao 吳光耀, "Xizang gailiu ben wei ji 
西藏改流本未紀," in Kangqu Zangzu shehui zhenxi ziliao jiyao (shang) 康区藏族社会
珍稀资料辑要（上）, eds. Zhao Xinyu 赵心愚, Qin Heping 秦和平, and Wang Chuan 
王川 (Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 2006), 52-54. In the late Qing and Republican periods the 
“Sichuan frontier” sense of the term was more common. 
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Chengdu). The Qing inclusion of the Kham chieftaincies in Yazhou 
Prefecture did not mean that Yazhou governors had real authority over 
Kham, but it made Yazhou the base for imperial engagement with that 
territory. 
In the 1900s, the Qing government undertook a campaign in large areas 
of the Sichuan frontier to replace tusi-rule with junxian administration, an 
undertaking they called gaitu-guiliu 改土歸流 . They sought to expand 
cultivation of “wasteland”, increase Han Chinese settlement, develop 
mining and other industries, and enact a broad reformation of indigenous 
culture. Yin Kechang 尹克昌, a member of the Qing Grand Secretariat 
proposed that the Jianchang Circuit be combined with large areas of Yunnan 
Province 雲南, including Lijiang 麗江, to create a “Jianchang Province” 建
昌省 . 2  Yin’s plan was not implemented during his lifetime, but the 
construction of a new province in the region remained high on 
developmental agendas. In 1906, the court promoted the Jianchang Circuit 
Intendant, Zhao Erfeng 趙爾豐 (1845-1911) to the newly created position of 
Warden of the Sichuan and Yunnan Marches (Chuan Dian bianwu dachen 
川滇邊務大臣). 3 Zhao proceeded to increase the intensity and scope of the 
highlands development programs, particularly in Kham. He also formulated 
a plan for a new province that included areas of Yunnan.4 Months before the 
1911 Revolution, Zhao was appointed Governor of Sichuan. His deputy Fu 
Songmu 傅嵩炑 (1869-1929) took over as Warden of the Marches, and 
                                               
2 Li Xizhu 李细珠, "Shilun Qing mo xin zheng shiqi zheng qu gaige de ji ge wenti 试论清
末新政时期政区改革的几个问题," Jindai shi yanjiu 近代史研究, no. 2 (2003): 119. 
3 This office is also—and perhaps more often—translated as ‘Border Commissioner for 
Sichuan and Yunnan’. I prefer John Jordan’s ‘Warden of the Marches’ because it 
preserves a difference in tone from the normal translations of Republican and Socialist 
period offices in which ‘Commissioner’ is used for weiyuan 委員. 
Birth and death dates are included where they are known.  
4 Wu Guangyao, "Xizang gailiu ben wei ji," 56. 
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proposed that the planned province be called Xikang 西康 (Kham-in-the-
West).5  
During the 1910s and 20s the term “Xikang” often referred only to Kham, 
though in Chinese engagement with the Sichuan highlands there was still a 
strong connection between Kham and Ningshu. Both regions were within 
the nominal authority of the Sichuan Frontier Garrison Commander 
(Chuanbian zhenshou shi 川邊鎮守使), and the forces attached to the office 
operated in both. 6  In 1916, for example, the commander of Xichang’s 
garrison led a force to Daocheng 稻城 in Kham to re-open a gold mine.7  
The idea that all the mountainous lands in Sichuan that were west and 
southwest of the Sichuan basin belonged together in a separate province 
retained a powerful grip on the imagination of frontier governors. A 1936 
report underlined that “there are strong connections [between Kham and 
Ningshu] in geography and personnel (renshi 人事).”8 From the late 1920s, 
positions of authority in civilian and military Han institutions across the 
highlands were dominated by the network headed by the militarist Liu 
Wenhui 劉文輝 (1894-1976). Liu’s nephew Liu Yuanzhang 劉元璋, for 
example, was the Settlement Commander (Tunsiling 屯司令) of Ningshu 
and the counties of Leibo 雷波, Mabian 馬邊, Pingshan 屏山 and Ebian 峨
邊 east of Ningshu. 9 There were also personal connections between this 
                                               
5 “Western Kham” would be a misleading translation, because there was no “Eastern 
Kham,” and nor did anybody think there was. The “Xi” in “Xikang” was needed to make 
a disyllabic name for consistency with other Chinese place names. 
6 The precise area under the authority of this office is somewhat unclear. The 1941 Xichang 
Gazetteer makes it clear that the Sichuan Frontier Garrison Commander had authority 
over a large number of the troops in Xichang in 1920. Zheng Shaocheng 鄭少成 and 
Yang Zhaoji 楊肇基, Xichang xian zhi 西昌縣志 [1941], reprinted in Zhongguo Xizang ji 
Gan Qing Chuan Dian Zang qu fang zhi huibian 中國西藏及甘青川滇藏區方志匯編, 
Vol 40, ed. Zhang Yuxin 张羽新 (Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 2003), 420. 
7 Ren Xinjian 任新建, "Jindai Sichuan Zang qu de huangjin kaifa 近代四川藏区的黄金开
发," in Sichuan Zangxue lunwen ji 四川藏学论文集, edited by Luo Runcang 罗润苍 and 
Ren Xinjian, (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 1993), 47. 
8 Anonymous (佚名), "Zhili Kangqu yijian shu 治理康区意见书," in Kangqu Zangzu 
shehui zhenxi ziliao jiyao, ed. Zhao Xinyu, Qin heping, and Wang Chuan, (Chengdu: 
Bashu shu she, 2006), 404. 
9 Zhang Yongjiu 张永久, Liu Xiang jiazu: Minguo Sichuan di yi jia 刘湘家族：民国四川
第一家 (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 2008), 19. 
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network and region's indigenous leaders: the daughter of Liu Wenhui's 
secretary became the second wife of a tusi in Yanyuan.10  
Still under the control of Liu and his supporters, the western Sichuanese 
highlands finally became Xikang Province in 1939. The establishment of the 
province had been held up by the chairman of Sichuan, Liu Xiang 劉湘 
(1888-1938), who was Wenhui’s first cousin once removed and adversary in 
an intra-Sichuan civil war in 1932-33. The elder Liu had been unwilling to 
formalize Wenhui’s control of Yazhou (typically called “Yashu 雅屬” in the 
Republic) and Ningshu. Liu Xiang’s death in 1938 cleared the way for the 
establishment of a Xikang Province comprised of all three territories at the 
start of the following year. 11  The Qing idea of also including some 
Yunnanese territory in the highland province was abandoned, however, 
presumably due to interprovincial conflict. Han institutions in Chuanbian 
were always dominated by Sichuanese; Xikang was, in some respects, a 
Sichuanese colonial project.12  
The administrative connections between Ningshu and Kham were 
reflected in strong connections in the production of knowledge about them. 
The 1930s journal Sichuan Frontier Quarterly (Chuanbian jikan 川邊季刊) 
focused on the whole frontier region. Some researchers concentrated on 
Kham or Ningshu, but many were engaged with both. Zheng Shaocheng 鄭
少成, for example, was one of the principle compilers of the 1941 Xichang 
Gazetteer (Xichang xianzhi 西昌縣志) and also participated in research on 
Kham. 13  Even journals and monographs with titles that indicated an 
                                               
10 Zhongguo kexueyuan minzu yanjiu suo 中国科学院民族研究所 and Sichuan shaoshu 
minzu shehui lishi diaocha zu 四川少数民族社会历史调查组, eds., Liangshan Xichang 
Yizu diqu tusi lishi ji tusi tongzhi qu shehui gaikuang (ziliao huiji) 凉山西昌彝族地区土
司历史及土司统治区社会概况（资料汇辑） (1963), 37. 
11 Liu Jun 刘君, "Jian lun Xikang sheng 简论西康省," in Minguo dang'an yu minguo shi 
xueshu taolunhui lunwen ji 民国档案与民国史学术讨论会论文集, ed. Zhang Xianwen 
张宪文, Chen Xingtang 陈兴唐, and Zheng Huixin 郑会欣 (Beijing: Dang'an chubanshe 
1988), 324. 
12 Wang Xiuyu, "China's Last Imperial Frontier: Statecraft and Locality in Qing Kham 
Tibet, 1890-1911" (PhD, Carnegie Mellon University, 2006), 354-56. 
13 For example, he was a member of the expedition that produced this report: Liu Hengru 
刘衡如 et al., "Shicha Dao Lu De Bai Zhan Ya Jiang qi xian baogaoshu 视察道炉甘德白
瞻雅江七县报告书," Xin Xikang 新西康 1, no. 2-3 (1938), reprinted in Kangqu Zangzu 
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exclusive focus on Kham and Tibet included many articles on Ningshu, as 
did Kham and Tibet Studies Monthly (Kang Zang yanjiu yuekan 康藏研究
月刊) and Kham Guide Monthly (Kang dao yuekan 康導月刊).14  
 
The British missionary Samuel Pollard, who was in Ningyuan during the 
last years of the Qing and the first of the Republic, noted the utopian tone of 
many discussions of the highlands and their development. 
 
Over and over again I have heard the Chinese talk of an Eldorado 
existing in Nosuland [Yi territory]. They call this mythical place Wan 
Tan Ping – the ten thousand piculs plain […] They also have a saying:  
‘If you only open up Wan Tan Ping  
The whole word will no more see hungry men.’15 
 
The frontier territory was often described as a “virgin land” (chunü di 處
女地); an untapped source of riches and a solution to Sichuan’s, or even all 
China’s, problems.  
Officials and observers were generally disappointed with the results of 
the frontier development endeavour, and most foreign historians have 
underscored its failures. 16  There was a significant increase in the Han 
population of certain parts of the eastern fringe of the highlands; around 
Kangding 康定, Luding 瀘定, Yuesui 越嶲 and Hanyuan 漢源; and there 
were other pockets of increase further west. But many goals were not 
achieved. Han authority was tenuous or non-existent in many places. A 
                                                                                                                       
shehui lishi diaocha ziliao jiyao,  eds. Zhao Xinyu and Qin Heping, (Chengdu: Sichuan 
minzu chubanshe, 2004).  
14 Articles about Ningshu in Kham and Tibet Research Monthly include: Ren Naiqiang 任
乃强, "Lun Ningyuan qu zhi jing jian buzhou 論寧遠區之經建步驟," Kang Zang yanjiu 
yuekan 康藏研究月刊 1, no. 3 (1946): 2-9; Ling Guangdian 嶺光電, "Wo dui Leibo Yi 
ren de guangan 我對雷波夷人的觀感," Kang Zang yanjiu yuekan 康藏研究月刊, no. 11 
(1946); 28-32. 
15 Samuel Pollard, In Unknown China: a record of the observations, adventures and 
experiences of a pioneer missionary during a prolonged sojourn amongst the wild and 
unknown Nosu tribe of western China, (London: Seeley, Service and Co., 1921), 135-36. 
16  For example, Elliot Sperling, "The Chinese Venture in K'am, 1904-1911, and the Role of 
Chao Erh-feng," The Tibet Journal 1, no. 2 (1976): 32; Hsiao-ting Lin, Tibet and 
Nationalist China's Frontier: Intrigues and Ethnopolitics, 1928-49 (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press 2006), 68. 
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1938 observer lamented that, throughout large tracts of the highlands, local 
indigenous headmen had simply become the new tusi, replacing the old tusi 
who had been deposed by the late Qing campaigns.17 The Xikang regional 
administration was always reliant on outside subsidies, as well as, from the 
mid-1930s, the export of opium. In 1955, the idea of a separate province in 
the highlands was abandoned entirely. Xikang’s territory was divided up 
between Sichuan and the Tibet Autonomous Region, along roughly the 
same border as had separated Sichuan and Lhasa-controlled Tibet during the 
Qing.   
In contrast to foreign and Republican era accounts that emphasize failure, 
Chinese historians working in the post-Mao period have tended to see 
Xikang as an unstable but nevertheless important step toward the 
development of the highlands and their integration within the Chinese 
nation.18 This interpretation is clearly geared toward producing history in a 
nationalist key, in which events are significant primarily for their 
contribution to the progress of the Chinese nation-state. Nevertheless, this 
historical narrative offers a useful reminder that the Chinese efforts in 
Sichuan’s frontier in the first half of the twentieth century were not 
unmitigated failures. Indeed, as I will show in chapter one, in a certain 
limited number of places, late Qing and Republican era governors built 
robust Han-dominated local administrations. The legacy of these 
administrations and their developmental projects is evident to this day. 
Judged by more realistic standards than the naive hopes of the era, and 
taking into account the immense difficulties of the late Qing and Republican 
periods, the Chinese engagement with the Sichuan highlands was often 
remarkably successful. This thesis is about that engagement and the forces 
that shaped it, both in the Qing and the Republican periods. These forces 
include: the visions that lay behind the late Qing expansion, the highland 
                                               
17 Liu Hengru et al., "Shicha Dao Lu De Bai Zhan Ya Jiang qi xian baogaoshu," 44. 
18 See Wang Chuan, "Jindai minzu guanxi shi shang de Xikang jian sheng ji qi lishi yiyi 近
代民族关系史上的西康建省及其历史意义," Xizang daxue xuebao 西藏大学学报 23, 
no. 1 (2008): 60-70; Huang Tianhua 黄天华, "Lun minguo shiqi Xikang jian sheng 论民
国时期西康建省," Sichuan shifan daxue xuebao 四川师范大学学报（社会科学版）28, 
no. 4 (2001): 95-100. 
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environment, pre-existing frontier institutions and the broader political, 
economic and intellectual milieu.  
 
Most chapters of this thesis examine the development of regional and 
local level Han-dominated state institutions: from county governments 
(xianfu 縣府 ) and their staff, to the regional military forces and civil 
governments, as well as the various organizations they established, such as 
the Xikang Provincial Agriculture Improvement Institute (Xikang sheng 
nongye gaijin suo 西康省農業改進所). China scholarship has often been 
uncertain as to whether to categorize regional “warlord” regimes, such as 
Liu Wenhui’s, as part of “the state” or not. Mary Backus Rankin writes:  
 
State authorities were only one of a long list of political actors that 
included central officials, provincial leaders, local officials, members of 
elite civic and voluntary organizations, publishers and journalists, 
warlords and their armies, revolutionaries and their forces, and loosely 
organized students in urban centres. Instead of clear dichotomies between 
state power and social action, there were shifting intersections between 
different processes of bureaucratic centralization, militarization, elite 
civic participation or nationalist protestation.19  
 
But the “warlords” did much the same things as the “state authorities”. They 
aimed to monopolize coercion within their territories, and they paid for it by 
taxing the population. Given that “the state” was not a cohesive, unitary and 
clearly delineated entity in the Republican period is the concept valuable for 
historians of that era? Would it be easier to name specific institutions 
without using the potentially confusing notion of “the state”?  
Despite Rankin’s warning about posing dichotomies between state and 
society, there is a strong tendency for scholars—including Rankin—to use 
the idea of the state, and I do not believe they are wrong to do so. Timothy 
Mitchell has argued that although the state is not “a free-standing entity […], 
located apart from and opposed to another entity called economy or society”, 
                                               
19 Mary Backus Rankin, "State and Society in Early Republican Politics, 1912-18," in 
Reappraising Republican China, ed. Frederick Jr Wakeman and Richard Louis Edmonds 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 7. 
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it does not follow that scholars should discard the notion entirely. 20 The 
effect of a separate and distinct state is one of the key characteristics of 
modern politics (and not a few pre-modern political contexts).21 This effect 
has been created by the accumulation of many small practices and 
interventions that Mitchell and Foucault call “disciplines”. 22  These are 
things such as barracks, which physically separate the space inhabited by 
‘state’ soldiers and the rest of ‘society’; as well as items like uniforms, 
insignia, passports and ‘political’ maps, all of which make manifest an 
otherwise abstract state entity.  
The Han-dominated government and military institutions in the late Qing 
and Republican era Sichuan highlands demonstrate the creation of a state-
effect as described by Mitchell. The authors of the sources used by this 
study perceived those institutions as constituting a series of integrated 
governmental organizations connected to a larger “Chinese state”. Those 
connections to national centres of authority certainly existed, though they 
were more tenuous than many writers perceived or admitted. Within local 
politics, the dividing line between state and non-state was at times unclear, 
and was drawn in different ways. One of Ningshu's most important martial 
leaders in the mid and late Republican periods was the bi-cultural Deng 
Xiuting 鄧秀廷. One section of a 1939 report referred to Deng's fighters as 
“government/state soldiers” (guan bing 官兵), yet in the same report’s 
summary of local armed-groups, Deng was listed under “private forces” 
(siren shili 私人勢力), as opposed to “security forces” (bao'an tuandui 保安
團隊), which the writer presumably saw as government organizations.23 But 
                                               
20 Timothy Mitchell, "Society, Economy, and the State Effect," in The Anthropology of the 
State: A Reader, ed. Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 
184. 
21 Ibid., 184-5. 
22 Ibid., 177. Mitchell is drawing on Michel Foucault and Colin Gordon, Power/knowledge: 
selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977 /Michel Foucault ; edited by, Colin 
Gordon ; translated by Colin Gordon ... [et al.] (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 
1980); Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter M. Miller, eds., The Foucault Effect: 
Studies in Governmental Nationality: with two lectures by and an interview with Michel 
Foucault (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). 
23 "Ningshu diaocha baogao huibian", 1939, (unpublished manuscript, held at Peking 
University library), junshi men 軍事門, 59; zhengsu men 政俗門, 27. 
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even though his categorization of Deng was more ambiguous than others’, 
this writer still saw a distinction between “private armed forces” and those 
that seemed more clearly associated with the regional government.  
On occasion the state-effect did break down altogether, as when one of 
the writers of a report commissioned by the Guomindang in 1939 
commented that “bandits and soldiers are one and the same thing (bing ye, 
fei ye兵也，匪也)”.24 But in general, the Sichuan Frontier Defence Force 
(Chuan-Kang bianfangjun 川康邊防軍 , in 1927 absorbed into Liu 
Wenhui’s Twenty Fourth Revolutionary Army, as his forces were known in 
Guomindang nomenclature) was perceived as a government organization, 
not a group of bandits. It still broke the law, for example, by selling opium. 
Arguably its infringement in this area was a much greater crime than 
anything bandit gangs could accomplish. But the state-effect was strong 
enough that almost all sources considered it a government army, not a 
bandit gang. While I have endeavoured to be specific about historical agents, 
I have also at times used the notion of the “Han state in the highlands” as 
shorthand for the network of regional and local Han dominated institutions 
that generally presented that effect of being a relatively distinct governing 
structure.   
 
 
Sources 
 
The section of this thesis concerned with Qing policy and ideology draws 
mostly on correspondence written by Zhao Erfeng and the officials who 
                                               
24 Guomin canzheng hui. Chuan kang jianshe shicha tuan 國民參政會. 川康建設視察團, 
ed. Guomin canzhenghui Chuan-Kang jianshe shichatuan baogao shu  國民參政會川康
建設視察團報告書 (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe youxian gongsi,1971 [1939], hereafter, 
CKSB), 141. 
10 
 
worked for him.25  The other key source for this period is the 1912 account 
of Zhao's campaigns written by Fu Songmu, Zhao’s deputy and successor.26 
For the Republican period there is a greater variety of sources. I have 
used archival material stored in the Sichuan Provincial Archives, and 
published compilations of documents in this and other archives. The 
Republican period also saw the publication of a large volume of writing on 
the frontier region. Most of this work appeared in journals such as Kham 
Guide Monthly or Xikang Economy Monthly (Xikang jingji yuekan 西康經
濟月刊), though around a dozen reports were also published in book form. 
This body of writing includes both travel narratives and more systematically 
planned research, though many works straddled both these categories. 
One individual, Ren Naiqiang 任乃強  (1894-1989), merits a special 
introduction due to the key role he played in the Han project to govern and 
produce knowledge about the Sichuan frontier. Moreover, although Ren was 
a much more prolific writer than his colleagues, his general career path was 
not untypical for Han engaged with Xikang during his time. Ren was born 
in Nanchong 南充, Sichuan, and attended Beijing Agricultural College from 
1915. 27  After graduation he worked for a Beijing newspaper, before 
returning to Nanchong to serve as the director of the local Bureau of 
Industry and Commerce and the director of middle school education. In 
1928 he wrote what one biographer calls “the first modern, systematic 
account” of the histories of the ancient Shu 屬 and Ba 巴 kingdoms.28 In 
1929, Hu Ziang 胡子昂 , the chief of the Border Affairs Office at the 
headquarters of the Frontier Defence Force, appointed Ren as an official 
                                               
25 Collected in: Zhao Erfeng 赵尔丰 and Wu Fengpei 吴丰培, Zhao Erfeng Chuan bian zou 
du 赵尔丰川边奏牍 (Chengdu: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 1984); Sichuan minzu yanjiu 
suo 四川民族研究所, ed. Qing mo Chuan Dian bianwu dang'an shi liao 清末川滇边务
档案史料, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,1989, hereafter QCBD).  
26 Fu Songmu 傅嵩炑, Xikang jiansheng ji 西康建省記, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhongguo 
Zang xue chubanshe, 1988 [1912]). 
27 Unless otherwise noted biographical information on Ren is from: Li Yuanyuan 李垣垣, 
ed. Minguo Chuanbian youzong zhi "Xikang zhaji" 民國川邊游蹤之『西康札記』 
(Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 2010), un-paginated preface. 
28 Ibid. 
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Border Region Investigator (bianqu shicha yuan 邊區視察員). 29 Funded by 
the Border Affairs Office, Ren spent a year in Kham conducting research.30 
On the basis of his investigations and with the help of his Tibetan wife, Ren 
compiled reports on eleven Kham counties and produced a monograph 
called Notes on Xikang (Xikang zhaji 西康札记).31 In 1929, Liu Wenhui 
appointed Ren as a member of the Economic Construction Committee 
(Jingji jianshe weiyuanhui 經濟建設委員會) of the Twenty Fourth Army. 
At the same time, Ren revised his work for serialized publication in the 
Sichuan Daily (Sichuan ribao 四川日報) newspaper, and in 1932 he did the 
same for the magazine New Asia (xin Yaxiya 新亞細亞), which published it 
as Xikang tujing 西康圖經.32 Reviews praised this work as “the best new 
gazetteer (zhi 志) of a frontier region” and a “pioneer work for research on 
Tibet.”33  
Ren was appointed to Liu Wenhui’s Preparatory Committee of Xikang 
Province (Xikang jiansheng weiyuanhui 西康建省委員會) when it was 
established in 1935. He later became the director of the Xikang County-
Government Officer Training Bureau, where he also taught a course on 
Tibetan history. After the region ascended to full province-hood, he began 
work on a Xikang gazetteer, though this was never finished. From 1943 he 
was a professor working on frontier research at West China Cooperative 
University (Huaxi xiehe daxue 華西協和大學) in Chengdu. In this role he 
spent a lot of time traveling, especially in Liangshan, a part of the frontier 
he had hitherto neglected. After 1945, he worked at Sichuan University, 
where he raised funds to establish a Kham and Tibet Research Society 
                                               
29 Chen Chunlei 陈春雷, "Xikang guiyi lu de laiyou 《西康诡异录》的来由," Dushu 读书
, June 2006, 145. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Wang Chuan, "Jindai minzu guanxi shi shang de Xikang jian sheng ji qi lishi yiyi 近代民
族关系史上的西康建省及其历史意义," Xizang daxue xuebao 西藏大学学报 23, no. 1 
(2008): 38. 
32 Chen Chunlei, "Xikang guiyi lu de laiyou," 145. 
33 Ibid. 
12 
 
(Kang Zang yanjiu she 康藏研究社), which published Tibet and Kham 
Studies Monthly.   
Ren had some knowledge of the local Xikang languages, although he was 
not completely proficient in their use. 34 He commented that the Xikang 
languages are “easy to learn but difficult to master” and provided readers 
with some introductory sentences in Xikang tujing.35 According to Ren, all 
the Han who went to Xikang soon learnt such phrases and, after one or two 
years, could conduct conversations in the local tongues.36 (Those in higher 
leadership posts appear to have been the exception: “It is unheard of for Han 
governors to be able to understand Fan [Tibetan] languages.”37)  
Ren read most secondary literature on Xikang that was available in both 
Chinese and English. In Xikang tuijing, he quoted Eric Teichman’s (1884-
1944) Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet and Charles Bell’s 
(1870-1945) Tibet: Past and Present. He commented that there were no 
more detailed accounts of the region than Teichman’s and largely agreed 
with Teichman’s explanation for the failures of colonization schemes.38 Bell, 
by contrast, was castigated as one of the “fierce invaders of Tibet” (qinlüe 
Xizang zhi zui mengjin zhe侵略西藏之最猛進者 ) 39 , although he 
recommended that Bell’s English-Tibetan dictionary be translated and 
published in China.40 He also referred to Oliver Coales and the Germans 
Ryder and Richthofen.41  
Ren's main patron was Liu Wenhui's regional government. Other bodies 
also commissioned research on the Sichuan frontier. In 1939 the 
                                               
34 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian 西康图经: 民俗篇 (Shanghai: Shanghai 
shudian, 1996 [1933]), 204. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 204, 29. 
37 Ibid., 225. 
38 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: diwen pian 西康图经：地文篇 (Shanghai: Shanghai 
shudian, 1996 [1933]), 27; Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 255. 
39 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: jingyu pian 西康图经：境域篇 (Shanghai: Shanghai 
shudian, 1996 [1933]), 53. 
40 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 217. 
41 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: diwen pian, 26-27. 
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Guomindang organized an investigation team to visit the region for some 
months, as one branch of a broader survey of Sichuan. The mid-1930s 
journal Sichuan Frontier Quarterly was sponsored by the Bank of China in 
Chongqing. As with all historical sources, it is reasonable to expect that the 
sponsoring organization had some degree of subtle or not-so-subtle 
influence over the finished product. It would be wrong, however, to view 
these sources as mere mouthpieces of state authority. For one thing, the 
Guomindang did not have much to do with Liu Wenhui’s Xikang regime. 
There is no reason to think that the provincial authorities could influence 
what was published outside Xikang very much, and outside sources had no 
particular reason to be kind to Liu’s provincial government.   
Finally, there are the sources written by foreign travellers, a group mostly 
made up of missionaries, geographer-adventurers, consuls and refugees 
from troubled Europe, who were present in quite large numbers relative to 
other parts of inland China. 
 
 
Previous scholarship 
 
This thesis can be situated within the parameters of different levels of 
history writing. Firstly and most directly, there is the relatively limited 
corpus of work on the Sichuan frontier region in the late Qing and 
Republican periods, the vast majority of which focuses on Kham, rather 
than Ningyuan/Ningshu. At a broader level, there is the flourishing body of 
writing about non-Han regions within the Qing and post-Qing states. 
Another relevant historiography at roughly the same level consists of 
writing about Chinese modernity. These historiographies connect to a still 
broader scholarship that relates to states, frontiers and modernity in the last 
few hundred years of world history.  
Where the history of the Sichuan frontier highlands in the late Qing and 
Republican period has been studied before, the emphasis has primarily been 
upon key leaders and their relationships with each other, often as shaped by 
various species of nationalism and regionalism. James Leibold has 
discussed the ideologies of the Guomindang and the Xikang provincial 
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government, and the tri-polar relationship of these two bodies and the Lhasa 
government.42 Hsiao-ting Lin has examined the vicissitudes of Guomindang 
policy towards Tibetan governments. 43  Peng Wenbin has analyzed 
indigenous self-rule movements, focusing particularly on the role of key 
actors such as Kesang Tsering and the Panchen Lama’s retinue.44 Of the 
Qing period, Xiuyu Wang has provided a thorough introduction to Qing 
campaigning in Kham and there have been a few other succinct but good 
discussions of Zhao Erfeng’s campaigns and his main aspirations.45 Chinese 
language scholarship has produced a tidy body of research on Zhao Erfeng 
and some isolated studies of the region in the Republican period.46 Much of 
this new Chinese scholarship is impressive, despite the influence of 
nationalist concerns identified above. 
This thesis differs from and complements this body of work by 
concentrating on the details of developmental agendas and activity, and the 
forces that shaped them, rather than on relationships between political actors. 
Of course, those relationships were an important influence on policy. But as 
we shall see, they were not the only influence. It is also the first study—in 
either Chinese or English—to take in the connections and contrasts between 
Kham and Ningshu, and the first to pay attention to continuities and changes 
over the whole of the first half of the twentieth century.  
                                               
42 James Leibold, Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism: How the Qing Frontier and its 
Indigenes Became Chinese (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
43 Lin, Tibet and Nationalist China's Frontier. 
44 Peng Wenbin, "Frontier Process, Provincial Politics and Movements for Khampa 
Autonomy During the Republican Period," in Khams Pa Histories: Visions of People, 
Place and Authority, ed. Lawrence Epstein (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2002): 57-84. 
45 Wang Xiuyu, "China's Last Imperial Frontier"; Sperling, "The Chinese Venture in K'am"; 
David Dahpon Ho, "The Men Who Would Not Be Amban and the One Who Would: Four 
Frontline Officials and Qing Tibet Policy, 1905-1911," Modern China 34, no. 2 (2008): 
210-46; William M. Coleman, "The Uprising at Batang: Kham and its Significance in 
Chinese and Tibetan History " in Khams Pa Histories: Visions of People, Place and 
Authority ed. Lawrence Epstein (Leiden: Brill, 2002): 31-56. 
46 For example, Wu Yanqin 吴彦勤, Qing mo min guo shiqi Chuan Zang guanxi yanjiu 清
末民国时期川藏关系研究 (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 2006); Ma Jinglin 马
菁林, Qing mo Chuanbian Zang qu gaitu-guiliu kao 清末川边藏区改土归流考 
(Chengdu: Sichuan chuban jituan, 2002); Wang Chuan, "Jindai minzu guanxi shi shang 
de Xikang jian sheng ji qi lishi yiyi". 
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 The volume of research within the second concentric ring of scholarship 
identified above, that concerned the non-Han regions of the Qing and its 
successor states, has grown significantly in the last two decades. Scholars 
have long recognized that, in most cases and for most of the time, the rulers 
of the Qing Empire were highly flexible in their approach to governing the 
different regions of their dominion. In Chinese language political discourse 
there was a basic distinction between the “interior lands” (nei di 內地)—the 
Han Chinese dominated territory often called “China proper” in English—
and the “outer lands” (wai di 外地), such as Xinjiang, Tibet and Manchuria. 
For the most part, these large component parts of the empire were governed 
according to different systems, in ways that adapted to indigenous social 
and political traditions. The idea of spreading institutions and culture from 
the Han world to certain non-Han regions also existed, particularly in the 
Yongzheng 雍正 (r. 1722-1735) and Jiaqing 嘉慶 (r. 1796-1820) reigns, but 
its impact was relatively limited.47 This aspiration gained much greater and 
more widespread traction in the late Qing. James Millward demonstrates 
that there was a “fundamental shift in governing principles” during the 
nineteenth century that saw attempts to establish junxian administration and 
propagate Chinese culture throughout the outer lands.48 The campaigns in 
the Sichuan frontier were clearly connected to this broader decline of a 
flexible approach to governance. The reasons for this wider shift are not 
well understood, and though a full explanation is beyond the remit of this 
thesis, it is a problem to which I return at various points. 
Many historical accounts describe the degree of difference that existed in 
frontier territory after attempts to establish junxian government and spread 
Chinese culture as a matter of the success or failure of these attempts. Or, 
from the perspective of the indigenous people, difference becomes a matter 
of their acculturation, adaptation or resistance to Chinese ways. James 
Reardon-Anderson describes the Han colonization of Manchuria as success 
                                               
47 Yang Minghong 样明洪, "Lun Qingdai Liangshan Yi qu de tusi zhidu yu gaituguiliu 论
清代凉山彝区的土司制度与改土归流," Minzu yanjiu 民族研究, no. 2 (1997): 94. 
48 James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 138. 
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on the sinicization front. There was a “wholesale importation of an 
essentially Chinese society, economy, and culture.”49 Yunnan was clearly 
different, but the key variables were the same. Of eighteenth and nineteenth 
century Yunnan, C. Patterson Giersch writes:  
 
Cultural borrowings [from Han culture by non-Han] represented a 
process of acculturation—the creative and selective adaptation of another 
society’s practices, rather than the wholesale imitation of another’s full 
cultural repertoire.50  
 
These fine histories give good accounts of social change in Manchuria 
and Yunnan. But they do not tackle variation on the Chinese side of the 
equation. This can give the impression that non-Han societies either resisted, 
or were partially or fully overlaid by, some kind of prototypical Han 
Chinese society and political order.  
However, historians of the development of the modern Chinese state 
have frequently pointed to the considerable local variation that characterized 
Chinese state-building. 51 Given that this process followed different courses 
in different regions within China proper, what exactly were the frontiers 
acculturating or assimilating to? In part, the regional diversity of local state 
making was a product of the fragmentation of the Republican era. But this 
was certainly not the only cause. Elizabeth Remick argues that regional 
variation in this period came about not only because a weak central 
government was unable to fully control local authorities, but also because 
local state builders operated under the constraints of different local contexts 
and had different priorities and ideologies. 52  Moreover, in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, central governments themselves 
                                               
49 James Reardon-Anderson, Reluctant Pioneers: China's Expansion Northward, 1644-
1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 7. 
50 C. Patterson Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China's Yunnan 
Frontier (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 188. 
51 Elizabeth J. Remick, Building Local States: China during the Republican and post-Mao 
eras (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004); Xin Zhang, Social 
Transformation in Modern China: The State and Local Elites in Henan, 1900-1937 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
52 Remick, "The Significance of Variation in Local States: The Case of Twentieth Century 
China," Comparative Politics 34, no. 4 (2002): 405. 
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contributed to the growth of diversity by moving away from a model under 
which wealthier regions subsidized the development of poorer ones, to “a de 
facto policy of ‘picking winners’”. 53  Thus, at exactly the same time as 
Chinese administrations formulated policy aimed at eliminating frontier 
difference, central government policy began to allow for a greater separation 
of hinterlands and core regions within interior China. This leaves the 
challenge of understanding the simultaneous vanishing or acculturation of 
frontiers and the “making of hinterlands”. 
We arrive now at the largest concentric ring of historiography; that 
concerned with the modern history of state-building and settlement in 
territory that is peripheral, new or frontier-like from the perspective of 
expanding polities. Both Chinese and Western historians often cast the late 
Qing government’s efforts to transform their empire’s periphery as 
fundamentally connected to the ‘age of high imperialism’.  Two distinct 
links are made. Firstly, as Kenneth Pomeranz argues with respect to 
Manchuria, “the new political calculus forced upon China by the age of high 
imperialism made the logic of encouraging expanded settlement and rapid 
development […] irresistible.”54 Secondly, as we shall see, many historians 
have argued that the Zhao Erfeng’s efforts in Kham bear the intellectual 
influence of Western colonialism. According to such explanations, Xikang’s 
development is best understood as the result of global political 
circumstances and developments. The alternative is to see it as the result of 
developments within China, or even southwest China, that were not strongly 
related to the formation of European empires in Asia. That both global and 
local contexts were important is a true but pretty banal observation. The 
important questions are which factors in the global picture should be 
connected to which events in the Sichuan frontier, and how much causal 
power should be assigned to them. This thesis does not provide 
comprehensive answers to these questions, something that would require 
                                               
53 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Making of a Hinterland: State, Society and Economy in Inland 
China, 1853-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 275. 
54 Pomeranz, "Is There an East Asian Development Path? Long-Term Comparisons, 
Constraints, and Continuities." Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 44, 
no. 3 (2001): 337. 
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investigation of issues that are beyond its already relatively broad scope. 
Yet it does seek to offer part of the foundations from which these questions 
can be approached, together with some preliminary observations and 
hypotheses.  
 
 
Outline of thesis 
 
Chapter one gives a broad overview of the development of Han local and 
regional authority in the highlands from 1905 to 1949. This chapter deals 
with one of the key established narratives: the notion, mentioned above, that 
the attempt to colonize the highlands was essentially a failure. I find that 
there were limits to failure, and areas of significant success. Hsiao-ting 
Lin’s comment that Liu Wenhui’s “so-called provincial regime was merely 
a foreign body to the Xikang natives with limited influence over 
infrastructure” is a good description of some places.55 But James Liebold’s 
notion of Xikang as Liu’s “fiefdom” gives a more accurate impression of 
others.56 The narrative of a general collapse in the Republican period also 
needs refining in order to identify the specific times and causes of regional 
Han government weakness. As I demonstrate, the nadir for Chinese 
engagement with the highlands came not immediately after the 1911 
revolution but in the late 1910s and early 1920s. Decline in this period was 
caused primarily by the Yunnanese occupation of Sichuan and consequent 
budget cuts to Sichuanese garrisons. From the mid-1920s, there was a 
revival of Han regional and local state power in certain areas in the east of 
the highlands under the leadership of Liu Wenhui. This was due to several 
factors: Firstly, Liu’s willingness to commit resources to the region before 
1933; secondly, his having no choice about doing so after 1933; thirdly, the 
subsidies his government received from the central government; and 
fourthly, the profit he derived from opium exports from the mid-1930s. 
                                               
55 Lin, Tibet and Nationalist China's Frontier, 68. 
56 Leibold, Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism, 69. 
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Chapter two focuses on the late and hasty Qing engagement with the 
Sichuan frontier. Elliot Sperling has summarized Zhao Erfeng’s policy as 
having the aim of “sinicizing” Kham as far as possible.57 At the broadest 
level, this is correct. But there was no single Chinese society for Zhao to 
copy and transplant. In 1905, China and Chinese history furnished a myriad 
of possible models for the frontier administration. Which were the most 
important influences? Most scholars have constructed Zhao as a modernizer. 
This raises the question of whether there a tension between “sinicization” 
and modernity in the plan for a new Kham. In fact, as I will argue, Zhao 
mostly drew conservatively on early and high Qing models of frontier rule. 
He could only be called a modernizer if those precedents themselves are 
admitted as “modern” (or at least “early-modern”). A lot of new scholarship 
on the Qing has moved towards suggesting exactly that, but this still 
requires us to acknowledge Zhao’s brand of modernity was a relatively 
conservative one.   
Chapter three addresses issues relating to continuity and change in the 
Republican period. The general mission to transform the highlands and 
ensure their integration into the Chinese nation-state was clearly a goal for 
Chinese officials throughout the period under investigation. There have 
been many other areas of continuity as well. From the late Qing to the end 
of the Republican period, all regional Han authorities prioritized spending 
on Kham above Ningshu. Republican period settlement societies 
implemented the same kind of settlement systems as that adopted by Zhao 
Erfeng. Republican period authorities also promulgated similar laws 
regarding land ownership to those made by Zhao. However, it is here that 
we also encounter one of the significant differences. Despite proclaiming 
that “wasteland” belonged to the state, Republican period authorities made 
almost no attempt to actually appropriate any wasteland, and even the 
provincial government’s own agricultural enterprises rented land officially 
categorized as “wasteland” from private owners. This change was due to 
several factors, but most notably to shifts in local and provincial 
government sources of revenue. The Republican era saw other changes in 
                                               
57 Sperling, "The Chinese Venture in K'am," 20. 
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the realm of agriculture too. Liu Wenhui’s regime created an agricultural 
development strategy that was very different from Zhao Erfeng’s. It pursued 
different kinds of agriculture, through different organizational forms, toward 
slightly different goals.  
Chapters four and five address the influence of local environments and 
institutions on the development of regional Chinese authority. The regional 
and local Chinese governments in the highlands were not copies of generic 
Chinese source material. Instead, they were powerfully influenced by local 
issues and officials’ responses to them. Chapter four focuses on Kham, and 
in particular the Inner Asian institution of the wula 烏拉 corvée labour tax, 
which was levied by regional Han military units and governors in Kham. 
The problems associated with the tax came to constitute the most critical set 
of dilemmas they faced in that region. Their attempts to resolve these 
problems powerfully shaped their developmental agendas as well as their 
relations with indigenous leaders, and left a legacy that exists to this day. 
Chapter five focuses on Ningshu. Here, there was no wula tax, but other 
pre-twentieth century institutions had an effect of similar magnitude. 
Security contracting arrangements between indigenous chiefs and Chinese 
local authorities that had been forged in the nineteenth century broke down 
violently in the late 1910s with important consequences for the subsequent 
development of politics and society in the region.  
Chapter six examines Han migration to the highlands. In some places in 
the east of the highlands there was a significant increase in the Han 
population. While this was not the explosive colonization that many 
governors and Chinese intellectuals hoped for, it was in marked contrast to 
demographic stagnation in the Sichuan basin, and decline on the eastern 
fringe of the basin. One of the primary reasons for going to the western 
highlands was that real wages for unskilled labour were higher there than in 
the Sichuan basin. A nationalist ideology that promoted settlement in the 
borderlands was also important in some cases. 
Finally, chapter seven gives a broad analysis of Chinese discourse about 
transforming the Sichuan frontier, taking in the Qing and Republican 
periods, and providing some preliminary observations about the survival, 
development or disappearance of ideas from those eras in the present day. 
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This chapter examines leaders’ discussion of the kinds of changes believed 
to be necessary, as well as narratives of the past that have posited certain 
kinds of transformations as historically significant. Four kinds of transition 
have been at the heart of discourse on change in the twentieth century. 
These are: the settlement of the highlands by Han people, a moral 
reformation of government, economic modernization, and the assimilation 
of the indigenous people. Yet these things have meant quite different things 
to different people. Moreover, rarely have all four been part of the same 
vision, and there has been considerable disagreement as to whether all are 
equally necessary.  
 
 
Omissions and limits  
 
Geographically, this thesis concentrates on the territory within the Qing 
Jianchang Circuit, most of which became Xikang province. Certain places 
on the eastern edge of the Liangshan range, Mabian and Leibo, were part of 
the Jianchang circuit but not Xikang. They warrant inclusion in this project 
because they were conceptualized as being part of the Sichuan frontier, and 
because in their economy, geography, history and ethnic composition they 
were closer to Ningshu than the Sichuan basin. Today, Leibo is a part of the 
Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture that has succeeded Ningshu as the 
regional administrative unit. Arguably what is today the Aba Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture, which was neither part of Jianchang nor Xikang 
province, but shared obvious similarities with the parts of Kham that were, 
should also be included for similar reasons. However, the scope of this 
thesis is already rather large, and I have decided to leave Aba for future 
studies. In addition, this thesis does not deal much with the places within 
Jianchang/Xikang that have been dominated by Han populations since at 
least the mid-Qing, such as Xichang and Ya’an. This is because this project 
is concerned primarily with frontier-ness; that is with new settlement and 
attempts to establish new administrations. 
As a study of Han engagement with the region, it draws mostly on 
Chinese language primary source material. I have made supplementary use 
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of accounts written by Western travelers. There are probably accounts 
written in indigenous languages—Tibetan and Yi—which would have been 
useful as well. However, my limited ability in these languages, combined 
with the greater difficulties in finding and accessing any such sources has 
excluded them. It is my hope that other scholars will locate such sources and 
use them to approach the topics covered in this project from indigenous 
perspectives. 
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Chapter One: The Rise and Fall and Rise of Chinese Authority in the 
Sichuan Frontier, 1905-1949 
 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the development of Chinese state 
authority in the Sichuan frontier in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Though governors often failed to achieve their own ambitious goals, they 
nonetheless succeeded in some places in establishing a rudimentary 
administration that wielded effective power at a local level. In the last 
decade of the Qing dynasty, indigenous chiefdoms were replaced with 
county bureaucracies managed by Han officials across large parts of the 
frontier region for the first time in history. This administration did survive 
the 1911 revolution, but the Han presence in the highlands suffered greatly 
in 1917 when Sichuan was occupied by the Yunnanese army. It recovered in 
the 1920s, and Chinese frontier state authority became remarkably strong in 
a limited number of locations in the 1930s and 40s. This regional state had 
several sources of support, but the two most significant were outside 
subsidies and opium. 
 
 
Qing engagement with Chuanbian, 1895-1911. 
 
In 1895 Lu Chuanlin 鹿傳霖 (1836-1910), then governor of Sichuan, led 
military campaigns in parts of Kham and argued for them to undergo gaitu-
guiliu 改 土 歸 流 : the replacement of indigenous chiefs with the 
administration system that governed interior China. The court rejected his 
proposal. 1  In 1897 Lu was dismissed for embezzling funds and 
mismanagement of the frontier.2 As a favourite of the Empress Dowager, he 
secured an appointment as a grand councillor and continued to publish his 
                                               
1 S. A. M. Adshead, Province and Politics in Late Imperial China: Viceregal Government 
in Szechwan, 1898-1911 (London: Curzon Press, 1984), 57. 
2 Ibid., 18. 
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views on frontier governance.3 The central government gaitu-guiliu-ists did 
not limit their program for reform in the southwest to Kham. Another grand 
councillor, Yin Kechang argued for the removal of all tusi in Yunnan and 
Sichuan and the establishment of a new Jianchang Province in the upland 
territory of the two provinces.4 In April 1903, the Mongol Xiliang 錫良 
(1853-1917) was appointed as the new governor of Sichuan. Lu Chuanlin 
admired and supported Xiliang though the protégée was much more risk-
averse than the mentor. Arriving in Chengdu, Xiliang professed that he 
“knew nothing about Tibet”.5 But whatever he had heard made him doubt 
the feasibility of the colonial program for the highlands, and he made no 
immediate moves in that direction.6  
The British invasion of Tibet, which began in late 1903 and reached 
Lhasa in August 1904, played into the hands of the reformist faction. Yet in 
one of his first memorials after the British expeditionary force left Gnatong 
in Sikkim for Tibet, Xiliang continued to insist that “commerce, mining and 
agricultural settlement are not solutions to the dire situation in Tibet”. 7  
Despite such strong reservations, he was willing to initiate trial efforts in 
these areas on a very limited scale. “Plans will be made for a farm [at 
Bathang], but only using around one square li of land”.8 Moreover, he “still 
resisted pressure to undertake a military build-up in Kham.”9 Xiliang gave 
the new assistant resident in Tibet, Fengquan 鳳全 (the former chief of the 
Chengdu police), only 150 guards rather than the large garrison Fengquan 
                                               
3 Ibid., 58. 
4 Yang Minghong, "Lun Qingdai Liangshan Yi qu de tusi zhidu yu gaituguiliu, 94. 
5 Roger V. Des Forges, Hsi-liang and the Chinese National Revolution (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1973), 72. 
6 Adshead, Province and Politics in Late Imperial China, 58. 
7 Sichuan minzu yanjiu suo 四川民族研究所, ed. Qing mo Chuan Dian bianwu dang'an shi 
liao 清末川滇边务档案史料, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989, hereafter 
QCBD), 4. The British army left Gnatong for Tibet on 11 December 1903. Xiliang’s 
memorial was dated 17 December, and was a response to a proposal relayed from the 
Grand Council. It is not clear how much Xiliang knew about the intentions of the 
British—the army in Gnatong would certainly have seemed threatening, however. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Des Forges, Hsi-liang and the Chinese National Revolution, 74. 
25 
 
had requested.10 Fengquan’s “arrogant and harsh” disposition got the better 
of any caution his weak force had lent him; having thoroughly antagonised 
the Bathang locals, he was killed in April 1905.11 Revolt spread to other 
parts of Kham and also claimed the lives of two French priests and their 
converts.12 This forced Xiliang to take more decisive action. He sent his 
own protégé Zhao Erfeng together with Ma Weiqi 馬維騏 (1846-1910) and 
a force of either 2,000 or 4,000 men (sources differ) to quell the rebellion.13  
Thus the significance of the British invasion is a more open question than 
many scholars have assumed.14 The foreign imperialist threat undoubtedly 
strengthened the hand of the gaitu-guiliu-ists. But that faction had existed 
before the British arrived. Furthermore, the revolts in which Fengquan and 
                                               
10 Ibid. 
11 Wang Xiuyu gives the most detailed analysis of the events that led to Feng’s killing: 
Wang Xiuyu, "China's Last Imperial Frontier," 119-30. 
12 Des Forges, Hsi-liang and the Chinese National Revolution, 76. 
13 The figure of 2,000 is given by Des Forges; Ibid., 78.; William Coleman says 4,000; 
William M. Coleman, "The Uprising at Batang: Kham and its Significance in Chinese and 
Tibetan History " in Khams Pa Histories: Visions of People, Place and Authority ed. 
Lawrence Epstein (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 44. Des Forges’s figure may by just troops led by 
Zhao Erfeng, i.e. not including troops commanded by Ma Weiqi or native troops supplied 
by the Mingzheng tusi (from Dartsedo).  According to Wang Xiuyu, Zhao led a force of 
2,500 soldiers, and Ma Weiqi had also led a force of an equivalent size. Some of Ma’s 
soldiers might have been assigned to Zhao, however. Wang Xiuyu, "China's Last Imperial 
Frontier", 77. 
14 Melvyn Goldstein, for example, writes: “whatever the tenuous nature of Tibet-Chinese 
relations before the twentieth century, three events in the first eleven years of this century 
dramatically altered the status quo: (1) the growth of British interest and relations with 
Tibet, culminating in the successful invasion of Tibet and Lhasa […] (2) the consequent 
efforts of the Chinese to reestablish control over Tibet, culminating in the military 
occupation of Lhasa in early 1910 by the Chinese general Chung Yin; and (3) the Chinese 
overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 and the mutiny of Chinese troops in Tibet.” 
Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: the Demise of the Lamaist 
State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 44-45. Wang Xiuyu writes: “The 
new polices show an activation of colonialist ideas in Qing statecraft thought, motivated 
by countering British imperialism, by increasing Qing advantages in administration, 
revenue, military and cultural attraction.” Wang Xiuyu, "China's Last Imperial Frontier", 
7. Chinese language scholarship tends to emphasize the importance of both the general 
threat of foreign imperialism to all China, and the specific threat of British imperialism to 
Tibet. The former is said to have produced the reform movements of which new policies 
toward the frontiers were a part, while the later was the proximate cause of the post 1905 
campaigns. See for example Wu Yanqin 吴彦勤, Qing mo min guo shiqi Chuan Zang 
guanxi yanjiu 清末民国时期川藏关系研究 (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe, 
2006). Li Maoyu 李茂郁, "Lun Zhao Erfeng 论赵尔丰," Shehui kexue yanjiu 社会科学
研究, no. 4 (2002); Ma Jinglin 马菁林, ""Gai tu gui liu" de hongguan lishi fenxi “改土归
流”的宏观历史分析," Xizang yanjiu 西藏研究, no. 3 (2001): 82-87.  
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the foreigners were killed appear to have been more important in pushing 
Xiliang towards the hawks than the British expedition. Moreover, no case 
can be made that the similar course of events in Ningyuan (see below) was 
precipitated by the threat of foreign colonization. 
Having put down the rebellion, Zhao was appointed to the new position 
of Warden of the Sichuan and Yunnan Marches created in August 1906. 
Even at this stage, Xiliang sought to “limit [the post’s] effectiveness as 
regards both territorial scope and agenda,” envisaging it as akin to that of 
the amban in Lhasa.15 In 1907, however, Xiliang was transferred to Yunnan, 
and Zhao Erfeng’s brother Erxun 趙爾巽  (1844-1927) became the new 
governor of Sichuan. This gave Zhao Erfeng space to redefine his role in the 
frontier and set a new, much more radical agenda. Gaitu-guiliu was applied 
throughout the part of Kham that Qing administrative geography had 
apportioned to Yazhou Prefecture in 1725. 16  In its aftermath, Zhao 
implemented a range of development policies; their focus and the ideology 
behind them is the subject of chapter two. 
Aside from the absence of a foreign threat, the action in Ningyuan in the 
first decade of the twentieth century unfolded in similar manner. In the 
eighteenth century, there had been explosive Han settlement in areas of 
Ningyuan, particularly the Anning river valley.17 Probably because of this, 
                                               
15 Adshead, Province and Politics in Late Imperial China, 72-73. 
16 The British Consul Eric Teichman stated that by the end of the Qing dynasty, there was 
“not a Tibetan ruler left in eastern Tibet”. Eric Teichman, Travels of a Consular Officer in 
Eastern Tibet; together with a History of the Relations between China, Tibet and India 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 33. This was not, strictly speaking, true, 
because there were still Tibetan rulers in places that had not been nominally part of 
Yazhou Prefecture, such as most of the modern day Aba Tibetan Autonomous Region, 
and also the Muli region of Ningyuan Prefecture. 
17 In 1711 Ningyuan Prefecture’s total population was recorded at 12,500 people. In 1820 it 
was recorded as 1,266,273. Some of this increase no doubt came from within the Yi 
population, but Han migration was responsible for most of it Liu Zhenggang 刘正刚 and 
Tang Weihua 唐伟华, "Qing dai yimin yu Han Yi jiaoliu tantao 清代移民与汉彝交流探
讨," Guizhou minzu yanjiu 贵州民族研究 22, no. 90 (2002): 147. See also Lin Chengxi 
林成西, "Yimin yu Qing dai Sichuan minzu diyu jingji 移民与清代四川民族区域经济," 
Xinan minzu daxue xue bao (renwen sheke ban) 西南民族大学学报（人文社科版) 11, 
no. 183 (2006); Zhongguo shaoshu minzu shehui lishi diaocha ziliao congkan' xiuding 
bianji weiyuanhui 《中国少数民族社会历史调查资料丛刊》修订编辑委员会, ed. 
Sichuan sheng Liangshan Yizu shehui lishi diaocha (zonghe baogao) 四川省凉山彝族社
会历史调查（综合报告） (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2009, hereafter SYSD), 83. 
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gaitu-guiliu had been on the central government agenda at times before the 
twentieth century, notably during the reigns of the Yongzheng (r. 1722-1735) 
and Jiaqing (r. 1796-1820) emperors.18 However, due to several factors, 
including stiff indigenous resistance and a concern that removing tusi could 
make the Yi even less governable, it was rarely pursued widely or 
consistently (though under Yongzheng’s general Ortai, it was certainly 
pursued ruthlessly). 19  At the turn of the twentieth century gaitu-guiliu 
returned more forcefully to officials’ attention. Nevertheless, as with Kham, 
there were no moves to overthrow the chiefs until the outbreak of conflict 
on the ground. The British adventurer John Brooke was killed in 1909 by Yi 
in a dispute over pay, after which Zhao Erxun dispatched an expedition 
against the Yi deemed responsible.20 In most histories, this campaign has 
been interpreted as a purely reactive move. 21  One present-day historian 
argues that the Boxer Protocol left Zhao Erxun with no option but to 
undertake an aggressive response to the killing.22 However, given that many 
officials had been in favour of thorough reform before then, and that Zhao 
Erxun had allowed his brother to carry out such a program in Kham, another 
interpretation would be that Brooke’s death merely provided an appropriate 
justification for action that Erxun wanted to undertake anyway. The Boxer 
Protocol may still have been important, but perhaps more as a rhetorical 
recourse for the gaitu-guiliu-ists in their arguments with conservatives who 
felt that costly intervention was unjustified.  
                                               
18 See Yingcong Dai, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 101-03. 
19 Yang Minghong, "Lun Qingdai Liangshan Yi qu de tusi zhidu yu gaituguiliu," 90-92. For 
Ortai’s campaigns, see Dai, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet, 101-103. 
20 The death of Brooke has been mentioned by many sources and many of them are very 
unreliable and often get even Brooke’s name wrong. The best account was written by his 
travelling companion, based (according to the writer) on the report of someone who was 
with Brooke when he died. W.N. Fergusson, Adventure, Sport and Travel on the Tibetan 
Steppes (London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1911), 293-314. 
21 Chang Longqing 常隆慶, Lei Ma E Ping diaocha ji 雷馬峨屏調查記 (Chongqing: 
Zhongguo xi bu ke xue yuan, 1935), 13; Yang Minghong, "Lun Qingdai Liangshan Yi qu 
de tusi zhidu yu gaituguiliu," 94. 
22 Yang Minghong, "Lun Qingdai Liangshan Yi qu de tusi zhidu yu gaituguiliu," 94. 
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It is also curious that the Boxer Protocol has been mentioned by the 
historians who have written about Liangshan, but not by those who have 
written about Kham. If the death of Brooke was an important factor in the 
provincial government’s decision to use military force in Ningyuan, then 
surely the killing of the French missionaries in Kham was an equally 
significant cause of the unleashing of Zhao’s campaign in that region. 
Alternatively, if the killing of the latter was unimportant, there is no reason 
to believe that Brooke’s death was. In any case, Zhao Erxun’s plan for 
Liangshan went well beyond punishing the Yi held responsible for Brooke’s 
death and extracting from them any indemnity that the British might 
demand. The plan for the reconstruction of Ningyuan was very similar to 
that drawn up for Kham.  
When it came to prioritizing where exactly efforts to implement such 
plans should be concentrated first, and at what stage they should be spread 
elsewhere, there was a certain amount of uncertainty. Before Zhao’s arrival 
there were some significant development initiatives in Ningyuan. In 1899, 
the Qing government paid a local tusi 3,000 taels for rights to open a mine 
at Wali 瓦里.23 In 1903, the director of the Sichuan Minerals Bureau, Song 
Yuren 宋育仁  (1857-1931), employed foreign geologists to survey the 
region. 24  There were also government efforts to increase Han Chinese 
settlement to Ningyuan. 25 However, Zhao Erfeng consciously prioritized 
Kham above not only Tibet, but also Ningyuan. “When the Three Frontiers 
[san bian 三邊; Tibet, Kham and the Yunnanese highlands] have been 
pacified, then Ningyuan can be brought into the fold and county 
administration established there too. The pacification of Kham is the first 
step, however.”26 
                                               
23 Ren Xinjian 任新建, "Jindai Sichuan Zang qu de huangjin kaifa 近代四川藏区的黄金开
发," in Sichuan Zangxue lunwen ji 四川藏学论文集, ed. Luo Runcang 罗润苍 and Ren 
Xinjian (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 1993), 45. 
24 Ibid., 38. 
25 See for example Chongqing Zhongguo yinhang diaocha zuzhi重慶中國銀行調查組織 
(hereafter, ZYDZ), "Leibo diaocha 雷波調查," Chuanbian jikan 川邊季刊 1, no. 4 
(1935): 109-10. 
26 Quoted in Ibid., 94.  
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Ningyuan was not totally ignored under the watch of the Zhao brothers. 
The campaigns against the Yi held responsible for Brooke’s death 
concluded with the implementation of gaitu-guiliu in the Zhaojue 昭覺 area 
and the establishment of Zhaojue County. The same year, work began on 
the construction of a road across the Liangshan mountains to connect Leibo 
and Xichang.27 Zhao Erxun ordered the construction of a fortress at Zhaojue 
at a cost of more than 20,500 taels. 28  The next year there were more 
campaigns in the south of Ningyuan, accompanied by more gaitu-guiliu and 
a resolution from Zhao Erxun to “abolish Yi slavery,” and thoroughly 
reform Yi society.29 
Despite such measures, during Zhao Erfeng’s time in the frontier, 
military campaigning and state supported development programs were 
concentrated more heavily in Kham than Ningshu. There has been a fairly 
widespread view that this was a response to the situation in Tibet. Li Maoyu, 
for example writes:  
 
The intensifying encroachment of Britain and Russia upon Tibet created 
an extremely precarious situation there. In order to reinforce Tibet, stave 
off the imminent danger and strengthen ties between Tibet and Sichuan, 
the Qing government had to take control of the Tibetan territory in the 
Sichuan frontier and implement gaitu-guiliu and direct administration of 
the region.30 
 
Recently, however, Daphon David Ho has agreed with S.A.M. Adshead’s 
conclusion that for Zhao “Xikang was an end in itself, not simply a means to 
                                               
27 Yang Minghong, "Lun Qingdai Liangshan Yi qu de tusi zhidu yu gaituguiliu," 94; Zeng 
Zhaolun 曾昭掄, Da Liang Shan Yi qu kao cha ji 大涼山夷區考察記 (Shanghai: Qiu 
zhen she, 1947), 72-73. 
28 Chang Longqing, Lei Ma E Ping diaocha ji, 14. 
29 Yang Minghong, "Lun Qingdai Liangshan Yi qu de tusi zhidu yu gaituguiliu," 94. 
30 Li Maoyu 李茂郁, "Shi lun Qing mo Chuan bian gaitu guiliu 试论清末川边改土归流," 
Xizang yanjiu 西藏研究, no. 2 (1984): 5. The view that Kham is a stepping stone to Tibet 
is certainly evident in later eras, as in Jiang Zemin’s aphorism was “A stable Tibet 
requires a peaceful Kham” (wen Zang bi xian zhi Kang 稳藏必先治康). Wang Huailin 王
怀林, "Guanyu "wen Zang bi xian an Kang" de jingjixue sikao 关于“稳藏必先安康”的
经济学思考" in Kang Zang yanjiu xin silu: wenhua, lishi yu jingji fazhan 康藏研究新思
路：文化历史与经济发展, ed. Luobu Jiangcun 罗布江村 and Zhao Xinyu 赵心愚 
(Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2008). 
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Tibet, and there was the danger that the two policies, Xikang and Tibet, 
might become rivals rather than complements.”31 Their argument is not that 
the Zhao brothers did not wish to see Tibet integrated more tightly into the 
Chinese empire. Rather, the point is that not everything in the reformist 
agenda for the southwest was geared towards securing control over Tibet. It 
is a view I agree with, and it fits well with the doubt outlined above as 
regards how much the British invasion of Tibet was really the sole or most 
important catalyst for the campaigns in Kham. The reasons for the Kham-
centric approach are complex, and belie the fact that more might have been 
accomplished in Ningyuan. We shall return to this question at various points 
in later chapters.  
In April 1911, Zhao Erfeng was promoted to the post of governor of 
Sichuan. Adshead suggests that he did not want the job, and there were good 
reasons to avoid it. 32  The Qing government’s decision to nationalize 
railways, announced in May, incited widespread fury from stockholders, 
who, in Sichuan’s case, included many people of average means who had 
been obliged to buy railway shares.33 The government offered compensation 
at market rates, but unfortunately the value of the shares had just crashed 
due to mismanagement and a fall in the Shanghai stock market. Agitation by 
the newly formed Railway Protection League (baolu tongzhi hui 保路同志
會) made Sichuan increasingly ungovernable. Zhao Erfeng succeeded in 
clearing militia units organized by the Railway Protection League out of 
Chengdu in September, but the fighting escalated in other parts of Sichuan. 
He was executed by a mob in December 1911. 
                                               
31 Adshead, Province and Politics in Late Imperial China, 83; Ho, "The Men Who Would 
Not Be Amban and the One Who Would,” 224. 
32 Adshead, Province and Politics in Late Imperial China, 98. 
33 Lei Yi 雷颐, "Qing mo "min you" yu "min ying" de ji dou 清末“民有”与“民营”的激斗
," Nanfang Zhoumo 南方周末, 14-06 2007. Adshead slightly mischaracterizes the 
railways crisis. Stockholders in Sichuan were a broader community than he suggests, and 
he does not mention that in some cases they had been obliged to buy stock as a kind of 
tax. The government was not really being “not unreasonable from a modern perspective” 
(Adshead, 1984, p.99). There is no reason to suspect that the population of a 
contemporary Western society in the same position as the Sichuanese in 1911 would be 
less aggravated. Therefore we cannot relate the citizens’ reactions to uniquely Chinese 
ideas about the state’s duty to care for the welfare of the population.  
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The Republican era 
 
There is a strongly entrenched narrative that says that in the early 
Republican period, the Chinese state in the Sichuan frontier region more or 
less collapsed. Sichuanese military leaders who held offices connected with 
the frontier were frequently accused of ignoring the region and 
concentrating on the Sichuan basin where the spoils of victory were greater. 
David Dahpon Ho introduces the Republican period with quotations from 
the missionary Flora Shelton that give the impression of almost unmitigated 
chaos: “‘cruelty was matched with cruelty’, and slicing, quartering, and 
mutilations were rampant on both sides. ‘Heads fell every day, and so many 
bodies lay in the streets of Batang that at times the dogs feasted’.”34 
Many reports suggest that things in Liangshan were even worse from the 
Chinese perspective. A 1935 article on eastern Liangshan in Sichuan 
Frontier Quarterly (Chuanbian ji kan 川邊季刊) reported that: 
 
In the Qing period the government paid great attention to border defense, 
and encouraged people to migrate to and cultivate [frontier territory in 
Liangshan]. All possible aid and support was provided for settlers. The 
Yi were afraid of the Han government's authority and did not dare to be 
unreasonable (wang shi 妄事 ) or disturb the Han. Thus the arriving 
farmers were extremely eager (yongyue 踴躍 ), cultivation advanced 
quickly, and in turn the places where migrants settled became prosperous. 
However, after the old regime disintegrated (zhenggang jiezu 政綱解組), 
the authority of the government lay in ruins […] The Yi seized the 
opportunity to come out of their nests, causing mayhem on an immense 
scale; trespassing, burning, killing and plundering. […] Han people in the 
frontiers were killed or captured, or fled. High buildings were reduced to 
rubble and fertile fields reverted to wastelands full of weeds.35  
 
This narrative needs qualifying somewhat. After 1911, Chinese power in 
central Tibet certainly did collapse. The following year, Yin Changheng尹
昌衡 (1884-1953), the first governor of Sichuan after the revolution, led an 
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“ill-disciplined” Sichuanese army into the highlands and succeeded in re-
establishing Chinese control of Chamdo.36   
As Eric Teichman, the British consol who was dispatched to the region in 
1918 to act as a middleman in negotiations between the Tibetan and Chinese 
militaries, commented: “the situation began to stabilize itself” in 1914.37 
Contrary to the impression given in many narratives, Chinese county 
administrations in the frontier territory appear to have functioned reasonably 
well in some places in the eastern highlands at this time. Zhu Zengyun 朱增
鋆, magistrate of Daofu in 1914 wrote “The turmoil of the borderlands has 
already calmed down.” 38 He also stated that in his county “the Han are few 
and the barbarians (yi 夷) many; fortunately they are, by custom, honest and 
simple folk, and it is not difficult to govern them (bu nan zhi 不難治).”39 
When some families ran away from the corvée labour duties to the county 
government, Zhu was able to use indigenous networks of authority to get 
them to return.40 Zhu also described adjudicating in disputes between locals. 
Here, at least, Chinese authority was certainly not “in ruins”.  
At this time, the Sichuan Frontier Finance Department (Chuanbian 
caizheng ting 川邊財政廳) maintained updated tax registers of gold miners 
and enforced a supervisory system that involved “mining licenses” (pai 牌) 
and the organization of miners into “tents” (peng 棚), with “tent heads” 
responsible for tax payments.41 The term “escaped” (toutao 偷逃) appears 
on many registers next to the names of certain miners, indicating that they 
had decamped without paying tax. But the numbers of such “escapees” was 
under ten percent of the total, and local magistrates' ability to keep it so low 
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was a considerable achievement. Nor was such control limited to Han 
miners; indigenous “tents” and “tent heads” are also mentioned in tax 
registers and official communications, even in 1918, when as we shall see 
below, Han state institutions began to weaken.42  This ability to tax miners 
rested on control of at least a part of the indigenous population because, as 
we shall see in chapter four, tax collectors used the corvée labour that 
livestock owning households provided.43 The indigenes paid other forms of 
tax to Han authorities as well. In 1917, the highland regional government 
raised from Kham 20,944 shi 石 of grain (in old Sichuan shi, which were 
twice the size of the most common shi in Eastern China), and 136,573 
Tibetan yuan in livestock tax.44 These taxes came from places throughout 
out Kham, including remote Derge and Sershul, as did the petitions from 
village heads describing the difficulties households faced meeting grain tax 
and corvée labour burdens.45 Again, this was not an environment in which 
Han regional state authority had collapsed.   
It was in 1918 that the situation really deteriorated from the Chinese 
point of view. In that year, a skirmish over rights to gather fodder from a 
mountainside in Chamdo boiled over into a major conflict between the 
Lhasa government’s Tibetan army and the Chinese forces in Kham. The 
Tibetan army overran Chamdo, Draya, Markam, Gonjo and parts of Bathang 
and by summer it was approaching Kanze.46 At this point the two sides 
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agreed to a ceasefire, with the provisional boundary being set along roughly 
the same border that the Qing government established in the eighteenth 
century between Lhasa controlled-Tibet and the Kham tusi domains that 
were nominally within Sichuan.  
Severe and widespread violence also erupted in Liangshan in late 1917 
and 1918. Alan Wininngton wrote: “Matters got much worse from 1918 
onwards when the scale and frequency of raid-and counter-raid rapidly 
increased.”47 A 1950s survey of the Liangshan region reported that in 1919 
“Han were massacred and many forced to leave” parts of eastern 
Liangshan.48 Ethnic cleansing appears to have been particularly severe in 
the Mabian-Pingshan-Leibo area.49 According to the figures in a Sichuan 
Frontier Quarterly article, Leibo County had been inhabited by 15,256 Han 
households in 1912.50 This increased slightly to 16,837 in 1916, but from 
1918 there was a dramatic fall. Figures show the county losing over fifty 
percent of its Han households between 1918 and 1920, and the Han 
population had halved again by 1930. After 1930 it stabilized and began to 
rise slightly. A chronology of conflict in Mabian indicated that the most 
serious violence occurred in 1917, 1925 and 1931, with the most significant 
population decrease apparently occurring in 1917. 51   Elsewhere in 
Liangshan in 1917, Yi captured the fortress that Zhao Erxun had built at 
Zhaojue.52  In Xichang, “from 1917 the Yi bandits came out of their lairs 
and cases of armed robbery increased.”53 The large mine at Maha, near 
                                                                                                                       
the Tibetans. Flora Beal Shelton, Shelton of Tibet (New York: George H. Doran 
Company, 1923), 203. 
47 Alan Winnington, The Slaves of the Cool Mountains (London: Serif, 2008 [1959]), 17. 
48 SYSD, 83. 
49 ZYDZ, "Diaocha ziliao," Chuanbian jikan 1, no. 1 (1935): 176; Ibid., "Diaocha ziliao," 
Chuanbian jikan 1, no.2 (1935): 137. 
50 Ibid., "Leibo diaocha," 105-09. 
51 Ibid., "Mabian diaocha 馬邊調查," Chuanbian jikan 1, no. 2 (1935): 26-27, 36. 
52 Zeng Zhaolun, Da Liang Shan Yi qu kao cha ji, 43. 
53 Zheng Shaocheng 郑少成 and Yang Zhaoji 楊肇基, "Xichang xian zhi 西昌縣志 
[1941]," in Zhongguo Xizang ji Gan Qing Chuan Dian Zang qu fang zhi huibian 中國西
藏及甘青川滇藏區方志匯編, Vol 40, ed. Zhang Yuxin 张羽新 (Beijing: Xueyuan 
chubanshe, 2003), 422. 
35 
 
Mianning, was abandoned in 1917 due to attacks by “Yi bandits”. 54  
However, although the violence was widespread, it did not occur 
everywhere where Yi and Han came into contact. One observer wrote that 
since the start of the Republican period Yi in Hanyuan “became more 
passive and Han-ized (Han hua 漢化).”55  
The weakening of county level authority from 1917 also occurred in the 
highlands to the east of the Sichuan basin. Indeed, fighting there might have 
been somewhat worse than in Kham and Ningshu. In some districts of the 
eastern highlands depopulation, usually attributed to rampant banditry, was 
described as “tremendous”.56 
Thus, in all the territory on the borders of the Sichuan basin, the most 
serious declines in population and local state authority occurred not in 1912, 
but in a period of intense conflict that began in 1917 or 1918 and lasted, 
depending on the location, between a few years and about a decade. This 
upsurge in violence occurred at exactly the same time as the Sichuanese 
military was suffering the effects of the occupation of Sichuan by the 
Yunnan army. In December 1915 the National Protection Army (hu guo jun 
護國軍 ), formed largely of Cai E’s 蔡鍔  (1882-1916) Yunnan army, 
entered Sichuan and defeated forces loyal to the would be new emperor 
Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 (1859-1916). Following this, the chief of the general 
staff of the National Protection Army, Luo Peijin 羅佩金  (1878-1922) 
assumed the post of military governor of Sichuan. Luo worked assiduously 
to replace officials in the Sichuan government with Yunnanese loyal to 
himself. 57 Furthermore, Luo sought to concentrate Sichuanese sources of 
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revenue, most notably the salt tax, under the control of his own office.58 Re-
branded as the National Army, Luo’s forces—essentially still the Yunnan 
army, and often referred to as such—received plentiful funding amounting 
to 1.2 million yuan per month. 59 At the same time, funding to Sichuanese 
military units was cut drastically. Because of this, Sichuanese military units, 
including the Sichuan Frontier Defence Force owed their staff and soldiers a 
total of more than two million yuan by April 1917.60 The huge budget cuts 
suffered by the Sichuanese military units stationed in the frontier obviously 
weakened their capacity to defend against indigenous rebels and deal with 
bandits. The cuts contributed to the conflict in other ways as well, as we 
shall see in chapter five.   
Weakened though they were, in October 1920 the Sichuanese military 
units managed to unite and drive the Yunnanese army out of the province. 
Scholars give mixed reports of Sichuanese civilians' feelings about the 
occupiers. According to Donald Sutton, for the local population in some 
places “the Yunnan army yoke often seemed preferable to that of the corrupt 
and disorderly Sichuan divisions.”61 Yi Bin, on the other hand argues that 
“the murder, pillage and rape committed by the Yunnan army aroused the 
widespread hatred of the Sichuanese population”.62 Yi cites a commander in 
the Yunnan army who reported to a superior: “today the hostility of the 
Sichuanese is such that even the women and children conspire against us.”63  
Following the Sichuan militarists’ recovery of the province, state power 
in parts of the frontier region increased markedly. In 1927, Liu Wenhui 
became the dominant Chinese authority in the region. At least some of the 
Chinese settlers in Kham were no more impressed with Liu than Teichman 
had been with earlier governors. In 1929 a group of settlers petitioned the 
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new Guomindang government in Nanjing to intervene and provide security. 
They claimed that:  
 
[The Tibetans] have already taken Bathang and Kanze. The armies in 
those counties repeatedly requested aid from the Sichuan Army, but the 
Chairman of that Province [Liu Wenhui] replied that the Sichuan 
situation was critical, and therefore no troops could be spared. The 
situation in the whole of Xikang is extremely perilous.64 
   
In 1939, Liu issued a mea culpa for past inattention to the region. 65 
However, the evidence suggests that Liu Wenhui was reasonably committed 
to establishing Chinese state power in the region, and reasonably successful 
at doing so in some places. I have not encountered any other records of 
major Tibetan advances in 1929, so it is possible that only certain areas of 
Bathang and Kanze counties had been attacked by Tibetans. Indeed, 
according to Ren Naiqiang, between 1928 and 1930, Liu’s forces—the 
“Twenty Fourth Revolutionary Army” in Guomindang nomenclature—
restored Chinese county administrations in Yanjing 鹽井, Daocheng 稻城 
and Derong 得榮—all places that were more remote (from the Chinese 
point of view) than Bathang and Kanze.66  
Furthermore, at least in some locations, Liu’s frontier administration did 
function effectively at a local level, and was able to depose established 
power holders. Ren Naiqiang described a prominent frontier community 
leader in Dawu, who was known as “Barbarian King Ding” (Ding Manwang 
丁蠻王).67 A Qing period settler, Ding had constructed a personal fortress in 
Daofu that had allowed him to hold out against a 1911 lama-led uprising, a 
feat that earned him enough authority for him to be made chief of the local 
militia (mintuan 民團) when a Han army returned. Ding subverted the 
militia to his own ends, by exempting its members from corvée duties and 
charging a fee to join. Because of this he became very rich and possessed of 
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a large amount of authority in the local community. Ren notes that he was 
asked to adjudicate disputes among the indigenous people, who saw him as 
a tusi. 68 In 1928, Ding was the target of two lawsuits, one from a Han 
merchant and the other from locals who had learned that it was Han 
government policy to pay for wula corvée labour. Liu’s Xikang Special 
Administration Committee (Xikang tequ zhengwu weiyuanhui 西康特區政
務委員會) upheld the complaints, and forced Ding out of his position. As 
this example shows, the formal county administration was able to remove 
local elites and power holders when it wanted to, which was certainly not 
the case in many parts of China.69  
In 1930, the Beri-Targye (Ch. Baili 白利-Dajin 大金) conflict broke out 
after the tusi of Beri seized the estates of an incarnate lama in his territory, 
forcing the lama to flee to the Targye monastery.70 The forces of Lhasa and 
Liu Wenhui joined in on opposite sides and the fighting escalated into a war 
in which the Lhasa army made quick gains. With the help of the Qinghai 
military leader Ma Bufang 馬步芳  (1903-1975), Liu embarked on a 
vigorous defense of his position in the region and counter-attack that saw 
the Lhasa army beaten back to the Yangtze by summer 1932. According to 
James Leibold, Liu hoped to conquer Lhasa, and it was only the onset of the 
war between Liu and his relative Liu Xiang that put an end to this hope.71 In 
1932, there were at least 8,000 Twenty Fourth Army troops in the region.72 
This was only a tiny fraction of the half a million or so men that Liu Wenhui 
commanded at the height of his power.73 But it was at least double the size 
of the armies that the Qing sent into Kham in 1905. On the other side, Ren 
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Naiqiang reported that there were about 10,000 Tibetan fighters at the Dajin 
monastery.74 However, more than half of these were locally raised militia. 
Liu Wenhui’s commitment of 8,000 soldiers to the Kham campaign was no 
token deployment. Due to logistical difficulties (which we shall examine in 
chapter four) it was probably about the largest army that he could possibly 
have fielded in the region without conscripting locals.75 Chinese scholars 
have often portrayed Chinese governors as the passive parties in Sino-
Tibetan wars started by intransigent Tibetan aggressors. But in this case, 
Wang Haibing has recently argued that neither the Lhasa government nor its 
military, nor the Targye monastery wanted a war with Liu; a fact that even 
Liu’s own magistrates recognized.76 It would be wholly inaccurate to say 
that Liu Wenhui ignored Kham, did not seek to expand his authority there, 
or did not successfully do so.  
In 1933, Liu was attacked by his relative Liu Xiang and driven out of the 
Sichuan basin. After his retreat, the rump of his army was stationed entirely 
in the region that would become Xikang. It was a much smaller force than it 
had been, although there is some uncertainty about just how small. Sun 
Shuyun, Cai Yuan and Ni Liangduan all say 20,000 men.77 Xiao Bo and Ma 
Xuanwei do not give a figure, but state that the post-1933 Twenty Fourth 
Army was reorganized into 12 regiments (tuan 團), which in the modern 
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Chinese military tradition typically contain about 1,000 men, though 
numbers in any specific case could be higher or lower.78 In 1948, A. Doak 
Barnett wrote that it officially contained 10,000 men, but that “the actual 
number may be much higher.”79 Thus it is safe to assume that the number of 
soldiers in the Twenty Fourth Army after 1933 was somewhere between ten 
and twenty thousand, although it is difficult to narrow down the figure much 
further. Liu later remarked that the loss of the vast majority of his soldiers—
mostly due to defection rather than death—constituted the “the greatest 
grievance of my life.”80 However, even our minimum of 10,000 was still a 
substantial force in the highlands. In 1936, the Lhasa government’s standing 
army only contained 5,000 men, plus another 5,000 in irregular militias.81  
Indeed, the number of soldiers per capita in the regions where the Twenty 
Fourth Army was deployed (eastern Kham, Yashu and parts of Ningshu) 
was probably as high as the number of soldiers per capita in northern 
Henan.82 In the latter region, “a reign of terror” unleashed by the army of 
Feng Yuxiang 馮玉祥  (1882-1948)—the “Christian General”—in 1927 
“caused any local challenge to the government’s authority to vanish on 
sight.”83 Of course, the topographical difficulties in Liu’s Xikang dominion 
were much greater, but it was undeniably a highly militarized region. Nor 
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were Liu’s forces crippled or incapacitated by their defeat at the hands of his 
relative—or if they had been they quickly recovered. Barnett—who had 
travelled widely in China—thought that they compared favourably to armed 
forces in some other parts of the country. He noted that Liu’s troops were 
well armed and had plenty of ammunition. “Each squad of sixteen men had 
fourteen rifles and an automatic weapon; every company has two mortars; 
every brigade has a special unit of artillery that includes both mortars and 
guns; and the division had a battalion of artillery.”84  
To a significant extent, military strength did translate into state authority 
in the regions in which it was deployed. In Ningshu, some accounts indicate 
that Liu’s regime was enormously strong in relation to local elites and 
militias in certain locations. The 1939 Sichuan-Xikang Survey Report 
reported that: 
 
In the past many private individuals owned guns, but the government 
took them away. A long time has passed and they still have not been 
returned, so in effect their weapons have been confiscated. Now the 
people have no power to buy more, and even if they did, they are afraid 
that they would be confiscated again. Thus local self defence urgently 
needs to be revived.85 
 
Elsewhere the report noted that:  
 
The custom here has been to prohibit people from owning guns. When 
the people suffered the ravages [of bandits and Yi], some of them bought 
guns to defend themselves, but they were arrested by the army and 
severely punished. […] People told the same story everywhere we visited 
[in Ningshu].86 
 
The report was critical of the government’s application of power in this 
case. However, other evidence indicates that the renewed strength of the 
state in Ningshu did bring greater security to Han settlements there. A 1936 
report noted that Xichang had been “calm since the arrival of Commander 
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Deng Xiuting 鄧秀廷” in the 1920s, a sentiment that was echoed in post-
war reports from the county.87 By the end of the 1930s, there was a general 
sense that peace had broken out in even the areas that had been most 
affected by what Han observers called the “Yi Scourge” of the late 1910s (a 
term examined in chapter five). In 1939 Liu Wenhui referred to the “Yi 
violence” (yi luan 夷亂) as something that had happened in the past.88 His 
assertion was generally supported by reports of the security situation in 
various parts of Ningshu compiled for Zhang Qun (張羣 ,1889-1990) in the 
same year. In seven of the 13 listed locations in Xichang, Yuesui and 
Yanyuan, banditry was described as either only a minor problem or not a 
problem at all, and in only three locations was it “serious” or “frequent”.89  
Reports from Mianning mentioned the “Red bandits” passage through the 
region years earlier, but not Yi bandits. The same series of reports 
summarized the numbers of Yi clans classified as “submitted” (toucheng 投
誠) and “not submitted” (wei toucheng 未投誠) in different counties, which 
are shown in table one below. 
The label “submitted” need not have meant that the Yi group in question 
obeyed the local Han magistrates in all matters; but equally “not submitted” 
did not necessarily mean that the group was in active rebellion. Records 
from the 1940 session of the Xikang Provincial Assembly stated that the 
“the Yi Scourge has gradually died down (mi ping 敉平) in recent years.”90 
In a 1947 account, Zeng Zhaolun reported that Xichang’s city defences were 
“unnecessary.” 91 By that time, the gaol for Yi in Xichang held only 10 
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prisoners; the others having been released. 92  Zeng wrote: “Since its 
establishment, the Xichang [Guomindang] Field Headquarters has made 
great efforts to maintain order and improve commerce. Roads that were seen 
as dangerous in the past are now open and unobstructed.”93  
 
County  Number of “submitted” 
Yi clans (zhi 支) 
Number of “not 
submitted” Yi clans 
Yuesui 28 (48)94   36 
Mianning 65   13 
Xichang 48 105 
Huili   0   12 
Zhaojue   2   57 
Ningnan   0   33 
Yanyuan 67     0 
Yanbian 15     9 
Table one: “Submitted” and “not submitted” Yi clans in Ningshu in 1939. 
Source: "Ningshu diaocha baogao huibian."95 
 
Some amount of Guomindang puffery probably lay behind that claim, but 
discussion of the difficulties facing the region had changed by the second 
half of the 1930s. A writer who gave a list of problems holding back private 
enterprise in Ningshu in the post war period did not even mention conflict or 
lawlessness.96 Accordingly, framings of the “Yi problem” (Yi wu wenti 夷務
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96 Cheng Yuandeng 程源澄, "Ningshu minying shiye xianzhuang 甯屬民營事業現狀," in 
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問題) shifted. From the 1930s, writers began to emphasise that, in the words 
of Wu Luzhong 吳魯仲, “the Yi problem is not just a simple law and order 
issue.”97 For Wu, the core “problem” was the existence of unassimilated Yi 
territories (Yi qu 夷區), rather than security per se. Indeed, when it came to 
security, he pointed out that “the Yi people feel that the Han regions and 
people are a danger to their existence. From their point of view, the ‘Yi 
problem’ is really the ‘Han problem’ (Han wu wenti 漢務問題).”98 In a 
1939 article, Liu Wenhui wrote that “the Han people talk of the Yi Scourge 
and the Yi people talk of the Han Scourge (Han huan 漢患)”, and other 
writers also played with the same idea.99 “In the Yi nests (Yi chao 夷巢) 
there is a saying 'when the Han come the Yi are finished' (Han dao Yi jue 漢
到夷絕), which is deeply impressed in their minds.”100 Estimates of the Yi 
population tumbled, which possibly also reflected the reality that they were 
no longer seen as such a great threat to the nearby Han communities.101 A 
shift in the focus of discourse away from security may be the result of 
several factors; but it is likely that an improved security situation was one.  
In Kham, Barnett reported that in the territory around and between Ya’an 
and Kangding Liu’s control was “secure and unquestioned.”102 Barnett did 
not rate the provincial government’s grip on territory further west very 
highly. But other sources indicate that, although provincial state authority 
was far from “unquestioned” west of Kangding, it was still significant to 
varying degrees. In Drango, by 1945 Chinese county magistrates were said 
to be handling all law suits—a role they had taken over from lamas—
although they did so in consideration both of modernized Chinese “law” and 
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what was somewhat disparagingly called local “custom”.103 In other places 
and times Chinese and indigenous authorities seem to have been in equal 
competition with each other. In 1939 an observer noted that in Nyarong 
about half of the people were loyal to the (Chinese) county government, the 
other half presumably being loyal to some form of native ruler.104 This, and 
the fact that only about 300 of the local Tibetan children attended the 
government schools in the county, was a great problem from the perspective 
of that official. Yet one could also interpret the existence, 200 kilometers 
northeast of Dartsedo, of a government school system with a roll of 300 in a 
population that was half-loyal to a Han magistrate precisely as a sign of the 
significance of regional government organizations in eastern Kham in the 
late Republican period.  
 
 
Sources of State strength 
 
As we have seen, state authority in the frontier crumbled when the 
Yunnanese occupation of Sichuan resulted in the cessation of Sichuanese 
funds to the Sichuan Frontier Defence Force. As this indicates, assistance 
from outside was critical for the Chinese state in the frontier. Zhao Erfeng’s 
campaigning and administration was paid for with subsidies from the central 
and Sichuan governments that amounted to three million liang of silver 
annually.105 His administration levied taxes in Kham that came to, at most, 
one tenth of this figure.106 Liu Wenhui’s administration also drew heavily 
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on support from outside Xikang. In 1939, legal tax income (i.e. excluding 
most opium related income) from Kham, Ningshu and Yashu came to about 
1.4 million yuan.107 Despite the famous tensions between Liu Wenhui and 
the central government, Liu was still able squeeze 2.8 million yuan from the 
national government that year; half of it listed as “regular/permanent” 
(jingchang 經常), while the other half was “temporary” (linshi 臨時).108 An 
additional 360,000 yuan came from the Sichuan government, though this 
subsidy was stopped in 1942.109 It is difficult to compare the finances of 
Zhao Erfeng and Liu Wenhui. Liu received a smaller subsidy in relation to 
his tax revenue, but a large portion of that tax revenue was drawn from 
Ningshu and Yashu, which had not been part of Zhao’s Kham 
administration. However, a significant amount of Liu’s expenditure was also 
directed toward Ningshu and Yashu. As we shall see in chapter three, there 
was a definite bias toward Kham in provincial government spending, 
although to what extent Ningshu and Yashu subsidized Kham is difficult to 
judge. 
In any case, one significant source of Liu Wenhui’s income was mostly 
not recorded in his administration’s official budgets: opium. Some revenue 
from opium did make it into government accounts, that which was called 
“prohibition income” (jin yan shouru 禁煙收入), which came from sales of 
licences to the county opium shops and opium users as part of the national 
anti-drug campaign. 110  However, as Peng Dixian notes, the anti-opium 
regulations in Xikang were just “empty words”, and the government 
profited hugely from the unregistered—hence illegal—opium trade.111 The 
military took some opium directly from farmers as tax; they bought some of 
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it; and the remainder was marketed by private merchants, who of course 
paid tariffs on it.112  
Arguably, opium should count as another form of assistance that the 
national government granted Liu Wenhui, because it was the Guomindang 
war on drugs that drove large scale opium production for export into Xikang. 
Communities in the highlands grew opium for their own consumption 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century. However, there were only 
two periods in which they exported a significant volume of opium to other 
parts of China. Both periods of export corresponded with government opium 
suppression campaigns that successfully slashed production in the Sichuan 
basin. As Alan Baumler has pointed out, “when the lowlands were 
producing opium in bulk, exporting from remote areas was not 
worthwhile.”113 Highland opium was only competitive in major markets like 
Chengdu and Chongqing if the territory around those centres was unable to 
produce it. By eradicating opium production from the lowlands, the central 
government gifted the highland state a potential source of revenue that was 
possibly more valuable than its subsidies.  
The first period of opium suppression in the Sichuan basin occurred at 
the end of the Qing dynasty, between 1906 and 1911. This anti-opium 
campaign was so successful that Alexander Hosie reported seeing no poppy 
plants at all during his travels through the Sichuan basin in 1910 and 
1911.114 According to the missionary Samuel Pollard, this resulted in opium 
producers relocating to the Liangshan Yi territories where they made “large 
payments to the chiefs” in return for permission to cultivate the poppy.115 
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There is no record, however, that the late Qing frontier regime capitalized 
on this sudden arrival of a commercially viable industry in the highlands.  
After 1911, large scale poppy cultivation returned to the Sichuan basin 
very quickly and apparently at the expense of opium exports from the Yi 
territory. According to Baumler, opium exports from the highlands only 
resumed after around 1936.116 By that year, the Guomindang anti-opium 
campaign had replicated the success of the late Qing efforts, and it became 
worthwhile again for merchants and soldiers to start buying opium from the 
Xikang indigenes. The Sichuan-Xikang Survey Report also reported that it 
was “when the price of opium was high in the interior” that “the Yi seized 
the opportunity to grow poppies.”117 That report guessed that in 1939 about 
5 million liang of opium was grown in Ningshu annually and 300,000 liang 
in Yashu.118 According to this source, the part of Kham that was in Xikang 
(and thus controlled by Liu Wenhui) did not produce any significant amount 
in that year.119 Certain Tibetan areas in northern Sichuan, like Songpan, 
grew a very large amount of opium from the mid 1930s, but these places 
were not part of Xikang province or controlled by Liu Wenhui. 120  
Cultivation spread from these places into the parts of Kham that were 
controlled by Liu Wenhui perhaps a year or two after 1939, when prices 
were even higher in the Sichuan basin. 121 According to one estimate, in 
1942 800,000 liang 兩  was grown around Danba and sent through 
Kangding.122 Finally, in 1940, Liu Wenhui is alleged to have struck a deal 
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with Long Yun 龍雲  (1884-1962), the military governor of Yunnan, 
allowing for Yunnanese opium to be trafficked through Xikang to 
Chengdu. 123  As cultivation in Xikang expanded however, trade with 
Yunnan declined, from a peak of about 500,000 liang.124 
Unlike Zhao Erfeng, Liu Wenhui certainly had no scruples about 
deriving income from the opium crop. Some historians rank it as his 
government’s largest source of revenue.125It is difficult to assess this claim 
without knowing more about the production and distribution system and 
about the final market value of the product. Good price data is surprisingly 
rare. A few sources quote a figure of three to four yuan per liang in 
Chengdu in the Liu Wenhui era.126 But they do not say when this was, and 
prices must have changed substantially due to hyperinflation and opium 
prohibition. Other sources are vague about currency units and places.127 3.5 
yuan per liang in 1939 would put the total value of the product that came 
from or through Xikang that year at least 21 million yuan. Liu Wenhui’s 
tariffs on Yunnanese opium were apparently 15 percent; if the rate of profit 
on the opium the military bought or appropriated from farmers was the same, 
then provincial government income from opium would have been at least as 
much as the subsidy from the central government. 128  Another way of 
looking at Xikang’s opium revenue is to consider that Communist Party 
surveyors estimated that there were about 100,000 guns in Yi hands in 
Liangshan in 1950.129 Most must have been bought with opium because the 
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Yi had little else to sell (some could have been captured). This hardly 
represented the total opium trade, because the Yi also acquired other things, 
such as silver, and ordinary products such as cloth and salt. If the Xikang 
state’s dividend from the opium-firearms trade equalled only ten percent of 
the value of the guns going into Liangshan, this would have been enough to 
arm 10,000 soldiers, or at least half of the Twenty Fourth Army after 1933. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has given an overview of the rise and fall and rise of the 
Chinese state in the highlands of west and southwest of Sichuan in the first 
half of the twentieth century. It has been common to highlight the failures of 
this state-making endeavour, as we saw in the quotations given at the 
beginning of our discussion of the Republican era. Such sentiment is also 
reflected in current histories of this period. Elliot Sperling writes: “The 
legacy that Zhao would have liked to have left behind in K’am [Kham] […] 
was unrealizable during and after his lifetime, due to the unwillingness of 
both Chinese and Tibetans to take part in it.”130 Hsiao-ting Lin has been 
similarly negative.131 Such assessment is valid if we judge the frontier state 
by its own ambitions. It did not control large areas of the territory it claimed. 
Nonetheless, the Chinese governors of the frontier did succeed in 
constructing a reasonably robust state in parts of Ningshu and the eastern 
counties of Kham.  
The Sichuan frontier largely falls into the mega-region that James C. 
Scott and other scholars call “Zomia” (“zo” means “remote” or “of the hills” 
in many Tibeto-Burmese languages, “mi” means “people). 132  In Scott’s 
analysis, the terrain of Zomia made it inimical to state-building and 
permanent conquest by lowland states before the development of things 
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such as “all-weather roads, bridges, railroads, airplanes, modern weapons, 
telegraph, telephone, and now modern information technologies including 
global positioning systems.”133 That Chinese governors managed to develop 
any kind of authority at all in the region—without most of those things and 
during a time in which China was beset by internal conflict and the Japanese 
invasion—is, in light of Scott’s argument, quite remarkable. The last time 
Han local authority and settlements had been established in this region, in 
the wake of the eighteenth century Jinchuan wars, it had required more 
silver than the conquest of Xinjiang to solidify control over a territory 
smaller than that dominated by Liu Wenhui.134 Therefore, it would be more 
pertinent to focus on the successes of the early twentieth century Chinese 
colonization efforts, rather than their failures.  
As we have seen, those successes were due in no small part to assistance 
from the rest of China, which came in a couple of forms. Firstly, and most 
directly, such assistance took the form of cash subsidies. It also came in the 
form of a drugs policy that sent opium cultivation into the highlands and the 
welcoming arms of Liu’s regime. Other forms of income were important to 
the highland state (we shall examine some of them in chapter three), but 
these two were the most significant. However, the establishment and 
survival of a frontier state was also achieved through adaptation to local 
challenges, pre-existing institutions and the local environment. As a result, 
the regional and local Han-dominated governments that developed in this 
region were not simply transplanted copies of some kind of prototypical 
Chinese order. On the contrary, its character was thoroughly shaped by local 
political and economic contexts. In chapter two we shall examine the 
original Qing vision for the region; and in chapters four and five we shall 
see how, despite some strong ideological continuity, various factors inherent 
in the local context led to moves away from this vision in the Republican 
period. 
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Chapter Two: Development Visions and Policy, 1905-1911. 
 
 
Zhao Erfeng. Source: Earnest Henry Wilson, A Naturalist in Western 
China.1 
  
This chapter concentrates on the vision and policy of the Qing rulers of the 
Sichuan frontier in the last decade of the dynasty. As the previous chapter 
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noted, the Zhao brothers were particularly Kham-centric in their planning 
and use of resources, so this chapter focuses on Kham, rather than Ningyuan. 
Elliot Sperling has commented that “It can safely be said that Zhao Erfeng's 
aim was to sinicize K'am as far as possible.”2 At the most general level, 
Sperling’s view is correct, but such a judgment implies that there is only one 
way of being Han Chinese. What kind of Chinese society did Zhao Erfeng 
hope to create in the highlands, and why? This chapter makes three broad 
arguments about his administration’s vision and policy. Firstly, it drew 
overwhelmingly on certain Qing precedents of frontier governance and was 
not as innovative or influenced by Western models of colonial control as 
some historians have assumed. Secondly, its developmental agenda 
prioritized grain production above mining or other extractive industries, for 
ideological reasons as much as practical ones. Thirdly, Zhao’s plan for 
Kham was based on a sounder understanding of Kham’s environment than 
some Republican period critics believed it was. Those critics perhaps paid 
too much attention to things that Zhao wrote in order to attract funding or 
settlers, and misinterpreted the intentions of some of his policies. However, 
the late Qing administration’s efforts to gather and disseminate more 
knowledge about highland environments were relatively lacklustre and 
narrowly focused compared with the efforts of late Qing administrations in 
Xinjiang.  
 
The Zhao brothers have been cast as modernizers by Chinese and non-
Chinese scholarship alike. Adshead argues that “At a time when the Qing 
state was widely regarded as weak, traditional and non-Chinese, the Zhao 
brothers displayed it as strong, modern and nationalist.”3 William Coleman 
writes: “Characteristic institutions of modernity appear throughout Zhao’s 
actions in Kham. Zhao Erfeng’s actions in Kham were driven by an 
ideology of imperialism, and this ideology was fundamentally modern.”4 
Ma Jinglin explains Zhao’s actions in Kham as both a response to the 
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British threat to Tibet and product of the modernizing effort that came in the 
wake of the Boxer catastrophy (known as the ‘New Policies’, Qing mo xin 
zheng 清末新政).5  
All historians working outside China have highlighted the references that 
Zhao Erfeng made to Western and Japanese imperialism; arguably this 
apparent influence on Zhao is one of the reasons for the view that he was a 
modernizer. 6  Historians working in China have not noted Western 
imperialism as an inspiration for his policy. It is unclear whether this is 
because it would be politically incorrect to point out the similarities between 
Western empire and Chinese rule in Tibet, or because they believe that—
whether or not such similarities exist—Western imperialism was actually 
not much of an influence on Zhao (a point that I will argue below).  
In contrast to most historians, Wang Xiuyu has argued that the ideology 
of the frontier administration was somewhat more eclectic than an amalgam 
of nationalism, imperialism and modernism:  
 
Qing officials did not merely imitate the other colonizers nor rehearse a 
derivative colonial discourse; they also drew upon an older Chinese 
repertoire of frontier statecraft, combining colonialism, dynasticism, and 
Confucianism with some threads of modernization, at the same time 
seeking a symbiosis between bureaucratic and merchant management.7 
 
Louis Sigel also suggests that, in addition to Western imperialism, the 
jingshi 經世  (‘statecraft’) school of school of Confucianism was an 
important influence on Zhao Erfeng.8 Thus, we have Zhao the modernizer, 
the nationalist, the Confucian, and the student of Western imperialism. Was 
he all these in equal measure? If so, how did the different components 
interact with each other?  
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Western imperialism was probably the least important influence, if it was 
influential at all. There were similarities between the Chinese frontier 
administration and Western and Japanese colonial regimes. But it is very 
difficult to make the case that Zhao adopted any particular policy because of 
what he had learned through studying foreign imperialism. The sum total of 
his references to foreign imperialism amount only to the following lines 
among all the memorials he wrote while in the frontier:  
 
Those countries that have opened up distant wastelands, as Britain has in 
Australia, France in Madagascar, America in the Philippines and Japan in  
Hokkaido, have all  first established hostels for migrants, and attracted 
them by offering benefits.9 
 
And: 
 
In Poland, India and Taiwan, the governments of, respectively, Russia, 
Britain and Japan have implemented policies to teach their own language 
and culture to the locals with the aim of assimilating (tonghua 同化) 
them. This proves the effectiveness of such policy.10  
 
The brevity and sparseness of Zhao’s references to Western imperialism 
suggest it was not a major influence. So too does their content. Hokkaido 
and Australia are, at least, examples of successful settler societies. It is 
almost inconceivable, however, that Zhao’s settlement policy for Kham had 
been inspired by study of American policy for the Philippines (and not very 
likely any French policy for Madagascar). Why did Zhao mention these 
examples, if they were not models that he genuinely aspired to emulate? The 
clue is in the second quote: “This proves the effectiveness of such policy.” 
In all probability, these references were rhetorical devices aimed at boosting 
the strength of his argument. The claim that his policy was similar to that of 
the great powers implied that it was the right course of action for a country 
that aspired to be a great power. As chapter one suggested, and we shall see 
again below, there was no unanimity within officialdom on the desirability 
                                               
9 Zhao Erfeng and Wu Fengpei, Zhao Erfeng Chuan bian zou du, 48. 
10 QCBD, 247. 
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and feasibility of Zhao’s program. There were doubters at most levels of 
government. Yet Zhao was asking the court to make an enormous 
commitment. As David Dahpon Ho argues, by supporting his campaigns 
“the Qing court was willing to flirt with fiscal disaster.” 11  In such 
circumstances, Zhao must have felt some pressure to prove that his 
approach to the frontier, which cost 12 times as much annually as Xiliang's, 
was a sound investment.12 Comparisons with the tactics of Western powers 
should be interpreted in light of this, not as explanations of the actual 
origins of his ideas. 
This is not to argue that Zhao had no intellectual interest in foreign 
methods of frontier governance. But, ultimately, they were not a major 
influence on his policies. Similarly, his brother Erxun had shown an interest 
in British local government while he experimented with administrative 
reform during his brief tenure as governor of Shanxi in 1902 and 1903.13 
However, as Roger Thompson demonstrates, even though Erxun’s reform 
proposals referred to “Western institutions, [they] stressed the importance of 
current practice and statecraft theory”. 14  Thompson contrasts Erxun’s 
approach with that of Yuan Shikai, whose reforms were more clearly shaped 
by Western and Japanese models. The Zhao brothers were curious about the 
West, but the key sources of influence on them lay within Chinese tradition. 
As for Zhao the modernizer, there were aspects of his rule that could 
indeed be described as modernizing, but it is easy to exaggerate them and 
important to clarify what one means by “modernization”. Scholarship in the 
2000s has greatly narrowed the developmental gap that was once supposed 
to exist in all or most fields between post-Renaissance Europe and China. 
Peter Perdue positions the Qing Empire as the peer of other large Eurasian 
early modern states like the Russian and Ottoman Empires, and Kenneth 
Pomeranz has famously argued that Britain had no advantage over the most 
                                               
11 David Dahpon Ho, "The Men Who Would Not Be Amban and the One Who Would," 
222. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Roger R. Thompson, China's Local Councils in the Age of Constitutional Reform, 1898-
1911 (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1995), 28. 
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advanced parts of China until about 1800. 15  Perdue further labels the 
eighteenth century Qing government’s monitoring of the agricultural 
economy as “precociously modern”.16  
Zhao Erfeng could fairly be considered a modernizer to the extent that 
the well-established precedents that his policies drew on can themselves be 
considered modern, or at least ‘early modern’. But his policies rarely went 
beyond long-standing Qing traditions. The Qing emperors are famous for 
being content to govern the different component parts of their empire 
through indigenous leaders and institutions. But when such leaders acted 
contrary to what was seen as the imperial interest, emperors rarely hesitated 
to use massive amounts of force to remove them, as the Zunghars and the 
Jinchuan chieftains found out. Removal of the tusi from Kham was not an 
unprecedented response to the anti-Qing violence that broke out in the 
region in 1905. Zhao Erfeng moved to restrict the power of lamas, but this 
was nothing new either. In the eighteenth century, Nian Gengyao 年羹堯 
(1679-1726) established limitations on the numbers of lamas at monasteries 
in Qinghai, forced them to register with the government and undergo 
inspections twice a year.17 One scholar makes much of Zhao’s decision to 
pay serfs for the labour and animals they provided for the transport of his 
forces.18 In fact, payment for this kind of labour was a well established part 
of Qing engagement with the Tibetan lands, though Republican period 
writers were also mostly ignorant of this (issues that are explored further in 
chapter four).19 Zhao hired a Japanese agronomist and an American trained 
Chinese geologist, but the use of foreign technical and scientific advice was 
                                               
15 Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 127; Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great 
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18 Coleman, "The Uprising at Batang," 50. 
19 See Chen Yishi 陈一石, "Chuanbian Zangqu jiaotong wula chaiyao kaosuo 川边藏区交
通乌拉差徭考索," Xizang yanjiu 西藏研究, no. 1 (1984): 52-53. 
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hardly outside the bounds of Qing tradition either. 20  There was no 
substantial attempt to spread the Chinese language among Tibetans until 
Zhao established schools in Kham, but other non-Han communities in the 
southwest had attended Chinese language schools since the Ming dynasty.21 
Zhao laid greater stress on schooling than most of his predecessors did, but 
it was a difference of degree rather than nature.  
Zhao Erfeng was not much of a modernist. He was more of a late 
imperial conservative, who drew eclectically on what he no doubt viewed as 
the tried and true policies from the better days of the early and high Qing 
periods. “Neo-Conservative” would not be too far-fetched. He was radical 
in the scope his vision and in the energy with which he pursued it, but the 
content of that vision was not innovative. Des Forges comments that Zhao 
wanted to turn Kham into another Manchuria. 22  The following section 
outlines Zhao’s settlement policy and then shows how it was in fact more 
similar to early and high Qing frontier settlement than it was to the system 
in Manchuria in the 1900s.  
 
 
The Settlement Policy of the Zhao Regime 
 
Having put down the revolt at Bathang, which he renamed Ba’an 巴安; “Ba 
Peace”, Zhao Erfeng and Xiliang promulgated in December 1906 what 
became one of the key legal documents in the new Sichuan Frontier 
administration: the “Bathang Reconstruction Articles” (Batang shanhou 
                                               
20 See Joanna Waley-Cohen, "China and Western Technology in the Eighteenth Century," 
American Historical Review 98, no. 5 (1993). 
21 John E. Herman, Amid the Clouds and Mist: China's Colonization of Guizhou, 1200-
1700 (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 2007), 143. Herman describes 
education provided to non-Han people in Guizhou in rather negative terms: “education 
offered the non-Han people most assuredly consisted of little more than language 
instruction sprinkled with moral tomes” (p. 143). This is a fairly good summation of the 
kind of education that Zhao’s government established in Kham; though language 
instruction by itself was no small undertaking, whether in Ming period Guizhou, or 
twentieth century Kham 
22 Des Forges, Hsi-liang and the Chinese National Revolution, 82. 
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zhangcheng 巴塘善后章程).23 These regulations provided for a complete 
restructuring of Bathang’s political, economic and social life. Republican 
period writers often argued that they established state ownership (literally, 
“national ownership”, guo you 國有) over all land in the whole Bathang (or 
even Kham) administrative region.24 This notion has been perpetuated in 
recent Chinese scholarship, though today’s scholars prefer the more 
historically appropriate term guan you 官有, “government ownership” to 
guo you, which was not common in the Qing documents.25 These claims 
appear to be rooted in the account written by Zhao’s successor as Warden of 
the Marches, Fu Songmu 傅嵩炑 (1869-1929).26 The articles themselves 
proclaim that land in the whole Bathang region was “the domain of the 
Emperor” (quan jing jie da huangshang ditu 全境皆大皇上地土). This 
should be treated as an assertion of sovereignty rather than state ownership. 
As far as the latter is concerned, the regulations only stated that all 
wasteland (huang 荒) was guan you. Hence, there was no “nationalization” 
of land that was obviously worked by the indigenes.  Those who worked 
land for monasteries, for example, were ordered to call themselves the 
“tenants of the monastery” (miao zhi dian hu 廟之佃戶) and explicitly 
forbidden from identifying themselves as “subjects/people of the 
monastery/lamas” (lama zhi baixing 喇嘛之百姓). They did not become 
“tenants of the state”, as farmers who cultivated land that was huang in 
1906 did (as we shall see below). 
Before the arrival of Zhao Erfeng, Xiliang had initiated a modest pilot 
land cultivation scheme at Bathang. The framework of this program had 
allowed for both “state cultivation” (guan ken 官墾 ), and “private 
                                               
23 The regulations may be found in QCBD, 1: 95-103. The Chinese-Manchu administrative 
and legal systems were to be transplanted to the new county, along with key laws like the 
hairstyle regulations. Various local customs including burial rites were outlawed, and 
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25 Deng Qiancheng 邓前程, "Lun Qing mo Chuanbian kenzhi 论清末川边垦殖," Sixiang 
zhanxian 思想战线, no. 3 (2007): 56.  
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cultivation” (min ken 民墾).27 Zhao Erfeng’ regulations abandoned the latter. 
Land categorized as wasteland could only be cultivated via the 
government’s own program, and could not be transferred to full private 
ownership afterwards. Zhao wrote: 
 
In Bathang and Xiangcheng 鄉城 there is much huang land. From 1906, 
recruiting settlers to cultivate this land is the prerogative of the 
government. No man, be he Han or Barbarian (man 蠻), priest or layman 
may privately cultivate this land of his own initiative. Those who wish to 
cultivate huang land, be they Han or Barbarian, priests or laymen, must 
obtain a licence from the government before doing so […] Henceforth, 
they shall be tenants of the state (guandian 官佃), with permanent rights 
to cultivate the land.28 
 
The Articles did not specify how much such licenses would cost, but one 
Republican era source gives a figure of 12.5 Tibetan yuan (Zangyang yuan 
藏洋元).29 Migrants usually signed a contract with the government which 
spelled out how cultivation was to be conducted.30  
Having made such contracts, farmers were allowed to “freely cultivate 
the [waste]land to the limit of their own strength.”31 Ren Naiqiang’s short 
biography of a husband and wife who were assigned to Yanjing 鹽井 
confirms that this was the way it worked in reality as well, at least some of 
the time. 32  After the government loans had been paid off, the local 
commissioner in charge of cultivation was to survey the land that the settler 
had managed to farm.33 At no charge, the government granted titles (di qi 地
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契) to the settlers to all the land they had cultivated. Such titles only gave 
farmers and their decedents use-rights. Zhao reiterated his prohibition of 
buying and selling land several times.  
 
Cultivated land is state property (guojia gongchan 國家公產 ). It is 
different from property one inherits from ancestors (zuye 祖業). As long 
as farmers (ken hu 墾戶) pay rent, the land shall be theirs in perpetuity. If 
any farmers leave the settlements (tun 屯 ), they must report to the 
settlement administration, which will take over management of the land. 
Members of the settlement may not sell or mortgage their land for profit. 
In order to prevent abuses no person may privately sell land.34  
 
In 1911 Zhao did permit land to be “sub-let to appropriate persons,” 
though he reminded settlers that they “may not sell one inch of land” and 
warned them that if subtenants caused any problems, the original tenant 
would be held responsible. 35  
A text produced by Zhao’s administration in May 1910 and reprinted in 
the Republican period gazetteer for Zayu County was addressed to 
prospective settlers to Kham (though it is unclear how exactly it would have 
been presented to them). It made grand claims about the fertility of the 
environment (to which we shall return in the third section of this chapter). 
But the author was careful not to make false promises regarding the kind of 
land rights they would have. “After three years when you have repaid any 
loans for seeds and oxen, the government will give you title to the land 
allowing you to work it in perpetuity (yongyuan guanye 永遠管業) at no 
cost other than the same tax rates that apply in the interior.”36 The term 
suoyou quan 所有權, ‘full ownership rights’, was never used in the Qing 
                                                                                                                       
33 Deng Qiancheng, "Lun Qing mo Chuanbian kenzhi," 58. The Bathang Reconstruction 
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documents from Kham. As we shall see in chapter five, an emotive 
discourse developed around it in the Republican period.  
Zhao was not tolerant of settlers who tried to work outside the system, or 
go to places that had not been approved. When Liu Huikun 劉輝坤, a 
surveyor employed by the frontier administration, developed a plan for a 
settlement at Lithang, Zhao wrote: 
 
When the gentleman (shen 紳) came beyond the pass he was tasked with 
surveying potential cultivation areas. This was not a licence to begin 
cultivating, and it goes without saying that he had no right to involve 
himself in other matters. Recently we received a telegram from Liu 
requesting permission to begin cultivation at Lithang, and also 
mentioning mining in that region. This involved many breaches of his 
legitimate authority; his conduct was absurd (guaimiu 乖謬) and he was 
ordered to stop. Contrary to expectation, the gentleman disobeyed the 
orders, and began cultivation and hydraulic mining […] This gentleman 
is ordered to leave the frontier without delay.37 
 
In non-agricultural industries there were actually restrictions on 
migration and settlement. In mining and medicine gathering, Zhao showed a 
strong preference for both the state and private entrepreneurs to use local 
labour, rather than Han migrants. The state mine at Derge paid Tibetans to 
learn mining techniques, not migrants.38 For the leather factory that was 
established at Bathang, Zhao preferred to hire “20 talented borderlanders 
(bianmin 邊民)” and send them to Sichuan to study tanning techniques, 
rather than hiring Sichuanese workers to go to Bathang. 39 In 1909 the 
Daocheng commissioner Zhang Zhongliang 張中亮  received orders to 
investigate local medicinal resources as well as those gathering them, and to 
draft regulations to govern the growing trade in medicines so as to prevent 
discord. 40 He gave an account of a group of migrants who had come to dig 
medicines. Zhang had ordered them to leave, and commanded the 
“Barbarians” to gather the herbs themselves. We are told that he warned 
                                               
37 Zhao Erfeng and Wu Fengpei, Zhao Erfeng Chuan bian zou du, 73. 
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them that if they did not, “outsiders” (pangren 旁人 ) would return to 
contend for this profit. Zhao’s approving comment was:   
 
The medicines that grow on the ground of mountains should belong to 
the local Barbarians to gather and sell. In order to avoid disputes, 
merchants may not employ people from afar to do this. The 
commissioner must give instruction to prevent [locals] from being 
confused by tales of mountain spirits and therefore wasting opportunities 
to profit, which causes others to greedily covet [these resources]. At the 
present time the government should not levy tax, so as to facilitate 
commerce and benefit the people. Later, when commerce is flourishing, 
it will be appropriate to begin taxation.41 
 
In another case, some settlers requested to be allowed to do something 
other than crop growing, and again Zhao’s response was to order them to 
leave the highlands.42 
 
The system in 1900s Mongolia and Manchuria would have suited better 
the aspirations of Liu Huikun or the would-be medicine gatherers. In 
Mongolia and Manchuria the state retained the same theoretical monopoly 
on initiating development of wasteland, though it was often laxly 
enforced.43 From 1902, local authorities in the northeast and the Mongol 
territories were charged with “reporting land for cultivation” (baoken 報墾). 
Here, however, local authorities simply auctioned off plots of land to the 
highest bidder.44 Unlike in Kham, one did not have to cultivate land in order 
to obtain rights to it. Another difference was that those who purchased land 
from a government bureau were free to on-sell it, use it as collateral for a 
loan (dianya 典押) or rent it out to others.45 This enabled a whole class of 
settlers who, as Lattimore reported, “have capital, which they raise by 
selling out the land they have previously developed and enhanced in value 
                                               
41 Ibid., 454. 
42 Ibid., 398-99. 
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in order to move on.”46 Lattimore wrote this in the 1930s—when the same 
strategy would have been possible in Kham—but he indicated that the 
process of buying, improving and selling land as a career “worked out in 
terms of continuous generations, not a single lifetime”, so the practice must 
have begun in the late Qing.47 
Zhao Erfeng’s system in Kham was much closer to most Qing precedent 
than was the system in 1900s Mongolia and Manchuria. In 1649, Dorgon, 
the Shunzhi 順治Emperor's regent, declared that landless migrants who 
cultivated abandoned land in Manchuria would receive permanent property 
rights. 48  But as in 1900s Kham, settlement was closely regulated and 
monitored. Migrants had to register at the Shanhai Pass 山海關, where 
officials assigned them specific plots of land in southern Manchuria. In the 
Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong reigns, farming colonies (tun 屯 ) in 
which land was owned by the state were established in the northwest and 
Xinjiang to facilitate the military campaigns against the Zhungar Mongols 
and provide for garrisons and civil administration following the Zhungars’ 
defeat.49  Tun also existed in interior China. Conditions were not uniform, 
but often households in tun were not allowed to leave the settlements, which 
leads one historian to describe the residents of the most restrictive tun as 
“state serfs” (guojia nongnu 国家农奴).50 By the late nineteenth century the 
tun had mostly died out due to a mixture of, at first, illegal and, later, 
legalized sales of settlement land. 51  However, in the Sichuan frontier, 
Xiliang and Zhao Erfeng stuck with the concept and the language. In a 1904 
report from a Bathang quartermaster to Xiliang made no mention of 
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contemporary Manchuria, but listed sites that could be cultivated to provide 
for soldiers’ rations, “in the spirit of the old tun colonies” (shi yi gu tun tian 
zhi yi yi 是亦古屯田之遺意).52  The same year, the post of Drango tun 
administrator (tunyuan 屯員 ) was created for a large region between 
Dartsedo and Danba. The post existed until 1911 and the officer clearly had 
an important role in organizing settlements.53  
Zhao made some minor adjustments to the way that tun had been 
organized in the earlier periods of the dynasty. In previous centuries, tun 
households usually had rights to a fixed area of land, typically around 30 mu, 
while Zhao’s system only conferred settlers with rights to land they had 
actually cultivated. This was possibly Zhao’s response to the problem that in 
many earlier tun, households did always not cultivate all the land that had 
been granted to them—which could cause good land to remain huang.  
One of Zhao Erfeng’s policies that really did diverge from most early and 
mid-Qing notions of good frontier governance was his decision to grant 
soldiers who married local women an extra dou of highland barley per 
month. 54  In the past, the Qing government had often prohibited marriage 
between Han and non-Han in the southwest.55 Some present day Chinese 
historians have seen the extra rations Zhao granted such couples as a 
measure designed to encourage intermarriage.56 As we shall see in chapter 
seven, many Republican era writers argued that their government should 
adopt policies to encourage intermarriage in order to foster the integration of 
Han and non-Han populations. That chapter will also show that Zhao’s 
cultural policies were framed quite differently from most Republican period 
assimilationism. Zhao certainly wanted a strong and unified China, yet he 
does not seem to have seen the Tibetans as potential separatists who might 
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want to split from an imagined national family: the dangers came from 
upstart renegade local leaders or foreign imperialists. It is likely that the 
rationale for the extra rations for soldiers who married was economic rather 
than assimilationist. Married soldiers who started households could 
eventually become less reliant on the state for their upkeep, which was, after 
all, the aim of tun settlements. How quickly and how much soldiers could 
have been weaned off the state via such means would depend on the details 
of the policy, something which is lacking in the documents used by this 
study. In the early 1620s, Nurhaci arranged for Manchu soldiers to be 
billeted with Han households in Liaodong for similar economic reasons.57 
Even here, then, Zhao was perhaps not completely outside the realm of Qing 
precedent, though how much he knew about the early Manchu colonization 
of northern China is unclear.  
 
 
Mining, Medicines or Crops? Priorities in Development.  
 
Lu Chuanlin had pinned great hopes on mining in Nyarong, envisaging that 
it would pay the whole cost of the junxian administration that he wanted to 
impose on Kham.58 However, after the arrival of Xiliang, visions for Kham 
were generally characterized by a bias towards crop-growing and against 
resource extraction industries like mining. As Wang Xiuyu has commented, 
“more than other policies, land reclamation received broad support from 
relevant officials at the metropolitan and provincial levels.”59 Of the very 
limited developmental initiatives that he proposed, Xiliang wrote: “Once 
cultivation is underway in Bathang, it will be relatively easy to undertake 
the same at any other places that are found to be suitable for growing crops. 
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Afterwards, pastoral farming and mining can be trialled in turn.”60 Despite 
the preference for farming, Xiliang was not completely averse to mining, 
though he seems to have preferred to support operations begun by 
enterprising locals, rather than initiate anything new. He sent 10,000 taels to 
the Mingzheng tusi who had long wished to open a gold mining operation at 
Taining, but had been frustrated by opposition from the local lamas. 61  
However, this was still a far cry from the scale of mining that Lu Chuanlin’s 
unrealized plan had envisaged. 
Zhao Erfeng’s interest in mining was greater than Xiliang's, but his 
prioritization was the same. In 1907, Zhao gave an overview of his plans for 
Kham, in which he stated: 
 
Originally I believed we could wait until all the other undertakings were 
underway and then, in time, consider mining. However the mineral 
wealth of the Sichuan and Yunnan borderlands is great indeed, and if the 
state (guan 官) does not establish mining operations first [i.e. before 
others] there will likely be disputes and conflicts.62  
 
In the text that followed, mining was still dealt with last and most briefly.  
 
We propose to appoint a Chinese graduate of a foreign geology course to 
undertake a survey. The state (guan 官) can establish mining operations 
at sites where ore is most plentiful. Local mining methods will be used, 
and the miners will be employed [by the state]. We will seek to improve 
panning and smelting techniques and if it proves necessary, machinery 
can be employed.63  
 
By ‘machinery’ Zhao probably meant something like the waterwheel 
driven batteries of stamps that had been in operation in the Maha gold mine 
(near Mianning in Ningyuan) since the 1880s.64 Ruling out the import of 
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such equipment, his plan was to proceed slowly with mining. State operated 
or supported mines would use simple, local techniques first, and adopt the 
machinery necessary for hard-rock mining only when it proved necessary, 
presumably when known placer deposits had been exhausted. After all, if 
the aim was only to stake out claims for the state—either to stop anyone else 
getting there first, or “prevent disputes”—then why make the effort of 
importing heavy machinery? That task would have been difficult, though 
not much more difficult than transporting cannon around Kham (see chapter 
four).  
Nevertheless, Liu Shilun 劉軾輪, the promised Chinese geology graduate 
of an American university arrived in 1908. He wrote reports of several 
locations, noting significant gold deposits in Taining, Dengzhanwo 燈盞窩, 
and that mining at a certain site in Lithang would be “extremely worthwhile 
(ji ke kaiban 極可開辦).”65  Liu also designed two pieces of hydraulic 
mining machinery that would suit the conditions of the region. 66 Neither 
appears to have been built. He left only one year after he arrived, officially 
because he found the highland environment too harsh.67 There was perhaps 
more to his departure than physical discomfort. The account of the 
missionary Flora Shelton, based on hearsay rather than first-hand 
information but nonetheless suggestive, was:  
 
A young Chinese mining engineer, educated in America, came in at the 
invitation of General Chao [Zhao] to discover gold. It was not to be 
found in the Bathang valley, a little lead being all he could discover. The 
great General was very angry, and threatened to take off the engineer's 
head. He started for America post haste and was hidden by missionaries 
at every stop so the “big man” could not find him.68  
 
                                               
65 Liu Xiangxiu 刘祥秀, "1903-1949 nian guojia bianjiang kaifa zhengce xia de Kang qu 
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66 Ren Xinjian, "Jindai Sichuan Zang qu de huangjin kaifa," 41. 
67 Ibid.; Liu Xiangxiu, "1903-1949 nian guojia bianjiang kaifa zhengce xia de Kang qu", 27. 
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Most sources describe Liu’s mission as extremely expensive at 10,000 
taels.69 Apart from this, an additional 3,000 taels were spent on ordering 
equipment from San Francisco, although in the end it was used elsewhere in 
Sichuan rather than in Kham.70 A small state operated mine was established 
at Derge in 1909 at a cost of 700 taels.71 Other spending may have been 
hidden in county government budgets—though the same may be said for 
any other category of expenditure. 13,700 was no small amount, but it was 
much smaller than the 60,000 taels spent on cultivation work (kenwu 墾務) 
in 1906 alone. 72  In 1911 the administration budgeted 40,000 taels for 
cultivation and nothing for mining.73 One Bathang official reported that the 
total costs of promoting cultivation were “uncountable”; Zhao himself 
calculated five or six taels in silver were spent for every mu cultivated 
around Bathang. 74 The cultivation expenses went towards provisions for 
loans for settlers’ travel expenses, agricultural equipment, beasts of burden, 
seeds, housing and food until their land was productive.75 As a Shanghai 
journalist writing in the 1930s put it, the “[cultivation] plan was detailed and 
treatment [of colonists] comprehensive, it can be said that nothing was 
omitted.”76 The loans were supposed to be paid off as settlers’ lands became 
productive, but Zhao expected officials to be lenient, and ruled that they 
were not to demand compensation in case settlers damaged borrowed 
tools.77  
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Zhao’s interest in state-supported mining never seriously threatened to 
distract his attention from state-supported agriculture. The Derge mine 
mentioned above was the only state operated gold mine established on 
Zhao’s watch, and it was a much smaller endeavour than many other mines 
in the southwest, employing only 200 men at its peak.78 Here, the state 
provided rations for two months for Tibetan trainee miners. Apart from that, 
it merely allowed people to mine there, and collected tax from them every 
six months. Various accounts also mention a state operated copper mine but 
none indicate how large it was or how much money the government 
invested in it.79 Two other state operated gold mines existed in Kham, but 
they had been established prior to Zhao’s appointment in the region—and 
given that the Taining mine had been established by the Mingzheng tusi, 
albeit with funding from Xiliang, its status as a “state mine” is perhaps 
somewhat questionable.80 
Even though mining was a much lower priority for the state than 
cultivation, Zhao did create rules designed to encourage private prospecting. 
Private enterprises in their trial stages of operations (shiban 試辦) only had 
to pay two thirds as much tax as established enterprises.81  Lone miners or 
bands of up to six who worked a site by themselves were not taxed at all, 
which Chinese historians have described as another “favourable” policy 
designed to encourage development.82 Quite possibly, however, this merely 
signalled that tracking down scattered individuals and gangs in remote 
valleys cost more than the value of the tax that they could be made to pay.  
Unsurprisingly given Zhao's general approach to migration, mining 
entrepreneurs also had to put up with significant restrictive regulation. 
When entrepreneurs applied for mining licenses, they had to state how many 
employees they would have, and not employ more or less without obtaining 
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permission.83 To the owner of one of the mining operations at Lithang—
who is described in accounts as a “local merchant”—Zhao wrote: “This 
mining area is more than 300 zhang 丈 . If the trial period comes to a 
successful conclusion, the merchant must hire more workers, otherwise the 
license will be cancelled.” 84  Employers were warned to exercise firm 
control over their employees. All gold had to be sold to the state at official 
prices, and no foreign investment was allowed.85   
Mining did not constitute the only area of government expenditure on 
economic development apart from its encouragement of crop growing. The 
administration is also reported to have spent 24,000 taels on a tannery in 
Bathang.86 This is significantly more than its expenditure on developing 
mining, but overall spending priorities were almost the reverse of those of 
the regional state in the late Republican period. The latter’s expenditure on 
industrial projects was more than double what it spent on agricultural 
development.87 
Wang Xiuyu argues that the government’s decision to direct the bulk of 
its energy and resources into crop farming rather than mining was 
essentially a rational one:  
 
Keenly as Zhao knew the importance of all his projects, he had little 
option but to prioritize army training, reclamation and commercial tea 
taxation above mining and the rest, as troops were essential for security 
and the other two could produce revenue more quickly but required 
relatively less investment. Industrial mining suffered from fiscal 
problems at the outset.88 
                                               
83 Ibid., 115. 
84 Ren Xinjian, "Jindai Sichuan Zang qu de huangjin kaifa," 43. 
85 Lai Zuozhong 来作中, "Jiefang qian Ganzi Zang qu de huangjin shengchan 解放前甘孜
藏区的黄金生产," in Ganzi Zhou wenshi ziliao, no. 14 甘孜州文史资料，第十四辑, ed. 
Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Ganzi Zangzu zizhizhou weiyuanhui 中国人
民政治协商会议甘孜藏族自治州委员会 (Kangding: Kangding xian yinshua chang, 
1996), 116. 
86 Ma Jinglin, Qing mo Chuanbian Zang qu gaitu-guiliu, 161. 
87 See Xikang sheng canyihui 西康省參議會, "Linshi canyihui, di san ci hui huibian 臨時
參議會第三次會匯編," 1942, (SCDAG, QZH: 204, AJH: 16), 73-43.  
88 Wang Xiuyu, "China's Last Imperial Frontier," 327. 
72 
 
 
In Wang’s view, Zhao did not have any ideological preference for crop 
farming over mining. He simply calculated that investment in the former 
was likely to pay off more quickly than investment in the latter. Certainly, 
after Liu’s departure, the idea that his whole mission had been a great 
disappointment appears to have grown up among some officials.89 Morevoer, 
Zhao was a military leader whose attention was occupied with ensuring 
military control of a very large area of territory. Naturally he was anxious to 
ensure a supply of food for his soldiers. Transporting provisions from 
Sichuan was expensive and meant that his soldiers sometimes went 
hungry.90 So his focus on the development of communities of crop growers 
that were fairly well tied to the land was partly related to the need to 
guarantee a reliable supply of grain for his soldiers wherever political 
developments might take them.  
However, we should not push this thesis too far. Zhao’s force was big 
enough that it would have greatly stretched the resources of any particular 
location in Kham, but its impact on the whole region should have been 
fairly negligible. We saw above that there is some uncertainty as regards the 
actual size of the Qing army in Kham. But even the higher figure of 4,000 
still amounts to a fairly small force. The Qing government had stationed 
armies of this size in Kham before. Taining alone had been host to a 
garrison of 3,000 soldiers during the Yongzheng reign.91 The Yongzheng 
emperor had not found it necessary to launch a land cultivation program 
paralleling Zhao Erfeng’s. (Mobilization during the Jinchuan wars utterly 
dwarfed both that of the Yongzheng reign and Zhao Erfeng’s, but these wars 
were enormously expensive and probably unaffordable for the central 
government by the twentieth century. 92 ) Reports of the Zhao 
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administration’s land tax income vary slightly. One source gives an income 
of 20,000 shi of grain per year, another 30,000.93  Either of these amounts 
should have been sufficient to feed 4,000 troops. Food was certainly 
expensive in Kham, but there were no instances of starvation that I am 
aware of, or cases in which food shortages were the source of unrest. 
Furthermore, according to Fu Songmu, “In the beginning, the troops ate 
tsampa and other kinds of grain, but they were afflicted with stomach 
ailments (fu ji 腹疾), so the army began purchasing rice in the interior and 
transporting it to the frontier in order to supplement their diet.”94 Importing 
food from outside had more to do with the army considering local food 
unpalatable than there simply not being enough of it. As well shall see in 
chapter five, transport was a critical problem for Zhao Erfeng and later 
governors, but food was only one of the goods that needed to be transported.  
Moreover, there is no evidence that the investment in agriculture yielded 
a better return, per tael spent, than the investment in mining, and there is 
little reason to think that a neutral observer could have imagined it would. 
Zhao Erfeng’s agricultural policy was extraordinarily expensive, but did not 
produce the great results that were hoped for, as we shall see below. These 
huge costs were the target of criticism from some within the frontier 
administration, who did not see it as money rationally spent. In 1909, a 
Bathang official reported that: “Cultivation has been one of the core policies 
of the Bathang administration, but careful investigation of the results reveals 
that in reality it is not worth the effort (de bu chang shi 得不償失).”95 In 
1910 another official argued for giving up on supporting migrants to come 
from other parts of China, and getting the indigenes to do more cultivation 
instead:  
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Huang land is unlimited, but the government’s resources are limited. […] 
There are those that argue that in order to build up the border country (shi 
bian 實邊 ) it is necessary to promote colonization (kenzhi 墾殖 ). 
Although this theory has its logic, unfortunately the commissioners 
(weiyuan 委員)96 have not organized it well; many of the colonists have 
run off, and such a sum of money has been wasted that adding it all up 
causes one to sigh in exasperation. Thus it would be better to change 
strategies, to gradually get those nomads who have no form of 
livelihood 97  to widely cultivate the vast earth. This will make the 
people’s lives richer, and the earth more fertile.98 
 
Clearly, the author of the second quote still supported cultivation, though 
it is less certain that the former did. But neither saw that the current 
cultivation program as a rational investment. Wang's argument that the 
prioritization of crop-growing over mining was a logical choice to allocate 
funds to the most promising activities is at odds with the views of some 
contemporary observers.    
In addition to military supply issues, there were a couple of important 
ideological influences on Zhao’s policy making. Most late imperial Chinese 
officials held a strong physiocratic belief that, more than anything else, 
expanding crop production generated wealth. As the magistrate of Darstedo 
wrote in 1908: “If we wish to grow our wealth (kuo liyuan 擴利源), it is 
necessary to use every ounce of the earth’s resources (jin di li 盡地力), and 
cultivate the open lands (kuang tu 曠土). Fields cannot be allowed to go 
waste.”99 The phrase “use every ounce of the earth’s resources”, translated 
as “exhaust the earth” by Perdue, was a key item in the vocabulary of late 
imperial Chinese political economy.100 As we saw above, a couple of lower-
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ranking officials in Zhao’s Kham administration did suggest that the costs of 
increasing land cultivation in Kham were greater than the benefits. Yet, 
where a clear and present environmental cost was not a factor, such thinking 
ran counter to the weight of Qing statecraft thought. 
Zhao also had a very strong preference for fixed settlements over mobile 
labour. Fairly, or unfairly, there was a connection in his thinking between 
banditry and non-agricultural labour. Regulations for a private mine in 
Lithang stated: “There is to be a roll with the names of all the miners on site, 
and each of them is to carry their license. This is to prevent deception 
(menghun 蒙混) and infiltration by bandits (fei lei qianliu 匪类潛流).”101 
Xiliang also showed great concern about the moral character of Han 
migrants to the frontier. One of the criteria for entrants to the Tibetan 
language school in Chengdu (for prospective Han administrators of the 
highlands) was that they had to “have clean (qingbai 清白 ) family 
backgrounds.” This contradiction between a desire to promote migration 
and an element of suspicion directed towards potential migrants is a theme 
to which we shall return in chapter seven. 
 
 
Environmental Knowledge 
 
Eliot Sperling has argued that Zhao “gave an exceedingly optimistic 
evaluation of the prospects for settlement of the frontier region”. 102  
Likewise, in 1936, Ren Naiqiang was scathing about the standard of 
officials’ knowledge about the Kham environment, both in the Qing and 
during his own time. 
 
Government officials who have a superficial acquaintance with the 
border region all love to rave (wang tan 妄談) about cultivation (kaiken 
開墾). In the time of Zhao Erfeng, kaiken was promoted vigorously. 
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Settlers (kenmin 墾民 ) from as far away as Hubei were recruited. 
Cultivation zones (ken chang 墾場) were established, with housing and 
oxen for the farms. In two years, expenses totalled more than 100,000 
[taels], but not one ounce of grain was harvested and the settlers all ran 
off.  The cultivation zones were generally on grasslands above 4,000 
meters in altitude, but the crops that were planted, were those such as 
cotton and rice that will not grow above 2000 meters. This was an 
unscientific fantasy (weifan kexue zhi miming 違反科學之謎夢), from 
which the officials of the border region still have not woken to this 
day. 103 
 
Elsewhere he wrote:  
 
Zhao Erfeng […] allocated a large sum of money to recruiting settlers 
from Sichuan, Hubei and other provinces and transporting them to Kham. 
Cultivation zones were established at Bathang […] and Daocheng, 
Xiangcheng, Derong, Yanjing and other places. In total, the government 
recruited more than one thousand farmers (kenfu 墾夫). But at that time 
both the government and the people lacked general knowledge about 
cultivation. They were determined to grow rice, cotton, silk and sugar 
cane. But in the Kham region all of this failed. Those farmers with some 
knowledge began growing kinds of wheat, but they were only ten to 
twenty percent of the total.104  
 
According to this view, the late Qing attempts to promote agricultural 
settlement in Kham were a naive, utopian blunder. But although Zhao's 
regime was not a paragon of environmental science and cutting edge 
agronomy, Ren's criticism would have been more accurate if it had been 
directed at certain intellectuals in the interior, rather than officials in the 
frontier.  
Before Zhao’s arrival in the frontier, the majority Han observers could 
hardly be accused of over-optimism regarding the prospects of agriculture in 
Kham. Lu Chuanlin wrote that in Kham: “the qi (氣) of the earth is bitterly 
cold, the five cereals will not grow, and thus it is not proper to recruit people 
to open up the huang.”105 As noted above, Lu hoped that mining rather than 
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farming would pay the costs of his proposed frontier administration. In 
November 1903, several Sichuanese provincial government bodies 
including the Administration Commission (Buzhengsi 布政司), the Office 
of Commerce (Shangwu zongju 商务总局), the Surveillance Commission 
(Ancha shisi 按察使司) and the Office of Foreign Affairs (Yangwu zongju 
洋务总局) wrote to the Ministry of Defence (Junjichu 軍機處), stating that 
“Only barley may be grown; the cultivation of rice is impossible. […] 
[Furthermore] the land that is not already cultivated is used for raising 
livestock. It is not lying abandoned (bing fei qi di 並非棄地).”106  
After the arrival of Zhao Erfeng, new and more positive ideas about 
Kham’s environment began to be articulated. In 1907, Zhao wrote a long 
memorial outlining proposals for the development of the region. It contained 
what appear to be the first examples of claims that the frontier environment 
was generally very fertile and bountiful in resources. Referring to the whole 
region he wrote: “Although the weather is rather cold, in general the earth is 
extremely fertile (jun ji gaoyu 均極膏腴 ).” 107  And “the Sichuan and 
Yunnan frontier country is rich in natural resources (chu chan shen rao 出
產甚饒).”108 Others in his administration adopted a similar tone. A surveyor 
dispatched to Zayu in what is now the south-eastern part of the Tibet 
Autonomous Region wrote in February 1910 that “There were fertile soils, 
convenient water resources, lush woods, and open valleys in all the places I 
travelled through.” 109  One location impressed him so much that he 
suggested that “if this land were cultivated, a small effort would produce a 
great result. Harvests would possibly be greater than those on even the best 
land in Interior China.”110  
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The motivations of the surveyor are unclear, but Zhao's proclamation of 
frontier fecundity was probably related to his request, in the same memorial, 
for ongoing funding of three million taels annually from the central 
government. This was a large sum for a government in great financial 
difficulty. The appeal of solidifying control over a key part of the non-Han 
southwest might have convinced the court to finance Zhao's campaigns 
regardless of the region's economic prospects, but the idea that Kham was 
fertile and rich enough in resources to eventually pay its own way cannot 
have damaged his case. Other portrayals of Kham, or specific locations 
within Kham, as particularly fertile also tended to occur in discourse 
soliciting outside support. The 1910 text addressed to prospective settlers 
(quoted earlier in this chapter) gave an almost utopian account of Zayu:  
 
We have received reports of a place called “Zayu”, which is not more 
than 10 to 20 days journey from Bathang. It is a broad, flat valley and the 
weather is the same as Chengdu. It has always produced rice. […] The 
Barbarian people (manzi 蠻子) are not lazy and they know how to grow 
rice, but there is too much land for their small population to cultivate. […] 
Only about one percent of the arable land there is cultivated, there is still 
room for 10 million mu of paddy fields. Water resources are convenient; 
it is truly a great place.111 
 
In his 1912 history of Zhao’s campaigns, Fu Songmu criticized unnamed 
Han people for being too pessimistic about the possibilities for expanding 
cultivation in Kham. The problem, from Fu’s perspective had been exactly 
the opposite of the problem Ren Naiqiang diagnosed: 
 
In the past […] many Han held the trite belief that grain would not grow 
in the Barbarian lands. They generalized about the whole of Kham on the 
basis of the cold and inhospitable parts of it.112 
  
Fu's work was not a direct request for money or recruits for a renewed 
settlement endeavour. But it served as a post-hoc legitimization of Zhao's 
campaigns and a hagiographic attempt to rehabilitate his mentor's reputation. 
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It was filled with comments such as “Everywhere people pledged their 
allegiance [to Zhao], and desiring to shake off the oppressive rule of the tusi, 
hutuktu (‘living Buddha, Ch. hutuketu 呼圖克圖 ) and headmen, they 
pleaded with the Warden of the Marches for him to implement direct rule in 
their villages.”113 Fu also had a reason, personal rather than material, to 
argue that Zhao's forerunners' pessimism regarding the Kham environment 
had been misplaced.  
Yet in communication that did not aim to garner more funding or settlers, 
Zhao was much more cautious about whether locations were suitable for an 
agricultural settlement. Before the surveyor quoted above wrote his 
February 1910 report extolling the advantages of Zayu, settlers arriving in 
Bathang had already heard of places further west that were said to be more 
suitable for cultivation. In July 1909, a Bathang quartermaster (liang yuan 
糧員) reported that: 
  
The settlers were unwilling to begin cultivation at Bamutang [in 
Bathang], and they requested to be allowed to go to Yanjing, where they 
had heard that two crops per year are possible and water resources are 
very convenient. […] I had no choice but to allow them to go.114 
 
Zhao Erfeng’s puzzled and angry response demanded that the 
quartermaster order the settlers return to Bamutang. He asked why the 
official had felt he had no choice but to allow them to go to Yanjing. As we 
have already seen, this was not the first time that Zhao forbade settlers from 
going to places that he felt had not been properly surveyed, or that did not 
seem suitable enough for cultivation. When Liu Huikun wanted to establish 
a settlement at Lithang, Zhao denied him permission. He wrote tersely that 
“If the settlers did not starve to death, they would freeze to death.”115 The 
simplest explanation for his refusal to allow migrants to go to places that 
had not been shown to be suitable is that sweeping claims about the 
bountiful frontier were mostly aimed at his grant-providers in Beijing. 
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Zhao's real views were probably closer to those of the officials who had 
preceded him: there were a few locations that were suitable for agricultural 
colonies, but settlers risked starvation or pneumonia if farming colonies 
were established in carelessly chosen places.  
Although Zhao himself probably did not believe Kham was generally 
extremely fertile and eminently transformable, many educated people back 
in interior China appear to have become convinced that this was indeed the 
case. A 1910 article in Datongbao 大同報  reported the impending 
transformation of the region: 
 
The natives in the 2000 li wilderness beyond Dartsedo […] only know 
the nomadic herding life, and are as yet unacquainted with crops and 
ploughs. Since the Warden of the Marches formulated a comprehensive 
plan to recruit settlers, the numbers of migrants to this previously 
untamed and ungoverned country has steadily increased. In no time at all 
it will have the prosperity and population of a great metropolis (yi 
zhuanshun ji chengwei fansheng du shi yi 一轉瞬即成為繁盛都市矣).116 
 
The origins of this view are unclear. Was Zhao too successful at selling 
the notion of an abundant frontier? Yet the vision of the “prosperity and 
population of a great metropolis” went beyond anything that Zhao promised, 
even to his financiers. This sort of prediction was probably what led to the 
formation of the ill-fated Bathang Cultivation Company (Batang kenwu 
gongsi 巴塘墾務公司). The main protagonist behind the Company was 
Peng Jinmen 彭金門, a native of Leshan, who returned to Sichuan in 1906 
from Japan, where he had been a student and had joined the revolutionary 
Datong Society (Datong she 大同社). According to one of his associates 
“the schools in Chongqing competed to employ him as a teacher, but he 
refused them all.” 117  For unknown reasons, Peng’s real interest lay in 
agricultural settlement (kenzhi 墾殖) of the frontier, and he and several like-
minded friends founded the Bathang Cultivation Company. Their efforts at 
                                               
116 “Zhengjie xinwen: Chuanbian kaiken zhi jinzhuang 政界新聞：川邊開墾之近狀”, 
Datongbao 大同報, (28.12.1910): 35. 
117 Yang Gengguang 楊耿光, "Sichuan Le-Ping kenwu gongshe nian yu nian lai zhi jingguo 
四川樂屏墾務公社廿餘年來之經過," Chuanbian jikan 2, no. 2 (1936): 1. 
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Bathang ended in disaster, though what exactly went wrong is unclear. 
Information on the company's original plan is similarly sparse, but, inspired 
by profit and patriotism it seems to have gone beyond providing food for 
garrisons and supporting an expanded bureaucracy. Ren Naiqiang's critique 
of late Qing settlement schemes was leveled at men with “superficial 
acquaintance with the border region” who “love to rave (wang tan 妄談) 
about kaiken”. Evidence suggests that men such as those who formed the 
Cultivation Company were a more fitting target for such criticism than Zhao 
himself.  
 
To what extent did Zhao’s administration attempt to gather and 
disseminate more information about the Kham environment? Zhao 
employed a Japanese agronomist Kojima Ikeda 池田小岛, although there is 
scant information on how long he stayed in Kham or what exactly he did 
there.118 As part of his regime’s efforts to increase settlement surveyors 
were dispatched to various locations throughout the region. They gave 
estimates, in mu of the area of huang land at various locations, noting 
whether water resources were convenient or not and sometimes how fertile 
it seemed to be. However, in contrast to the meticulous monitoring of 
harvests in the frontier colonies in the Qianlong era, Zhao’s administration 
appears to have been quite lackadaisical about reporting harvests and 
cultivated area. As the historian Deng Qiancheng has pointed out, surveyors 
gave quite detailed reports of the area of huang land in mu in different 
locations, but officials were vague and tardy when it came to reporting the 
number of settlers in their jurisdiction and the amount of newly cultivated 
land.119 It was not until October 1908 that the administration arranged for 
the production of standardized dou 斗  grain measurement units to be 
dispatched to county officials for the measurement of rations, harvests and 
                                               
118 Wang Chuan, "Qing mo, Minguo shiqi Xikang diqu de nongye gaijin ji qi shiji 
chengxiao 清末、民国时期西康地区的农业改进及其实际成效," Minguo Dang'an 民
国档案, no. 4 (2004): 55. 
119 Deng Qiancheng, "Lun Qing mo Chuanbian kenzhi," 59. 
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taxes.120 Officials had been reporting grain yields in ke 克, a transliteration 
of the traditional Tibetan grain measurement unit khal, which, as the 1908 
memorial noted, varied in size throughout Kham.121 Given such variation, 
pre-standardization assessments of which places in Kham could produce the 
highest per mu grain yield must have been fairly impressionistic. Even after 
the October 1908 order to officials to use a standard dou measure, some 
continued to quote grain volumes in ke without explaining the size of the 
local ke unit.122  
There was no attempt to gather knowledge of pastoral farming at all. 
Justin Tighe and others have noted a similar bias against pastoral farming in 
the late Qing and early Republican administration in Mongolia.123 Yet the 
Xinjiang administrations of Zhao’s era were quite different in this regard. 
The 1910 Xinjiang Gazetteer noted that “Investigations show that the profits 
from pastoral farming are much greater than those from crop farming”.124 
The gazetteer included roughly the same amount of information about 
livestock farming (mu 牧) in the province as it did about crop-farming (nong 
農), and recorded things such as how many of horses, cattle or sheep a hired 
Mongol or Kazakh herder could look after. 125  The attention that the 
Xinjiang administration gave to livestock farming must have been related in 
part to the stud and sheep farms it operated, which were revived versions of 
Qianlong era establishments. 126  Yet interest in livestock in late Qing 
agronomy and frontier policy was not completely confined to Xinjiang. In 
1901, Zhang Zhidong 張之洞  (1837-1909), who was in favour of 
agricultural colonization in Mongolia, argued for the development of 
                                               
120 QCBD, 1:250.  
121 Ibid., 96, 112. 
122 QCBD, 2:330-31.  
123 Justin Tighe, Constructing Suiyuan: The Politics of Northwestern Territory and 
Development in Early Twentieth-Century China (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 145. 
124 Yuan Dahua 袁大化 and Wang Shuwo 王樹枂, eds., Xinjiang tuzhi 新疆圖志 (Taibei: 
Wenhai chubanshe,1965 [1910]), “shiye, part 1”, 13b. 
125 Ibid., "shiye, part 1", 15b-16a. 
126 Ibid., "shiye, part 1", 11b. 
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livestock farming and animal science throughout China.127 That livestock 
farming was so absent from late Qing agronomy and strategies for 
agricultural development in Kham and Mongolia remains something of a 
mystery.  
 In 1910, La Shijun 喇世俊, the new magistrate of Dengke 登科 opened 
an experimental farm, though this appears to have been his own initiative 
rather than Zhao’s.128 La submitted a report to Zhao requesting funding and 
listing 34 types of vegetables and grain that he proposed to trial.129 Zhao’s 
response was:  
 
The farm should concentrate on the five grains (wu gu 五谷130), to serve 
as a model for the Barbarian people to study the art of crop growing. 
Vegetables are not a key aspect of agriculture (fei nongshi zhi yaoling ye 
非農事之要領也). Furthermore, the report states that the earth is not 
suitable for the production of rice, and therefore this crop will not be 
trialled. What is the evidence for this?131  
 
Apart from wanting a trial rice crop, Zhao believed the farm should have 
a pedagogical focus, rather than a knowledge-gathering one. La got the 
message: a later report detailed plans to improve indigenous agriculture, but 
did not mention any trial crops, with the exception of the rice, which had not 
gone well.132 La and Zhao were not giving up on rice, however. A strain of 
cold-water-rice (leng shui gu 冷水穀) from Kangding had been ordered. 
La’s list of measures to improve indigenous agriculture included things such 
as the purchase and production of better ploughshares, the encouragement of 
weeding fields, as well as other practices characteristic of the intensive 
agriculture of the Interior. These may have boosted per mu yields, but 
                                               
127 Eduard B. Vermeer, "Population and Ecology along the Frontier in Qing China," in 
Sediments of time: environment and society in Chinese history, ed. Mark Elvin and Liu 
Ts'ui-jung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 258. 
128 QCBD, 3:818. 
129 Ibid., 2:640-42.  
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nobody appears to have considered whether or not such intensive 
application of labour to land was efficient for agriculture in a sparsely 
populated landscape. 
 
Outcomes of the Qing systems 
 
Present-day Chinese historians give mixed assessments of the outcomes of 
the Qing settlement programs. Li Maoyun is one of several who have argued 
that the systems were successful until the collapse of the Qing dynasty.133 
However, Deng Qiancheng, who is one of the few historians who has 
attempted to quantify Han migration, argues that “it is beyond doubt that the 
results of migration and cultivation were disappointing.”134  Most estimates 
put the total number of new settlers who entered the frontier during the last 
five years of Qing rule at only around 2,000.135 According to the sources 
used by Liu Xiangxiu and Guo Pingruo, a total of approximately 20,000 mu 
was brought into cultivation between 1903 and 1911.136 By contrast, in 
Mongolia, 2 million mu of former Mongol Yeke-juu league land had been 
officially measured, assessed and sold or rented to Han peasants by 1908.137 
Nor were commissioners in charge of cultivation overly impressed with 
the quality of the migrants the scheme attracted.138 A Bathang quartermaster 
reported to Zhao that  
                                               
133 Li Maoyu, "Lun Zhao Erfeng," 125. 
134 Deng Qiancheng, "Lun Qing mo Chuanbian kenzhi," 58. See also Zou Lihong, "Qing 
mo chuanbian tun ken yu mu zheng di wenti tanxi," 31. 
135 Ibid.: 58. Chen Zhongwei says that the number of Han who entered the Xikang (Kham) 
region in the late Qing was 200,000. All of Chen’s figures are substantially higher than 
other sources, however. A figure of around 2,000 settlers is also compatible with the 
estimation that 20,000 mu had been brought into cultivation. Chen Zhongwei 陳重為, 
Xikang wenti 西康問题 (Shanghai: Zhonghua shu ju, 1930), 89. 
136 Liu Xiangxiu and Guo Pingruo, "Qing mo tun ken zhengce zai Chuanbian Zang qu," 21. 
137 Justin Tighe, Constructing Suiyuan, 110. It is not clear, of course, whether all of the land 
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138 Deng Qiancheng, "Lun Qing mo Chuanbian kenzhi," 59. Another official warned that 
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Concerning their motivation, half of them are rogues and hooligans 
(wulai liumang 无赖流氓), who come beyond the pass seeking refuge 
from the law (butaosuo 逋逃薮). Since they can get money from the 
Sichuan treasury […] they say that they come to cultivate the land, but in 
reality they are not interested in cultivation.139 
 
Another Bathang tax official Dong Tao, reported that new settlers frequently 
left without repaying their debts: “As soon as they have land assigned to 
them, they require loans of seeds and food in order to begin work, but if 
things are not exactly to their satisfaction, they simply run away, leaving the 
quartermaster with the costs of seeds and food they had loaned.”140 Such 
complaints, however, indicate the failure of physiocratic visions for 
agricultural colonisation rather than the failure of settlers, as many migrants 
stayed in the highlands but went into other occupations (see chapter six).  
Generally speaking, the replacement of tusi with Han administrators 
(gaitu guiliu 改土歸流) was a violent process that saw revolts break out and 
pacification campaigns unleashed in several regions.141 By allowing settlers 
to cultivate all the huang land that they could, Zhao showed complete 
confidence in the notion that land designated as such was empty and unused. 
This was not always the case, and Zou Lihong has demonstrated that despite 
the small numbers involved, the settlement programs caused land disputes 
between indigenous pastoralists and migrant farmers.142 Zou suggests that 
the government addressed this in an ad-hoc (and fairly ineffective) manner. 
Drango tun administrator Wu Qingxi ordered, for example, that  
 
Farmers must build high embankments around all cultivated land that is 
near to routes used by livestock, so as to prevent crops being trampled. If 
the embankments are not high, and some livestock cross them by mistake, 
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trampling on the cultivated land, farmers must act reasonably, and may 
not block livestock or make demands.143 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
‘Sinicization’ is not a bad broad-brush term for what Zhao Erfeng hoped to 
achieve in Kham. But it glosses over the fact that his vision was not for a 
generic “Chinese” society in the region. He had specific targets and 
priorities that were different from those of some other Chinese leaders. The 
plan was to foster the growth of stable, rooted agricultural communities. 
They would be egalitarian societies in many ways. There could be no large 
landowners and settlers could only claim what they actually worked.  
Society would be tightly managed, and migration into non-agricultural 
professions was often restricted. Zhao Erfeng's vision was not for Kham to 
become like the Manchuria of his own era. Several factors shaped his policy; 
the need to provision troops was important but should not be exaggerated. 
Also significant were a distrust of mobile labour and the traditional late 
imperial belief that the expansion of cultivation was the best thing a 
government could do to foster economic growth.  
Zhao was more optimistic than his predecessors that substantial farming 
communities could be established in Kham, but Ren Naiqiang's later 
judgment that his settlement schemes were founded on unrealistic ideas 
about the Kham environment was somewhat unfair. Zhao's urge to control 
migration was also rooted in part in a recognition that many places in the 
region really were unsuitable for the establishment of crop-growing 
communities. He did not tend to acknowledge this in communications with 
the central government and prospective settlers, however. This was possibly 
the reason that some people in the interior held beliefs about the 
transformability of the frontier environment that really could be called 
“unscientific fantasies”.  
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Philip Kuhn’s interpretation of Wei Yuan 魏源 (1794-1856) is that he 
“was born into the relative sanity of the premodern age: government could 
not hope to achieve a fundamental transformation of human nature.”144  
Though Zhao Erfeng was a couple of generations after Wei Yuan, a similar 
comment could be made of his attitude toward frontier agriculture: it would 
be wrong to connect it to the Maoist utopian hope that grasslands could be 
transformed into cornfields. Yet if Zhao’s strategy lacked the visionary 
excess of Maoist frontier agriculture, it lacked other kinds of vision as well. 
Efforts to gather more knowledge about frontier ecologies and the kinds of 
food that could be produced in them were very limited. Zhao disapproved of 
La Shijun’s proposed experiments with a wide range of crops, and did not 
attempt to gather information about livestock farming as the Xinjiang 
administrations of his own time did. Zhao also appears never to have 
seriously questioned the assumption that the expanding cultivation was the 
best investment the administration could make in frontier development, as a 
couple of his officials did. 
By 1911, some settlements had been established, but progress was 
disappointing. It is hard to say how Zhao Erfeng would have responded had 
he had more time. Many of his officials fared better than Zhao in the 
Revolution, and there were strong continuities as well as differences 
between the Qing and Republican periods. The way that Republican period 
policy evolved, both in response to the challenges of that era, and the 
unresolved problems facing the Qing plan is the major question of the 
following chapter.  
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Chapter three: Continuity and Change in the Republican Period 
 
 
As we saw in chapter one, Han local and regional state authority 
experienced a decline between approximately 1917 and the mid-1920s. It 
recovered after this, thanks to subsidies from the national and Sichuan 
governments, opium export, Liu Wenhui’s willingness to commit resources 
to the region before 1933, and his having no choice about doing so after 
then. Thus there were two periods in which the Chinese highland state was 
relatively strong in some locations, separated by an interregnum of 
weakness that lasted around a decade. The primary question in this chapter 
is how similar regional government in the two eras of relative strength was. 
In terms of its character and policy, did the Liu Wenhui regime essentially 
represent a revival of the Zhao Erfeng administration? Many of the laws and 
administrative customs that Zhao created remained in place throughout the 
Republican period. Liu’s regime was also ostensibly committed to many of 
the goals that Zhao had pursued. We saw in chapter one that the late Qing 
government had prioritized Kham over Ningyuan in its allocation of 
resources, and this bias remained also more or less ingrained in the 
Republican period. However, there were also some considerable differences 
in policy. Liu’s government moved away from Zhao Erfeng’s emphasis on 
fostering communities of crop-growers who were tenants of the state but 
independent of each other. Instead, late Republican policy was to create 
large state-owned agricultural enterprises that in many cases did not have 
crop growing as their core purpose. Another key point of divergence was 
policy regarding huang land (“wasteland”). The Xikang provincial 
authorities continued to proclaim state ownership over huang land, but not 
only was this principle not enforced by local governments, but even 
provincial government enterprises rented huang land from private owners. 
This chapter explores potential causes for these shifts, and argues that one 
decisive factor was the shift in the relative importance of different forms of 
taxation for local governments.  
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Qing-Republican Continuities 
 
There was disagreement among Han engaged with the frontier about Zhao 
Erfeng’s rule, and particularly how it was remembered by indigenous people. 
Chen Zhongsheng wrote:  
 
Not for nothing do the Tibetans [Fan 番] view Zhao as a ‘butcher’ […]. 
In the winter of 1911, Zhao died dishonourably when he was beheaded in 
Chengdu. It was a fitting end.1 
 
Other writers gave almost diametrically opposite views. An article in 
Chuanbian Quarterly summarized his achievements thus: 
 
Today when the people of Xikang talk of Zhao Erfeng they are fearful, 
respectful and desirous of his return; his memory is loved and cherished. 
Truly, such men are exceptionally rare among frontier officialdom.2 
 
Liu Wenhui’s view was somewhere in between the hagiography and 
condemnation. He wrote that Zhao had “exerted himself with great 
diligence” but that his policy had “not escaped extremism”.3 
 
Despite such reservations about certain aspects of Zhao’s approach, 
Republican period regulations relating to land and ownership left the system 
bequeathed to them by the Qing largely intact. The theory that huang land 
was government owned and that farmers who reclaimed it were tenants of 
the state existed until the end of the Republican period. When Xikang 
province was established in 1939, the new provincial authority drafted a 
series of “Land Rights Principles (di quan yuanze 地權原則)”. An article on 
the principles in Chuanbian Economy Quarterly approvingly pointed out 
                                               
1 Chen Zhongsheng 陳重生, Xi xing yan yi ji 西行豔異記 (Shanghai: Shanghai shibao, 
1930), 191-93. 
2 ZYDZ, "Diaocha ziliao," Chuanbian jikan 1, no. 3 (1935): 179. 
3  JKDZ, 75. 
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that they were based on the precedent left by Zhao Erfeng. 4 The “Land 
Rights Principles” were:  
 
1) All forested land and wasteland is without exception considered public 
property  
2) Pastoral land (mu di 牧地) shall be communally owned by groups of 
pastoralists.  
3) Land cultivated by serfs (chaimin 差民 ) shall belong to the 
government according to established custom. 
4) People who have cultivated plots of land for more than twenty years 
shall without exception receive full individual title (suo you quan 所有
權). 
5) Publicly owned land shall be brought under cultivation according to 
regulations. Cultivators shall be recruited and granted five years before 
they are eligible to pay tax. 
6) Arable wasteland that is occupied by tusi, shall be purchased at a 
regulated minimum price by the government and distributed among 
settlers (kenmin 墾民), or directly purchased by the settlers.  
7) Occupiers or purchasers of wasteland who do not cultivate the land or 
rent it to tenants who do, shall pay a wasteland tax, which shall increase 
annually. 
8) Regulations shall stipulate the maximum amount of wasteland that 
may be privately owned by an individual, in order to prevent emergence 
of large land owners.5 
 
Evidently, there is some ambiguity here. The articles began with a 
straightforward declaration of the state’s rights over wastelands. In number 
six, wasteland has to be purchased by the government from “occupiers”. In 
number eight, private ownership of wasteland is permitted, albeit within 
certain as yet undefined limits and subject to undefined but menacing rates 
of taxation. The articles imply that pastoral land and huang land are 
different categories, yet some government institutions made pastoral land a 
subcategory of huang land.6  It seems implausible that the drafters of these 
principles had not noticed these problems, and the most likely explanation is 
that there was some amount of disagreement among them. Broadly, 
                                               
4 Tu Zhongshan 涂仲善, "Tiaozheng Kang qu di quan wenti zhi guan jian 調整康區地權問
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5 Ibid. 
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diaochabiao 西康省土地戶口調查表," 1947,  (SCDAG, QZH: 249, AJH: 152). 
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however, the principles indicated that the government would take an 
aggressive, appropriative stance toward developing wasteland, reminiscent 
of that taken by Zhao Erfeng.  
Other proclamations and plans did not always go as far as the first article 
in the above principles, but nevertheless sketched measures to be taken 
against the owners of forested or huang land. A resolution passed by the 
Xikang Provincial Assembly stated “the government shall require all private 
owners of huang land to cultivate it within a certain limited period of time. 
If they do not, people who need land may apply to appropriate it according 
to the law.”7 The Xikang Agriculture Improvement Institute (Xikang sheng 
nongye gaijinsuo 西康省農業改進所, henceforth 'Agriculture Institute'), 
founded in 1939, drew up a plan for the development of a proposed forestry 
zone (yinglin qu 營林區) in Ningshu.8 The Agriculture Institute envisaged 
that the area chosen would consist mostly of huang land, which would 
mostly be already public land. Several principles were formulated to deal 
with any private land (min di 民地) that the zone might also contain. Plots 
of less than 100 mu would be appropriated by the government, and the 
owners given as compensation 30 percent of the gross profit from the trees 
that the Agriculture Institute would plant on their plots. Owners of more 
than 100 mu could keep their land, but would have to use it for forestry 
according to the Agriculture Institute plan. In 1947, the Draft Xikang 
Gazetteer (Xikang tong zhi gao 西康通志稿) stated that “Apart from in a 
part of southern Kham where there is buying, selling and conditional-selling 
(diandang 典当)9 of land, the rest of the land is publicly owned (gongyou 公
有). Huang land may be rented by the people from the government.”10 
                                               
7 Xikang sheng canyihui 西康省參議會, "Linshi canyihui, di yi ci hui huibian 臨時參議會
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The basic elements of Zhao’s settlement system also survived in the 
Republican period, though the system was more often implemented by 
semi-private companies than state authorities. The Republican period saw 
the establishment of several settlement “societies” (she 社 ), and 
“companies” (gongsi 公司), mostly by men with official positions or ties. In 
Kangding, for example, in 1934 Deng Pancun 鄧蟠村, a Twenty Fourth 
Army colonel, and Chen Dongfu 陳東府, the Administration Department 
director, founded the Golden Abundance Crop and Pasture Company (Jin bo 
ken mu gongsi 金博垦牧公司), intending to develop a range of agriculture 
and forestry businesses.11 Companies such as these tended to adopt very 
similar systems to that which Zhao had created. In 1934 the Sichuan 
Construction Bureau (jianshe ting 建設廳 ) reported on the Pioneer 
Cultivation Society (tuo bian ken she 拓邊墾社 , henceforth Pioneer 
Society), which was working in Mabian. As with the Qing system, new 
settlers were required to report to Pioneer Society and, if accepted, given the 
official status of “cultivating household” (ken hu 墾戶).12 On the basis of an 
assessment of the settler’s ability, the Society assigned them areas of land, 
and granted interest-free loans of food, agricultural equipment and seeds if 
settlers were unable to provide these things for themselves. As the imperial 
state had done, the Society retained ultimate ownership of all the land 
worked by its cultivating households, withholding from them the right to 
buy and sell land. Indeed, it played an even larger role in the management of 
social and economic activity in the community than Zhao Erfeng’s 
government had done in the settlements it founded. ‘Cultivating households’ 
did not pay taxes to the Pioneer Society, and instead they performed labour 
duties, such as building roads, defences and other public works.13 Thus, at 
the same time that in northern China traditional labour duties owed by 
peasants were being converted into cash payments, and other Xikang 
governors were trying to convert the wula corvée system into a system of 
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paid labour (see chapter four), a “modernizing” settlement society adopted a 
system of taxation via unpaid labour. 14 The Pioneer Society also managed 
community education, public enterprises, entertainment, marriage and 
funeral ceremonies, and had detailed conduct rules for the registered 
households. In the economic sphere, it ran a market where the Han settlers 
could trade with local Yi, although the Sichuan Frontier Quarterly report 
implied this was unnecessary because everything that the settlers needed 
was already provided by the society. 
 
As we saw in the previous chapters, the Qing engagement with the 
Sichuan frontier was characterized by a bias towards Kham over Ningyuan. 
Ren Naiqiang was fiercely critical of this, and made the comparative 
advantage argument to support his view that Xikang should be developed as 
a united whole in which each component region would receive funding to 
promote whatever it was best suited to. Having excoriated the decision to 
focus on grain production in Kham, Ren proposed the following alternative: 
 
Fortunately, bordering Kham, Sichuan and Yunnan are the eight counties 
of Ningyuan, which are well suited to the production of grain. […] 
Currently polished rice costs seven jiao per sheng in Kangding, but in 
Xichang, Mianning and other Ningyuan counties, one can buy a dou with 
half a yuan [i.e. five jiao for 10 sheng of rice]. The reason for this 
difference is that the former place is reliant on far away sources of food, 
while the latter place has no way to export its produce. There is now a 
national consensus in favour of the unification of Kham and Ning into 
one province. […] A highway between Ning and Kham can be swiftly 
completed with the concentration of the resourses of the new province. In 
the future, there will be much improved availability of grain in Kham and 
animal produce in Ning. […] For this reason those involved with crop 
production must focus on the eight counties of Ning. […] If Kham strives 
for food self-sufficiency, even if pure gold were spent as though it were 
manure, and flesh and blood used to irrigate the soil, there would still be 
no profit.15  
 
                                               
14 Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1988), 78. 
15 Ren Naiqiang, "Xikang yuncang de fu li yu jianshe de tujing 西康蘊藏的富力與建設的
途徑," Xibei wenti jikan 西北問題季刊 2, no. 1 (1936): 59. 
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These ideas met with approval at the very highest levels of the Xikang 
government. In his 1939 address at the establishment of the province, Liu 
Wenhui commented that “the climate, soil, produce and population 
distribution in the Ning region is especially advantageous [for agricultural 
development programs]”. 16  And between 1939 and 1942, government 
spending on the Agriculture Institute projects was divided roughly evenly 
between Kham, Ningshu and Yashu.17  
However, Ren Naiqiang’s vision of a unified agricultural development 
strategy for the whole of the highlands was never fully realized, and nor did 
it lead to a correction of the government’s focus on Kham outside 
agriculture. Firstly, although, the concentrated resources of the new 
province did indeed produce a flurry of road building, none of the major 
new roads connected Ningshu with Kham. Instead, 1941 saw the completion 
of new roads between Kangding and Ya’an, Xichang and Leshan and 
Xichang and Yunnan.18 In 1942 a road between Kangding and Kanze was 
finished. The Xichang-Leshan highway improved transport between 
Kangding and Ningshu, but it still left a substantial amount of ground to be 
covered on the older and much slower roads. It was a road building program 
that envisaged not one integrated frontier territory, as Ren had, but two 
frontier territories that were connected by different transport links to 
different parts of the outside world. 
Secondly, although spending on agricultural projects was evenly divided 
between Xikang’s three constituent regions, outside agriculture the 
provincial government spent much more per-capita on Kham, particularly in 
the Kangding-Luding region, than on Ningshu or Yashu. The choice of 
Kangding, rather than any of the half-dozen much larger towns in Yashu 
and Ningshu to be the provincial capital was a symptom, as much as a cause 
                                               
16 JKDZ, 73. 
17 Liu Yiyan 劉貽燕, "Wu nian lai Xikang nongye jianshe zhi huigu 五年來西康建設之回
顧," Xikang jingji jikan 1, no. 8 (1944): 5-6. 
18 Liu Jun 刘君, "Jian lun Xikang sheng 简论西康省," in Minguo dang'an yu minguo shi 
xueshu taolunhui lunwen ji 民国档案与民国史学术讨论会论文集, ed. Zhang Xianwen 
张宪文, Chen Xingtang 陈兴唐, and Zheng Huixin 郑会欣 (Beijing: Dang'an chubanshe 
1988), 328. 
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of Kham-centricism. As figure one (below) illustrates, the volume of credit 
made available to cooperatives showed a strong bias towards Kangding and 
Luding. In the era of hyperinflation, credit at normal interest rates was 
essentially a gift. Bearing in mind that the population of both of these 
counties combined was probably only the size of Yuesui’s, and much 
smaller than Ya’an’s or Xichang’s, a greater volume of money per head of 
population entered Kangding and Luding via the cooperatives than any 
other county. 
 
 
Figure one: Total County Cooperative Debt by Year. Source: Fiscal 
Records of Xikang Province (Jian sheng hou zhi Xikang caizheng 建省後之
西康財政).19 
 
Education spending also offers a useful proxy for regional government 
engagement with a region and its population, even though it is often difficult 
to meaningfully interpret. To calculate spending in relation to population 
size we would need good population data, which is often absent for 
indigenous populations. This would not matter so much if we could safely 
assume that all government spending on education was directed toward the 
Han and mixed populations, for which there are more reliable counts. But 
                                               
19 Xikang sheng caizheng ting 西康省財政廳, Jian sheng hou zhi Xikang caizheng 建省後
之西康財政 (Kangding: Xikang sheng caizheng ting, 1945), chapter 11, pp. 16-26.  
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given efforts to educate the indigenous population, this was not necessarily 
the case.  
In 1939 government spending per school student was much higher on the 
eastern edge of Kham than in Ningshu or Yashu (see figure two below).  
 
 
Figure two: 1939 government spending on education per enrolled student in 
selected Xikang counties. Source: CKSB.20 
 
Spending per student should have been strongly influenced by the 
average number of students per class. Densely populated regions, like 
Yashu, could have larger class sizes, which would mean fewer teachers and 
buildings in relation to the number of students. In such conditions spending 
per student would be lower than in less densely populated regions like 
Kham. This explains the difference between Kham and Yashu well. But it 
does not account for the difference between Kham and Ningshu, because, 
unexpectedly, the number of students per education worker (jiaozhiyuan 教
職員 , i.e. teachers and administrative staff) was roughly the same in 
Ningshu counties as it was in the eastern Kham (see figure three below). 
Therefore, the higher spending per student in eastern Kham compared with 
                                               
20 CKSB, 186, 192-93, 195-96, 467-68. 
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Ningshu was not simply because Kham needed relatively more teachers per 
student because of a more dispersed population.  
 
 
 
Figure three: Students per education worker in 1939 in selected Xikang 
counties Source: CKSB.21 
 
It is uncertain where the extra money went. Assuming that levels of 
corruption were roughly equivalent, it could have been used to pay higher 
salaries in Kham, or to make greater investments in school buildings and 
infrastructure in that region. As we shall see in the chapter four, wages in 
Kham were high in relation to other places, but the difference was not so 
great as to explain the gap seen in figure one. Alternatively, some of the 
difference may have been due to greater efforts to attract indigenous people 
to school. If those efforts were unsuccessful, then overall costs in relation to 
student numbers would have been higher. Just as the regional government 
prioritized eastern Kham in its loans to cooperatives and its industrial 
projects, its spending in education was similarly skewed towards that region. 
In addition to the maintenance of theoretical state ownership over huang 
                                               
21 Ibid. 
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land, and the societies that implemented Zhao Erfeng-ist settlement systems, 
this was another area in which the late Republican state followed the pattern 
of its late Qing predecessor. 
 
 
Changes in Policy on Land and Agriculture 
 
Despite the similarities detailed above between the Liu Wenhui and Zhao 
Erfeng regimes, there were some very significant differences. The biggest 
concerned their agricultural development strategies and attitude toward 
actually appropriating the huang land that the state theoretically owned.  
In the 1930s, the regional government’s agricultural spending was 
concentrated on establishing experimental farms in Kham and on an 
operation to raise livestock for the government to use as pack-animals, 
discussed in chapter four. 22  After 1939, funding for agricultural 
development went through the Agriculture Institute. The main focus of the 
Institute’s activity was a series of state-owned enterprises that were either 
newly founded or built on the 1930s ventures.23 In Kham it operated a ranch 
(muchang 牧場) in Taining; a farm (nongchang 農場) in Simaqiao; a dairy 
farm (runiu chang 乳牛場) in Kangding; a forest and horticulture plantation 
(senlin yuanyi chang 森林園藝場 ) in Luding; and a fertilizer plant in 
Kangding.24 In Yashu, the Institute set up a farm in Ya’an, a sericulture 
operation (canchang 蠶場) in Hanyuan and a forest plantation in Tianquan. 
Ningshu enterprises were run through a regional office, which managed 
farms at Xichang, Dechang and Huili, nurseries at Mianning and Yanyuan 
                                               
22 On the experimental farms, see Wang Chuan, "Minguo hou qi "Xikang sheng nongye 
gaijin suo" de sheli shimo ji qi lishi yiyi 民国后期“西康省农业改进所”的设立始末及其
历史意义," Xizang daxue xuebao 西藏大学学报 20, no. 1 (2005): 61. 
23 Liu Yiyan, "Wu nian lai Xikang nongye jianshe zhi huigu," 5. 
24 See Ibid., also the provincial government budgets in Xikang sheng canyihui, "Linshi 
canyihui, di san ci hui huibian 臨時參議會第三次會匯編," 1942, (SCDAG, QZH: 204, 
AJH: 16), pp.77b-79a. Wang Chuan, "Qing mo, Minguo shiqi Xikang diqu de nongye 
gaijin ji qi shiji chengxiao 清末、民国时期西康地区的农业改进及其实际成效," 
Minguo Dang'an 民国档案, no. 4 (2004): 56. 
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and a silk reeling factory at Lizhou. The Institute also established a series of 
weather and climate monitoring stations throughout the new province.  
Liu Wenhui's provincial government made significant efforts to recruit 
outside talent for the Institute. The vice-director, Xu Xiaohui 徐孝恢, was a 
graduate of the agriculture program of Tokyo Imperial University.25 The 
first director was Ye Xiufeng 叶秀峰, who was concurrently the director of 
the Xikang Construction Bureau.26 Ye was a Jiangsu native, a graduate of 
Princeton University and a member of the Guomindang. He was therefore 
something of an outsider in Liu Wenhui’s administration. There are reports 
that he and Liu disagreed on various matters which is probably why Ye left 
after a couple of years.27  
None of the Agriculture Institute enterprises appear to have been 
regarded as outstanding successes. Established during wartime, they were 
not well resourced. Moreover, they suffered from being tasked with 
pursuing multiple, potentially conflicting aims. They were supposed to 
conduct research into improving animal and plant stocks, educate the 
natives in agricultural techniques, run profitable businesses, and at the same 
time bring more land into use.28   
Overall, there were two fundamental differences between the Xikang 
provincial government’s agricultural strategy and Zhao Erfeng’s. The two 
governments promoted different organizational forms and, in many cases, 
pursued different kinds of agricultural activity. The late Qing administration 
had attempted to foster settlement by independent state-tenants who would 
grow crops and manage separate plots of land to which they would have 
permanent use rights. The Xikang provincial government-owned enterprises 
                                               
25 Wang Chuan, "Minguo houqi "Xikang sheng nongye gaijin suo" de sheli shimo ji qi lishi 
yiyi," 62. 
26 Wang De'an 王德安, "Jiefang qian Xikang jianshe ting ji jingji jianshe gaikuang 解放前
西康建设厅及经济建设概况," in Ya'an wenshi ziliao xuanji: di ba ji 雅安文史资料选辑
：第八辑, ed. Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Sichuan sheng Ya'an shi 
weiyuanhui 中国人民政治协商会议四川省雅安市委员会 (Ya'an: Zhongguo renmin 
zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Sichuan sheng Ya'an shi weiyuanhui, 1994), 67. Wang Chuan, 
‘Minguo houqi "Xikang sheng nongye gaijin suo’," 63. 
27 Wang De'an, "Jiefang qian Xikang jianshe ting ji jingji jianshe gaikuang," 68. 
28 See Wang Chuan, "Minguo houqi ‘Xikang sheng nongye gaijin suo’." 
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did rent a very small amount of land to independent tenants.29 But generally 
they employed people as waged labourers. A document relating to the 
establishment of a farm at Simaqiao stated that: 
 
Farmers on cultivated land [to be acquired by the farm] should be 
employed on preferential terms (congyou 從優 ) by the Agriculture 
Institute as agricultural workers (nonggong 農工). Those who do not 
wish to stay should be allowed to leave.30  
 
One writer notes that workers tasked with crop-growing at Taining were 
given one yuan per ten days per 100 square meters they cultivated. 31  
In addition to this substantial change in organizational form, a much 
broader array of projects received state support. Gone was the old emphasis 
on grain production. This was partly due to the influence of those like Ren 
Naiqiang, then a member of the Preparatory Committee of Xikang Province, 
who believed that past schemes had been “unscientific fantasies” because 
they had not considered what kinds of activities were really suited to the 
Xikang environment.32 The emphasis on education of indigenous people in 
what were considered to be better agricultural techniques was also a strategy 
advocated on the grounds that it was a more “realistic” approach to 
agricultural development.33 In Kham, the shift towards livestock farming 
was also due to the wula crisis of the Republican period, which we shall 
examine in the next chapter. 
Probably due to the differences in organizational form and range of 
projects they pursued, there was a further difference between the Zhao 
Erfeng and Liu Wenhui administrations in how the results of agricultural 
                                               
29  At the Simaqiao farm, 26 mu out of the farm’s 536 mu was rented to private tenants. 
Simaqiao nongchang changzhang 司馬橋農場場長, correspondence with Director of 
Agriculture Institute, 1943, (SCDAG, QZH:249; AJH:81).    
30 Xikang sheng nongye gaijinsuo, "Zhengyong Simaqiao nongchang jingguo 征用駟馬橋
農場經過", 1940, (SCDAG, QZH:249; AJH:81). 
31 Dao Xue 稻雪, "Xikang Taining shiyanqu diaocha 西康泰宁试验区调查," Xin Kang 
bao 新康报 1, no. 2 (1938). In Zhao Xinyu and Qin Heping, eds., Kangqu Zangzu shehui 
lishi diaocha ziliao jiyao (Chengdu: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 2004), 214. 
32 Ren Naiqiang, "Xikang yuncang de fu li yu jianshe de tujing," 53. 
33 CKSB, 402-03. 
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policy were assessed. The late Qing government had been strongly focused 
on the number of migrants who came to the frontier and the number of mu 
that they brought under cultivation, though as we saw in chapter two, 
officials’ reports of cultivated mu were often fairly haphazard. For the 
Agriculture Institute, volume of output; the number of shi of grain, dan of 
cotton, or pounds of butter (as well as cultivated land area) constituted the 
relevant measures of success or failure.  
The state farms were not in all respects a break from the precedent 
established by Zhao Erfeng. In some ways, their innovations intensified 
rather than moved away from the characteristics of the late Qing agricultural 
policy. The Qing regime had played a strong role in the management of 
migrant communities, and the new organizational form of waged labour 
allowed this to be taken to new heights. The vice-director-general of the 
Taining farm conducted daily literacy and cleanliness activities, and a 
weekly ‘mass training’ session. The farm also ran consumers’ cooperatives 
(xiaofei hezuoshe 消费合作社) to provide for its workers. 
 
 
Huang land in practice 
 
The other major difference between the Liu Wenhui and Zhao Erfeng 
periods concerned the status of huang land. As we saw above, Liu’s 
government maintained the theoretical position that huang land belonged to 
the state (though in some instances it allowed a certain amount of ambiguity 
to creep into regulations). In practice, this theoretical state ownership of 
huang land was almost never recognized and even the Agriculture Institute 
enterprises rented huang land from private owners. Zhao Erfeng’s 
administration had not always been able to actually enforce meaningful state 
ownership over land it categorized as huang. But the late Republican 
government appears to have made almost no effort whatsoever to do so.   
In 1936 an aggrieved member of the Bank of China research group wrote 
a bitter tirade against the Kangding local authorities for Sichuan Frontier 
Quarterly. They had “betrayed the Three Principles of the People and 
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violated national law.”34 The crime of the local government was to allow 
local Tibetan households the right to charge Han Chinese settlers rent for 
the privilege of using huang land that the Tibetans claimed to own.35 To ram 
home his attack the writer highlighted the case of a man who was forced to 
pay rent to bury his wife on a huang hillside. There were many aspects of 
the case that caused outrage. The rent was “ten times higher than in 
Shanghai” (which is quite hard to believe). The land “owners” allegedly 
robbed and murdered people who did not pay up. It was said they did not 
pay taxes on their land. They sold the land to foreigners who used it to start 
colonies. But the core problem was with the very idea that this type of land 
could be privately owned. “Huang land like this, according to regulations in 
the president’s Fundamentals of National Reconstruction (jianguo dagang 
建國大綱 ) ‘belongs to local governments, and must be used for local 
enterprises for the public good’.”36 By rights, it was “national, publicly 
owned huang land.”  
But it was not only poor Han migrants who paid private individuals rent 
for the use of huang land. With the exception of the ranch at Taining, which 
was special for reasons made apparent in chapter four, state-owned 
enterprises established by the Agriculture Institute rented the land they used 
from private landowners, even when the land was registered as wasteland or 
forest. The huang land used by Kangding’s Simaqiao farm was all rented, 
from a Catholic mission, the Wasi Tibetan household (the same family 
whose rent-a-gravesite practices had enraged the Bank of China’s 
researcher), and other landlords of uncertain ethnicity. 37  This was not 
merely a Kham phenomenon. In a letter to Liu Wenhui in 1944, the 
Agriculture Institute’s Ningshu office reported that the Ningshu agricultural 
and forestry enterprises “have never owned any of their land. It is all 
                                               
34 ZYDZ, "Diaocha ziliao," Chuanbian jikan 川邊季刊 2, no. 2 (1936): 163. 
35 Ibid.: 162-63. 
36 Ibid.: 162. 
37 "Xikang sheng nongye gaijin suo xiang Simaqiao dizhu Wasi diao zujie Simaqiao tudi 
wei nongshi shiyanchang dang ping Kangding xian zhengfu ding heyue西康省農業改進
所向駟馬橋地主瓦司碉租借駟馬橋土地為農事試驗場當憑康定縣政府訂定合約
,"1943, (SCDAG, QZH: 249; AJH: 81). 
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rented”.38 The manager of the Ya’an farm wrote to the Agriculture Institute 
head office, stating that “since this farm has been established, all its land has 
been rented from private individuals.”39 The manager asked the government 
to consider buying 140 mu of land, most of which was marked as huang or 
“uncultivated” on the map sent with the request. The Xikang provincial 
government did expropriate small amounts of (cultivated and uncultivated) 
land for infrastructure projects like the Kangding airstrip. However, I have 
not encountered any evidence that the state expropriated land as the 
implementation of its declared principle that all huang land was public 
property. A detailed 1939 survey of huang land in Ningshu counties noted 
whether plots were owned by Yi, Han private individuals, tusi, or the state 
(guan 官).40 In each county, the proportion of huang land that was state-
owned was tiny. In Mianning, for example, five percent of the 242 square li 
of huang land in the county belonged to the state (and 55 percent was 
privately owned by Han). 
The rent payments made by the state enterprises were quite low. The 
Simaqiao farm paid the Catholics, the Tibetans and the other landlords the 
uniform rate of eight kg of grain per mu, and “in accordance with local 
custom” the government did not pay any rent for the first three years.41 
According to Dwight Perkins’ figures, the Republican period national 
average per mu yield of barley was around 75 kg; so if the Simaqaio land 
had produced this much, rent would have amounted to only a bit more than 
ten percent of yield.42  But in reality only a small proportion of the farm's 
                                               
38 Xikang sheng nongye gaijin suo, Ningshu ban’gong shi shizhang Xu Xiaohui 西康省農
改所，甯屬辦公室室長徐孝恢, correspondence with Director of Agriculture Institute, 
1944, (SCDAG, QZH: 249; AJH: 79). 
39 Xikang sheng nongye gaijin suo, Ya’an nongchang changzhang 雅安農場場長, 
correspondence with Director of Agriculture Institute, 1947, (SCDAG, QZH: 249; AJH: 
79). 
40 "Ningshu diaocha baogao huibian," nongmumen 農牧門, 67-77. 
41 "Xikang sheng nongye gaijin suo xiang Simaqiao dizhu Wasi diao zujie Simaqiao tudi 
wei nongshi shiyanchang dang ping Kangding xian zhengfu ding heyue西康省農業改進
所向駟馬橋地主瓦司碉租借駟馬橋土地為農事試驗場當憑康定縣政府訂定合約," 
1943,  (SCDAG, QZH: 249; AJH: 81) 
42 Dwight H. Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968 (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1969), 279. 
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land was productive at that level. In 1949, the manager of the Simaqiao farm 
reported that of the 536 mu they had rented only a little more than 100 mu 
had been cultivated.43 The manager did not state how much the farm earned 
from this and the livestock that presumably grazed on at least some of the 
uncultivated land. But however much the farm made, “after paying the rent 
there is very little left. If the weather is dry, output drops significantly and 
self-sufficiency is very difficult.”44  
Most of the other farms were much smaller than this one (again, with the 
exception of the Taining ranch), and understandably so. If the government 
policy was to rent rather than expropriate huang land, there was no point in 
adding to expenses by renting large amounts of land when it was uncertain 
whether it could be put into profitable production or not. The contrast with 
Zhao Erfeng’s approach is stark. After the central government had paid 
Zhao’s military expenses, it had cost nothing for him to appropriate huang 
land in the name of the Emperor with the aspiration of filling it with as 
many settlers as possible, who were permitted free use of as much of it as 
their strength permitted. There was not much chance that the late 
Republican local governments would be so generous given that huang land 
was something they rented from private owners, rather than something they 
acquired for free. In Yashu and Ningshu, where rent was more expensive 
than in Kham, some enterprises experienced a serious shortage of land.45 
The Ya’an farm had 40 mu; 10 of which was devoted to experimental crops 
and 30 to production for the market in an unsuccessful effort to recoup 
expenses. The Hanyuan farm did not have enough land to establish a 
                                               
43 "Xikang sheng nongye gaijin suo Kangding nongchang yewu gaikuang西康省農業改進
所康定農場業務概況," 1949, (SCDAG, QZH: 249; AJH: 152). 
44 Ibid. 
45 For example, a Dechang farm and forest plantation paid one landlord two shi for 12 mu, 
nearly double the Simaqiao farm’s rents. Generally, agriculture is more productive in 
Ningshu due to the warmer climate. However, with higher rents, the cost of not producing 
anything, or producing inefficiently would have been higher.  
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mulberry plantation, even though silk production was one of its core 
activities.46 It had to buy its mulberry leaves from private growers.  
In addition to not enforcing theoretical state ownership of huang land 
even when the vital interests of state agricultural enterprises were at stake, 
no punitive measures were ever taken against landlords who owned 
wasteland. In fact, such land was either not taxed at all, or taxed at a rate far 
below other categories of land. In Hanyuan in 1940, all land was 
categorized into nine grades depending on its productivity. Huang land was 
in the bottom category, and taxed at a rate that was only one eighth of the 
category that contained the worst kind of tian 田 “field” land.47  
The decision to rent huang land rather than expropriate it seems to 
represent an unexpected bout of respect for private property from what 
Barnett calls “one of the most oppressive (in my opinion, one of the worst) 
warlord regimes in China.”48 It had far reaching consequences for the model 
of agricultural development employed by the government enterprises. It 
probably also affected private land reclamation as well. The 1936 Sichuan 
Frontier Quarterly article quoted above argued that:  
 
For more than twenty years the government has attempted to foster 
migration to the Kham borderlands and the cultivation of its huang lands, 
but they have made no progress whatsoever. Efforts have been obstructed 
by the evil influence of vestiges of feudalism.49  
 
Describing ownership of huang land as “feudalism” was stretching the 
definition of “feudalism”, even by the standards of Chinese discourse in 
which the concept stood for a vague array of problematic conditions. 
Nevertheless, in arguing that this restricted settlement the writer had a point. 
                                               
46 Xikang sheng nongye gaijin suo. Hanyuan nong chang changzhang 漢源農場場長, 
correspondence with Director of Agriculture Institute, 1947, (SCDAG, QZH:249, AJH: 
101). 
47 Xikang sheng tudi chenbao banshichu 西康省土地陳報辦事處, "Hanyuan xian di mu 
shuilü fu’e tongji biao 漢源縣地畝稅率賦額統計表," 1940, (SCDAG, QZH: 248, AJH: 
2). 
48 A. Doak Barnett, China's Far West: Four Decades of Change (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1993), 448. 
49 ZYDZ, "Diaocha ziliao," Chuanbian jikan 2, no. 2 (1936): 163. 
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As we shall see in chapter six, the high cost of transport in the frontier 
meant that away from major markets farming could only be profitable if 
farmers had virtually free use of land.  
Why did Republican governments allow people to exercise private 
ownership over huang land, a course that was detrimental to both their own 
agricultural enterprises and the general ambition of increasing Han 
settlement in the highlands? As we saw in chapter one, although the late 
Republican regional government only controlled a small part of the territory 
it claimed, within this zone of control its authority was relatively strong. In 
1939, Liu Wenhui’s Twenty Fourth Army defeated the well armed field 
office of the Panchen Lama in distant Kanze in only two months (see 
chapter four). It would be wrong to think that the army was simply not 
strong enough to confiscate plots of huang land for the provincial 
government’s agricultural enterprises. Rather, this was a result of structural 
factors relating to the state’s methods of raising revenue, as well as the 
landowning interests of some (but not all) government officials’ families 
and their peers.  
 
 
Government by Official-Elite Network? 
 
The most popular explanation in the Republican period for governments’ 
failures to allow settlers free use of huang land was that wealthy landowners 
bought off local authorities. This is the explanation given in the Sichuan 
Frontier Quarterly article quoted above, which accused the Kangding 
authorities of taking bribes from Tibetan families in return for allowing 
them to collect rent from Han users of huang land. This has also been the 
explanation that other scholars have highlighted when discussing analogous 
phenomenon in the Sichuan basin. Referring to a book about Sichuan’s 
Republican-period malaise, Robert Kapp writes:  
  
Landowners, if they wished to escape the ruinous demands of bandits, 
militia and occupying armies had to be on good terms with the predators 
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and be able to buy their good will with flattery, gifts, and lavish 
entertainment.50 
 
Here we are presented with suffering landlords who were forced to bribe 
rapacious men-at-arms, rather than rapacious (Tibetan) landlords who 
bribed (negligent) men-at-arms, causing migrants (who were apparently 
absent from the Sichuan basin scene) to suffer. But the core phenomenon is 
similar: by developing positive relationships with the armed forces, 
landowners could be spared the latter’s demands.  
“Gifts and lavish entertainment” may well have greased these 
relationships, but we need not imagine they were the sole components. 
Perhaps the government and landowning elites were tightly interwoven by 
various forms of social and kin connections. Indeed, the impression given in 
some accounts is that the “state” should be seen as merely the official 
threads within a web of elite power, in which some individuals were vested 
with official titles and some not. Aside from kinship connections, there was 
the Paoge 袍哥: the not-so-secret society which “men of letters and the 
gentry alike compete to join […] Almost all the officials and magistrates, 
men and officers are members”51 Perhaps state policy was produced by this 
Paoge infused network of elites and officialdom, with the result that even 
though all officials paid lip-service to the theory that strong state institutions 
should be built for the benefit of the nation, they were more interested in 
building strong private enterprises for the benefit of themselves and their 
network associates.  
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This view fits well with the dominant interpretation presented in English 
language writing on the late Republican Xikang government: that it was 
largely a vehicle for furthering the interests of Liu Wenhui and Family Inc. 
Barnett wrote: 
 
When [Liu Wenhui] moved to Xikang, he was accompanied by his 
personal army, a horde of relatives, and the usual host of hangers-on who 
congregate as satellites and sycophants around a powerful local leader in 
China. These people took over control of the region and today they rule 
in General Liu's name.52 
 
Goullart made a similar comment: “The directorate of the [“Xiling”] 
company, I was told contained all the top men in Sikang [Xikang], including 
the governor; a perfect ‘family’ affair as they were all more or less 
related.” 53  And when state officials wanted land for their own private 
enterprises, they never seem to have had any difficulty acquiring it. Deng 
Pancun and Chen Dongfu acquired several hundred mu in the early 1930s 
for their Golden Abundance Cultivation and Livestock Company (Jinbo 
kenmu gongsi 金博墾牧公司).54 Government officials were also privately 
involved with the Kham-Ning Migration and Settlement Company (Kang-
Ning kenzhi gongsi 康甯墾殖公司).55  
There is certainly strong evidence that Agriculture Institute farm 
managers consulted local elites about expansion strategies, and that they 
considered the views and actions of “local gentry” (difang shishen 地方士
紳) worthy of reporting to the head office. The manager of the Hanyuan 
farm wrote “this summer I raised the matter of our farm’s urgent need for a 
mulberry plantation with the local gentry, and they all approved of the idea 
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of using the old militia training ground for this purpose.”56 Furthermore, 
local gentry in Xichang appear to have been able to negotiate with the 
government on how much tax they had to pay.57 Unsurprisingly given such 
arrangements, huang land in Xichang was not only not subject to punitive 
tax rates, it was exempted from tax entirely.  
More clues about the nature of the relationships that bound state officials 
and landowning elites emerge from the government’s handling of the 
catastrophe that many landlords faced in the era of wartime and post-war 
hyperinflation. Wherever rents were paid in cash and contractually fixed, 
hyperinflation wiped out landlords’ incomes. To make matters worse, in 
1941 the central government stipulated that the land tax had to be paid in 
kind rather than in cash. This meant that having seen their rental incomes 
collapse, landlords were forced to buy grain at prices that spiralled ever 
upwards in order to pay their taxes. In Kham, most landlords were immune 
to these devastating changes because their rents were typically paid in grain. 
In Ningshu and Yashu, ruined landlords desperately sought to renegotiate 
tenancy contracts, often seeking to repossess their lands, including those 
rented to the state agricultural enterprises. The Xikang government 
considered three potential responses. 58  Firstly, it could ignore the 
landowners and continue the leases according the contracts. Secondly, it 
could accede to the landlords’ requests and return the land. Thirdly, the state 
could buy the land, which was presumably the second best option for the 
landlords. In 1946 the provincial government created a convoluted system 
for determining which course of action to take.59 All scenarios, except for 
the apparently impossible situation in which the land value had declined 
despite hyperinflation, led to it being either returned or bought. With the 
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widespread termination of the leases, Xichang’s Madaozi farm, for example, 
cancelled all its leases, the government again acted favourably towards 
landowners even though it had no obligation to do so.60  
Despite the government agreeing to their requests, however, landlords 
who successfully got out of their tenancy agreements did pay a cost. The 
deposits (yazu 押租) that the government had paid when the leases were 
created were adjusted for inflation. “If the 1940 land value was 51,000 yuan 
and the deposit for the tenancy was 5,400 yuan, and the 1946 land value is 
51,000,000 yuan, then the deposit returned should be 400,000 yuan.” 61  
Elsewhere in China courts ruled that deposits did not have to be adjusted for 
inflation.62 Even without such payments, the extent to which the land was 
really “given back” was questionable. “It is hoped that after the land has 
been given back, [landlords] will continue to grow cotton and will accept 
the guidance of the Ningshu office of the Agriculture Institute.”63  
Thus there is a certain amount of ambivalence to the government’s 
handling of the issue. It was kind to landowners but not very kind. It let 
them out of contracts when they faced ruin, but forced them to pay back 
inflation adjusted deposits that could have tipped some of them over the 
edge anyway. And in case the landowners survived, they carried the “hopes” 
of the government that they would continue to implement its development 
plan under the direction of state agencies. Perhaps hyperinflation shifted the 
balance in the state-elite network, causing the influence of elites to wane. It 
humbled formerly prestigious and influential landowners and empowered a 
provincial government with more ready access to the money printing-
presses. 
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However, even in the time before hyperinflation, there are limits to the 
thesis that the decision not to appropriate huang land was due to the relative 
importance of landowners and unimportance of state institutions to regional 
government officials. For one thing, renting land rather than buying or 
expropriating it was the uniform policy of all the enterprises under the 
Agriculture Institute, a policy that was clearly made at the highest levels of 
the government. Tenancy agreements, as well as the documents relating to 
the giving back of land during hyperinflation show that the government’s 
treatment of its landlords did not vary much. By contrast, Richard Gunde 
argues that “By freely wielding their power as a political elite, […] the 
[Sichuanese] warlord and bureaucrat landlords constructed a system of 
taxation that oppressed some landlords, but left others, namely themselves 
untouched.” 64  Why not adopt the same selective oppression of poorly 
connected landowners in Xikang?  
Furthermore, more than one group of people could take advantage of the 
possibility of bribing government officials or using Paoge and other kinds of 
connections to get what they wanted. The settler forced to pay rent for a 
grave site was presumed to be a poor, hapless individuals who was easily 
bullied around by the wealthy landlords. But not all people who stood to 
gain from Zhao Erfeng-ist free use of huang land fit this description. Agri-
businesses, cultivation societies and rival landlords could be powerful and 
influential. In a retrospective account of the Leshan-Pingshan Cultivation 
Society (the successor to the Bathang Cultivation Society mentioned in 
chapter two), one of its founders described how, in 1910, the society had 
bribed Qing officials at the Provincial Bureau of Commerce and Industry 
(quanyedao 勸業道) to register their society so it could take advantage of 
regulations designed to encourage the cultivation of privately owned huang 
land.  
 
A landlord of Zhongzui of powerful social standing, one of the wealthiest 
in the township, came to “make representations” (fasheng jiaoshe 發生交
涉). We told him that Zhou Xiaohui 周孝懷 of the Bureau of Commerce 
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and Industry was lobbying the government to register (li’an 立案) our 
society. If the land were declared state-owned wasteland (guan huang 官
荒), we would have ten years tax free use of it […]. If it were declared 
privately owned wasteland (minhuang 民荒), the landlord would have 
one year to cultivate the land himself, or else the Leshan-Pingshan 
Cultivation Society would be allowed to cultivate it in perpetuity and 
need only pay [extremely low] […] “wasteland rents” (huang zu 荒租). 
[...] For the next twenty years, no more landlords ever came to make 
representations with us again.65  
 
In theory, to register with the Bureau the society had to be able to show 
that its capital stock was worth at least twenty thousand yuan.66 The society 
had much less than this but managed to get the Bureau to register it through 
a combination of deceit and bribery. Society agents “squandered an 
enormous amount of money” entertaining Bureau officials. Once in the 
mountains, they told the officials that the Society had spent the money 
raised through the sale of shares on grain. “Using the excuse that 
storehouses had not yet been built, [we] told the commissioner that this or 
that family’s grain belonged to the society.” The commissioner believed 
them and the society was registered. Hence, another problem with the thesis 
that corruption was the sole reason that officials ignored the law and 
allowed landowners to own and charge rent on huang land is that corruption 
could also work against landowners and allow outsiders like the Society to 
take over huang land even when they had not fulfilled all the legal 
requirements for doing so.     
 
 
State Revenue  
 
A different explanation for the government’s decision not to appropriate 
huang land relates to its relationship with land, rather than people. It is an 
explanation that highlights the way that the government funded itself. 
Delving into state finances is a perilous undertaking, particularly in the 
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Republican period. Jerome Ch’en notes that one set of budget figures used 
in his study of the eastern Sichuan-Hubei highlands “were a pipe dream and 
a warning to myself and those who are interested in studying the 
government finances of Republican China that budgetary figures were just 
dreams.” 67  Nevertheless, because organizations' policies are likely to be 
influenced by the way they raise revenue, the interpretation of these 
particular dreams is a worthwhile, if difficult, endeavor. 
From a certain point of view, Qing magistrates were justified to connect 
huang land to, in the vivid words of Ruth Meserve, “the horror of 
devastation and desolation.” 68  Chinese administrations sometimes had 
difficulty deciding whether or not land used for grazing livestock counted as 
huang or not. But in the cool light of Qing budgets, it did not really matter. 
Almost all revenue generated from Sichuan frontier resources came in the 
form of land taxes levied on cultivated land. Using the official price of 20 
Tibetan yuan per shi of highland barley, the Kangding land tax was worth 
20,760 Tibetan yuan in 1910; 99 percent of county government revenue, 
given that livestock taxes amounted to only 203 Tibetan yuan.69 Customs 
revenue belonged to the national government and, in any case, was mostly 
generated by the traffic of Sichuanese tea through frontier counties, rather 
than by resources from the frontier counties. Even in a county like Lithang, 
where there was even more herding and less crop growing, the land tax was 
worth 17,753 Tibetan yuan, and livestock taxes only 2,431 Tibetan yuan. 
Whether it was used for grazing animals or used for nothing at all, 
grasslands were unproductive from the administration’s perspective in that 
they produced only a very small amount of revenue compared to cultivated 
land. Livestock owners did not get a free-ride: they faced the wula corvée 
tax, which was a much more onerous burden in many cases and will be 
discussed in chapter four. Wula however, did not result in cash income for 
governments: there was no reason for the Qing frontier administration to see 
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livestock as a potential source of revenue rather than a resource that it 
needed but only in finite quantities. 
This changed dramatically in the Republican period, when all county 
governments experimented with different kinds of extra taxes. 70 Specific 
rates and levies varied from county to county, but everywhere direct and 
indirect taxation on animal resources as a share of total revenue increased 
significantly. The new butchery tax (tu shui 屠稅), which was an indirect 
tax on livestock, accounted for 20 percent of Kangding county government 
revenue in 1932.71 The share of county income generated by the livestock 
tax had risen from less than one percent to four percent by the same year.  
Two new taxes on opium and alcohol consumption amounted to three 
percent together, and the deed tax, which had existed elsewhere in China 
during the Qing but had not been collected in Kangding, amounted to five 
percent. The deed tax was significant for another reason too, as we will see 
below. This meant that taxes on grain had dropped from 99 percent to 68 
percent of on-the-books county government revenue. Although the land tax 
still brought in three times as much revenue as animal related taxes, the 
contrast with the Qing period, when the difference has been a factor of a 
nearly a hundred, was significant. Furthermore, as we shall see in chapter 
four, Republican period governments levied more animal transport corveé 
than Zhao Erfeng.  
Butchery taxes were also hugely important in Ningshu in the Republican 
period. Of the levies that Yuesui remitted to the provincial government, the 
land tax accounted for 47 percent and the butchery tax for 20 percent.72 
There is an uncertainty here that was largely absent in Kham, where most 
livestock were goats, yaks or horses that grazed mostly on uncultivated 
pasture. Goats and horses were raised on grazing land in Ningshu too, but 
some of the animals butchered in Yuesui were pigs raised in sties on 
cultivated land.   
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Despite this uncertainty, throughout the whole Sichuan frontier region, 
Republican period Han local and regional governments drew on livestock 
resources much more than their Qing predecessors had. The question of 
whether or not grazing land was huang was now more important for 
governments. Whichever way it was answered there would be further 
difficult questions. Agriculture Institute records often made pastoral land 
(fangmu di 放牧地), together with forested land, a sub-category of huang 
land. One survey, for example, estimated the area of huang land in each 
county, broken down into the percentages of forest, grazing land, chaicao di 
柴草地 (“firewood land”) and “other huang land”.73 This being the case, 
given the changes in where their income came from, it seems very 
improbable that magistrates could have still considered huang land ipso 
facto, to be unproductive, associated only with “devastation and desolation”. 
Even if governors continued to accept the idea that more cultivation was 
desirable, the dichotomy between unproductive huang land and productive 
cultivated land was surely no longer tenable. Yet, to a large extent it was 
precisely this dichotomy between huang and cultivation that justified state 
appropriation of huang land.  
Of course, even though a dichotomy between huang (inclusive of grazing 
land) and cultivated land now made less sense, the government could have 
decided to appropriate huang land anyway as a part of an atavistic return to 
Zhao Erfeng-ism. However, while almost nobody in the Kham or upland 
Ningshu had possessed title deeds to uncultivated land issued by a Chinese 
government in the Qing, Republican period governments issued a very large 
number of titles to huang land. They did this for two reasons. Firstly, as the 
French missionary F. Gore reported, county magistrates sold off land 
appropriated by the Qing administration. 74  It is probably impossible to 
determine exactly how much land was sold in this manner because the 
practice was illegal.  
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Secondly, Republican era local administrations issued land title to huang 
land in order to collect the deed tax (qishui 契稅). This was levied on 
property titles and transactions authorized by the government. It was 
collected as a percentage of the value of the transaction, on both outright 
land sales and conditional sales. In Xikang the normal deed tax rates were 
six percent on outright sales and three percent on the conditional sales, 
although like most Republican period taxes, it was also subject to local 
surcharges. This tax had existed during the Qing dynasty, but in Kham, 
Zhao Erfeng did not levy it on the titles his government granted to migrant 
farmers.75 Migrants were not allowed to resell these titles, and all huang 
land was supposed to belong to the government, so in theory the deed tax 
could only ever be levied on transactions involving urban property and land 
already cultivated by indigenous people. The Qing government made no 
attempt to issue the indigenous people with land-titles, however.76 There 
may have been a very small amount of deed tax collected on urban property 
transactions involving Han settlers in places like Kangding, but this does not 
appear in any of the frontier administration budgets used by this study.77 If it 
existed, it must have been in the category of “miscellaneous taxes (zhengza 
shui 正雜稅)”, which amounted to less than one percent of tax revenue from 
within the Kham region.78 In Ningshu, away from established centres of 
Han population, tusi issued Han migrants hong zhao 红照  land-rights 
contracts—these will be discussed in chapter five: here we need only note 
that Chinese authorities appear to have had nothing to do with them.  
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In 1914 the Sichuan Frontier Department of Finance (caizheng bu 财政
部) established a Deed Tax Collection Office (qi shui chou ban chu 契稅籌
辦處). It noted that in Kham “there are no official deeds, and there are 
frequent disputes caused by allegations of trespassing. Now, deeds will be 
granted to landowners without exception, in order to prevent conflicts and 
increase tax revenue (yu shui ru 裕税入).”79 The same lines or variations of 
them appeared multiple times in government communications on the 
subject.80 Because only a very small number of landowners in Kangding and 
Luding already possessed land deeds, estimations of the potential income 
that could be gained by issuing them with a small tax on each were very 
large indeed. The magistrate of Gong County, between Ba’an and Chamdo, 
figured that about 35,000 Tibetan yuan would be collected from his small 
and thinly populated county.81 This must have been a huge overestimate, but 
actual income could be substantial. In 1916, the Gyaisi county authorities 
succeed in raising 4,170 dayang yuan by issuing deeds for property 
categorized as “fields”, “pasture (muchang 牧場)”, “buildings” or “temple 
estate”.82 In the past, officials had had an incentive to register land as huang 
so that migrants could be settled on it; now there was an incentive to register 
it in one of the other categories and permit private ownership of it so that 
more tax could be collected. 4,170 dayang 大洋  yuan may have been 
something of a disappointment, but it would have covered most of the costs 
of, for example, grain rations for a garrison of about 150 soldiers for a 
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year.83 Gyaisi County’s population was estimated at around 12,000 in the 
1930s, so a garrison of 150 would have been a meaningful presence.84  
The initial deed tax bonanza ended after those landowners who could be 
coerced or otherwise persuaded into paying for an official title deed did so. 
Thereafter the tax was collected when the government issued new deeds to 
purchasers of real estate. In places where there was a significant amount of 
buying and selling of land revenue could still be significant. The Kangding 
records quoted above indicated that the deed tax amounted to seven percent 
of the value of the land tax in 1932. Throughout the 1930s the relative value 
of the tax grew significantly. In Kangding in 1939, revenue from this tax 
was worth 7,600 yuan.85 In that year the land tax was, in theory, worth about 
47,150 yuan, if the amount given in grain (1,886 shi) 86 is converted into 
cash at market prices (roughly 25 yuan per shi in 1939)87, so in theory the 
deed tax was now worth 16 percent of the land tax. In reality, its relative 
worth was higher than this because the government often allowed the land 
tax to paid as a cash payment at what was a below market price for the 
amount of grain owed.88 In 1940, provincial government records calculated 
that in the province as a whole, deed tax income was equivalent to a massive 
33 percent of the land tax income.89 According to the same records by that 
time, it had become the third most important tax to the provincial 
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government and the most important tax to local governments (it is unclear 
how the income from it was divided between the two.)90 
In some Ningshu counties, the deed tax was even more significant for 
county governments. Astonishingly, according to some records, Mianning’s 
deed tax revenue was higher than its land tax revenue in 1941.91 Records of 
Ningshu tax revenues are more varied than records from Kham, perhaps 
because the Ningshu’s administration was more complex due to a higher 
population and more diverse economy. But while Mianning’s deed tax may 
not actually have been higher than its land tax, all the records that I have 
seen indicate that it was a highly significant source of revenue.92 
It was a tax that should have retained its importance through the era of 
hyperinflation because it was collected as a percentage of transactions’ 
value, rather than as fixed amount (like the livestock tax), and because it 
was collected throughout the year. According to one writer, there was a 
robust trade in land throughout the 1940s because small capitalists had 
“little faith in the national currency” and “came to see purchasing land as 
the most reliable [store for wealth], and everybody began buying land. From 
the hinterlands to the core, from southeast to northwest, there was a great 
competition among the wealthy to buy land.”93  
Just as in early Republican Kham, county officials mindful of the 
importance of this source of revenue had an incentive to grant individuals 
title to uncultivated land. For each transaction in the 1940 Kangding deed 
tax records there was a single word description of the type of land involved, 
and some stated that the land was, indeed, huang or forest.94 Most of the 
records simply described the land as “mountain land” (shan di 山地 ), 
without noting what, if anything, it was used for. Buyers (or the tax office) 
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may well have recorded uncultivated or forested land as “mountain land” as 
a precaution against problems that could have arisen had the provincial 
government decided to make good its proclamation of one year earlier that 
huang land was public property. Most of the names in the records are Han 
Chinese names, though this does not mean that some were not Tibetans or 
people of mixed ancestry using Chinese names. But in seven of the 128 
transactions, someone with an obviously Tibetan name bought land from a 
person with a Han name, and in two transactions both the names are clearly 
Tibetan. 
In sum, subjectively, the huang land that officials encountered in the late 
Republican period was different from the huang land that the Qing 
administration had dealt with. It produced almost no income for the Qing 
government, but a substantial amount of revenue for Republican 
governments. Moreover, in the Qing it had not been covered with any form 
of legal title that Chinese governments recognized. By the late Republican 
period, large numbers of people, particularly those nearby Chinese 
administrative centres and including indigenous people, possessed titles to 
huang land that had been created by local Chinese authorities. This was one 
of the key reasons for the difference between the Qing and Republican 
period administrations’ behaviour regarding uncultivated land in the 
highlands.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the second half of the Republican period a strong Chinese state re-
emerged in the eastern part of the highlands. Of course, in many places in 
Kham and Liangshan, this state was, as Hsiao-ting Lin puts it “merely a 
foreign body to the Xikang natives, with limited influence over the 
infrastructure.”95 But the triangle between Ya’an, Kangding and Xichang, as 
well as certain other places such as Taining, was, in James Leibold’s words, 
                                               
95 Lin, Tibet and Nationalist China's Frontier, 68. 
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Liu Wenhui’s “fiefdom”. 96  There were some significant continuities 
between Liu Wenhui’s regime and Zhao Erfeng’s. Both were Kham-centric. 
Both maintained the theory that huang land belonged to the state. 
Republican period settlement societies and companies implemented regimes 
to foster and control migrant communities that were obviously inspired by 
Zhao Erfeng’s system. However, differences were substantial. Despite what 
it said, Liu’s government gave up on the idea that huang land was public 
land and, with one significant exception to be explored in the next chapter, 
even state-owned agricultural enterprises rented their land from private 
owners, even when it was registered as huang.  
This may strike us as paradoxical, because it seems to clash with another 
significant change that occurred in the Republican period: the rising 
importance of state-owned enterprise. In contrast to Zhao Erfeng, who 
aimed to develop communities of peasants with small amounts of land that 
they leased from the state, Liu Wenhui's government concentrated its 
agricultural spending on a cluster of provincial government owned 
enterprises, which employed migrants as waged labourers. Some of the 
reasons for the change in agricultural strategy and for the significance of the 
state owned enterprises in Kham will be explored in the following chapter. 
How is it that state institutions became more important for the 
government's development strategy, but the government became less 
inclined to use state power to appropriate huang land? Was the Han state in 
the highlands growing or withering? The decision not to take over huang 
land can be partially attributed to the way that Liu’s regime was solidly 
embedded in a network of landowners and regional elites. However, this 
does not explain why the provincial government did not just pick on poor or 
poorly connected landlowners. In fact, we need not see the government's 
decision to rent huang land as a result of the weakness of state institutions. 
It can be explained by changes in the sources of provincial and local 
government revenue. Government at both levels drew a much greater 
proportion of their income from huang land, in the form of taxation of 
animal products or taxation of land trading, than the Qing state had done. 
                                               
96 Leibold, Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism, 69. 
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Taxation of land titles also encouraged a vast expansion in the amount of 
land covered by titles that Han authorities recognized. Comparing the 
Republican and Qing governments’ ability to extract wealth from the 
frontier, the Republicans added these forms of tax revenue at the cost of the 
Agriculture Institute enterprises having to pay small amounts of rent to 
private landowners. It was probably a worthwhile move that left them, on 
balance, better off than their Qing predecessors had been.  
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Chapter Four: Corvée Labour and the Development of Local and 
Regional Chinese Authority in Kham  
 
 
“Certainly if anyone deserves to go to Lhasa and get a medal for it, it is the 
supply and transport man. But he will be left behind.”1 
-Edmund Candler (1874-1926). 
 
Thus far we have looked at the development of Han Chinese regional and 
local authority in the highlands west and southwest of the Sichuan basin 
between 1905 and 1949. In chapter one I argued that, if one takes into 
consideration the immense difficulties that regional Han governors faced 
and judges them by more realistic standards than those they set for 
themselves, this state-building endeavour was rather more successful than 
many historians have assumed. This modest success was thanks in no small 
part to subsidies from the national and Sichuan governments, and, from the 
mid-1930s, to a war on drugs that gifted the highland state a lucrative source 
of revenue. However, it was also achieved through adaptation to local 
circumstances. The Han-dominated highland authorities that emerged in the 
first half of the twentieth century were not merely copies of a generic 
Chinese form, but were fundamentally influenced by the ways they 
attempted to resolve the core problems of governing this region. This 
chapter demonstrates this with respect to Kham and the next chapter does 
the same with respect to Ningshu.  
In a 1940 article, Liu Wenhui argued that there were three key matters 
requiring government attention in Xikang.2 These were: the “Yi problem” in 
Ningshu; religion and the government’s approach to religion in Kham; and 
the problems relating to the wula 烏拉 corvée labour tax in Kham. The “Yi 
problem” is the subject of chapter five. Of the two Kham-related problems 
that Liu mentioned, this thesis concentrates on wula for two reasons. Firstly, 
                                               
1 Edmund Candler, The Unveiling of Lhasa (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1905), 56. 
Candler was a journalist, novelist, educator, and Daily Mail correspondent ‘embedded’ 
with Younghusband’s Tibet expedition. 
2 Liu Wenhui, "Ganzi shibian jiejue jingguo 甘孜事變解決經過," Kangdao yuekan 2, no. 8 
(1940): 8. 
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I feel that it was a more serious difficulty for the government and certainly it 
generated a very large volume of discussion that referred to it as a 
“problem”. By contrast, discussion of religion was less likely to explicitly 
consider it a “problem” that needed to be resolved. Liu’s focus on religion 
might have been partly due to his own personal interest in 
Buddhism. According to Sun Shuyun, Liu himself was a devout Buddhist.3 
Peter Guillart notes that “the superstitious and backward Governor would 
not take a step without recourse” to “Soong Lama” in Kangding, who was 
his “unofficial soothsayer.” 4 Liu’s government established Wuming (wu 
ming 五明, Five Sciences) Buddhist Colleges from 1938 in several places in 
Xikang (discussed briefly in chapter seven).5 The other reason for focusing 
on corvée labour rather than religion is that the relationship of Republican 
era Chinese politics and Tibetan religion is much better served in the 
existing Chinese and English language literatures than the topic of corvée 
labour in the highlands.6  
“Wula” was the Chinese transcription of the name of a customary Inner-
Asian tax according to which owners of carrying animals were obliged to 
provide transport services to government officials and armies, typically 
either for free or for compensation at well below market transport rates. This 
chapter examines the problems caused by this system in the early twentieth 
century, and government attempts to resolve these problems. I argue that the 
wula problem was of fundamental importance in defining regional and local 
government developmental agendas for Kham, as well as government 
relations with indigenous leadership and communities. There was a plurality 
of opinion as to what the root problem really was, and what the best way to 
                                               
3 Sun, The Long March, 146. 
4 Goullart, 29-30. 
5 Wang Chuan, "Minguo zhong-hou qi de zhengzhi yu zongjiao: Liu Wenhui yu Xikang 
diqu zangquan fojiao jie 民国中后期的政治与宗教：刘文辉与西康地区藏传佛教界," 
in Yijiusanling niandai de Zhongguo 一九三 0年代的中国, ed. Zhongguo shehui kexue 
yuan jindaishi yanjiusuo minguo yanjiushi 中国社会科学院近代史研究所民国研究室 
and Sichuan shifan daxue lishi wenhua xueyuan 四川师范大学历史文化学院 (Beijing: 
Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2006), 809. 
6 The best work in English is Gray Tuttle, Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern 
China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). In Chinese, see Wang Chuan, 
"Minguo zhong-hou qi de zhengzhi yu zongjiao." 
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deal with it was. Nevertheless, discussion of the wula problem led to the 
formation of constellations of opinions and plans for action that had far-
reaching implications for the development of the Chinese state in Kham. 
Officials who did not like working with indigenous leadership, or those who 
blamed indigenous leaders for the problems with the wula system, argued 
for the formation of a large state-enterprise to deal with the problem. Those 
who were warier of state-enterprise found the only other solution was to 
work more closely with indigenous leaders, and deepen relations between 
the state and indigenous communities. Both sorts of solutions exerted an 
important influence on the development of regional and local Chinese 
authority in Kham, an influence that can be detected even in the present day. 
This chapter begins with an analysis of the problems caused by this tax, 
and Zhao Erfeng’s attempts to deal with them. Wula became a much more 
significant problem in the Republican period, although not necessarily for 
the reasons that were given at the time, which rested on a somewhat rosy 
construction of Zhao’s regime. I then outline Republican period responses to 
the wula problem and demonstrate that this problem was crucial to the 
evolution of the Chinese authority in eastern Kham in that era.  
 
 
The “Wula Problem” in the Qing  
 
Wula, which has been romanized as “u-lag” from Tibetan, “ulaq” from 
Turkic and “ulagh” and “ulag-a” from Mongolian, had an extremely broad 
geographic and historical existence.7 The term, originally Turkic according 
to John Boyal, dates from the Mongol empire and continued to be used by 
the Islamic and Mongol states that succeeded that empire.8 It is not clear 
                                               
7 See James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass, 119; John Masson Jr. Smith, "Mongol and 
Nomadic Taxation," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 30 (1970): 75; Melvyn C. 
Goldstein, T.N. Shelling, and J.T. Surkhang, eds., The New Tibetan-English Dictionary of 
Modern Tibetan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 
8 See Sunil Kumar, "The Ignored Elites: Turks, Mongols and a Persian Secretarial Class in 
the Early Delhi Sultanate," Modern Asian Studies 43, no. 1 (2007); Ata-Malik Juvaini, 
John Andrew Boyle, and David Morgan, Genghis Khan: the History of the World 
Conqueror, trans. John Andrew Boyle (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 
30. Juvaini himself explained that the tax was originally one of the qubchur taxes levied 
only on Mongols, not the peasantry, (Kumar, "The Ignored Elites," 65.) 
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when the tax and its lexicon entered the Tibetan world. This could have 
occurred during the thirteenth century Mongol Empire, as one recent 
Chinese historian has suggested, or on any number of later occasions. 9  
Goldstein reports that interviewees from a village near Gyantse in Central 
Tibet said that corvée service had the generic name of rkang-’gro. 10 For 
them, ’u-lag referred specifically to human labour corvée, while riding 
animal corvée was rta’u (‘ta-wu’) and carrying animal corvée was khal-ma 
(‘kay-ma’). In Qing administrative language, “wula” usually referred 
specifically to the transport corvée, which they levied in Mongolia, 
Southern Xinjiang and the Tibetan plateau.11 
The u-lag/wula (in this thesis, I use wula) transportation corvée was 
appropriate for the normal requirements of a customary Tibetan 
administrative system that, as Goldstein notes, “delegated substantial 
government rights to the lords.”12 The central Tibetan government kept only 
a minimal military force, and did not maintain any kind of police force in 
rural areas. Even in these circumstances, Goldstein argues that the 
transportation corvée was still one of the “most difficult labour obligations 
for serfs.”13 Thus, even the kind of institutions and military that the Qing 
maintained in eighteenth and nineteenth century interior China would have 
resulted in great pressure on u-lag and the serfs who performed it.  
Zhao Erfeng himself was well aware of the problems that his 
campaigning had caused: 
 
Officials, petty officers, soldiers and men at arms of the Tibetan-frontier 
army come and go constantly. The transport of the rations and munitions 
that are required by the military forms an unending train, and the 
                                               
9 Hu Xiaomei 胡晓梅, "Liu Wenhui Kangqu wula zhidu gaige shulun 刘文辉康区乌拉制
度改革述论," Sichuan jiaoyu xueyuan xuebao 四川教育学院学报 18, no. 9 (2002): 36. 
10 Goldstein, "Taxation and the Structure of a Tibetan Village," Central Asiatic Journal 15, 
no. 1 (1971): 10. 
11 Millward, Beyond the Pass, 119. Millward mentions the use of the corveé, but does not 
provide any details as to Qing innovations. 
12 Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 5. 
13 Ibid., 4. 
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common people who live by the main routes are exhausted by rushing 
about performing this task. Many of them have fled.14   
 
His comment illustrates well the practical dangers posed by allowing 
peasants’ wula duties to rise unchecked. If overburdened peasants revolted 
or ran away, the transportation of goods and military equipment became 
impossible. It also fundamentally undermined government efforts to 
increase the population and revenue base of the region.15 As an official in 
Bathang pointed out in 1909: “In recent times, the corvée has been 
particularly burdensome, and they [wula providers] have no spare time to 
take up the cultivation of land”.16  Corveé burdens were probably also a 
factor in the resistance to Zhao Erfeng: the Lithang tusi refused to provide 
transport services to Zhao for his campaign against the rebels at Bathang, 
precipitating a violent reaction from Zhao.17 The impression given in some 
accounts is that the tusi was motivated by sympathy for the Bathangese, yet 
there is no reason to discount the severity of the wula burden as a factor in 
the tusi’s resistance. 
Even without such practical problems, increasing the burden on 
peasantry also ran directly counter to Qing traditions of light taxation.18  
Reductions of tax rates in newly conquered territory to lower levels than 
those set by the conquered government were an established way of 
demonstrating the munificence of Qing imperial power.19 Fu Songmu gave 
the following account of Zhao’s interaction with the people of Derge:  
                                               
14 Quoted in Huang Shangcheng 黃上成, "Xikang wula chaiyao zhidu zhi shi de xushu 西
康烏拉差徭制度之史的敘述," Kangdao yuekan 2, no. 5 (1940): 25. 
15 Particularly badly affected were places between Kangding and Kanze; a 1938 research 
team wrote that: “In Zhonggu and Drango and other places, in former times because of 
military campaigning, the corvée labour burden was too heavy for people to bear. There 
also they abandoned their lands and fled. […] Thus abandoned fields can be seen 
everywhere beyond the pass.” Liu Hengru et al., "Shicha Dao Lu De Bai Zhan Ya Jiang 
qi xian baogaoshu," 39.  
16 QCBD, 2:405. 
17 Sperling, "The Chinese Venture in K'am, " 18-19. 
18 Ye-chien Wang, Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750-1911 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1973), 28-31. 
19 Millward, Beyond the Pass, 54. 
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In first year of Xuantong [1909], the tusi of Derge was deposed and 
replaced with a Han civilian official. The Frontier Commissioner, Zhao 
gathered the Fan people at Sershul and said unto them: “Now the Derge 
tusi has been deposed and you will be governed by Han. Your grain 
taxes have already been reduced and your labour duties have been cut, 
we deeply hope for your development.20 
 
Zhao probably never said this to the people of Derge at all. Indeed, in 
official communications Zhao openly acknowledged that labour duties had 
not been cut in Derge, but, on the contrary, the presence of his forces had 
“added a great burden to the people’s lives.”21 However, Fu’s description 
probably indicated how Zhao would have liked to have acted, and more 
importantly, been seen to have acted. It demonstrates the extent to which the 
officials in his administration, like their forebears in Xinjiang, regarded 
cutting taxes in a newly absorbed territory as an effective demonstration of 
benevolent rule, another reason that adding to the burden of the peasantry 
was deeply problematic. 
Wula was different from other forms of heavy taxation in that it was a 
localized corvée that was essential to the basic operation of the state military 
and bureaucracy. New taxes collected in money or produce could 
theoretically be shared across a whole region equitably and levied at rates 
proportional to local wealth. Wula burdens inevitably fell unequally on 
communities where the government needed transport. Pack animals, 
handlers and fodder were not brought in from outside regions to spread the 
load evenly according to the natural distribution of resources. As we shall 
see, this solution was attempted in the Republican era, but it was very 
difficult to organize, and throughout the period of this study the government 
was basically reliant on conscripting local pack animals on an ad hoc basis.  
Zhao Erfeng’s military campaigns were not the first Qing forays into the 
Tibetan highlands and the problem had occurred before. From the Kangxi 
reign (1662-1722) to the end of the dynasty, the government response to 
these problems was to make payments to wula providers and to stipulate 
                                               
20 Fu Songmu, Xikang jiansheng ji, 3:30. 
21 QCBD, 2:303. 
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limits on how much officers and officials could demand of them. The early 
and mid Qing period had produced a lot of documentation relating to wula. 
The first Qing references to it in the Tibetan areas occur in the Kangxi 
period, and they usually indicate that livestock owners were paid for the 
service.22 The court promulgated regulations to govern compensation and 
officials’ use of the corveé as early as the fourth year of the Qianlong reign 
(1739). 23  Yingcong Dai confirms that during Qianlong’s campaigns in 
Jinchuan (1747-49 and 1771-76) “not only did the Qing pay for the non-Han 
labourers and ‘ula,’ but also granted awards and extra pay in the event of an 
emergency, transportation tasks becoming urgent.”24 
Zhao Erfeng maintained Qing tradition and ordered that payments be 
made for wula service. In addition, he created a large number of wula 
related regulations. These were promulgated in an ad-hoc fashion in a 
number of different documents and were often specific to a certain locality. 
For example, in Ba’an (Bathang) payments were increased to take into 
account the high demand and the large area from which peasants were 
recruited, which often entailed longer journeys. 25 In July 1911, a set of 
regulations intended to replace all previous provisions throughout the whole 
of Kham was produced.26 This last wula code contained twenty six articles 
and made the corveé by far the most comprehensively regulated aspect of 
the new administration’s interaction with Kham society. The wula articles 
laid out the rights and duties of peasants in great detail, leaving few aspects 
of the corvée untouched.  Payments were to be half a Tibetan yuan per 
animal per day, or four wen (文) per li; or for a human porter a quarter of a 
yuan per day. A yak could be loaded with a maximum of 120 jin 斤, a 
                                               
22 Chen Yishi, "Chuan bian Zangqu jiaotong wula chaiyao kaosuo," 48-52. 
23 Ibid.: 59. 
24 Dai, "The Qing State, Merchants, and the Military Labor Force in the Jinchuan 
Campaigns," 59. However, as Dai notes, the Qing also banned the non-Han rGyal-rong 
people from going to the Chinese areas to work as agricultural labourers, possibly with 
the intention of increasing the amount of labour available for ula, and thereby limiting the 
pressure on the government to increase compensation.  
25 QCBD, 1:104. 
26 Zhao Erfeng and Wu Fengpei, Zhao Erfeng Chuan bian zou du, 198-203. 
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human porter with 60 jin, horses were to carry only one rider, no matter the 
size of the rider. Compensation for animals that died in service was to be 
paid at market rates, to a maximum of twenty taels per horse or ten taels per 
yak. Another article gave compensation amounts to be paid in the event of 
damage to saddles, reigns and other items. Wula was to be levied on 
households according to their ownership of animals or grain tax duties. 
If Zhao’s approach to wula seems more thorough than that of his 
eighteenth century predecessors, this was most likely due to changes in 
military technology rather than ideological orientation. Zhao noted that each 
large cannon (dapao 大炮) had to be carried by several men, with several 
more being required for the emplacement (paowei 炮位) and still more for 
the shells. 27  During the Jinchuan wars, the Qing had also used heavy 
artillery, but had adopted the tactic of manufacturing cannon on site in order 
to reduce the transportation burden.28 The Jinchuan campaigns had been 
focused on a relatively small geographic area (400 li according to 
Qianlong), while Zhao’s sphere of activity stretched the entire breadth of 
Kham, so it would have been more difficult for him to implement such a 
labour saving tactic.29 This likely resulted in greater demand for transport 
services and a somewhat more significant wula problem than that faced by 
earlier military leaders in the Tibetan lands. 
 
 
Republican period knowledge of wula in the Qing 
 
Republican period writers and officials believed that Zhao Erfeng’s 
regulations had essentially solved the problem. Jiang Junzhang’s 蔣君章 
comment in Bianzheng gonglun 邊政公論 is typical:  
 
                                               
27 QCBD, 2:334. 
28 Joanna Waley-Cohen, "China and Western Technology in the Eighteenth Century," 
1537-38. 
29 Peng Zhiyan 彭陟焱, "Shi lun Qianlong pingding Jinchuan zhi yingxiang 试论乾隆评定
金川之影响," Xizang yanjiu 西藏研究, no. 1 (2003): 4. 
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We know that Zhao Erfeng was a vigorous and severe administrator, 
whose orders were always strictly enforced, with no disobedience 
tolerated. Thus, after he had established a reasonably appropriate way of 
dealing with wula, the problem was temporarily resolved.30 
 
Curiously, the history of Qing regulation of wula before Zhao Erfeng 
and in areas outside Kham appears to have been almost completely 
unknown to most Republican period officials and writers. Several writers 
did mention the Qing “pacification” of Tibet in the Kangxi reign as a critical 
moment, and understood that there was a connection between the wula 
institution of their own time and generals such as Yue Zhongqi 岳鐘琪 
(1686-1754) and Fala 法喇 (?-1735, a Commander-in-Chief active in Kham 
during the Kangxi period campaigns on the plateau). 31 But there was a 
complete and striking absence of detail in comparison to what they knew 
about Zhao Erfeng. Liu Wenhui noted simply that “the wula system was 
created in the early Qing period.”32  
One small and difficult to interpret exception to this is that several 
Republican era authors noted that a ‘human service’ (ren yao 人徭 ) 
component of wula, which entailed the provision of sexual partners to 
traveling officials, had been banned in the Qing.33 None of Zhao Erfeng’s 
regulations mentioned the ren yao, so if it ever existed it must have been 
prohibited before his arrival, which would mean that Republican writers did 
have some fragmentary knowledge of a pre-Zhao period reform of wula. On 
the other hand, this kind of service is not mentioned by Yang Zhonghua, 
who gave the most detailed account of the different types of corvée. 34   
Notwithstanding this one exception—which was never elaborated on—
                                               
30 Jiang Junzhang 蔣君章, "Wula wenti zhi jiejue tujing 烏拉問題之解決途徑," Bianzheng 
gonglun 邊政公論 1, no. 7-8 (combined) (1941): 20. 
31 Huang Fensheng, ed. Meng Zang xin zhi 蒙藏新志, 968; Zhang Zihui 张子惠, "Lihua 
chaiyao zhi jin xi ji qi tedian 理化差徭之今昔及其特點," Kangdao yuekan 2, no. 5 
(1940): 170. 
32 Liu Wenhui, "Ganzi shibian jiejue jingguo," 8. 
33 JKDZ, 19; Jiang Junzhang, "Wula wenti zhi jiejue tujing," 17. 
34 Yang Zhonghua 楊仲華, Xikang ji yao 西康紀要 (Shanghai: Shang wu yin shu guan, 
1937), 289. 
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Republican accounts can create the general impression that Zhao Erfeng 
was the first frontier official to regulate and pay for wula.  
This was not necessarily deliberate. An article in Kham Guide Monthly 
suggested that Republican period writers may have suffered from a lack of 
access to documentary records: 
 
Reportedly, during the Qing dynasty, the Mingzheng tusi established 
relay stations and wayside accommodation for the Qing officials 
traveling to Tibet […] Unfortunately, there is no record of whether or 
not there are any regulations from that time, […] the first documents 
relating to wula are those from the time of Zhao Erfeng.35 
 
Republican period writers not only knew very little about previous 
attempts to deal with the problem in Kham; they were also almost entirely 
unaware of the origins of wula and wider geographic spread of the tax. One 
writer provided the term in Tibetan script with the same spelling as given by 
Goldstein and Jäschke, and wrote that its origins were Tibetan.36 On the 
institution itself, comments such as the following from a 1941 Bianzheng 
gonglun article are typical: “Wula is a form of corvée labour that is unique 
to Xikang and Tibet.”37 An article in a special issue of Kham Guide Monthly 
on the subject stated that “Its origins must be traced far back to the 
formation of chiefly rule (tuqiu zhengzhi 土酋政治).”38 Qing Mongolia and 
Xinjiang were never mentioned in any Republican period writing on the 
subject that I have seen. Even those who were aware of the use of wula in 
Qinghai confined their analysis of the “wula problem” to twentieth century 
Kham, rather than discuss whether and how the issue had been resolved on 
other Tibetan frontiers. The problem was seen essentially as a local one, 
indicative of a surprisingly narrow focus of twentieth century discourse on 
the Sichuan frontier. 
 
                                               
35 Huang Shangcheng, "wula chaiyao zhidu zhi shi," 23. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Jiang Junzhang, "Wula wenti zhi jiejue tujing," 17. 
38 Huang Shangcheng, "wula chaiyao zhidu zhi shi," 23. A view that was also expressed by 
Zhu Zengyun: Zhu Zengyun, "Chuanbian zhengxie," 158. 
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The Worsening Situation in the Republic 
 
Republican period writers often contrasted what they imagined the state of 
affairs in Zhao’s time was like with what they saw as a much worse 
situation in their own time. This may have involved some amount of 
nostalgia and a proper contrast between the two periods is difficult because 
of a lack of independent sources of information on the late Qing 
government. Most Republican writers, like Jiang Junzhang highlighted 
Zhao’s alleged strictness and incorruptibility.39 The dichotomy between an 
era of impartial, ruthless commitment to the law under Zhao, and 
appallingly corrupt Republican period governance has been well entrenched 
in the Chinese and foreign historical narrative from the 1920s to the present. 
Zhang Zhen’guo, who was appointed by Liu Wenhui’s government to the 
position of Wula Supervisor (jianchayuan 監察員) at Taining, listed ten 
kinds of corruption practiced by those who used wula, and a further four 
practiced by those who organized it (and still felt able to grumble about the 
misbehavior of the peasants themselves). 40  Zhang and many others 
complained that officials used it for private profit rather than official 
business, or allowed merchants to do the same. They also charged that 
officials did not pay peasants in full or at all, and that they frequently 
ignored regulations on the maximum daily distances. The latter practice 
often caused animals to die, in which case compensation was hardly ever 
provided. Many writers also blamed indigenous leaders whom they believed 
were appropriating most or all of the money that was paid out for the 
peasants.41 This latter problem was especially significant because it was 
connected to the question of the broader relationship between Chinese 
officials and indigenous leadership. As I shall show, officials’ proposals for 
                                               
39 Jiang Junzhang, "Wula wenti zhi jiejue tujing," 20-21. 
40 Zhang Zhen'guo 張鎮國, "Feichu Kang qu wula zhidu jianyi shu 廢除康區烏拉制度建
議書," Kangdao yuekan 2, no. 5 (1940): 128-30. 
41 See Jiang Junzhang, "Wula wenti zhi jiejue tujing," 21-22; Ren Zhuo 任灼, "Wula zhidu 
yu guan ying mu yun 烏拉制度與官營牧運," Kangdao yuekan 康导月刊 2, no. 5 (1940): 
14. 
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a solution to the wula problem were significantly influenced by their ideas 
concerning this relationship (and vice versa).  
Not all accounts give such a clean picture of Zhao’s forces. Chen 
Zhongsheng reported hearing that: “After the imposition of direct rule, the 
Qing officials and soldiers trampled over and exploited the people 
everywhere they went.”42 However, even if Zhao indeed enforced his wula 
regulations more rigorously than Republican era governments did, ensuring 
the compliance of both the Chinese and native leadership, this was not the 
only reason that wula became a much greater problem after the fall of the 
Qing. As we saw in chapter one, funding to frontier authorities was 
unreliable in the late 1910s and 1920s. Han regional authority recovered 
from the late 1920s, though until the opium export boom of the late 1930s 
and 1940s it was probably worse off than Zhao’s administration had been. 
For several reasons, financial difficulties exacerbated the wula problem.  
Reliable and generous outside support meant that his administration 
could afford the wula payments more easily than Republican era authorities. 
This was very likely the reason that wula payment rates were not raised until 
1936 (at exactly the time that the Xikang government began benefiting from 
opium exports). Before then, wula regulations had been extensively revised, 
but the stipulated payments remained at half a Tibetan yuan.43 In 1936 this 
was raised to one yuan per yak and one and a half yuan for a horse.44 The 
rate of inflation in the twenty five years before this is difficult to judge with 
much precision, but food prices appear to have risen by about 67 percent 
over this time.45  
                                               
42 Chen Zhongsheng 陳重生, Xi xing yan yi ji 西行豔異記 (Shanghai: Shanghai shibao, 
1930), 239. 
43 For a 1929 set of regulations produced by the Sichuan-Xikang Border Defence Force 川
康邊防軍, see Huang Shangcheng 黃上成, "wula chaiyao zhidu zhi shi," 34-36. Also 
published in JKDZ, 200-02. 
44 JKDZ, 210-12. 
45 In 1915 highland barely cost 1.5Tibetan yuan for 10 jin (JKDZ, 85-86). In 1937 it cost 
about 2.5 Tibetan yuan for 10 jin. (The October 1940 highland barley price, which was 
about 7.7 times higher than the 1937 average, was 87 dayang yuan (roughly 196 Tibetan 
yuan) per 100 jin.  (Xikang sheng nongye gaijin suo 西康省農業改進所, "Kangding 
chengxiang wujia diaocha 康定城廂物價調查," 1940,  (SCDAG, QZH:249, AJH:33). 
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A worse financial position in the late 1910s and 1920s also meant a 
greater need to collect more revenue locally. This was important for two 
reasons. Firstly, more taxation meant more official journeys for taxmen, 
which resulted in a greater demand for wula. Early Republican governments 
decided to increase their efforts to collect taxes from gold miners in 
Kangding, who were mostly Han Chinese and mostly paid very little tax. 
But the miners could only be surveyed and coerced into paying tax with the 
aid of wula services provided by the indigenous people. The locals pleaded 
in a petition to the magistrate that: 
 
Also, if the gold miners run away, they [agents of the government] send 
us to catch them, this is on top of the regular corvée labour service. If 
the commissioners continue to do this, the people who undertake the 
labour service will be unable to bear the suffering it causes.46 
 
In addition to needing more wula labour in order to collect more tax, 
Republican period county governments also increased other forms of 
taxation levied on livestock owners, as we saw in chapter three. Zhao 
Erfeng’s government did collect some tax in cash from livestock owners. He 
had set the livestock tax at an annual rate of one Tibetan ju (咀—one quarter 
of a Tibetan yuan) per horse or yak, or one ju per ten goats.47 However, he 
also stipulated that certain numbers of animals could be owned tax-free. 
These numbers varied from place to place, possibly depending on the wula 
burden. In Zhaya in Chamdo, those who owned less than thirteen yak 
equivalents were exempted from paying tax (one yak equaled one horse or 
ten goats) and households with more animals also did not have to pay tax on 
the first ten yaks, two horses, or ten goats.48 The rate per animal remained 
the same at least until the 1920s, but such exemptions appear to have 
                                                                                                                       
Price index in Xikang jingji jikan 西康經濟季刊, 1942, no.5-6 combined issue (5-6 hekan
合刊), 50.)  
46 SCDAG, Xikang caiwu choubei chu 西康財務籌備處, QZH: 206; AJH: 12 
47  QCBD, 3:734. See also JKDZ, 140-41. 
48 This was in 1910. In the same year in a different place, households were entitled to one 
tax-free horse, two tax-free yaks and ten tax-free goats. QCBD, 836. 
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disappeared fairly quickly after 1911.49 Assuming that an average man ate 
around 225 kg of barley equivalent per year, Zhao’s reduction in the 
livestock tax would have been equivalent to more than five percent of the 
cost of a man’s annual diet.50 In addition to this, as we saw in chapter three, 
many Republican period counties implemented and then frequently 
increased the butchery tax (tushui 屠稅 ). 51  How exactly this affected 
livestock owners is unclear, though hefty taxes on slaughter of animals for 
meat likely had some impact on livestock owners.  
Around 1938, the national Chinese currency (fabi 法幣) entered a period 
of high inflation and then hyperinflation. The effect of this on wula is 
difficult to clarify, because the 1936 regulations stated that the wula 
payments were to be made in Tibetan yuan, which had been steadily 
devalued throughout the Republican period but was not subject to the same 
hyperinflation as the fabi.52 This caused consternation among officials, who 
noted that by 1940 the market value of the two currencies was 
approximately equal, despite government attempts to fix the exchange rate 
at the old rate of one Tibetan yuan to .45 fabi.53 The failure of such attempts 
and the rapid increase in the value of the Tibetan yuan relative to the fabi 
caused equivalent increases in the wula costs of officials who primarily used 
fabi. This prompted Zhang Zhen’guo to argue that wula payments should be 
made in fabi, which was after all the national currency of China. Zhang was 
                                               
49 See JKDZ, 150-56. 
50 One source puts the cost of a 300 kg guan shi 官石 of barley in Kham at 42 Tibetan yuan 
in 1915 (JKDZ, 85-86). 
51 The tax rate of the butchery tax varied from county to county. In some counties the 
revenue from the butchery tax was less than that from the livestock tax, in some it was 
similar, while in Kangding the butchery tax brought in more than five times what the 
livestock tax did. See Chuanbian caizheng ting 川邊財政廳, "Ge xian liangshui diaocha 
biao 糧稅調查表," 1932, (SCDAG, QZH:197, AJH:42). 
52 On the republican period increase in the supply of Tibetan yuan, see  Zhong Mu 钟穆, 
"Minguo shiqi de Zangyang zhuzao 民国时期的藏洋铸造," in Ganzi Zhou wenshi ziliao, 
no. 14 甘孜州文史资料，第十四辑, ed. Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi 
Ganzi Zangzu zizhizhou weiyuanhui 中国人民政治协商会议甘孜藏族自治州委员会 
(Kangding: Kangding xian yinshua chang, 1996), 72-87; Yang Jianwu, "Minguo shiqi 
kangqu de jinrong caizheng." 
53 Zhang Zhen'guo, "Feichu Kang qu wula zhidu jianyi shu," 131. 
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also convinced that the Tibetan yuan denominated wula prices in the 1936 
regulations should be converted according to the old “official” exchange 
rate. From the perspective of a peasant who primarily used Tibetan yuan, 
such a conversion of wula payments in 1940 would have been a disaster. 
But as a report by the China Agricultural Bank noted, most Xikang local 
authorities continued to use Tibetan yuan rather than fabi for all their 
business, so it is unclear whether or not the fabi hyperinflation had much 
effect on wula providers.54 
Taking into consideration inflation and the flow-on impacts of 
diminished outside funding, even if the allegations that the Republican 
period authorities were more corrupt than Zhao Erfeng’s regime are 
exaggerated, it is safe to conclude that the wula problem really was more 
serious in the Republican period than in the Qing. 
 
 
Republican Period Responses to the Wula Problem, 1911-1930. 
 
By the 1930s it had become clear that automobiles would one day be able to 
play some role in fixing the wula problem. However, given the difficulties 
Xikang’s terrain presented for road construction, and the government’s 
financial situation, observers agreed that it would be a long time before 
motorized transport could replace pack-animals on even the main routes. A 
complete end to pack-animal transport was often dismissed as impossible.55 
Broadly, two types of solution to the associated problems were attempted. 
Firstly, governors throughout the Republican period followed the same 
strategy as Zhao Erfeng: ameliorating livestock owners’ burdens with 
regulation and payments. The second solution, first attempted in 1932, was 
to create a state owned farm system to supply pack animals for government 
transport. 
Early Republican governors adopted the former strategy and added still 
more articles to the already comprehensive code bequeathed to them by 
                                               
54 Zhong Mu, "Minguo shiqi de Zangyang zhuzao," 83. 
55 See Jiang Junzhang, "Wula wenti zhi jiejue tujing," 32. 
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Zhao. Chen Xialing, who held the early Republican post of Sichuan Frontier 
Garrison Commander between 1917 and 1924, ordered the abolition of the 
‘broth service’ (tang yi 湯役), according to which officials could demand 
food and hot water prepared for them, as well as the ‘general service’ (da yi 
打役), according to which peasants were required to care for private horses 
and perform other miscellaneous services.56 This prohibition was obviously 
not successful because later Republican writers described both of these 
services as part of current practice.57 Despite this—and despite the apparent 
neglect of most other wula regulations—new rules were frequently 
formulated. A code created by the command of the Twenty Fourth Army in 
1929 was lengthier still than Zhao Erfeng’s.58  
It is debatable how effective such codes would have been in alleviating 
the burden of wula on peasants, even if they had been rigorously enforced. 
Regulators had an obvious conflict of interests because, as the military 
leadership, they were also the primary users of wula corvée. A tension 
between the two aspirations of ensuring a reliable supply of pack-animals 
and giving peasants a minimum standard of protection is evident in a lot of 
writing by magistrates and governors. Zhu Zengyun, 朱增鋆 an early 
Republican magistrate of Dawu, wrote of peasants who had fled from the 
corvée: “I have sent the village head to conduct a search. My orders are that 
if he should encounter them, he is only permitted to kindly persuade 
(shanquan 善勸) them to return, and may not force them to do so.”59 One 
wonders how the village head interpreted the orders, and where the limits of 
“kindly persuasion” were. This tension is also manifested in the regulations. 
In addition to not raising payments, some articles contained vague, 
                                               
56 JKDZ, 199. Chen’s prohibition of tang yi and da yi are referred to in a memorial written 
in 1928, I have not seen the original prohibition. The 1928 memorial was also published 
in Huang Shangcheng, "wula chaiyao zhidu zhi shi," 32-33. Concerning these services, 
Zhao’s 1911 code had stated: “The tang yi, da yi and human porter (背夫 beifu) services 
generally fall upon the women among the barbarians (man min 蠻民). From now on, 
whether the services be performed by men or women, the person in question must be over 
fifteen and under fifty.” (Article thirteen). 
57 Jiang Junzhang, "Wula wenti zhi jiejue tujing," 17. 
58 See JKDZ, 200-02. 
59 Zhu Zengyun, "Chuanbian zhengxie," 148-49. 
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convenient get-out clauses. One stipulated that county magistrates had to be 
notified three days in advance of a “small corvée” requirement and ten days 
in advance of a “large corvée” requirement. However, the regulation also 
stated that this did not apply in any unnamed “special circumstances”.60 
Notification in advance was important, because, as Republican 
administrators often noted, wula burdens were much heavier on some 
communities because of their location near roads, but to spread burdens 
more evenly magistrates needed time to arrange for the duty to be levied on 
further away places. 
Indeed, the rearrangement of wula burdens to spread the load more 
evenly was another form of response undertaken by Republican leaders to 
deal with the problem. In the 1940s, a Dawu magistrate wrote an 
argumentative article which illustrated the use of such a tactic.   
 
In 1917, because there were many troubles on the southern roads and 
corvée burdens in Kangding were heavy, [the then Sichuan Frontier 
Garrison Commander] Chen Xialing 陳遐齡 [1873-1950] temporarily 
granted to Kangding the power to levy corvée from Chaba [which had 
been in Dawu]. However that was a long time ago and things have 
changed since then, but Chaba’s corvée is still levied by Kangding. In 
fact they do not contribute any animals, but only pay a monthly fee of 
1,200 yuan to the county government. […] Now Chaba’s corvée should 
return to Dawu […] to reduce the heavy burden on the Dawu people.61  
 
To support his argument further, the writer also referred to the redrawing of 
other boundaries in Xikang for similar pragmatic reasons, and pointed out 
that the Ning and Ya regions had been assigned to Xikang to assist the 
provincial government to pay its bills. The process of redrawing boundaries 
almost certainly contained an element inter-county turf-war in addition to 
any concern for tax-payers. Both of the Dawu magistrates quoted here 
complained about the bullying, unilateral behavior of Kangding 
magistrates. 62  Sometimes this may have made the wula problem worse. 
                                               
60 JKDZ, 200-02. 
61 Wang Zhuo 王卓, "Daofu wula neimu jiqi zhengli yijian 道孚烏拉內幕及其整理意見," 
Kangdao yuekan 康导月刊 2, no. 5 (1940): 151. 
62 See also Zhu Zengyun, "Chuanbian zhengxie," 122. 
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Villages may have sometimes been assigned to jurisdictions for political 
reasons even though their wula resources were less important to the new 
jurisdiction than the old. However, efforts to rearrange the levying of wula 
were probably not entirely unsuccessful. Nor did the rearrangement of wula 
duties have to take the form of a redrawing of county boundaries. Zhu 
Zengyun, for example, arranged matters so that inbound and outbound 
traffic took different routes and thereby imposed on different villages.63  
 
 
War in Kham and Solutions to Wula in the 1930s.   
 
Despite the general worsening of the situation in the Republican period and 
the problems with the solutions attempted before 1930, the system could 
possibly have limped on without facing any major crises if war and the 
concomitant military campaigning could have been avoided. However, 
when the Pehru-Targye (Ch. Baili-Dajin) monastery conflict broke out in 
1930, the forces of Lhasa and Liu Wenhui joined in on opposite sides and 
the fighting escalated into a war that involved up to 20,000 fighters (see 
chapter one). With the help of the Qinghai warlord Ma Bufang, Liu 
embarked on a vigorous campaign that saw the Lhasa army beaten back to 
the Yangtze by summer 1932. The cost of this campaign was huge for the 
wula providers. By the Frontier Defense Force leadership’s own admission, 
war related traffic increased the demand for wula by roughly ten times what 
it normally was.64 Faced with the danger of being unable to supply armies at 
the front, Liu Wenhui attempted the second solution for the wula problem 
identified above. In August 1932, he tasked Brigade Commander Yu 
Songlin余松琳 with establishing a State Wula Agency (Guan yun wula 
shiwusuo 官運烏拉事務所). The Agency’s provisional constitution (shiban 
zhangcheng 試辦章程) ordered every county magistrate to organize a local 
office and a certain number (to be determined by the army) of encampments 
                                               
63 Ibid., 123. 
64 JKDZ, 204. 
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(zhang 帳).65 Each encampment was to purchase 100 yaks from the nearby 
pastures at “approved prices” (heding jiage 核定價格). These yaks were to 
be used for nine to twelve outward supply journeys in the six months from 
April through September (the busy season for official transport). On return 
journeys and in the case that official demand for transport was low they 
were to provide a commercial transport service which would help pay for 
the Agency’s costs. It seems unlikely that the Agency could have made 
much money in this manner because transport rates going from west to east 
were very cheap in comparison to the other direction (see chapter six). This 
was not the only difficulty facing the Agency, however, and the scheme was 
a failure. Many animals died from sickness and exhaustion and the 
organization was wound up within a year, after more than twenty thousand 
Tibetan yuan had been spent on it.66  
The root problem or problems are unclear. It appears from Frontier 
Defense Force records that the number of livestock actually bought was 
much less than the amount that the provisional constitution had envisaged. 
The records may be incomplete but the total cost given, 19,521 Tibetan 
yuan, tallies with the twenty thousand that Hu Xiaomei says was spent in 
total.67 The documents show the purchase of 68 mules, 38 horses and 86 
bovines—mostly dzo, the Tibetan yak-cattle hybrid (Ch pianniu 犏牛), as 
well as equipment and tents.68 The prices paid were thus relatively high, an 
average of 51 Tibetan yuan per bovine or 155 yuan per mule. It is difficult 
to know how close these prices were to what would have been paid by 
purchasers who lacked an army to strengthen their bargaining position. The 
purchasers indicated that they had initially planned to buy 360 bovines, but 
due to the effects of a cattle pestilence (niu wen 牛瘟) the price of these 
animals was very expensive, and the horses and mules were bought instead. 
                                               
65 Ibid., 204-06. 
66 Hu Xiaomei, "Liu Wenhui Kangqu wula zhidu gaige shulun," 37. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Hu Renji 胡人紀, "Chengwei zunling huitong dianyan guanyun wula zaoce jicheng 
yangqi 呈為尊令會同點驗官運烏拉造冊齎呈仰祈," Chuan Kang bian fang jun 川康邊
防軍, (SCDAG, QZH:24, AJH:4).  
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If this were the case, then the purchasers were not able to dictate prices to 
the sellers. In 1939, Ren Naiqiang reported that a mule cost around 100 
dayang yuan (roughly 225 Tibetan yuan).69 Taking inflation between 1932 
and 1939 into account, the price paid by the Agency for mules in 1932 
seems fairly reasonable. Certainly the prices were higher than the 
compensation mandated by the 1929 code for dead animals, which was 30 
Tibetan yuan per bovine. On the other hand, it is possible that these prices 
were not paid at all, some of the money being embezzled by the purchasers. 
One of the purchasers, a magistrate called Wu was indeed later found to 
have misappropriated Agency funds.70 However, those charges related to 
another matter, and in addition to the purchasers’ note about disease, other 
sources also mention livestock disease in Kham at various times in the 
Republican period, so the charge that this was responsible for some of the 
Agency’s problems is not implausible.71 
The reasons for the death of its livestock are also unclear. It could have 
been due to one or a combination of the following: negligence in the 
treatment of the animals by the Agency, a general disease affecting 
livestock in Kham, or the fact that the animals may have been sick and old 
to begin with. These problems would have been exacerbated by the 
extraordinary demand placed on the system in 1932 when Liu’s forces in 
Kham attempted to rapidly redeploy from Bathang back to the Sichuan 
basin after the start of the “Two-Liu War”. Petitioners from Dawu, who 
were protesting against the army’s later demand that they repurchase the 
exhausted surviving animals (at the prices that were recorded by the 
purchasers), blamed all these factors for the deaths. 72  (Tactfully, they 
referred to the redeployment of Liu’s troops as a “triumphal return”). 
                                               
69 Ren Naiqiang, "Luding kaocha ji 泸定考察记," in Minzu yanjiu wenji 民族研究文集, 
ed. Ding Shihao 丁师浩 (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1990), 114. 
70 Hu Renji, "Chuan Kang bian fang jun," Chuan Kang bian fang jun,  (SCDAG, QZH:24, 
AJH:4).   
71 See Xikang sheng linshi canyihui 西康省臨時參議會, di er jie, di yi ci da hui huibian 第
二屆第一次大會匯編 (1942), p. 32; Coales, "Narrative of a Journey from Tachienlu to 
Ch'amdo and back via Batang," 208; Meng Yongxi 蒙永锡, "Shiqu xianzhuang sumiao 
石渠现状素描," Kangdao yuekan 康导月刊 2, no. 8 (1940): 64. 
72  JKDZ, 208-09. 
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Without more information on this question, it is difficult to evaluate and 
contextualize the later explanations of the Agency’s failure. These tended to 
focus on negligence and ill treatment of the animals, which they blamed on 
poor organization, as we shall see below.  
The disappointment of the Agency did not prevent other attempts at 
establishing alternative transport institutions. In 1935 and 1936, at least 
three journals on frontier affairs published Ren Naiqiang’s ambitious plan 
for a Sichuan Frontier Crop and Pasture Company (Chuanbian ken mu 
gongsi 川邊墾牧公司 ). 73  At this time, Ren was a member of the 
Preparatory Committee of Xikang Province. According to the plan, the 
company would earn most of its income in the tea trade, but, in addition to 
engaging in almost every kind of agriculture possible in the region, would 
also undertake wula services for the government.74 It is unclear whether Ren 
imagined that this would be in return for government investment, or if his 
argument was that a profit could be derived from contracting the source of 
peasants’ hardship. The plan became a reality a couple of years later with 
the establishment the Xikang Animal Transport Company (Mu yun gongsi 
牧運公司) in 1938.75 The only information I have seen on its ownership and 
management structure is in criticisms written after it was wound down a few 
years after it was established, from which it appears to have been a wholly 
state owned and operated enterprise.76  There is less doubt about its fate, 
which was more or less the same as that of the State Wula Agency. The 
livestock—more than one thousand head this time—died en masse and 
                                               
73 Ren Xiaozhuang 任筱莊, "Chuanbian ken mu gongsi jingying shiye jihua 川邊墾牧公司
經營事業計劃," Chuanbian jikan 川邊季刊 2, no. 2 (1936)., also published in Sichuan 
nongye 四川農業 2, no.4 (1935): 20-27 and Kang-Zang qian feng 康藏前鋒 3, no.7 
(1936): 33-40. It is according to Josef Kolmas that Ren Naiqiang sometimes used the 
penname Ren Xiaozhuang: Josef Kolmas, Chinese Studies on Tibetan Culture: a 
Facsimile Reproduction of the K'ang-Tsang Yen-chiu Yüeh-k'an (Hsik'ang-Tibet Research 
Monthly) (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1983). 
74 Ren Xiaozhuang 任筱莊, "Chuanbian ken mu gongsi jingying shiye jihua 川邊墾牧公司
經營事業計劃," 166, 71. 
75 Wang Zhuo 王卓, "Daofu wula neimu jiqi zhengli yijian 道孚烏拉內幕及其整理意見," 
153. 
76 Zhang Zhen’guo, for example calls it a ‘guan ying shiye 官營事業’ Zhang Zhen'guo, 
"Feichu Kang qu wula zhidu jianyi shu," 134. 
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within one year the company was dissolved, after more than one hundred 
thousand yuan had been spent on it.77   
 
 
Discourse on regulation and innovation and their failures 
 
By the 1940s a range of different solutions to the wula problem had been 
attempted. None of them resolved the issue and some were bitter 
disappointments that carried a large financial cost (in Xikang terms). In 
1940 Kham Guide Monthly published a special issue on the wula problem, 
which, together with articles published in other frontier-orientated journals, 
was the site of a relatively vigorous exchange of ideas on the causes of the 
failures and what the next move should be. In explaining the problems with 
the first two attempts to establish an alternative transport institution most 
writers shared roughly the same opinion. Discussion focused mostly on the 
1938 attempt rather than the earlier one.78 In his own brief article in the 
Kham Guide Monthly special issue Liu Wenhui explained:  
 
The State Wula Agency and the Animal Transport Company both ended 
in failure. What is the reason that they did not work? The task of raising 
a large number of animals is a difficult one. Han people are several 
thousand years removed from nomadic life, and when they were put in 
charge of the animals, the livestock were not properly fed and looked 
after. This was the case with the Animal Transport Company, and all the 
animals died. When the Kham people were put in charge of them, they 
did not have a strong incentive to look after the animals. Thus they were 
lax and inattentive, and the animals were still not properly looked after. 
This was the case with the State Wula Agency, and all their animals died 
as well.79 
 
These points were stated or expanded on by many writers. Zhang Zhen’guo, 
for example wrote that: 
                                               
77 Hu Xiaomei, "Liu Wenhui Kangqu wula zhidu gaige shulun," 37. 
78 Jiang Junzhang complained that there were no documents to explain the reasons for the 
failure of the State Wula Agency: Jiang Junzhang, "Wula wenti zhi jiejue tujing," 31. 
79 Liu Wenhui, "Xikang chaiyao zhi guoqu yu jianglai 西康差徭之過去與將來," Kangdao 
yuekan 2, no. 5 (1940): 5. 
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In the counties beyond the pass, most people still live a nomadic life 
[…]. From their childhood to old age they live in close harmony with 
their animals […]. Furthermore, yaks and horses are the people’s living 
assets. For these reasons, they love and protect, raise and cherish their 
livestock, valuing them as much as their own lives […] However, the 
Animal Transport Company, as a state operated enterprise, employed its 
staff as hired labourers. The livestock did not belong to the workers, and 
all the profits accrued to the state. The staff were frequently shuffled 
around […] and none of them expected to be in their positions for long 
[…]. In such circumstances, how could we expect great devotion to the 
animals from them?80   
 
Zhang wrote the most extensive critique of the Animal Transport 
Company, naming six failings that could be rectified and four that would be 
difficult to deal with—the problem of incentive was one of the latter. Like 
other writers, he showed a strong tendency to relate the problems to lack of 
knowledge of livestock as well as the scheme’s organizational structure. 
Thus although he mentioned corruption, he saw it mostly as the result of 
these two factors. Managers were poorly trained and ill-equipped to deal 
with the large numbers of staff. Zhang also explained corruption as a 
general result of state ownership: “State enterprises are typically beset by 
the problem of employees using state funding for private ventures, and the 
Animal Transport Company was no exception.”81 Politics may well have 
prevented Zhang from accusing the leadership of the company of anything 
more than naivety and poor planning, but he could possibly have addressed 
the problem of embezzlement at higher levels of the company by discussing 
the earlier State Wula Agency, given that Magistrate Wu was already a 
disgraced figure. Also, the lone hint that the company may have suffered 
from insufficient financial resources was his statement that there was a 
complete lack of veterinary medicine.  
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Wula solutions, indigenous leadership and the development of local 
government 
 
In the Kham Guide Monthly special issue on wula, Liu Wenhui summarized 
the two main approaches to solving the wula problem; regulation on the one 
hand and an alternative transport system on the other. One could argue for 
both in the short term, but they were seen as mutually exclusive in the long 
run. The aim of an alternative transport system was the eventual abolition of 
the wula corvée. Those who argued for regulation tended to see an 
alternative transport institution as unfeasible.  
The whole debate on wula served as a field for the development of 
viewpoints on the vital questions of what the state’s relationship with 
indigenous leadership ought to be and what its role in society in general 
ought to be. The argument here is not that interpretations of the wula 
problem completely dictated officials’ positions regarding these questions, 
but that viewpoints on the wula problem, indigenous leadership and the role 
of the state were mutually related. Furthermore, this discourse led to the 
development of practical agendas: ideas for concrete courses of action that 
the government should or should not undertake. Interpretation and 
discussion of the wula problem transformed what may otherwise have 
remained vague prejudices and notions into substantial programs that had 
real consequences for the Han-dominated local state’s relationship with 
indigenous communities in particular, and its size and role in society in 
general.  
Indigenous leaders were the key intermediaries within the existing wula 
system. Many officials believed that they were the reason for the problems 
with it. They accused the indigenous leaders of withholding payments the 
state made to wula providers and ignoring the regulations. Indeed such 
officials often pointed to the native leaders’ power in the wula system as the 
reason for all the regional government’s problems. Ren Zhuo wrote:  
 
Although the authority to requisition wula in Kham in theory belongs to 
the government, the great power of raising wula is in reality wielded by 
the native headmen (tutou 土頭). The headmen of Kham dare to openly 
act according to their own whim, without paying attention to any rule or 
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restraint. They hold the government in the palm of their hand and bully 
the people. They are stubborn and obstinate and make themselves a 
great obstacle for the government's rule. Indeed, with their great power 
over transport they are in control of everything (neng zuoyou yiqie 能左
右一切).82 
 
Those, like Ren, who had an unambiguously negative view of the role 
played by indigenous headmen, argued passionately for the establishment of 
a transport institution that was wholly owned and operated by the state and 
could bypass this layer of obstreperous indigenous authority, depriving it of 
its power and ridding Xikang of what they deemed was the greatest threat to 
the smooth running of the government. Ren argued:  
 
It is vital to first establish state managed (guanying 官營 ) animal 
transport in Kham, in order to thoroughly take control of transport … 
[only thus] can the new administration of the Kham region develop 
smoothly. There is no other rational way forward. The obstreperous 
headmen know that state-managed transport is not in their interests and 
thus they oppose it, but their opposition must not cause the government 
to decline to take up the long neglected keys to power.83 
 
Such writers probably had prejudices against indigenous leadership that 
were not caused by or related to the wula problem. However, their 
interpretation of the wula problem likely hardened and reconfirmed such 
prejudice. More importantly it led them to argue for the development of a 
major state owned enterprise; something that would have far reaching 
consequences for the nature of the state and for its relations with indigenous 
communities. 
Prejudice was not necessarily the only reason for supporting the idea of 
a state-owned enterprise to replace wula. Wula-abolitionists probably also 
saw state-owned enterprise precisely as a way to make up local shortfalls 
using outside resources. The enterprise would be paid for with taxes that 
would be levied fairly and proportionally across all wealth in Xikang, as 
opposed to disproportionately on livestock owning peasants who happened 
to live near major roads. I have not, however, encountered a source that 
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makes this point directly. Officials may have avoided making this argument 
explicitly for fear of causing offense by suggesting that places and people 
that currently paid little tax would have to pay more under their schemes. 
Ren Naiqiang’s notion that a state-owned wula-replacing enterprise could 
actually make money would have been much more appealing than the idea 
that such an enterprise would require a greater extraction of wealth from the 
provincial well-off.84 
There were a couple of reasons why some officials opposed the 
establishment of an alternative transport system and argued that it was better 
to ameliorate the status quo with regulations. Firstly, they believed that this 
solution was simply more likely to be successful than the establishment of 
the kind of enterprise described by Ren Zhuo. The politics of the broader 
national debate between proponents of private enterprise and supporters of 
state-owned enterprise exerted some influence here. The Frontier 
Administration Planning Commission (Bianzheng sheji weiyuanhui 邊政設
計委員會) for example, stated that “the experience of the Interior furnishes 
many examples of private enterprises whose achievements are much greater 
than government departments.”85 Secondly, some opponents of a solution 
along the lines of what Ren Zhuo proposed had less negative views of 
indigenous leadership, or at least were less inclined to blame indigenous 
leaders for the wula problem. If the indigenous leaders were not the 
problem, then there was no need for the solution to be based on the principle 
of excluding them.  
In my reading of the available sources, those who supported this kind of 
approach were less passionate and direct in their arguments than those in the 
‘new transport organization’ camp. Nevertheless, it appears that after the 
end of the Animal Transport Company, Liu Wenhui veered towards 
maintaining and improving wula rather than replacing it. The failures of the 
new transport organizations seem to have convinced Liu that they were 
unviable, and as we saw above, he argued that no matter whether indigenous 
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or Han employees were used, the animals would inevitably be neglected. 
Perhaps mindful that many of his officials continued to support a state 
enterprise solution, Liu did not categorically rule out this option. But he did 
go on to write: 
 
It is impossible not to use the Kham people and their animals, because 
only the Kham people have a large enough number of animals and only 
the Kham people have the skills to look after them. […] If we would 
decrease the suffering that corvée brings to them, and even bring to them 
some small benefit, it is necessary to implement some regulations.86 
 
While Ren Zhuo and others argued passionately for the abolition of wula, 
Liu Wenhui was averse to this idea, even in exceptional situations that 
would not have greatly affected government transport. When a small airstrip 
was built near Kangding, five families who were evicted from their land 
petitioned to request exemptions from tax and wula. Liu’s response was that 
compensation for the lost land could be granted, as well as an exemption 
from the land tax, but the corvée duty would still have to be met.87  
Consistent with Liu’s preference for the maintenance of wula, the 
available evidence suggests that Liu Wenhui was less averse to working 
with indigenous leadership than many in his administration. In his 1939 
inaugural address as the chairman of Xikang province, he stated:  
 
Those [natives] that have ability, learning, or are virtuous and highly 
esteemed; they should at all times be selected for appointment, and be 
made to participate in the politics of this province.88  
 
Ren Zhuo’s thundering attack on the headmen certainly did not suggest that 
among them were leaders who were virtuous or possessed of learning and 
suitable for posts within the provincial administration.  
This does not mean that we should characterize Liu and those who 
proposed a regulatory system as being pro-indigenous in general. As this 
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solution required greater links between indigenous leadership and the Han 
state, it left less room for indigenous autonomy. Indeed those who favoured 
this approach sometimes put forward the broader mission to assimilate the 
indigenes as a reason to adopt it. The Han-ization (Hanhua 漢化) of the 
indigenes could only proceed if there were strong contacts between the 
indigenes and the Han government, they reasoned. Given that the wula 
system was the primary point of contact between the two (in some cases the 
only point of contact) it was necessary to maintain it just so it could serve 
this purpose. Wang Zhuo王卓argued for Dawu corvée duties to be levied on 
people in Chaba (Kangding), and stated that it would “make the Chaba 
people accustomed to Han-ization (xi yu Hanhua 習於漢化), and come into 
more substantial contact with the government.”89 As we shall see in chapter 
seven, one of Liu Wenhui’s broad aspirations was to encourage the 
assimilation of the indigenous population (though we shall also see that 
what he meant by “assimilation” is somewhat unclear). In the sources used 
by this study, however, he did not make the argument that wula ought to be 
retained as a tool to serve this end, so whether his views on assimilation 
affected his policy on wula remains a matter of conjecture. The idea of 
retaining wula for this purpose was roundly criticized by opponents like 
Zhang Zhen’guo, who pointed out that contact between the people and 
government should be based on the principle of improving their happiness.90  
There was perhaps a compromise position in the form of proposals for a 
new transport institution that was privately owned and operated—with some 
government investment or oversight—and inclusive of substantial 
indigenous co-ownership and management. This would have entailed a 
significant and legitimate space for indigenous leadership within the key 
institutions of the new Xikang society. Jiang Junzhang argued for such an 
organization, as did the Frontier Administration Planning Commission 
(Bianzheng sheji weiyuanhui 邊政設計委員會) of the Military Affairs 
Commission Headquarters during a 1937 All-Kham Conference on 
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Corvée. 91  Jiang Junzhang suggested giving the indigenes shares in the 
company equivalent to the value of the animals that they had provided—so 
that they were the main shareholders. He presumably saw this as the key to 
having a workforce that not only knew how to look after animals, but had 
the incentive to do so as well.92 The Planning Commission argued that “the 
planning of this organization will be undertaken cooperatively by the 
Commission for the Establishment of Xikang Province, the Chamber of 
Commerce, those lamas who are held in high esteem locally, the tusi and 
representatives of pack-animal transport teams of the high pastures.”93 
This sort of proposal was often criticized for being based on unrealistic 
assumptions about indigenous people and society. Yang Zhonghua—one of 
the Chinese observers who was more familiar with the indigenous people—
argued against it. Yang is reported to have said that “None of the Xikang 
natives would be willing to offer their precious and limited livestock in 
order to organize a company that is totally unfamiliar to them.”94 Zhang 
Zhen’guo also quoted several indigenous leaders who apparently argued that 
it would be difficult or impossible for them to take up roles in the 
management of such a company due to their nomadic lifestyles. Widely 
believed to be unrealistic—and doubtless unattractive to those who held that 
the indigenous leadership was the key problem anyway—this kind of 
proposal does not appear to have been well supported.  
 
 
The Lasting impact of wula on the development of the Chinese state 
 
The government and military demand for wula had a huge impact on some 
herding households, but what kind of impact did it have on the state? The 
supporters of state-enterprise never saw their proposals come to fruition. 
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Nevertheless, advocacy for this position and the experiments that it 
generated made a significant contribution to the development of the Chinese 
regional state in Kham. Arguably, it was one of the key reasons for the 
recalibration of government agricultural policy toward livestock farming 
initiatives and away from the Qing policy of supporting crop farming.  
As we have noted already Ren Naiqiang, the architect of the Animal 
Transport Company, was also a member of the Preparatory Committee of 
Xikang Province. In 1937 the Commission had founded the Taining 
Experimental Zone (shiyan qu 實驗區). One of the key undertakings within 
the Experimental Zone was a government managed livestock ranch, which 
was presumably established in preparation for an Animal Transport 
Company. Unlike the company, the ranch did survive, and was later put 
under the management of the Agricultural Institute. It was the largest and 
best funded state owned agricultural enterprise in Xikang, receiving 37 
percent more investment than the second most highly funded single 
enterprise listed in the available sources. 95  In 1943, there were 1,245 
bovines, 188 horses, 263 lambs, 120 sheep and 127 pigs on the farm. 96 
According to the historian Wang Chuan, the farm covered almost 2.5 
million mu, or around 1,680 square kilometers.97 One report refers to some 
of the ranch’s bovines and horses as “wula” animals. It is unclear whether 
this meant that these were animals raised by the ranch to provide wula 
services, or whether they were wula animals provided free of charge by 
locals, to be used in the service of the farm itself.98 In 1955 the ranch was 
combined with the Agriculture Institute’s Kangding farm to form the Kanze 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Experimental Agriculture Station 甘孜藏自
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治州农业试验站.99 Since then it has undergone several other changes to its 
name and character, but has remained in existence to the present day. In this 
way, the wula problem, or rather one attempted solution to the wula 
problem, made a significant contribution to the development of large state-
enterprise in Kham.  
Despite such efforts, wula was not abolished until well into the socialist 
period.  Like the state-enterprise solution, the attempt to regulate the system 
also had a significant effect on the development of regional state authority. 
It led to more closely managed relationships between the regional state, 
local agents loosely associated with the state, and indigenous non-state 
authorities than would probably have been the case otherwise. In this 
respect, state development in Kham was significantly different from the 
state involution that, in Prasenjit Duara’s view, took place in northern 
China. 100 In the latter region, formal state structures grew simultaneously 
with informal state structures. The surplus extracted from villages massively 
increased, but was divided between the formal state and the ‘entrepreneurial 
brokers’ who collected taxes for it but existed outside its control. For our 
purposes, one of the most important features of this type of state 
development was that it began in an environment in which taxes were 
extremely low; hence there was space for multiple forms of authority to 
grow without cannibalizing each other. 
In Kham, the labour surplus that could be extracted as corvée was so 
limited in some places that involutionary growth was unlikely or 
impossible; it was difficult for one form of authority to grow without 
impeding another. The problem was not merely that the number of people 
and animals was limited. It was also easier for these people to run away 
from the taxmen than it was for, say, villagers in northern China. As we 
have seen, the provincial government attempted to obviate this problem by 
sourcing its transport elsewhere. Before this solution was attempted and 
after it failed, the impossibility of involutionary growth had two 
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consequences. Firstly, it encouraged conflict between different forms of 
authority, and between the regional government and its local associates over 
the limited surplus that could be extracted from communities as corvée 
labour. Secondly, when one party failed to gain the upper hand in such 
conflicts, it led to detailed divisions of the taxable households between 
different wula-controlling authorities. Relationships between such 
authorities came to be precise, legalistic and highly managed. 
Entrepreneurial brokers existed in Kham, but they were often squeezed 
out of the picture by a more formalized local bureaucracy that was jealous 
of the surplus they extracted from local communities. Chapter one 
introduced one prominent early Republican frontier strongman in Dawu 
County, who was known as “Barbarian King Ding” (Ding Manwang).101 
Ding did not have an official position in the Chinese bureaucracy, but he 
was in charge of the local militia and also clearly had the power to arrange 
the corvée duties. He abused this authority by exempting militia members 
from wula, and reportedly made more than 10,000 yuan by charging a fee 
for the privilege of joining the militia. From a certain perspective, there was 
a rationalizing tendency here. He had essentially converted the corvée 
labour tax into a tax paid in money, a move that was entirely consistent with 
long-term trends in taxation throughout China. Ding’s downfall came when 
he was sued twice, once by a Han merchant and once by locals who had 
learned that it was government policy to pay for wula corvée labour. The 
Xikang Special Administration Committee sided against Ding, and forced 
him to cough up some of the wealth he had amassed and let go some of his 
authority. Despite Ding’s success at defending Han authority against the 
lamas, it was not surprising that the Special Administration Committee 
sided against him. His income did not merely represent foregone income for 
the local administration, but actually depleted the capacity of the local state. 
It meant that fewer households performed the corvée, and in Dawu the 
primary limitation on state growth was the lack of available corvée labour.   
Local governments’ relations with indigenous communities were also 
affected by the wula regulations. Having created them, authorities were 
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bound to at least attempt to ensure that they were enforced. This entailed a 
certain amount of policing of indigenous leadership and communities that 
would otherwise not have been necessary. Wula payments had to actually 
reach the peasants, and burdens had to be shared throughout a community. 
To this end, Liu Wenhui also established a corvée supervisory system 
(jiancha zhidu 監察制度), which saw supervisors posted at key locations 
with the aim of watching over county magistrates and tusi to ensure their 
compliance with regulations. How much impact the wula supervisors had is 
unclear, but their existence increased the presence of Han bureaucracy in 
Tibetan communities. At least one of the pre-1930 wula codes had 
contained an article mandating that it be translated into Tibetan and 
distributed to “all the villages” in the Kham administrative region.102 Again, 
it is unclear to what extent this was actually carried out, but Liu Wenhui 
also stressed the importance of this in his discussion of the problem in 
1940.103 Wula users also had to have a good idea of the livestock resources 
of each settlement and for this purpose the regional government ordered 
extensive surveys of livestock holdings.  
Government policy relating to wula also created other unexpected 
entanglements and connections between local Chinese authorities and 
indigenous communities. Zhu Zengyun described a dispute between a mill 
owner and his tenant. 104  As part of the rent, the tenant had agreed to 
undertake the landlord’s corvée service. When Chen Xialing exempted the 
local lamasery from the corvée (we presume that the landlord was connected 
to the lamasery), the deal looked bad for the landlord, and he demanded the 
property back. Zhu’s account of the case gives the impression that the 
dispute was resolved by his own judiciousness. One imagines that an 
indigenous authority could have dealt with it just as well. Nevertheless, both 
the plaintiff and the defendant in the case presumably had made every effort 
to understand the government’s policy concerning wula and anticipate any 
future changes as the value of their deal depended on such calculations. 
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Thus local communities did not merely passively respond to governments’ 
demand for corvée (or run away). They were in a position of having to 
actively gather information about changes in policy and future levels of 
demand. This also boosted interaction between the government and local 
communities beyond what would have been the case with a more 
predictable and less problematic tax.   
 Where local Han governments were unable to completely control the 
supply of wula labour, their relationship with other local authorities, such as 
monastic estates and chieftains, tended to be structured around a detailed 
and legalistic separation of the tax base. When Chen exempted serfs 
attached to the large lamasery in Dawu from providing corvée for Chinese 
officials, Zhu Zengyun requested several times for the exemption to be 
lifted. In one report, he listed the families and animals that provided corvée 
service for his county government, as well as those that did the same for the 
lamasery.105 In the magistrate’s view the latter lived lives of idleness, but 
one supposes that the lamasery found work for them to do. His letter 
demonstrates that every livestock owning family and their animals was 
explicitly identified as belonging either to the magistrate or the lamasery. 
To a large extent, the trilateral relationship between these two parties and 
Chen Xialing, the Garrison Commander, was structured around an ongoing, 
legalistic dispute about the apportioning of this tax base.  
 
 
Wula and the Ganzi conflict 
 
In Dawu, this tension appears never to have escalated further than a military 
stand-off. There is, however, evidence that this kind of dispute was partly 
responsible for the much more serious 1939 Kanze conflict. The sources 
used by this study do not permit a firm conclusion that the wula problem 
was the primary cause of the conflict. But the brief narratives that have been 
given by scholars do not satisfactorily explain the events either: there is a 
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piece or two of the puzzle missing, and it is quite likely that wula was one of 
them.  
The dramatic events of the Kanze conflict have been the subject of 
several brief scholarly accounts that differ significantly in terms of emphasis 
and interpretation.106 Following, I give a brief summary of the events and 
the dominant explanation of them, then present the case that the wula 
problem was one significant factor in the build up to the conflict. 
From 1924 the Panchen Lama, a “pro-Chinese” Tibetan theocrat, was 
resident in Inner Mongolia.107 In December 1933, the 13th Dalai Lama died, 
and the Panchen began a journey back to Tibet, apparently seeing an 
opportunity to wield temporal power there.108 He received strong support 
from the Guomindang in the form of a well armed field office with three 
hundred soldiers, as well as a series of honorific titles including membership 
in the Supreme Council.109 The Chinese mass media pinned great hopes on 
the Panchen’s return cementing Tibet’s position within the Chinese 
republic. 110  There is some debate, however, about the Guomindang’s 
motives. Hsiao-ting Lin suggests that Party secretly worked to keep the 
Panchen in Qinghai, believing that he was more useful there than in 
Lhasa.111 Whether he was stalled by the machinations of the Guomindang, 
or by a Lhasa government opposed to the return of a “pro-Chinese” leader, 
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the Panchen died, frustrated, in Qinghai on 1 December 1937. The field 
office moved to Kanze in 1938.112 According to the office, food supplies 
were dangerously low in Yushu and the post-mortem preservation 
procedures to be conducted on the Panchen’s body could be performed more 
readily in Kanze.113  
On 25 December Wu Zhongxin 吳忠信 (1884-1959), the director of the 
Guomindang Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (Meng Zang 
weiyuanhui 蒙藏委員會), wrote to Chiang Kai-shek suggesting that the 
office move on to Kangding.114 Liu Wenhui also urged the field office to 
come to Kangding, probably hoping that there his government would be 
able to take control of the resources heaped upon the office by the 
Guomindang. The field office rejected the invitation. In March 1938, the 
Guomindang dispatched Zhao Shouyu to repossess the field office’s 
weapons. However, the office was unwilling to disarm and Zhao was unable 
to force it to comply.  
Sources written after the conflict state that Liu Wenhui’s Xikang 
government now began hearing frequent “rumours” that the Guomindang 
was planning to separate the northern Kham counties from Xikang and 
create a special administrative region under the authority of the field office, 
which would report directly to the central government. 115  It is highly 
improbable that the Guomindang was planning anything of the sort. Firstly, 
this would be inconsistent with Wu Zhongxin’s proposal that the office go 
to Kangding. Secondly, it would also seem inconsistent with the attempt to 
disarm the field office. Thirdly, after the start of the fighting between Liu 
Wenhui and the Panchen’s field office, the Guomindang expressed support 
for Liu Wenhui. 116  Finally, there are no examples of the Guomindang 
actually creating new administrative regions and then bequeathing control of 
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them to non-Han forces that the Party did not fully control. Liu Wenhui may 
have erroneously believed that this was the central government’s intention, 
although it seems unlikely that an experienced politician like Liu would 
make this kind of mistake. Even the 1940 sources connected to Liu Wenhui 
that do mention the idea of a conspiracy between the Panchen’s office and 
the central government describe the idea as a frightening “rumour”  
(yaozhuo 謠諑 ), rather than something that was, in hindsight, a real 
possibility. 117 The “rumour” that the Guomindang was planning to give 
control of northern Kham to the Panchen Lama’s field office was almost 
certainly Liu Wenhui’s post-hoc justification for what happened next, not an 
explanation for it. 
In late 1939, an officer in the field office became engaged to marry 
Dechin Wangmo, a local chieftain and daughter of one of the most powerful 
Kanze families. Seeing the political implications of a union between the 
family and the Panchen’s field office, Liu Wenhui opposed the marriage. 
Unable to influence either party, he had Dechin Wangmo arrested in late 
1939. The field office responded by attacking and disarming the Twenty 
Fourth Army garrison in Kanze on 24 December 1939, following up with an 
attack on the Drango county garrison. Liu counter-attacked vigorously and 
quickly drove the field office and Dechin Wangmo out of Xikang.  
In most accounts, Liu Wenhui is portrayed as being on the receiving end 
of a campaign against him.118 After the Field Office had disarmed Liu’s 
garrison and taken over Kanze, Liu indeed faced a choice between losing 
some authority in northern Kham and defeating the Panchen’s guard in a 
military confrontation. A valid question, however, is whether Liu 
deliberately courted the military confrontation. Was the arrest of Dechin 
Wangmo anything other than an attempt to provoke the Panchen’s guard 
into starting a fight? It did nothing to break the relationship between her 
powerful family and the Panchen’s field office, and it is difficult to see why 
Liu could have imagined that it would have. There may be no smoking-gun 
                                               
117 Li Jingxuan, "Ganzi shibian zhi zeren wenti," 11. 
118 Peng Wenbin, "Frontier Process, Provincial Politics and Movements for Khampa 
Autonomy During the Republican Period," 72. 
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evidence in the form of an admission that he aimed to provoke an armed 
showdown with the field office. But if the “rumours” about the central 
government’s intention of giving control of northern Kham to the Panchen’s 
field office were mostly post-hoc legitimization, it is reasonable to attribute 
some of the blame for the conflict to Liu.  
Perhaps the reason that Liu is rarely blamed for the conflict is that on the 
basis of the evidence presented in the usual accounts it is difficult to see 
why Liu would have courted a confrontation in Kanze when there were so 
many other parts of Xikang where his government had very limited 
authority. I argue that the Field Office’s use of wula, which affected not just 
Kanze but trade in large parts of northern Kham, was an important factor in 
the build up of tension between the Xikang provincial government and the 
Panchen’s guard. As any large political organization did, the Panchen’s 
office levied a large amount of wula transporting its goods and personnel.119 
The Kangding customs bureau and merchant community “complained 
vociferously” (ze you fan yan 嘖有煩言) about the behaviour of the office 
in this regard. 120  They argued that seventy percent of the goods being 
transported from Sichuan to Kanze—in trains of hundreds of pack 
animals—consisted of commercial goods for sale rather than vital 
supplies.121 Whether or not this claim was true, if it was believed to be true, 
the merchants would have been angry for two reasons. Firstly, tax and 
transport costs made up a large portion of the price of goods imported to 
Kham from outside. So with tax-free wula transport, the field office would 
have been able to significantly undercut the merchants’ prices. Secondly, 
because transport resources were severely limited, trains with hundreds of 
wula pack animals could very plausibly have driven up the prices that the 
merchants had to pay. Strong inflation began in 1939, so a rise in transport 
prices by itself does not necessarily indicate that the field office was 
responsible. Nevertheless, it would not have been unreasonable for 
merchants to believe that it was. The Kangding tax authorities predictably 
                                               
119 Li Jingxuan, "Ganzi shibian zhi zeren wenti," 11. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
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sided with the merchants in complaining against the field office. The 
merchants, who were by and large tax payers, had a plausible case that they 
were losing business because of a field office that did not pay tax. Thus, 
from the perspective of both the merchants who sold Sichuanese goods in 
Kham and the Kangding customs authorities, the impact of the Panchen’s 
field office was much more significant and detrimental than whatever 
impact it had on the local political situation in Kanze.  
The field office was notionally an ally of the central government, so 
attempting to tax its supplies could have been diplomatically difficult for the 
provincial government. In any case, as we have seen, controlling the levying 
of wula was always difficult. Therefore, Liu Wenhui’s government may 
have decided that the simplest course of action was to provoke a conflict 
that made it look as though the field office was the aggressor, and drive it 
out of Xikang.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The Xikang provincial government faced many challenges in Kham, but the 
“wula problem” was probably the toughest and it generated more discussion 
than any other issue. The problem had both environmental and institutional 
causes. In the age before engines that ran on hydrocarbon fuels that could be 
readily stored and transported, land transport relied on pack animals and 
fodder. In theory these things could have been imported to the highlands 
from outside. However, this would have been an immense logistical 
achievement and no governments managed to do this. Therefore all regimes 
relied on local animals and fodder for official transport. In a very sparsely 
populated region with tough terrain, increases in the size and centralization 
of the state and military presence greatly increased the burden on local 
livestock owners. Overburdened herders rebelled or moved out of reach of 
those who levied the corveé, causing very significant problems for the 
officials. Thus, political authority was reliant on a tax that was very difficult 
to increase. This meant that there was less space in Kham than in other parts 
of China for involutionary growth, that is, the simultaneous growth of 
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multiple forms of authority. In Kham different authorities tended to compete 
with each other for the corvée that could be levied. This, I argue was one of 
the major causes of the Kanze conflict. The regional government also 
intervened to prevent its local agents from appropriating the value of this 
labour by converting it into cash payments. When Han military forces could 
not dominate rivals, there was a tendency for its relationships with them to 
be highly managed and structured around a minute division of the tax-base.  
Twice the state attempted to break free from this situation by making 
alternative arrangements for its transport, which involved the creation of 
state livestock farms that would provide pack animals for official and 
military use. Neither attempt was successful, but these ventures did 
contribute to the development of the regional government’s agricultural 
strategy. Indeed, the farms established in a vain but creative attempt to solve 
the wula problem remain a part of the Kham landscape to the present day.   
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Chapter Five: Conflict, Security and Ethnicity in Liangshan 
 
 
With the weakening of Han frontier authority around 1917, fighting broke 
out in many places throughout the highlands. Most accounts give the 
impression that violence in Liangshan was more intense than in most parts 
of Kham. In chapter one, we saw that Leibo lost fifty percent of its Han 
population between 1918 and 1920. Han authority was completely 
eliminated in Zhaojue. The large and profitable mines at Maha in Mianning 
were abandoned due to conflict. This violence was not well understood in 
the Republican period, and nor has it been satisfactorily explained since. At 
the time, it was simply referred to as the “Yi scourge” (Yi huan 夷患), 
which was used exclusively to talk about violence in Ningshu. No matter 
how violent some parts of Kham may have been at particular times, there 
was no idea of a “Kham barbarian scourge”. The “Yi scourge” was part of 
the “Yi problem” (Yi wu wenti 夷務問題 ). The indigenous people of 
Ningshu were thus problematized in a way that the Kham indigenes never 
were. Although the latter were infrequently called yi 夷, “the Yi wu wenti” 
always referred to Ningshu, and there was no equivalent “Kham people 
problem”. Other terms were also localized to Ningshu as well. Writers 
fretted about “Yi areas” (Yi qu 夷區), or more emotively the “Yi lairs” (Yi 
chao 夷巢, literally “Yi nests”). There were plenty of entirely non-Han 
communities in Kham as well, yet there were no “Yi/Khampa areas” or 
“lairs” there. Another difference in the reporting of violence in the two 
places was that in Kham conflict was usually characterized as a form of 
(political) revolt (panluan 叛亂), incited by malevolent outside forces. A 
1929 petition from Xikang settlers to the Nanjing government claimed: 
 
The Tibetan soldiers [in the Lhasa army] repeatedly attempt to incite 
the obstinate elements of the eastern Kham population to rise up and 
expel the Han. […] According to recent information in special 
dispatches from Chongqing, the British have also been inciting the 
Tibetan army to invade Xikang.1  
                                               
1 JKDZ, 50. 
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The implication in this petition and in other similar reports is that violence 
in Kham was the result of meddling outsiders rather than the problematic 
nature of the Khampa, or other factors within Kham. Reports from Ningshu, 
by contrast, tended to relate violence to the basic nature of “the Yi” and 
their society.    
This chapter works through the attempts of Republican period writers 
and later historians to explain the violence that occurred in Ningshu in the 
late 1910s and early 1920s. I argue against seeing this conflict as the result 
of intractable ethnic tension, or the opium trade, as other historians have 
done. I offer instead the interpretation that the Yunnanese occupation of 
Sichuan and the resulting budget cuts to Sichuanese military forces led to 
sudden unemployment for a large number of Yi mercenaries, who had 
served as security contractors for Chinese administrations for decades.  
This chapter also examines the breakdown in the late Republican period 
of a form of tenancy agreement that Han migrants to the region in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had often made with Yi chiefs. The 
violence of the early Republican period, coupled with the end of this form 
of tenancy a couple of decades later, had the net effect of greatly reducing 
the degree of interaction between Yi and Han communities. The Republican 
period was an era of increasing ethnic segregation. Thus, like the previous 
chapter, this chapter also looks at how the development of local and regional 
Han authority was shaped by local problems and institutions.  
 
 
Backgrounds: Slavery and Historical Conflict 
 
For many observers in the Republican period, one of the primary causes of 
the “Yi problem” was relatively simple. It was the Yi themselves. They 
were a savage race of slave-owners, whose hunger for loot and more slaves 
drove them to attack Han communities. The 1941 Xichang Gazetteer stated: 
“The Yi of Xichang also delight in killing and plunder. They hate other 
races and their fortes are robbing, capturing, killing and burning the 
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property of the Han people.”2 The term “Yi scourge” conveys the sense of a 
generalized calamity wrought by a purportedly barbaric people. It offered an 
interpretation of violent incidents that framed them as part of a general 
inclination for Yi to be violent against Han people; the term “Yi scourge” 
was never used when talking about violence within Yi communities.  
Slavery certainly existed in pre-1950s Yi society, though as Ann 
Maxwell Hill argues, it would be better characterized as a “society with 
slaves” rather than a “slave society” as it has been labelled by post-1950s 
historiography. 3 Slave owning was incidental rather than essential to Yi 
production and social structure. Moreover, not all Yi groups were equally 
engaged with the practice of capturing slaves from the fringes of Han 
settlements. A 1930s article on Leibo mentioned that “[the local Yi] usually 
aid in the defense of Han villages, and furthermore make great efforts in 
doing so.”4 However, to Han who lived nearby to slave-raiding Yi groups, 
the mechanics of the Yi mode of production were probably much less 
important that the chilling prospect of being enslaved by the ethnic other. 
The probability of this occurring might have been quite low. Nevertheless, 
the psychological impact of the practice on Han communities and local 
governments ought to be taken into consideration as part of the background 
of the ethnic conflict in Ningshu. 
This sense that the conflict was due to innate Yi savagery was at odds 
with the relatively common view that the Qing had been, in the words of the 
Sichuan-Xikang Survey Report, “an age of peace between the Han and Yi.”5 
“The Yi always treated [government soldiers and messengers] with the 
greatest respect, and there were never any instances of messengers being ill 
                                               
2 Zheng Shaocheng 鄭少成 and Yang Zhaoji 楊肇基, "Xichang xian zhi 西昌縣志 [1941]," 
in Zhongguo Xizang ji Gan Qing Chuan Dian Zang qu fang zhi huibian 中國西藏及甘青
川滇藏區方志匯編, Vol. 40, ed. Zhang Yuxin 张羽新 (Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 
2003), 535. 
3 Ann Maxwell Hill, "Captives, Kin, and Slaves in Xiao Liangshan," The Journal of Asian 
Studies 60, no. 4 (2001): 1033. 
4 ZYDZ, "Leibo diaocha," 74. 
5 CKSB, 171. A similar narrative was given by ZYDZ, "Diaocha ziliao," Chuanbian jikan 1, 
no. 3 (1935): 165-68. 
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treated or slighted.” 6  In fact, the Qing had seen some bitter conflicts 
between imperial forces and some Yi groups, which the Survey Report 
hinted at but did not elaborate on. In 1868, Zhou Dawu 周達武 (1813-
1895), the Provincial Military Commander (tidu 提督) of Guizhou had led 
10,000 soldiers from that province to Yuesui, where he executed “corrupt 
and traitorous Han”, and then fought his way across Liangshan to Puxiong 
普雄 in a tough campaign against rebellious Yi.7 The 1906 Yuesui Gazetteer 
rather coyly stated that when Zhou's forces dug themselves in at Puxiong to 
rebuild government offices “the Yi went into hiding and within three to four 
hundred li of the garrison there was no trace of any Yi.”8 Liu Wenhui later 
commented that Zhou's forces killed “tens of thousands of Yi bandits”, 
though he did not give a source for this figure.9 D'Ollone, by contrast, heard 
from unnamed sources that “In 1868 General Chao [Zhou] […] suffered a 
complete defeat at [Yi] hands […] and the Chinese were forced to recognize 
their independence.”10 The details and outcome of the war clearly require 
further research. Nevertheless, it seems safe to assume that it involved a 
rather large loss of life for both sides. Even if we do not buy the “Yi delight 
in killing and plunder” interpretation of the early Republican violence, there 
was a real history of enmity between some Yi clans and Chinese authorities.   
However, despite this background of tension, around 1917 something 
suddenly and dramatically ended the peace that had persisted with relatively 
few interruptions since 1869. As we saw in chapter one, in that year or one 
or two years later, Han populations that had been stable or rising suddenly 
                                               
6 CKSB, 171. 
7 Ma Zhongliang 馬忠良 and Sun Qiangzeng 孫鏘增, "Yuesui ting zhi 越嶲廳志  [1906]," 
in Zhongguo Xizang ji Gan Qing Chuan Dian Zangqu fangzhi huibian 中國西藏及甘青
川滇藏區方志彙編, Vol. 39, ed. Zhang Yuxin 张羽新 (Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 
2003), 166 [original pagination: bianfang 邊防, 26a]. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Liu Wenhui 劉文輝, "Ningshu Yi wu wenti zhi jiantao 甯屬夷務問題之檢討," Kangdao 
yuekan 2, no. 3 (1939): 2. 
10 Vicomte D'Ollone, In Forbidden China: the D'Ollone Mission, 1906-1909: China-Tibet-
Mongolia, trans. Bernard Miall (Boston: Small, Maynard and Company, 1912), 77. 
Goullart wrote more or less the same thing: Peter Goullart, Princes of the Black Bone, 
120. 
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began to fall, while mines and magistrates' offices were abandoned. In most 
places, this conflict began to die down in the late 1920s or early 1930s. Thus 
it was an historically specific phenomenon that occurred at a particular time, 
rather than a constant and inevitable feature of life on the Han-Yi frontier. 
Nineteenth century conflicts may have created an environment of mutual 
mistrust, but, like Yi slave-owning, they do not explain the rapid escalation 
of violence in the late 1910s 
There are several types of explanation for that conflict within the 
existing literature. Firstly, there is an argument that violence intensified 
because of increased trade, particularly in opium and weapons. Secondly, 
throughout the twentieth century there has been a vein of interpretation 
suggesting that an upheaval within Yi society in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries was to blame. According to this view, tusi 
increasingly lost power to a more violent and unruly slave-owning 
aristocracy. Thirdly, many Republican era sources argued that there was a 
deterioration in either the strength or moral standards of Han governments 
in the region. 
The following discussion analyses the evidence and arguments relating 
to opium first. I find that the trade probably was important, but that there are 
chronological and interpretive problems with many arguments. The view 
there was an upheaval within Yi society is intriguing, yet the link between 
that and the conflict between Han and Yi communities requires elaboration. 
On their own, the arguments concerning troop numbers and standards of 
governance are often somewhat unsatisfactory as well. However, seen 
within the broader context of the Yunnanese occupation of Sichuan, both 
are more plausible. Another consequence of that occupation, overlooked by 
both contemporary observers and later scholars, was the end an intricate 
system of security contracting relationships between local Han governments 
and Yi chiefs.  
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Trade, Opium and Guns 
 
Republican era writers and later historians have held the trade in opium and 
firearms responsible for the increase in violence in the twentieth century. 
Contemporary reports frequently accused corrupt military officers of selling 
firearms to Yi groups in exchange for opium.11 Such writers pointed out that 
this increased the capacity for recalcitrant Yi tribes and bandits to raid 
villages. Ann Maxwell Hill presents a variant argument, based 
predominantly on evidence from the Xiao Liangshan (Lesser Cold 
Mountains) in Yunnan, adjacent to Xikang’s Da Liangshan (Greater Cold 
Mountains) region, though her conclusions relate more broadly to “old 
Liangshan society” and the Nuosu Yi in general. According to Hill, chiefs’ 
demand for guns caused them to seek to increase opium production, for 
which they needed more labour and thus more captives.12 
These arguments are interesting, but there are some problems with 
linking the increase in violence in the late Qing and Republican periods with 
the trade in opium and arms. The first is chronological. As we saw in 
chapter one, there were two periods in which a significant volume of opium 
was exported from Liangshan, both corresponding to relatively successful 
prohibition in the Sichuan basin. These periods were between 1906 and 
1911, and from around 1936 onwards. However, as we have seen, the period 
in which violence was most intense in Liangshan was between 1917 and the 
early 1920s, a time when not much opium was exported from Liangshan.  
There is also an interpretive problem. The key parties in the trade were 
in a state of near mutual dependence. The Yi had no other source of modern 
firearms and ammunition, while, during the periods of opium suppression, 
the opium dealers had few other suppliers. In some cases, the drug was a 
                                               
11 ZYDZ, "Leibo diaocha," 80; CKSB, 171; Xikang sheng canyihui: di er jie, di yi ci da hui 
hui bian 西康省參議會：第二屆第一次大會匯編 (Kangding: Kangyu gongsi, 1942) an 
wen 案文, 43a. This thesis has been picked up by later Chinese historians, see: Du Yuting 
杜玉亭, "Yunnan Xiao Liangshan Yizu de nuli zhidu 云南小凉山彝族的奴隶制度," in 
Yunnan Xiao Liangshan Yizu shehui lishi diaocha 云南小凉山彝族社会历史调查, ed. 
Minzu wenti wuzhong conghsu Yunnan sheng bianji weiyuanhui 《民族问题五种丛书》
云南省编辑委员会 (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2009), 22. 
12 Hill, "Captives, Kin, and Slaves in Xiao Liangshan," 1038. 
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key source of local government revenue. This situation could also be 
conducive of good relations. In 1939, a report for Zhang Qun listed four 
reasons that Yi groups “submitted to” (toucheng 投誠) Han governments: if 
they were weak, had been defeated by the Han, lived near the Han, or had 
trading relations with the Han.13 In 1948, Shi Wen wrote:  
 
In recent years the Yi have gradually learnt from the Han the art of 
poppy cultivation […] Who would have thought that mountainsides 
incapable of producing grains can grow opium so well! […] Even in the 
most remote parts of the Yi regions, the Yi bandits cease robbing 
travelers during the poppy harvesting season and allow the Han to come 
and do business.14 
 
It is not clear from the available evidence that the negative impacts of trade 
on ethnic relations outweighed the positive.  
Furthermore, some accounts suggest that the opium exports of the late 
1900s and late 1930s and 1940s occurred against a background of declining 
trade. Zeng Zhaolun wrote:  
 
In the Qing period, many Han merchants went into Liangshan to trade 
cloth and salt […] Such merchants traversed the whole region. […] In 
the late Qing and early Republican periods, the Yi people became 
increasingly unruly. Han people who went into the mountains were 
often enslaved. Even merchants who had made great profits from trade 
no longer dared go into the hills.15 
 
In chapter six we shall see that some merchants did in fact continue to go to 
Yi territory during the Republican period, and were generally safe if they 
made protection arrangements with Yi chiefs. But the “unruly Yi” was not 
the only reason for trade to decline. Before the late nineteenth century, an 
insect that produces wax used in the manufacture of candles was one of 
Liangshan’s most significant exports (the insects breed better in Liangshan, 
                                               
13 "Ningshu diaocha baogao huibian," junshi men 軍事門, 23. 
14 Shi Wen 石聞, "Xikang wei Zhongguo yin lai de san da wenti: yapian, yiwu yu Yingguo 
shili de ruqin 西康為中國引來的三大問題：鴉片，夷務與英國勢力的入侵," Shi yu 
wen 時與文 3, no. 22 (1948): 11. 
15 Zeng Zhaolun, Da Liang Shan Yi qu kao cha ji, 66-67. 
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and were taken from there to Leshan where their wax was harvested). 
However, as Hosie wrote: 
 
Since the introduction of kerosene oil into China and its almost 
universal use in the remotest provinces of the Empire, the demand for 
white wax has declined considerably […] Not many years ago […] ten 
thousand porters were required to carry the scales [containing insects] 
from the Chien-ch’ang [Jianchang] valley […], and in 1884 we find that 
a thousand porters are able to transport the Chien-ch’ang supply. In 
many homesteads in Ssu-ch’uan [Sichuan], where candles were 
formerly the only lights, kerosene has been introduced. […] The value, 
like the demand, has also declined. Not many years ago it was quoted at 
double the prices realized at present.16  
  
If the two flowerings of opium export occurred against a background of 
declining trade in other commodities, then the view that the violence of the 
early Republican period was caused by the Yi clans’ increased access to 
guns, which was supposedly thanks to an increase in trade, is problematic. It 
may have been that the volume of trade declined, but the value increased, 
but clearly the matter requires more research.  
If the opium trade was important, it may well have been the end of the 
trade that mattered. In the 1906 to 1911 period, some Yi chiefs became 
accustomed to reaping substantial profit from selling opium or renting land 
to Han opium growers. 17 When the export of opium from Liangshan ended, 
it is possible that some chiefs sought to replace those gains through robbery. 
Alternatively, as opium production increased in the Sichuan basin after 1911 
and the price of poppies tumbled, Yi land would have had to produce much 
more to maintain the same income. This could have sparked the practice that 
Hill suggests: the raiding of Han villages for captives who could be put to 
work in poppy plantations. A third possibility is that because most Yi knew 
little about the situation in the Sichuan basin, it would have been hard for 
them to understand why the prices offered by Han merchants had declined 
so rapidly. Many descriptions of ethnic tension in Liangshan balance a 
stereotype of Yi savagery with one of Han proclivity to cheat the Yi in 
                                               
16 Alexander Hosie, Three Years in Western China: A Narrative of Three Journeys in Ssu-
chuan, Kuei-chow, and Yün-nan (London: George Philip & Son, 1897), 200-01. 
17 Pollard, In Unknown China, 238. 
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trade.18 Decreases in opium prices could have gelled with and supported this 
stereotype and touched off conflict in places that had profited from the 1906 
to 1911 opium trade.  
In sum, the post-1936 boom in opium exports from Liangshan resulted 
in Yi clans having more and better guns. However, these firearms were not 
used in the worst instances of ethnic conflict, because those incidences 
occurred between 1917 and 1920. The briefer 1906-1911 period of opium 
export from Liangshan must have given some Yi clans greater access to 
firearms, making the 1917 to 1920 conflicts more deadly than would 
otherwise have been the case. On the other hand, the end of the late Qing 
opium trade probably had a more significant detrimental effect on ethnic 
relations than the trade itself: More research in this area could prove 
worthwhile. The six year gap between the end of the trade and the onset of 
the most significant fighting also makes it difficult to accept that the trade 
was a core cause of that fighting, rather than just an intensifier of it.  
 
Late Republican and post-1949 Chinese ethnography has frequently 
argued that in the late Qing and early Republican periods tusi authority 
declined in relation to a slave-owning aristocratic warrior caste. 19  In 
Chinese, this group has usually been known as the Black Yi (Hei Yi 黑夷/
彝), which derives from the meaning of the indigenous term “Nuosu”, or 
less often the Luo-Yi (猓夷/倮夷), which appears to come from a phonetic 
rendering of the same indigenous term. 20  According to Stevan Harrell, 
“Nuosu” is the self-identification of almost all the Yi in Liangshan, among 
                                               
18 Shi Wen wrote: “The Yi people are often badly cheated by Han merchants” Shi Wen, 
"Xikang wei Zhongguo yin lai de san da wenti: yapian, yiwu yu Yingguo shili de ruqin," 
11. See also Zeng Zhaolun, Da Liang Shan Yi qu kao cha ji, 37. Liu Wenhui wrote “The 
Yi people came to see me, and also said that in the past evil gentry (tu hao lie shen 土豪
劣紳) and the army and officials had conspired together to cheat, oppress and exploit 
them. I dispatched men to investigate and found that what they said was completely true.” 
Liu Wenhui, "Ningshu Yi wu wenti zhi," 4. 
19 "Ningshu diaocha baogao huibian," nongmu men 農牧門, 65-66; Yang Minghong, "Lun 
Qingdai Liangshan Yi qu de tusi zhidu yu gaituguiliu," 94. 
20 Stevan Harrell, "Ethnicity, Local Interests, and the State: Yi Communities in Southwest 
China," Comparative Studies in Society and History 32, no. 3 (1990): 525. 
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whom the slave-owning aristocrats are properly called the nuohu.21 English 
languages scholarship usually identifies commoners and slaves as “Nuosu”, 
but of the quho, mgajie and gaxy galo castes rather than nuohu castes.22 In 
Chinese, commoners and slaves tend to be labelled White Yi (Bai Yi 白夷/
彝), or not “real Yi” at all. 23 In many Chinese accounts, the increasing 
dominance of the slave-raiding Black Yi/ “real Yi” over the other strata of 
non-Han Liangshan society caused the conflict of the early twentieth 
century. “When the Black Yi replaced the nzymo (Ch. zimo兹莫) [a royal 
elite] to become the paramount leaders [of Liangshan indigenous society], 
the slave system entered its historical peak, and raiding for captives became 
more intense.”24 Han Chinese were not the only victims of the rising and 
aggressive Black Yi:  
 
In the Daoguang reign (1821-1850) there were no Luo-Yi in Yanyuan 
and Yanbian. However, the tusi became wary of Han tenants and 
instead began to recruit Luo-Yi to cultivate their land. In the end, the 
Black Yi became the tail that wagged the tusi dog (wei da bu diao 尾大
不掉). The native offices were burned and the Xifan 西番 and Moxie 
麼些 peoples were driven away.25  
 
In many respects, this is the 'savagery-and-slavery' interpretation of the “Yi 
scourge”, made more logical by its capacity to explain why, at a specific 
historical moment, relations between Han and certain non-Han communities 
got much worse. The puzzle of why tusi power declined relative to the 
Black Yi / Luo-Yi remains, and some sources relate it to late imperial gaitu-
                                               
21 Harrell, "Introduction," in Perspectives on the Yi of Southwest China, ed. Stevan Harrell 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 9, 11. 
22 Ibid.; Lu Hui, "Preferential Bilateral-Cross-Cousin Marriage among the Nuosu in 
Liangshan," in Perspectives on the Yi of Southwest China, ed. Stevan Harrell (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001), 68. 
23 Zhongguo kexueyuan minzu yanjiu suo 中国科学院民族研究所 and Sichuan shaoshu 
minzu shehui lishi diaocha zu 四川少数民族社会历史调查组, eds., Liangshan Xichang 
Yizu diqu tusi lishi ji tusi tongzhi qu shehui gaikuang (ziliao huiji) 凉山西昌彝族地区土
司历史及土司统治区社会概况（资料汇辑）(1963), 51. 
24 Yang Minghong, "Lun Qingdai Liangshan Yi qu de tusi zhidu yu gaituguiliu," 94. 
25 "Ningshu diaocha baogao huibian," zhengsu men 政俗門, 15.  
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guiliu or other Han military campaigning, though these things did not occur 
everywhere in Liangshan.26  
This argument is intriguing and certainly worthy of further research, 
though there are some interpretive problems. The above discussion should 
be adequate to demonstrate that terms such as “Black Yi” are unstable and 
ill-defined: single terms are used differently by different observers. In the 
Liangshan context, “tusi” is particularly problematic. In imperial political 
theory, “tusi” households had, at some point in the Yuan-Ming-Qing era 
been granted official recognition from a Mongol, Han or Manchu emperor. 
In this sense, not all indigenous leaders were tusi. With such a definition the 
argument regarding the rise of the non-tusi aristocracy is at least a logical 
proposition. Yet in the early twentieth century, the term “tusi” was also used 
more broadly to signify any non-Han leader who served as a benign 
mediator between the Chinese bureaucracy and the world of the barbarian. 
Even the adopted Yi son of the magistrate of Hanyuan was called a tusi by 
local Chinese.27 In this usage, the term was similar to the labels “cooked” 
(shu 熟) and “raw” (sheng 生) for “civilized” and “uncivilized” barbarians 
respectively. These names mostly described the referents’ political 
behaviour and loyalties, rather than their cultural orientation and, in the case 
of “tusi”, their actual position in non-Han society. This reduces the 
argument related in the previous paragraph to a claim that a group of ill-
defined non-friendly indigenous leaders replaced a group of equally ill-
defined friendly indigenous leaders. There is no real evidence that the 
people in the two sets were always different individuals. According to a lot 
of scholarship, the tusi were drawn from nzymo elite; if the nzymo were also 
Black Yi, as some historians have it, one wonders what separated the tusi 
from the “Black Yi slave-owners” who have been cast as the bugbears of 
peace-loving communities in Liangshan. 28  It may be that a careful 
                                               
26 Wu Wenhui 吴文暉 and Zhu Jianhua 朱鑒華, "Xikang tudi wenti 西康土地問題," 
Bianzheng gonglun 邊政公論 3, no. 6 (1944): 11. 
27 Zeng Zhaolun, Da Liang Shan Yi qu kao cha ji, 53; Goullart, Princes of the Black Bone, 
115. 
28 Hui defines the nzymo as Black Yi, for example Hui, "Preferential Bilateral-Cross-Cousin 
Marriage among the Nuosu in Liangshan," 68. 
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examination of Yi language sources will reveal a relatively clear distinction. 
But it is also worth considering what happens when we stop attempting to 
ascribe blame to a vague cultural group, and instead analyze the specifics of 
the local political contexts in which the violence of 1917 erupted. The 
following sections of this chapter do this by sketching the impact of the 
Yunnanese occupation of Sichuan on Liangshan, and in particular the way 
that it affected an intricate security arrangement that had existed in many 
parts of Liangshan for at least half a century. 
 
 
The Yunnanese Occupation and the Qing Security Arrangements  
 
As we saw in chapter one, the Yunnanese occupation of Sichuan led to 
drastic budget cuts across Sichuanese military units, including the Frontier 
Defence Force. There were three main impacts on local politics on the Yi-
Han frontier. Firstly, the cuts suffered by the Sichuanese military probably 
resulted in the disbanding of garrisons in some locations. Although 
Republican sources were inexplicably shy about blaming the Yunnanese, 
they rarely failed to point out that the conflict in Sichuan weakened the 
frontier garrisons. The 1946 New Gazetteer for the Sichuan Frontier 
reported:  
 
In the past, border defences were sturdy. The garrisons put fear into the 
hearts of the Yi. They hibernated (zhe蟄) in their mountains. In the 
Republican era, due to the chaos in Sichuan the border defenses have 
slackened and the Yi have run rampant.29 
 
This referred specifically to Leibo, Mabian and Pingshan, and echoed what 
investigations published in Sichuan Frontier Quarterly had written about 
the same places in the 1935.30 However, it is uncertain as to whether there 
was a net loss of soldiers in any region. During this time Sichuan was the 
                                               
29 Zheng Lijian 鄭勵儉, "Chuanbian xin di zhi 川邊新地志 [1946]," in Zhongguo Xizang ji 
Gan Qing Chuan Dian Zang qu fang zhi huibian 中國西藏及甘青川滇藏區方志彙編, 
Vol 44, ed. Zhang Yuxin 张羽新 (Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 2003), 429. 
30 ZYDZ, "Diaocha ziliao," Chuanbian jikan 1, no. 3 (1935) 166.  
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reluctant host to three million personnel from the Yunnan army. 31  The 
compilers of the 1941 Xichang Gazetteer noted that in 1920 the Yunnan 
army deployed troops throughout Ningshu, though they had no information 
on the numbers of soldiers in such garrisons.32  
Secondly, the Yunnanese and Sichuanese military units competed with 
each other for income, and there is evidence that in many places both began 
taxing Yi communities. The Yunnanese garrison commander stationed in 
Leibo, is reported to have “extorted money from the people as he wished, 
which aroused the hostility of the Yi people, causing them to rise up and 
fight back.”33 An article about Mabian describes how one garrison began 
“luring the wealthy Black Yi into captivity and demanding ransoms for their 
release, a practice called ‘catching fat pigs’ by the bandits in the interior.”34 
As we shall see in chapter seven, blaming unethical governance for the 
frontier’s problems was one of the key tropes in Han discourse about the 
region, and perhaps had more to do with the culture of Han politics than 
anything else. However, the struggle between the Yunnanese and 
Sichuanese militaries, and the desperate search of both for revenue, provides 
a plausible context for the argument that standards of government declined 
and that relations with Yi communities were a casualty of that decline. 
Thirdly, the budget cuts sustained by the Sichuanese garrisons led to the 
sudden unemployment of significant numbers of Yi mercenaries. In the late 
Qing a complicated system designed to ensure stability in the ethnically 
mixed regions of Liangshan developed. According to the Yuesui Gazeteer 
and D'Ollone, the system was created after the 1868 war, though an article 
in Sichuan Frontier Quarterly stated that, in Mabian at least, it was 
established as early as the Jiaqing reign, so possibly Zhou Dawu merely 
expanded an already existing practice.35 Under this system, the government 
                                               
31 Yi Bin, "Shilun min chu Sichuan difang zhuyi de sheng ji guanxi," 87. 
32 Zheng Shaocheng and Yang Zhaoji, "Xichang xian zhi," 420. 
33 ZYDZ, "Leibo diaocha," 83. 
34 ZYDZ, "Mabian Yi ren diaocha 馬邊夷人調查," Chuanbian jikan 1, no. 3 (1935): 137. 
35 Vicomte D'Ollone, In Forbidden China, 77; Ma Zhongliang and Sun Qiangzeng, "Yuesui 
ting zhi," 167-69 [original pagination: bianfang 邊防, 26a]; ZYDZ, "Mabian Yi ren 
diaocha," 136. 
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paid Yi leaders to be responsible for the security of a designated area.36 
Most sources give the impression that such chiefs were primarily 
responsible for preventing Yi crimes against Han. It is unclear who was 
responsible for Han crime against Yi. Yi leaders in this role who failed to 
deal with breaches of the peace in their beat would be held personally 
responsible and suffer the loss of their wages.  
This practice often merged with a system whereby selected Yi leaders 
had to reside in Yi ka (夷卡), or “Yi guardhouses”. Accounts of the Yi ka 
give divergent and ambiguous impressions of what this actually meant. 
Fergusson gave the following description of the situation in Yuesui: 
 
In a kind of prison or hostel in connection with the Yamen [government 
office] are to be seen a number of hostages who may be seen also in our 
photographs. These hostages come from various parts along the border, 
and are representative leaders or chiefs, who take turns of imprisonment 
to go pledge for the good conduct of their tribes. These chiefs are paid a 
nominal sum by the Chinese Government for thus serving a period in 
durance, and after serving a term of three months they are allowed to be 
relieved by other representative men of their tribes.37 
 
Fergusson called the Yi “hostages”, yet he was clearly not quite sure about 
their status, being uncertain as to whether to call the Yi ka a “prison” or a 
“hostel”. This was hardly Fergusson’s fault as other accounts are often fairly 
unclear or contradictory too. Some accounts refer to the Yi leaders in the Yi 
ka as “doing service” (dang chai 當差 ). 38  A late Republican source 
described the function of the Yi ka thus: 
 
The purpose of the Yi ka in the Qing dynasty was primarily to detain 
(juliu 拘留) the hostages (renzhi 人質) sent by the Yi tribes in order to 
prevent them from rebelling.39 
 
                                               
36 Ma Zhongliang and Sun Qiangzeng, "Yuesui tingzhi," 167-69 [original pagination: 
bianfang 邊防, 26a-32b]. See also ZYDZ, "Mabian Yi ren diaocha," 136. 
37 W.N. Fergusson, Adventure, Sport and Travel on the Tibetan Steppes (London: 
Constable and Company, Ltd., 1911), 289. 
38 ZYDZ, "Mabian Yi ren diaocha," 136. 
39 Zeng Zhaolun, Da Liang Shan Yi qu kao cha ji, 36. 
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Writing about his visit in the late Republican period, Goullart called the yi 
ka “yamen” (衙門); ‘government offices’ rather than ‘prisons’.40 No source 
I have encountered indicates whether the “hostages” were ever subject to 
other forms of punishment in addition to the loss of their wage if they failed 
to ensure peace in their area of responsibility.  
 
 
 
Yi chiefs in the Yuesui Yi ka, from Fergusson.41 
 
 
The Republican period accounts that fail to mention that the Yi leaders 
in question were paid for their “service” as “hostages” are also clearly 
missing something. Even Fergusson’s account is potentially misleading 
because such payments could be much more substantial than “nominal”. 
According to one description, there was a system of ranks for Yi with whom 
the government had such relationships.42  All ranked Yi received a wage (Yi 
xiang 夷餉), though only “aristocrats with authority” were required to take 
turns at residing in the Yi ka. In Mabian, the Yi yue 夷約, the lowest paid, 
got eight taels of silver per year, the “Yi soldiers” (Yi bing 夷兵) eight to 
                                               
40 Goullart, Princes of the Black Bone, 119. 
41 Fergusson, Adventure, Sport and Travel, 301. 
42 ZYDZ, "Mabian Yi ren diaocha," 136. 
178 
 
twelve taels, while the highest paid, the “thousand household supervisors” 
(qianhu 千戶) got between 24 and 34 taels.43 In the late Qing, soldiers in the 
regular Green Standard army received one tael per month, so the better paid 
“Yi soldiers” had pay-parity with soldiers in the regular armed forces.44 The 
Yi bing, moreover, were irregular fighters, who were not required to live in a 
barracks. According to Sichuan Frontier Quarterly, by the end of the Qing, 
Mabian County’s annual wage bill for the Yi amounted to 7,256 taels, 
which was paid by the Sichuan government.45 A more detailed late Qing 
source stated that with some contributions from county governments, the 
Sichuan provincial government paid out 22,115 taels annually to cover Yi 
xiang for 598 Yi fighters in Ebian, Mabian, Leibo and Pingshan, as well as 
the costs of associated with the Yi ka in those counties.46 Referring generally 
to the other side of the Liangshan, Vicomte D’Ollone wrote that at the time 
of his 1906 visit, the “frontier clans” received an average of between 75 and 
150 taels annually for their services, though the size of these “clans” is 
unclear.47  
If the Yi in the Yi ka were not necessarily the hostages of an oppressive 
regime, as some writers in the Republican period portrayed them, nor were 
they bold natives who turned the tables on the Chinese state and extorted 
tribute money from it, which is the impression D’Ollone gives. 48  The 
majority of tusi in the Qing Empire were not paid. 49 But the Yi militias of 
Liangshan, like certain native officials and their fighters in Yunnan who 
                                               
43 Ibid. 
44 Li Zhiming 李志茗, "Yong ying zhidu: Qing dai jun zhi de zhong jian xingtai 勇营制度
：清代军制的中间形态," Shi lin 史林, no. 4 (2006): 32. 
45 ZYDZ, "Mabian Yi ren diaocha," 136. 
46 Du Mingyi 杜明燡, "E Ma Lei Ping bianwu cha biao ce 峨馬雷屏邊務查表冊," in 
Zhongguo shaoshu minzu guji jicheng. Han yihou Xinan ge minzu. 中國少數民族古籍集
成。漢以後西南各民族, Vol. 94 (Chengdu: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 2002), 418. 
47 D'Ollone, In Forbidden China, 37. 
48 Ibid.  
49 For example, the tusi that are the subject of Jennifer Took’s monograph were not paid: 
Jennifer Took, A Native Chieftaincy in Southwest China: Franchising a Tai Chieftaincy 
under the Tusi System of Late Imperial China (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 191. 
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became “essential mercenary forces for the Qing” at the same time, did 
more for the Qing than the unpaid indigenous leaders of other parts of the 
empire.50 Passing through one Yi settlement, H. R. Davies noted that “The 
son of the head-man was at the time of our visit away with a good many of 
the young men of the place, helping the Chinese in an expedition against 
some of the independent Lolos [Yi].”51 Qing generals also recruited the Yi 
mercenaries from Ningyuan Prefecture for their campaign against the 
Panthay Rebellion (1856-1873) in Yunnan: a rare instance of irregular 
fighters who were not Han, Manchu or Mongol being deployed across a 
provincial boundary.52 
In some places, problems with this system appear to have developed 
before the end of the Qing. According to Samuel Pollard, even in the 
Panthay rebellion, there had been conflict between the Yi mercenaries and 
their employers. Pollard heard that the Yi fighters in Yunnan had had their 
pay withheld. “The Nosu [Yi] soldiers, of course resented this and 
determined to get equal with those who were squeezing them.”53 There are 
reports indicating that by the late nineteenth century demographic pressures 
were also putting the system under strain. According to the Sichuan 
Frontier Quarterly article on Mabian, the Yi population increased during 
this time. 54  This meant that over time the wages provided by the 
government were shared between more people, with the obvious result that 
individuals received less. In addition, some individuals whose families had 
been accustomed to receiving the payments were shut out of the system. 
According to the report, such individuals began “deliberately making 
trouble” (gu yi daoluan 故意搗亂).55 
                                               
50 Giersch, Asian Borderlands, 115. 
51 H. R. Davies, Yün-nan, the link between India and the Yangtze (Taipei: Ch'eng Wen 
Publishing Company, 1970 [1909]), 213. 
52 Pollard, In Unknown China, 178. 
53 Ibid. 
54 ZYDZ, "Mabian Yi ren diaocha," 136. 
55 Ibid. 
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However, the major problem occurred in the early Republican period, 
when “the province’s finances dried up” (sheng kuan duan jue 省款斷絕), 
and there was no longer any money to pay the yi xiang.56 One overview of 
the Mabian-Pingshan-Leibo region gave a broad-brush history of the 
conflicts, stating that:  
 
When the old regime disintegrated, the authority of the government 
was ruined and the Yi stipends and rations were also stopped. […] 
Whereupon the Yi seized the opportunity to come out of their nests 
(chao 巢), causing mayhem on an immense scale; trespassing burning, 
killing and looting.57 
 
The reports in Sichuan Frontier Quarterly did not relate the “drying up” of 
the funds that were previously used to pay the Yi wages specifically to the 
Yunnan occupation. Nor do they state directly that the Yi of the “Yi 
Scourge” were disgruntled former employees of the Chinese state. However, 
given the information that the reports do provide, and the occurrence of the 
“Yi Scourge” at exactly the same time as the Yunnan army cut the budgets 
of Sichuanese military units, I believe we can reasonably infer both of these 
things.  
 Firstly, it is clear that local garrisons were still able to employ the Yi in 
the years immediately after the revolution; their funding did not end with the 
Qing dynasty. For example, in June 1917 a local garrison commander was 
able to “bribe (hui 賄) the Yi of the Wuqi 吳奇 clan to enter the city and 
guard the county offices.”58 He also recruited various other Yi clans from 
Liangshan “to occupy the town and surrounding countryside.”59 
The Wuqi Yi were no strangers to this role. In the west of the county, 
more than one hundred Han households had lived under Wuqi protection 
(baohu保護) before the revolution.60 The article does not state that the Wuqi 
                                               
56 Ibid.: 137. 
57 ZYDZ, "Diaocha ziliao," Chuanbian jikan 1, no. 3 (1935): 166. 
58 ZYDZ, "Leibo diaocha," 80. 
59 Ibid.: 81. 
60 Ibid.: 74. 
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received payments for the protection they granted these communities before 
the revolution. But Yi who were paid under the system described above were 
usually referred to euphemistically as the providers or guarantors of 
“protection (baohu)”. Combined with the evidence that demonstrates this 
system was widespread throughout Liangshan in the late Qing, it can be 
safely assumed that the Wuqi of Leibo did receive remuneration for their 
services before 1911, which clearly continued after the revolution until 1917. 
In April 1918, however, the Wuqi were among those who “came out of 
their lairs” to pillage the Han communities.61 Again, the article does not 
state directly that they did this because their wages were no longer being 
paid. But given what we know about the broader context, this is the simplest 
and most likely explanation for the Wuqi’s shift from protector to menace. 
After all, the military unit that became a bandit gang after having its wages 
cut or withheld is a familiar figure from Republican period history.62 Of 
bandits in general in the Sichuan frontier, Sichuan-Xikang Survey Report 
wrote “bandits and soldiers are one and the same thing.”63  
In many places, the Qing system, or a modified version of it, was 
revived during the late 1920s or early 1930s. Mabian, for example, 
established two defense institutions that involved the Yi. One was an office 
called the Yi Affairs Bureau (Yi wu chu 夷務處), which made monthly 
payments, which were still called Yi xiang after the Qing nomenclature, to 
Yi groups who had ‘submitted’ in return for their assistance with problems 
involving other Yi.64 In most respects this was a straightforward return to 
the Qing status quo. The county government does not appear to have 
required representative leaders to reside in Yi ka, but this system resurfaced 
in other places in Liangshan. Chang Longqing commented that the safety of 
his expedition had been guaranteed by a nephew of a chieftain serving as a 
                                               
61 Ibid.: 82. 
62 See Phil Billingsley, Bandits in Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
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63 CKSB, 141. 
64 ZYDZ, "Mabian Yi ren diaocha," 138. 
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“hostage” (renzhi 人質) in Xichang.65 In addition, Mabian and some other 
counties established small brigades of regular Yi soldiers, which were 
integrated in some way with the local Han military forces.66 In Xichang, the 
situation was similar. Deng Xiuting, the local military commander who was 
widely credited with improving the security situation in that county, 
established an Yi regiment which made up one third of the total forces under 
his control.67 Reports considered members of this regiment to be regular 
soldiers, but as one researcher pointed out, because they usually wore their 
own clothes instead of uniforms outsiders were unable to identify them as 
such. 68  Measures such as this did not result in a complete cessation of 
conflict, but combined with the increase in regional government military 
strength, they did lead to a significant decline in violence.  
Yang Gengguang’s report of the Bathang Cultivation Society’s (see 
chapter one) relocation to Yi territory in Leshan in the last years of the Qing 
explicitly attributes peaceful relations between the Yi and Han communities 
then and in the Republican period to the maintenance of security contracting 
agreements. Before the revolution, the Leshan government made substantial 
payments to local Yi. 69 Yang notes that “because of the bao shan 包山 
agreements, there was no Yi scourge to speak of”.70 The term “Bao shan” 
could mean a couple of different things but in this report, it almost certainly 
referred to some form of security contract, the “bao” meaning “guarantee” 
as in baopei 包賠; ‘to guarantee to pay compensation’. Hence bao shan 
should be something like “guaranteeing the mountains”. Bao shan is also 
used this way by Zeng Zhuyun:  
 
                                               
65 Chang Longqing 常隆慶, Lei Ma E Ping diaocha ji 雷馬峨屏調查記 (Chongqing: 
Zhongguo xi bu ke xue yuan, 1935), 15. 
66 ZYDZ, "Mabian Yi ren diaocha," 137. 
67 Zeng Zhaolun, Da Liang Shan Yi qu kao cha ji, 42. 
68 "Ningshu diaocha baogao huibian," zhengsu men 政俗門, 27. 
69 Yang’s text has “500 jin 金 [gold]”; jin probably means ‘taels’ (liang 兩).  Yang 
Gengguang, "Sichuan Le-Ping kenwu," 9. 
70 Ibid. 
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In the Qing dynasty, the government adopted a loose rein policy for 
ruling the Yi. It established Yi officials (Yi guan 夷官), and gave them 
the prerogative (quanli 權利) of guaranteeing security in the mountains 
and protecting the roads (yu yi baoshan baolu de quanli 予以包山保路
的權利).71 
 
Note that the Chinese word quanli 權利 is normally translated as ‘rights’. In 
this context, ‘prerogative’ is more accurate because the ‘right’ in question is 
to be the protectors of travellers in the mountains. That this is framed as a 
‘right’ rather than a duty (yiwu 義務) indicates that the Yi received some 
benefit from doing so.  
In 1932 Yang’s society re-made a bao shan contract with a chief called 
Hongche’er 紅扯兒 in which it agreed to pay 250 taels per year in Yi xiang 
to be divided among the chiefs of local clans.72 For unstated reasons one 
particular Yi chief was unhappy with the situation and took some of the 
society’s farmers (kenhu 墾戶 ) hostage. The society complained to 
Hongche’er and received support from a chief called Sansan’er 三三兒 in 
its attempt to rescue the hostages. After a battle, there were negotiations 
which resulted in Hongche’er securing the release of the hostages and the 
society receiving 500 yuan in compensation. The next year there was a 
formal signing of the bao shan agreement, attended by the society, eight 
members of the local Han gentry, representatives of the local Han 
government, and the Yi chiefs Hongche’er and Sansan’er with 80 of their 
followers. Yang reported that “in 1935, after the signing of the bao shan 
agreement, relations between the Yi and Han were peaceful and 
uneventful.”73  
The breakdown of the security contracting relationships was not the only 
cause of violence, and their revival was probably not the only cause of the 
improving situation in the 1930s. However, the evidence indicates that these 
relationships were an important factor in both of these phenomena. Why 
would many reports be coy about stating this directly? One reason is that 
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this explanation did not gel very well with the interpretation that the conflict 
was caused by fundamental Yi savagery and hunger for slaves. As we saw 
above, this was one of the key Republican period framings for the violence. 
According to this interpretation, Yi who helped the government were seen 
as more civilized/Chinese than the wild “uncooked” Yi, who took the blame 
for the conflict.74 A Yi group’s degree of distance from Chinese culture and 
administration was related to their propensity to attack Han settlements. The 
view that violence was caused by Yi otherness was thoroughly compatible 
with the core nation-building concerns of many twentieth century leaders 
and intellectuals, who were already pre-occupied with the task of building 
cultural and administrative unity. The revelation that the “Yi scourge” was 
wrought in part by the Yi who had worked most closely with the Qing 
would have demonstrated that closeness did not lead inexorably toward 
greater stability. 
The rebuilding of the security contracting relationships helped to end the 
violence. However, this was not something that satisfied nation-building 
prescriptions for the region either. To most Republican period 
commentators, paying salaries to Yi who did not wear government issued 
uniforms and live in barracks was a form of jimi 羈縻 ; ‘loose rein’ 
governance.75 For them, jimi was a pejorative term that meant empowering 
local elites but allowing them to act autonomously with little or no 
supervision. Qing accounts, such as that given in Yuesui Gazetteer, never 
described the security contracting system as jimi. From the Qing perspective 
such a characterization would not have made sense. After all, the system was 
a lot less ‘loose rein’ than having no relationship at all with the Yi elites, 
which was the likely alternative. By the 1930s the goal of assimilating the 
whole region into the Republic’s regular administrative system was never 
seriously questioned. The use of the term ‘jimi’ to describe the security 
contracting system reflected the transformed expectations of the Republican 
period.  
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Land Tenure and the Hongzhao 
 
In addition to the security contracting relationships, a second local 
institution also broke down in the Republican period. In this case, the break-
up may have been less violent. It resulted, all the same, in a greater degree 
of separation between Yi and Han communities. This institution was a 
particular form of tenancy agreement between Han settlers and Yi chiefs.  
The Qing dynasty saw a massive influx of Han migrants into 
Ningyuan.76 Many migrants established farms in the region, for which they 
acquired land from the Yi. One of the means by which this occurred was the 
creation of land use agreements that the Chinese sources call hongzhao 紅照 
(“red tickets”). This was a kind of inheritable tenancy, although Republican 
period observers did not refer to them with the same terms as those used for 
the permanent tenancy in Interior China, or state that the two customs were 
the same. All the sources I have encountered are clear that they are tenancy 
agreements, not purchase agreements.77 According to Wu Migeng, their use 
was not restricted to deals between Han and Yi. Wu states that most land in 
the Yi regions was held by the “Black Yi” aristocracy, but some powerful 
“tusi” also had substantial land holdings that were documented with 
hongzhao, understood in broadly the same terms as given in other 
descriptions.78 
Due to apparent tusi need for cash in the late Qing, it became common 
for them to jia ya 加押, a term also found in the Chengdu plain, which 
literally meant “increase the deposit/tenancy fee” (it is not always clear 
whether ya 押 should be thought of as a refundable deposit or a tenancy 
                                               
76 In 1711 Ningyuan Prefecture’s total population was recorded at 12,500 people. In 1820 it 
was recorded as 1,266,273. Liu Zhenggang 刘正刚 and Tang Weihua 唐伟华, "Qing dai 
yimin yu Han Yi jiaoliu tantao 清代移民与汉彝交流探讨," Guizhou minzu yanjiu 贵州
民族研究 22, no. 90 (2002): 147. This migration was part of the broader mass movement 
of Han Chinese to the southwest. On migration to Yunnan, see Giersch, Asian 
Borderlands. 
77 See for example Fu Zhenyuan 傅真元, "Liang yan hong zhao di zhi neirong ji qi jiejue 
zhi tujing 两盐红照地之内容及其解决之途径," Kangdao yuekan 4, no. 8,9 (合刊) 
(1941); Wang Zhengguan 汪正琯, "Yanyuan jixing 鹽源紀行," Kangdao yuekan 5, no. 6 
(1943). 
78 Wu Migeng, "Jiejue Xikang Kang Ning liang shu diquan wenti," 38. 
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fee).79 In reality jia ya was a way of loaning money from tenants, as tenants 
got a rent reduction in return.80 In this respect, the practice was the same on 
the Chengdu plain and in Ningshu. It is uncertain why tusi needed to raise 
more cash; Fu Zhenyuan interprets it as a result of their “pride and 
extravagance”.81 
In Republican period Ningshu it appears that there were relatively 
frequent confrontations between Han holders of hongzhao tenancy and the 
tusi who nominally owned the land but had perhaps not used it for 
generations and often collected little rent from it because they or their 
forebears had resorted to jia ya. According to Wang Zhengguan, in Yanyuan 
and Yanbian the tusi became rich due to cultivation of opium, and “without 
regard to inflation, demanded the return of their land according to the prices 
of the past, and the Han farmers, who had worked hard for several 
generations, were suddenly left with nothing.”82 While these writers blame 
the tusi, the Xikang Provincial Assembly canyihui 參議會) also pointed its 
fingers at “capital from outside the province” in the hands of unnamed 
“companies, groups and private individuals.”83 Working under the pretext of 
the “admirable cause of cultivation” such outsiders were said to use large 
amounts of money to “snatch (juequ 攫取) fields that had already been 
cultivated by Han farmers.”84 “Attracted by the large sums offered to them, 
the tusi seized the hongzhao without consulting the tenants, and transferred 
the tenancy to others or even sold the land.”85 
                                               
79 Fu Zhenyuan 傅真元, "Liang yan hong zhao di zhi neirong ji qi jiejue zhi tujing 两盐红
照地之内容及其解决之途径," 44. On the use of the term in the Chengdu plain, see Li 
Deying 李德英, "Minguo shiqi Chengdu pingyuan de yazu yu yakou 民国时期成都平原
的押租与押扣," Jindai shi yanjiu 近代史研究, no. 1 (2007). 
80 Fu Zhenyuan, "Liang yan hong zhao di zhi neirong ji qi jiejue zhi tujing," 43. 
81 Ibid.: 44. 
82 Wang Zhengguan, "Yanyuan jixing," 61-71. 
83 Xikang sheng canyihui 西康省參議會, "Linshi canyihui, di yi ci hui huibian 臨時參議會
第一次會匯編," 1940, (SCDAG, QZH:204, AJH:14), section 8, p.12a.  
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
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Whether or not they were aware of it, the tusi might often have had a 
good case under Guomindang law. Lawmakers of the late Qing and 
Republican period sought to restrict the rights of permanent tenants, or 
‘topsoil owners’ in order to move toward Western notions of unitary 
ownership.86 The 1929 Guomindang code included a provision that allowed 
landlords to end permanent tenancies if they wished to farm the land 
themselves. 87  However, this caused controversy throughout China, and 
courts often ruled in favour of tenants despite the provisions in the new legal 
codes. 
There was a certain amount of debate as to how the provincial 
government ought to deal with Ningshu’s hongzhao. Some evidence 
suggests that there was a considerable amount of lobbying from the Han 
holders of hongzhao for the government to recognize the documents as 
deeds of full ownership (suoyou quan 所有權).88 Not all Han commentators 
thought that this would be a good idea. A relatively large body of opinion in 
the Republican period saw the tusi as governors who oversaw territory on 
behalf of the national government, but had no special claim to own land in 
that territory by virtue of their position. This allowed the government to 
argue that that land had always belonged to the state, and the hongzhao were 
merely some kind of Zhao Erfeng-esque state-tenancy managed by the tusi. 
Tu Zhongshan worried that recognizing hongzhao as deeds of full 
ownership would imply that the tusi had a right to sell land.”89 If the tusi 
could sell land, this indicated that they owned it, and therefore, “giving into 
the hopes of a very small number of Han people would entail recognition 
that land occupied by the tusi is in fact owned by the tusi.”90 Hence “the 
nation would lose a very large amount of land that was formerly public land 
                                               
86 Huang, Code, Custom and Legal Practice in China, 108-17. 
87 Ibid., 113. 
88 Xikang sheng canyihui, "Linshi canyihui, di yi ci hui huibian," 1940, (SCDAG, 
QZH:204, AJH:14), section 8, p. 12a.  
89 Tu Zhongshan 涂仲善, "Tiaozheng Kang qu di quan wenti zhi guan jian 調整康區地權
問題之管見," Xikang jingji jikan 西康經濟季刊 1, no. 8 (1944): 65. 
90 Ibid. 
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(gongyou 公有).”91 The government could presumably have argued that the 
hongzhao were state-tenancies that it generously had decided to convert into 
full ownership; but this would likely have encouraged other tenants to 
demand their own tenancies be converted into full ownership. 
In 1939 Liu Wenhui ruled that the holders of hongzhao should be given 
government titles to “complete management rights” (guanye quan, gui bao 
hongzhao zhe suoyou 管業權，歸包紅照者所有). 92   This formulation 
seems calculated to include the emotional term “complete” suoyou 所有, but 
avoid “complete ownership” (suoyou quan 所有權). Possibly this was an 
attempt to keep both the settlers and the likes of Tu Zhongshan happy. 
Evidently there was some concern as to whether even this ruling would be 
implemented or not because the following year the Xikang Provincial 
Assembly resolved to:  
 
Request that the provincial government order each county government 
to issue government titles to the holders of verified hongzhao, in order 
to clarify holders’ rights to land.93  
 
The assembly produced an initial statement that “this measure is vital for the 
protection of the people’s land rights and to prevent their land from being 
illegally occupied.” 94 This statement was amended by resolution so that 
“land rights” (tudi quan 土地權) was replaced with “complete ownership 
rights” (tudi suoyou quan 土地所有權), further indicating the high degree 
of sensitivity over the precise nature of the land rights to be conferred on the 
Han farmers. 95 
  In any case, some form of government issued title to very secure land 
rights replaced the hongzhao, breaking the relationship between tusi 
                                               
91 Ibid. 
92 Xikang sheng canyihui, "Linshi canyihui, di yi ci hui huibian," 1940, (SCDAG, 
QZH:204, AJH:14), section 8, p. 12a. 
93 Xikang sheng canyihui, "Linshi canyihui, di yi ci hui huibian," 1940, (SCDAG, 
QZH:204, AJH:14), section 8, p. 12. 
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landlords and Han farmers. This was not a surprising outcome. The notion 
of greedy tusi seizing hongzhao from Han tenant farmers resonated with the 
images of Han being forced from their lands by the “Yi scourge”. The fear 
of tusi capitulating to the shadowy forces of “outside capital” was probably 
a genuine motivation for the provincial government to seek to replace the 
tusi as the Han farmers’ landlords as well. A certain amount of parochialism 
pervaded decision making by the Xikang provincial government. The 
Xikang Provincial Assembly’s proposed regulations on mining stipulated 
that “in order to protect the rights and interests of locals”, local people had 
to be given time to establish mining operations and ensure that existing 
operations were compliant with the law before mines could be established 
with “funds owned by other people” (ta ren jizi 他人集資; i.e. people from 
outside Xikang).96 Another regulation stated that joint public-private mining 
venture had to first offer stocks exclusively to Xikang residents, and then 
solicit “outside capital” only after a certain period of time had elapsed.97 
Hence, the spectre of “capital from outside the province” taking land from 
locals probably raised some real alarm. 
In sum, in the later Republican period, relationships manifest in 
hongzhao ended in three ways. Some tusi who profited by the renewed 
export of opium after 1936 bought off their tenants or bullied them into 
accepting the termination of the hongzhao. Other hongzhao were cancelled 
by the Xikang government and replaced by government issued titles. Only 
under the scenario that the tusi re-issued titles on new terms to other Han 
would the degree of contact between Han and Yi remain the same, but there 
is no evidence of this occurring on a significant scale. Because the new 
agreements were with the government rather than the tusi, there was no need 
for the settlers to have any form or relationship with the tusi.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
96 Ibid., section 8, p. 31a. 
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Conclusion: Ethnic Politics in Ningshu in the Twentieth Century 
 
Evidence suggests that by the end of the Republican period there was less 
contact between Han and Yi than there was in at the end of the Qing 
dynasty. A background of ethnic tension certainly existed in the Qing. 
Arguably, the slave-owning, non-Buddhist Yi were more alien to Han than 
the Kham natives. However, the bitter conflict that saw the Han population 
of several locations decline significantly between 1918 and 1920 was not 
caused by inherent Yi savagery, or intractable ethnic tension between Yi 
and Han. The end of the late Qing boom in opium exports from Liangshan 
may have been an important factor, but, on balance, there is not enough 
evidence for the thesis that trends in trade were responsible for violence. 
The most important factor was the slashing of Sichuanese garrisons’ 
budgets during the time of the Yunnanese occupation of Sichuan. This 
forced military commanders to seek more revenue from local communities, 
and it left large numbers of Yi mercenaries unemployed. These two factors 
transformed the low-intensity ethnic tension that had existed in the Qing 
into highly intense violence. This violence died down in the 1920s, though 
there were further episodes of serious conflict in some places.  
I argue that this violence led to increasing ethnic segregation in 
Ningshu. Before it occurred there were “territories peopled by Chinese […] 
governed by native princes.”98 But such ethnically mixed territory was a 
causality of the conflict. Han writers tended to see this process as the 
expansion of the “the Yi territories (Yi qu 夷區).99 But what some writers 
referred to as “Han territory” (Han ren jingdi 漢人境地) probably also 
increased in size due to the collapse of ethnically mixed communities.100 As 
we saw in chapter one, even Liu Wenhui suggested that the “Yi scourge” 
had a “Han scourge” counterpart. In Xichang and other places Yi people 
were forbidden from staying in the town overnight.101 Goullart wrote that “It 
                                               
98 D'Ollone, In Forbidden China, 31. 
99 Zeng Zhaolun, Da Liang Shan Yi qu kao cha ji, 40, 68. 
100 Chang Longqing, Lei Ma E Ping diaocha ji, 17. 
101 Zeng Zhaolun, Da Liang Shan Yi qu kao cha ji, 36. 
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was as unhealthy for a Lolo [Yi] to venture alone into big Chinese 
settlements as it was for the Chinese to intrude into Lolo territory.”102 Yi 
were prohibited from even entering some communities in Yunnanese 
Liangshan. 103  Yi needed the consent of the Han leaders to enter Han 
territory, just as the Han needed Yi consent to enter the Yi territory. Some 
ethnically mixed communities continued to exist, but sources mention such 
places and people far less in Ningshu than they do in the eastern edge of 
Kham.  
As we have seen, the violence led to the recreation of Qing style 
security contracting agreements, which ensured there was at least some kind 
of relationship between Yi elites and the government. But this relationship 
was cast in primarily negative terms. The goal was to keep the Yi from 
bothering Han settlements. It did not involve Han authorities intervening in 
any way in Yi communities. Arguably, these security arrangements 
themselves contributed to greater ethnic segregation. Under this system, the 
Yi chiefs were primarily responsible for the prevention of Yi attacks on 
Han, which gave them a vested interest in keeping the communities apart.  
The later Republican period was considerably more peaceful, but a trend 
toward greater ethnic segregation continued as hongzhao tenancy 
agreements between Yi chiefs and Han farmers broke down. This often 
resulted in either the Han farmers moving away or in the local Chinese 
government taking over the role of landlord. 
What was the effect of this trend toward ethnic segregation on the 
development of the Chinese state in Ningshu? There was much less 
government engagement with indigenous communities in Ningshu than 
there was in many parts of Kham. This was not only a result of the increased 
ethnic segregation in Ningshu. In the previous chapter we saw how one of 
the effects of the wula problem was a highly managed relationship between 
Han county governments and indigenous authorities. Wula also forced the 
regional and local Han state to engage with indigenous communities in a 
way that would not have been necessary if the problems associated with the 
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192 
 
tax had not existed. In Ningshu there was no equivalent problem and no 
body of regulation comparable to that governing wula was ever translated 
into Yi and disseminated among Yi communities. Government engagement 
with the Yi was typically limited to measures designed to defend Han 
settlements from Yi attacks. 
In the period before 1939, the Sichuan government did plan the 
establishment of six schools in Ningshu specifically for the Yi.104 Only one 
of them, in Mianning, actually opened classes and was considered 
successful. As we saw in chapter three, state spending on education was, in 
relation to the number of students, significantly lower in Ningshu than in the 
eastern fringe of Kham. One of the explanations proposed in that chapter 
was that the government made greater, if often unsuccessful, efforts to get 
indigenous people to attend school in eastern Kham than they did in 
Ningshu. This thesis still requires more supporting evidence, but it fits well 
with the general conclusion drawn in this chapter that provincial 
government generally interacted less with indigenous communities in 
Ningshu than it did in Kham. 
The government’s lack of engagement with the Yi also affected the 
development of the local and regional government in the Han regions of 
Liangshan. In 1939, Liu Wenhui wrote of Ningshu that: 
 
The government’s orders only reach the Han people. […] Because the 
government’s orders are not disseminated to the Yi lairs, even in the 
Han regions in matters of opium prohibition, law and order, taxation, 
conscription and economic construction, the trend towards greater unity 
and centralization is weaker than the trend towards disunity. 105  
Criminals also find refuge in the Yi lairs. These problems constitute 
great obstacles, and because of them it is difficult to keep pace with the 
developments in the Interior.106 
 
In the Qing dynasty, the investiture of indigenous leaders with offices 
was common on most of the empire’s frontiers. As Giersch points out, there 
                                               
104 CKSB, 195. 
105 Literally, “centripetal forces are weaker than centrifugal forces”. 
106 Liu Wenhui, "Ningshu Yi wu wenti zhi jiantao," 3. 
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has been a tendency among Chinese and foreign scholars to homogenize 
native officials under the rubric of a “native official system”: 
 
There were “native officials” (tusi) and Qing laws governing their 
appointments, but there was never a "native official system"; the term 
does not appear in Qing sources. […] the relationship did not revolve 
around an intangible “system”, but around individuals.107  
 
A comparison of Kham and Ningshu illustrates the point that there was no 
unified “tusi system”. But the relationship between the Chinese state and the 
tusi revolved around regional institutions, such as the wula tax and the 
security contracting arrangements of Ningshu, as well as around individuals. 
The different local institutions of the Qing period led to very different 
political challenges and developments in the Republican period, which 
fundamentally influenced the evolution of Han authority in the two regions 
in the twentieth century.  
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The notion of a “tusi system” has been widely used however: Took uses the term in the 
introduction of her subject (Took, A Native Chieftaincy), as do many Chinese scholars. 
194 
 
Chapter Six: Han Migrants in the Frontier, 1905-1949.  
 
 
Thus far we have examined the development of Chinese regional and local 
authority in the Sichuan frontier, as well as the interaction of these bodies 
with indigenous communities. This chapter concentrates on the Han 
migrants in the highlands. Firstly, it details the magnitude of the increase in 
the Han Chinese population in various places. Secondly, it asks what 
brought Han migrants to the highlands, and how much their presence owed 
to the existence or policies of Han dominated local and regional authorities.  
Governors and activist intellectuals hoped for a boom in Han migration 
that would rival the magnitude of nineteenth century British overseas 
settlement. Chen Zhongwei foresaw millions of eager pioneers settling on 
Xikang’s virgin soil. 1  Such prophets of explosive colonization were 
disappointed. Nevertheless, the Han population in the triangle between 
Kangding, Ya’an and Yuesui increased significantly; in some locations by 
around 2.7 times over the first half of the twentieth century. Beyond the 
triangle of strong Han population growth, there were further pockets of 
significant increase as well. This increase occurred at a time when the 
population in the Sichuan basin remained roughly stable and the population 
in the highlands of central China declined. 2  In some parts of the latter 
region, the decrease in population was dramatic; a survey reported a decline 
in one district in eastern Sichuan from 1,900 households in 1912 to only 200 
in 1937.3  
There is good evidence that unskilled but strong workers could earn 
significantly more in the western frontier highlands than they could in 
Chengdu and this was probably the most important reason for the population 
increase. Propaganda and a relatively strong ideological commitment to 
                                               
1 Leibold, Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism, 198 n. 82. 
2 Ch'en, The Highlanders of Central China, 41-45. According to Ch’en the total Sichuanese 
population increased by 11 percent in the Republican period: it was not quite stagnant, but 
it grew much more slowly than the regions discussed in this chapter. 
3 Hsiang, C.-Y. "Mountain Economy in Sichuan." Pacific Affairs 14, no. 4 (1941): 453. 
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settlement of borderlands within Chinese reformist activism might also have 
made a significant contribution, though it is harder to quantify.  
 
 
Population Trends 
 
Population estimates for places throughout the region vary considerably. For 
Dartsedo figures range from an early Republican estimate of 700 
households4 to the figure of 45,000 people given in 1930.5 The range is also 
extreme in the case of Xichang. The lowest estimate of 119,995 people 
comes from the 1947 Xikang Agricultural Improvement Institute figures.6 
The highest is one in Sichuan Fronter Quarterly: 409,217 Han people in 
addition to 300,000 “settled barbarians” (shuyi 熟夷).7  
The diversity of the figures reflects the large number of problems 
associated with producing them. One that is particularly relevant to our 
question about the numbers of Han people is the significant number of 
people of mixed parentage in some parts of eastern Kham, and, to a lesser 
extent, some parts of Ningshu. Goullart wrote of Kangding that “There was 
much intermarriage, both legalized and otherwise between Tibetans and 
Chinese, resulting in many half breeds, who were considered Tibetan or 
Chinese provided they wore appropriate dress and pursued either the 
Tibetan or Chinese mode of life.”8 Ren Naiqiang speculated that 90 percent 
of “Han” people in Kham were of mixed ancestry, as was one in five or one 
                                               
4 This is one of several estimates from different sources that Ren Naiqiang provides when 
discussing the same problem Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: jingyu pian, 87. 
5  Like most of Chen’s data, this is much higher than other estimates. However if his data—
which he probably did not collect himself—actually referred to the whole of Kangding 
County it would be roughly the same as some other estimates—though this cluster of 
estimates of a population around 40,000 contrasts with another cluster of estimates of 
around 20,000 souls. Chen Zhongwei, Xikang, 91-92. 
6  Xikang sheng nongye gaijinsuo 西康省農業改進所 , "Xikang sheng tudi hukou 
diaochabiao 西康省土地戶口調查表," 1947, (SCDAG, QZH: 249, AJH: 152). 
7 Liu Shangxin 劉尚新, "Ningshu jishi 寧屬紀實," Chuanbian jikan 1, no. 4 (1935): 192-
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8 Peter Goullart, Princes of the Black Bone, 18. 
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in six of the total population of Kangding.9 Ren was the only surveyor I 
have encountered who attempted to count the mixed population separately 
from what he called “pure Han” (chun Han 純漢) and “pure Fan [Tibetan]” 
(chun Fan 純番), and he only attempted it once among all his population 
counts.10 For either ideological or practical reasons, more normal practice 
appears to have been to count households that were obviously mixed as 
Han, as Ren did on other occasions. 11  Of course, the non-Han totals 
probably also included substantial numbers of people with mixed ancestry 
too—especially given that, as many reporters noted, there were “Han” 
households and people who had been “native-ized” (man hua 蠻化).12 “In 
the mixed regions (za chu 雜處) the Han are somewhat Kham-ized (Kang 
hua 康化) and the Khampas are somewhat Han-ized (Han hua 漢化).”13 
The missionary Flora Shelton, who was in Bathang in the 1900s and 1910s 
even wrote that “If [Han] remain long in Tibet, they are absolutely 
swallowed up by Tibetan customs […] The Tibetan race Tibetanizes the 
Chinaman who makes Tibet his home.”14 The research subjects themselves 
were also active participants in this process of ethnic identification. Ren 
noted that “Those Fan [Tibetan] people who are related by some marriage 
connection to Han people, all like to call themselves Han. Therefore the 
                                               
9 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 234; Ren Naiqiang, "Kangding xian shicha 
baogao 康定縣視察報告," Bianzheng 邊政, no. 2 (1929), reprinted in Zhao Xinyu and 
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10 Ren Naiqiang, "Kangding xian shicha baogao," 261. 
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ized Kham people”; Wu Wenhui 吴文暉 and Zhu Jianhua 朱鑒華, "Xikang tudi wenti 西
康土地問題," Bianzheng gonglun 邊政公論 3, no. 6 (1944): 22. The practical motivation 
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lived and what language they spoke. Some researchers probably assumed that, even if 
mixed households or “Han-izing” natives were not yet fully ‘assimilated’, they would be 
in the near future. Ren Naiqiang argued that of all the minorities in China the “Fan” 
would be the easiest minority in China to assimilate. (Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu 
pian, 219-22.) 
12 See. Ke Xiangfeng 柯象峰, "Xikang ji xing (xu wan) 西康紀行 (續完)," Bianzheng 
gonglun 邊政公論 1, no. 8-9 (合刊) (1942): 87; Chen Zhongsheng, Xi xing yan yi ji, 120. 
13 CKSB, 427. 
14 Flora Shelton, Shelton of Tibet, 101. 
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results from the survey show that there are seven times more Han than non-
Han (Yi 夷). In reality the numbers [of Han and non-Han] are roughly 
even.” 15  Chen Zhongsheng, who adopted the slightly less orthodox 
ethnographic practice of sleeping with an abundant number of the females 
of his research population (or at least claiming that he did), examined the 
skin of three women in a community of tea growers in Yazhou. He 
concluded that “Their identification of themselves as Han, is merely a 
matter of their envying the Han (xianmo Hanzu 羨慕漢族).” 16  Chen’s 
research methods were dubious, and Ren Naiqiang was exceptionally 
scornful of Chen's work. Nevertheless, Chen grasped the important fact that 
ethnic identity is not the same as genetic heritage. 
In addition to the vagaries of ethnic classification, several other factors 
influenced population counts. Different writers used different methods, and 
were more or less methodical. Town populations were probably easier to 
estimate than dispersed rural populations. However, in the case of estimates 
of town populations, different surveyors may have understood the borders of 
towns differently. In many places, there was, as Stevenson notes of 
Dartsedo, a “large floating population of transient merchants, traders, 
officials, and caravan men”. 17  Some sources may have included such 
people, while others deliberately excluded them. Some researchers counted 
households, while others counted individuals, and others counted 
households and then used a formula to convert this total to an individual 
total. Ren Naiqiang appears to have done this on a number of occasions, 
assuming that there were roughly ten people per household. 18 It is uncertain 
why Ren believed ten people per household was average, as this is far 
higher than the China-wide average, which Freedman states was between 
five and six.19 Other researchers indicate that household sizes were even 
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smaller in the Sichuan frontier—as would be expected given the large 
number of sojourners, soldiers and merchants. Some researchers may have 
also converted household totals to individual totals, or vice-versa, but used 
different formulas.  
Qualitative data is an important aid to sorting out the more and less 
realistic population estimates. If writers’ observations led them to report that 
a certain place had either grown or shrunk in recent years, in most cases it is 
reasonable to believe them. Numbers may be suspect for many reasons, but 
it is harder to be skeptical about impressions of demographic change based 
on observations of new houses being built, new lands being cultivated—or 
alternatively, reports of abandoned housing and fields. Such descriptions 
provide a good starting point for our analysis of the range of population 
estimates. 
The descriptive data from the eastern fringe of Kham indicates an 
increase in the Han migrant population starting in the late Qing period; 
possibly dating from before the onset of Zhao Erfeng’s campaigns and 
development program. In 1916 British geographer Oliver Coales wrote:  
 
There is a gradual infiltration of Chinese settlers in the Dau [Dawu] and 
Drango districts where in the low-lying parts of the valley of the She 
Ch'u land neglected by Tibetans is being brought under cultivation. Dau 
is a semi-Chinese town and below Drango a purely Chinese colony has 
sprung up, the greater part of which is Christian. Beyond Drango there 
are a few Chinese on the soil but at Kanze there are two or three score of 
petty traders who have attached themselves to Tibetan families through 
their wives. The latter is a very common practice. […] Flour mills at 
Kanze are monopolized by Chinese. Carpentry [...] is also in the hands 
of Chinese.20 
 
In 1933, Ren Naiqiang wrote that: “Fifty years ago, the number of paddy 
fields in Luding was less than a fifth of what it is today and Dartsedo did 
not even have one stretch of cultivated land.”21 In the same work, Ren gave 
several brief biographies of settlers who arrived in the late Qing or early 
                                               
20 Oliver Coales, "Narrative of a Journey from Tachienlu to Ch'amdo and back via Batang," 
221. 
21 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 254. 
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Republic.22 Ren also described the settlements that sprung up around mines 
near Darstedo and Danba. 
  
In the past, mining west of Zheduo Mountain was prohibited by Lamas. 
In the reigns of Guangxu (1875-1908) and Xuantong (1909-1911), the 
Dartsedo government petitioned the Court to have this prohibition lifted. 
They recruited people to mine, and in a short time a mining industry 
was flourishing. Places such as Rongcha Gulley and Tonglufang in 
Danba and Kongyu and Yutong in Kangding all had hundreds of tents 
of miners, and merchants from everywhere selling salt, grain, oil and 
other daily necessities. Houses, markets, native-place associations 
(huiguan 會館 ) and shrines to Guandi were built. Land cultivation 
(kenshi 墾事) also rose correspondingly […] After four or five years the 
[placer gold in the] land for tens of li around each settlement was 
exhausted […] Most miners drifted about destitute and unable to return 
home. By this time they were able to understand the native language 
(fan yu 番語) and they settled in the borderlands, taking up farming 
(ling ken 領墾 ). This was the fate of most [Han at the mining 
settlements]. For this reason, wherever there are abandoned mines there 
are usually Han villages.23 
 
In 1930, Chen Zhongwei reckoned that overall about five percent of the 
Kham aristocracy’s income came from mortgaging land to Han settlers. 24 
The figure is immensely suspicious, but the statement does indicate that in 
some places there was a non-trivial incidence of Han using land acquired 
from native elites. 
The small Han population at Bathang that had been established during 
Zhao Erfeng’s reign declined due to the conflict that peaked around 1918. 
The displaced people did not necessarily leave the frontier, however. When 
Wu Zizhong and his wife were forced out of Yanjing in 1911, they settled 
nearby in a place that is also in the modern Tibetan Autonomous Region.25 
Moreover, where conflict led to depopulation, there is evidence that people 
returned relatively quickly when stability improved. By the 1930s Han 
                                               
22 Ibid., 62-3, 256-78. 
23 Ibid., 252-53. 
24 Chen Zhongwei, Xikang wenti, 146. 
25 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 267. 
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people were returning to Bathang.26 
Among the numerical chaos of population estimates for Dartsedo, there 
are some broad trends. Most surveyors did not include military garrisons, 
and I believe that none of the following figures do. 27  Ren quoted two 
government sources from the 1910s which put the town population at 700 
households and 900 households respectively. 28  According to a foreign 
traveler who visited in 1894, there were about 800 houses in that year.29 
Elsewhere, Ren mentioned “old tax records” that gave a population of 
2,411. 30   A cluster of estimates from the mid 1920s and early 1930s 
suggests that by this time the population had roughly doubled. A foreign 
traveler visiting in 1924-1925 said there were about 5,000 people.31 In 1929, 
Ren Naiqiang proposed 1,500 households (including surrounding 
villages). 32  The Chinese Academy of Sciences in the Western Regions 
(Zhongguo xibu kexueyuan 中國西部科學院) conducted research in 1930 
and found that there were 4,256 people who had been resident for six 
months or more, in 1,108 households.33 In 1934, at least two organs of the 
Xikang administration were using a figure of 1,628 households.34 
There is contradictory evidence regarding trends in migration in the 
mid-1930s. Some sources suggest that growth slowed or stopped at this 
time. Demand for highland products like wool, hides and medicines dropped 
markedly during the Great Depression. 35  The population of Luding is 
                                               
26 Ba ren 巴人, "Xikang de xin Ba'an 西康的新巴安," Kangdao yuekan 康道月刊 4, no. 4 
(1943): 78; Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 254. 
27  Ibid., 241. 
28 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: jingyu pian, 87. 
29 H. R. Davies, Yün-nan, the link between India and the Yangtze, 292. 
30 Ren Naiqiang, "Kangding xian shicha baogao," 260. 
31  Wim van Spengen, Tibetan Border Worlds: a Geohistorical Analysis of Trade and 
Traders (London; New York: Kegan Paul International, 2000), 108. 
32 Ren Naiqiang, "Kangding xian shicha baogao," 261. 
33 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: jingyu pian, 87. 
34 JKDZ, 183. 
35 Tim Wright, "Distant Thunder: The Regional Economies of Southwest China and the 
Impact of the Great Depression," Modern Asian Studies 34, no. 3 (2000): 716. 
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reported to have declined due to banditry in the couple of years following 
the Sichuan famine of 1936, though it recovered by 1939.36 On the other 
hand, trends in the value of the deed tax, which was collected as a 
percentage of the value of real estate transactions, suggest a continuous 
population increase in Kangding over the 1930s. As we saw in chapter 
three, even though there was no change in the tax rates, the value of the 
deed tax as a percentage of the value of the land tax more than doubled 
between 1932 and 1939. The increase in land values relative to inflation as 
measured in grain prices (which climbed through the 1930s, but more 
slowly) indicates an increase in the demand for land; a probable indicator 
that the population was increasing.  
Many reports from the late 1930s and 1940s indicate a rapid increase in 
population in the war and post-war periods. 37  A Xikang Agriculture 
Improvement Institute paper made the typical comment that in the 1940s 
“commerce in Kangding has boomed and the population has grown larger 
and larger.”38 Police records from September 1939 show that in that month 
231 people moved into the urban area of Dartsedo (while 53 moved out).39 
In 1939, Kangding’s government planned to spend 20,000 yuan on the 
construction of a new district for the town.40  In 1939 the report from the 
Guomindang’s Sichuan and Xikang Investigation Team stated that in 
Kangding County there were 15,000 “farmers”, 2,500 “merchants” and 
3,700 “workers”. 41  We can presume that the latter two categories were 
urban residents of the town, but some of the former were likely sub-
urbanites, who would have been included in some of the earlier estimates 
                                               
36 CKSB, 409-10. 
37 See for example Xikang jingji jikan, 1, no. 7 (1942), 152; Xikang jingji jikan, 1, no. 5-6 
[combined issue] (1942), 30-31; Also Xikang sheng canyihui 西康省參議會, "Linshi 
canyihui, di er jie, di yi ci hui huibian 臨時參議會第二屆，第一次會匯編," 1943, 
(Shanghai Municipal Library), p.40. 
38 Xikang sheng nongye gaijinsuo 西康省農業改進所, "Kangding Yalatuo huangdi tunken 
jihua 康定亞拉沱荒地屯墾計劃," 1949, (SCDAG, QZH: 249, AJH:152). 
39 Xikang zhengfu gongbao 西康政府公報 no.9 (Sept. 30, 1939) unpaginated tables. 
40 CKSB, 409. 
41 Ibid. 
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above. This gives somewhat over 6,000 town residents, which is consistent 
with the figure of 7,000 that officials told A. Doak Barnett when he visited 
in 1948. 42  Therefore, we have the overall impression that Darstendo 
increased throughout the first half of the twentieth century from possibly 
2,500 people to around 7,000, or by a factor of around 2.8. 
Population estimates for Kangding and Luding counties suggest that 
growth of this magnitude was not confined to the Dartsedo town area in the 
1930s and 1940s (there is no useful data for the non-town population from 
before the 1930s). In 1930, Feng Yunxian recorded 1,700 “Han” households 
in Kangding and 6,280 in Luding.43 In 1933, Ren Naiqiang recorded 1,800 
in Kangding and 7,000 in Luding. 44 Post-war figures appear—for unknown 
reasons—less likely to divide population statistics according to ethnicity. In 
1945, the provincial Bureau of Civil Affairs  (Minzheng ting 民政廳), gave 
a total inclusive of all ethnicities of 6,825 households in Kangding and 
5,409 in Luding (the bureau probably used a different boundary between 
Kangding and Luding). 45 By the Republican period, most settlements in 
Luding were identified as Han. Estimates of the ratio of Han to indigenous 
people in Kangding swing back and forth wildly, according to estimates of 
the indigenous population, ethnic classification methods and administrative 
boundaries. One post-war government report suggested that sixty or seventy 
percent of Kangding’s population were Han. 46  Sixty-five percent of the 
Kangding households (as given by the Bureau of Civil Affairs) plus the 
Luding households comes to a total of 9,845 Han or mixed-race households 
in the post-war period. This represents an increase of roughly seventeen 
percent from Ren and Feng’s figures of fifteen years earlier. 
Reports from the more remote parts of Kham also indicate that 
migration to places further afield than Kangding continued in the late 
Republican period. In 1939, an official commented on the “steady 
                                               
42 A. Doak Barnett, China's Far West, 443. 
43 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 15-18. 
44 Ibid. 
45  JKDZ, 191. 
46 Ibid., 227. 
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flourishing of agricultural settlement” in Gyaisi (Ch. Jiulong 九龍 ), 
containing 1,184 Han households in Gyaisi; up from none in the Qing 
period.47 Dawu County’s Taining Experimental Region, the site of the large 
government ranch initially established for the Animal Transport Company 
also experienced a population increase; from 1,327 people in 1937 to more 
than 4,700 in 1943.48 In 1933, Ren Naiqiang estimated that there were 5,000 
Han people in Danba and 13,000 elsewhere in places such as Bathang, 
Dawu, and Drango. 49  Yang Zhonghua’s 1937 population figures and 
estimates of percentage Han in these places suggest a total Han population 
of 38,000 beyond Luding and Kangding.50  
In the 1940s, a journalist reported that “every year a steady of 
adventurers heads forth to mine gold.”51 Peter Goullart wrote that in 1939 
“Alluvial gold was to be found […] almost everywhere in Sikang highlands, 
and so were these gold panners, mostly Szechuanese Chinese. They were 
everywhere—in small groups of two or three and singly.”52 In addition to 
loners and small bands, there were also larger mines, some of which were 
worked by over 3,000 miners during their peaks.53 However, these generally 
did not last very long and numbers of miners at any single location 
fluctuated greatly from year to year. At a single mine in Dawu there were 
between five and six hundred miners in 1932, around 170 a year later, and 
between seven and eight hundred in 1935.54  ‘Several thousand’ miners in 
Kham might be the best possible estimate.55    
                                               
47 Qiu Shuling, "Jiulong jingji jianshe zhi yantao," 40, 42-43. 
48 Shang Cheng 尚誠, "Kangbei de shengdi -- Taining 康北的聖地 -- 泰宁," Kangdao 
yuekan 5, no. 5 (1943). in Zhao Xinyu and Qin Heping, eds., Kangqu Zangzu shehui lishi 
diaocha ziliao jiyao, 220; Dao Xue, "Xikang Taining shiyanqu diaocha," 213. 
49 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 241. 
50 Yang Zhonghua, Xikang ji yao, 144-151. 
51 Shi Wen, "Xikang wei Zhongguo yin lai de san da wenti," 11. 
52 Goullart, Princes of the Black Bone. 46. 
53 See Kangdao yuekan 1, no. 7 (1939) un-paginated tables after page 48; also Ren Xinjian, 
"Jindai Sichuan Zang qu de huangjin kaifa, " 47. 
54 ZYDZ, "Diaocha ziliao," Chuanbian jikan 1, no. 1 (1935): 157. 
55 See Kangdao yuekan 1, no. 7 (1939) un-paginated tables after page 48. 
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Turning to Ningshu, as we saw in chapters one and five, many reports 
indicate that Han settlements on the fringes of Liangshan were devastated 
by the conflict that began around 1918. But as was the case in Bathang, 
refugees did not necessarily go very far. In chapter five, I argued that while 
“Yi territories” might have expanded, some of the “Han territories” 
probably did too. When conflict died down in the 1930s, Han settlers 
returned to areas of Liangshan that they had previously abandoned just as 
they did in Bathang. Lin Yueh-hua described settlements that had 
reappeared on land abandoned in the early Republican conflict with the Yi, 
though full recovery had not yet occurred by the time of his visit in 1943.56 
In 1939, Liu Wenhui commented that in the previous ten years Han people 
had returned to some of the places near Xichang that they had abandoned 
during violence in the early Republican period.57 A 1947 survey reported 
“certainly some land has been abandoned due to banditry. However the area 
of such land is not great. It is not worth initiating a large scale campaign for 
its reclamation.”58  
It is uncertain whether and to what extent the back-and-forth nature of 
settlement in some places affected the final numbers of Han settlers in the 
whole region at the end of the Republican period. It was not only Han 
Chinese who were victims of conflict. Indigenous people were also forced 
from homes by bandits, renegade soldiers or local rivals.59 Abandoned fields 
did not only signal the effects of Han fleeing the “Yi scourge”:  
 
The authority of some tusi has declined and they are often unable to get 
their people to cultivate the land. In some cases, defeats by the military 
have broken the power of the tusi, so there is nothing they can do when 
their people rebel and refuse to farm land for them. Because of this 
much land has been abandoned and gone huang.60 
                                               
56 Lin Yueh-hua, The Lolo of Liangshan [Liangshan yi jia 凉山夷家], trans. Ju-Shu Pan, 
(New Haven: HRAF Press, 1961), 13-14. 
57 Liu Wenhui, "Ningshu Yi wu wenti zhi," 3. 
58 Zeng Zhaolun, Da Liang Shan Yi qu kao cha ji, 21. 
59 See for example report from magistrate of Wang Jinchen 王藎臣 to the Sichuan Frontier 
Region Sheriff (Chuanbian daoyin 川邊道道尹, Chuanbian dao gongshu 川邊道公署; 
(SCDAG, QZH:196, AJH:8). 
60 Wu Wenhui and Zhu Jianhua, "Xikang tudi wenti," 11. 
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Violence could facilitate colonization, as well as impede it. Indeed, the mass 
settlement of the Americas and Australasia by Europeans could hardly have 
happened without violent conflict. 
The available population data from Yuesui suggests that there was a 
significant increase in the Han population of that county. The 1906 Yuesui 
Gazetteer reported a population of 10,922 households, a figure which 
probably only included households that seemed mostly Han or not too 
distinct from surveyors’ ideas of Han-ness.61 I have not found any early 
Republican period estimates, but there is a cluster of figures from the 1930s. 
In 1935, an article in Chuanbian Quarterly reported that the Han population 
numbered 15,803 households or 56,376 people. 62 This report indicated a 
total of 24,600 “settled Yi-barbarian” (shu Yi 熟夷) individuals and an 
unknown number of “wild Yi-barbarians” (sheng Yi 生夷). This is roughly 
the same as the Yuesui County government’s count and another survey done 
during the early 1930s, although the Twenty Fourth Army gave a higher 
figure in its 1929 count.63 Growth appears to have continued throughout the 
1930s because in 1939 the GMD survey team estimated that there were 
about 83,000 Han people, which would suggest around 18,500 households if 
there were an average of 4.5 people per household.64  
Hanyuan, just across the northern border of Ningshu was similar to 
Luding, in that the identification of its population as 95 percent Han in the 
1930s masked a much more diverse reality. 65  Goullart wrote that the 
magistrate “has tribal blood in his veins […] He is extremely pro-Lolo.” The 
man’s adopted Yi son, whose Chinese name was “Electric” Leng 冷光佃電, 
                                               
61 Ma Zhongliang and Sun Qiangzeng, "Yuesui ting zhi," 88. 
62 ZYDZ, "Diaocha ziliao," Chuanbian jikan 1,  no. 4 (1935), 192. 
63 Junshi weiyuanhui weiyuanzhang xingying bianzheng sheji weiyuanhui 軍事委員會委
員長行營邊政設計委員會, "Chuan-Kang bianzheng ziliao jiyao 川康邊政資料輯要," in 
Minguo Zang shi shi liao huibian 民国藏事史料汇编, ed. Zhang Yuxin and Zhang 
Shuangzhi 张雙志 (Beijing: Xuefan chubanshe, 2005 [1940]), 75. 
64 CKSB, 186. 
65 ZYDZ, "Diaocha ziliao," Chuanbian jikan 1, no. 4, 273. 
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controlled traffic through Hanyuan and was called a tusi by Chinese 
visitors.66 The county’s population apparently remained stable at just over 
50,000 in the late Qing and early Republic, but some figures show it 
increasing quite quickly from the 1920s or early 1930s, reaching an 
estimated 69,300 in 1935.67 In 1947 it was recorded as 104,189.68 
Statistics from Xichang are particularly diverse, as noted above, but 
there is descriptive evidence of an increase in migration to Xichang in the 
late Republican period. “From the war-era, the city began to transform itself 
into a modern metropolis (dushi 都市). There has been a great influx of 
professionals (renshi 人士) from other provinces. Modern garments are seen 
everywhere.”69 
In other regions the Han population appears to have remained stable 
throughout our period. In Mianning, the population in the areas where Han 
people lived (which presumably included some Yi too) was listed as 
102,066 in 1916.70 In 1953 the Han population was listed as 99,738.71  
In sum, over the whole period from 1905 to 1949, the Kangding-Luding 
region probably gained around 25,000 Han people, assuming that the 
growth rate of Dartsedo town is representative of the less well surveyed Han 
townships that sprung up in Kangding and Luding counties. Elsewhere in 
Kham there were probably at least another 20,000 more souls of Han or 
mixed ethnicity in 1949 than there had been in 1905. Yuesui may well have 
gained up to 35,000, and it would be plausible to suggest similar or greater 
increases around Hanyuan. The general picture for the Chuanbian region in 
the period from 1905 to 1949 is one of important settlement growth in 
                                               
66 Zeng Zhaolun, Da Liang Shan Yi qu kao cha ji, 53; see also Goullart, Princes of the 
Black Bone, 115. 
67 Chongqing Zhongguo yinhang diaocha zuzhi, "Ebian diaocha 峨邊調查," Chuanbian 
jikan 1, no. 3 (1935): 53-54;  ———,"Diaocha ziliao," Chuanbian jikan 1 no. 4, 273. 
68  Xikang sheng nongye gaijinsuo, "Xikang sheng tudi hukou diaochabiao," 1947, 
(SCDAG, QZH: 249, AJH: 152). 
69 Zeng Zhaolun, Da Liang Shan Yi qu kao cha ji, 34. 
70 Sichuan sheng Mianning xian difang zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui 四川省冕宁县地方志编
纂委员会, ed. Mianning xian zhi 冕宁县志 (Chengdu: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 1994), 
131. 
71 Ibid., 146. 
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certain areas. This was not the explosive colonization that many frontier 
leaders hoped and planned for. Nor was it as dramatic as the incredible 
migrations into Sichuan (including Ningyuan Prefecture) during the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.72 However, those earlier waves of 
settlement occurred against the background of a doubling of the whole 
Chinese population. By contrast, the more modest twentieth century growth 
of colonies in the Sichuan frontier grew at the same time that the population 
fell or remained static elsewhere in the country.  
 
 
Factors affecting migration (I): Han Law and Order.  
 
How important was the mere existence of the relatively stable Han Chinese 
authority that existed in the Jianchang valley, around Kangding and Ya’an 
and between those places? Firstly, Han government authority was not 
absolutely necessary for migration to occur. There were Han people in 
places where there was no meaningful Han local state authority at all. In 
1940 Xu Xiaohui, the vice-director of the provincial government’s Xikang 
Agriculture Improvement Institute commented on the government of the 
Tibetan tusi in Muli:  
  
[His authority is] stern and exacting, but although migrants’ (kemin 客
民  [lit. “guest people”]) suffer under heavy burdens, they need not 
worry about the preservation of law and order. Because of this the 
peasants who are stricken by the Yi scourge often come here for 
refuge.73 
 
An article in Bianjiang gonglun also reported that banditry was not a 
problem in Muli and that there were migrant farmers present in the tusi’s 
                                               
72 According to Perkins’ statistics there were around 3 million people in Sichuan in 1771. 
By 1776 there were 7.7 million; by 1819, there were 25.6 millions. The population had 
increased eight-fold in only fifty years. Over the following fifty years, it doubled again. 
Dwight H. Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, 207. 
73 Xu Xiaohui 徐孝恢, "Ningshu ge xian nongye gai guan 甯屬各縣農業概觀," Kangdao 
yuekan 2, no. 12 (1940): 37. 
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domain. 74  Xikang jianying’s report on the merchants—particularly those 
from Shaanxi—also demonstrates that areas beyond the control of the 
provincial government in Kham were not necessarily dangerous. 
 
As long as they don an outfit in the Kham style, the Han merchants find 
no severe problems with security while traveling in the Kham region 
Staying on familiar routes and maintaining friendly relations with the 
local good-for-nothings, the merchants are able to go anywhere without 
fear of danger. The Kham people are very welcoming towards this kind 
of trader, who does not require them to go very far from their homes, 
but wears their clothes, speaks their language and carries things that 
they are in need of [...]  Because of this Shaanxi merchants have 
traversed even the domains of those remote tribes where government 
power does not reach. [...] Even when the political situation was at its 
most chaotic, they were still able to cross the Jinsha River to conduct 
trade in Tibet.75 
 
As this passage indicates, whether a certain place was dangerous or not 
probably depended a lot on how one behaved and what one wanted to do 
there. In general, Ningshu may have been somewhat more dangerous than 
Kham, but the same rule still applied. There is substantial evidence that 
travellers and residents were able to prevent harm to themselves by 
maintaining good relations with the locals. Indeed, such practice was 
regularized into a customary form of exchange according to which outsiders 
made agreements with Yi chiefs who would guarantee their safety. A 
typical example of this is recalled in the testimony of a merchant who did 
small trade by exchanging Sichuanese salt and needles for Liangshan 
animal products. “When Han people from outside went into the Yi regions 
to trade or do other things, they would be safe enough as long as they had a 
protector (baotou 保頭 ) to guarantee their safety.” 76  According to Hu 
Chaojun, merchants paid between one and ten percent of their goods to 
obtain such a guarantee of protection. If the baotou fees are viewed as 
                                               
74 Wu Wenhui and Zhu Jianhua, "Xikang tudi wenti," 15, 17. 
75 Cheng Yuqi 程裕淇, Xikang jianying 西康剪影 (Duli chubanshe, 1945), 25. 
76 Hu Chaojun 胡朝均 and Li Jing 李静, "Wo zai Yi qu jingshang de jingyan 我在彝区经
商的经验," in Liangshan Yizu wenshi ziliao zhuanji 凉山彝族文史资料专辑, ed. Yang 
Ling 杨凌 and Chen Hua 陈华 (Chengdu: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 2000), 73. 
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customs levies, the Yi chiefs were hardly more extortionate than the Xikang 
government, which also collected customs tax on goods entering and 
leaving the province. The official rates were up to five percent of the value 
of goods taken out of the province, seven and a half percent for everyday 
goods imported into the province, 12 percent for imported luxury goods and 
an extra two percent on foreign goods.77 Having paid the baotou fee, Hu 
found the Yi with whom he had dealings to be “very hospitable (feichang 
haoke 非常好客)”. In a passage that illustrated both the dangers outsiders 
faced in Ningshu and the possibility of managing them, Peter Goullart 
wrote:  
 
Here a small colony of Chinese merchants lived and carried on their 
business, despite an ingrained terror of the Lolos [Yi]. The position was 
altogether anomalous. [...] the Chinese could not enter Lololand unless 
they had a special passport from one of the princes. [...] The Chinese 
merchants at Dienba had such passports from Prince Molin and, in 
fairness to the Lolos [Yi], they were strictly respected. If the Chinese 
were peaceful citizens and stuck to their legitimate trade, they had 
nothing to fear.  […] The Lolos, contrary to expectation, did not kill or 
enslave bona fide residents, but let them live and trade under special 
guarantee from the ruler.”78 
 
Zeng Zhaolun made a very similar comment.79 The practice of making 
agreements with chiefs involving some kind of payment in exchange for 
security is also mentioned by Fergusson and D’Ollone, and then forty years 
later by Covell and Lin Yueh-hua.80 These writers all use the term ‘baotou’ 
to describe such agreements. 
                                               
77 Xikang sheng canyihui 西康省參議會. "Linshi canyihui, di yi ci hui huibian 臨時參議會
第一次會匯編," 1940, (SCDAG, QZH: 204, AJH: 14), ‘sheng zhengfu shizheng baogao 
省政府施政報告, p.15. The report does not indicate how a “luxury good” was defined. 
78 Goullart, Princes of the Black Bone, 135-36. 
79 Zeng Zhaolun, Da Liang Shan Yi qu kao cha ji, 53. 
80 Ralph Covell, Mission Impossible: The Unreached Nosu on China's Frontier (Pasadena, 
California: Hope Publishing House, 1990), 87.; W.N. Fergusson, Adventure, Sport and 
Travel on the Tibetan Steppes (London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1911), 303; Lin 
Yueh-hua, The Lolo of Liangshan, 17. 
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The existence of Chinese state authority at a local level was neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for Han migration to a particular region. 
Nevertheless, the largest increases in Han population were all in places were 
there was a functioning Han dominated local state authority. However, 
establishing cause and effect relationships here is difficult. Were migrants 
more likely to go to a place where the authorities were of the same ethnicity 
as themselves? It seems likely that they were, but it is hard to know how 
much more likely. Goullart described a couple of teachers working in 
Liangshan, employed by Electric Leng: 
 
At first they thought Prince Molin was a real Chinese when he offered 
both of them a job with decent pay and quarters in Dienba. They gladly 
accepted, having little idea of the remoteness of the place and the savage 
conditions of life among the barbarian tribes. They did not regret their 
coming here, but, they confessed, they were still frightened and unable 
to get rid of a gnawing, debilitating dread of the Lolos which poisoned 
their otherwise peaceful and uneventful lives.81 
 
Would the couple have still gone if they had known that Prince Molin was 
not a “real Chinese” like they had assumed? It is difficult to quantify such a 
preference. Given the enormous subsidy and opium related income wielded 
by the provincial government, there were almost certainly more job 
opportunities in the places where provincial authority was strongest; this 
may have been more important in determining trends in migration than 
ethnic preference. Furthermore, it is also quite possible that local Han 
authorities were more likely to become well and securely established in 
places where there were already more significant migrant communities. The 
two processes, Han migration and Han state-building, probably reinforced 
each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
81 Goullart, Princes of the Black Bone, 131. 
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Factors affecting migration (II): Trade, Work and Income 
 
We have already noted a couple of the pursuits that drew migrants to the 
highlands: gold-mining and medicine gathering. Jobs associated with trade 
between the highlands and lowlands were also an attraction. In 1915, Oliver 
Coales calculated that Dartsedo saw 160,000 pounds sterling of worth of 
east-going musk and 170,000 pounds worth of west-going tea annually; the 
value of the former trade was enough for two French perfume firms to 
maintain representatives in the town.82  Musk was worth 380 yuan per jin in 
Kangding in 1938. 83 According to Barnett, at the end of the Republican 
period musk and tea were still the two most important articles of commerce, 
followed by medicines of various kinds.84 Trade between the Sichuan basin 
and Ningshu was also significant, Ningshu’s most important products being 
wood for coffins, and, in the late Republican period, opium, as we saw in 
chapter one.85  
Different goods rose and fell in their importance over the period of this 
study. As we saw in chapter five, wax for candle manufacture was a highly 
important export from Ningyuan in the mid-Qing era, but demand slackened 
as kerosene oil replaced candles at the end of the nineteenth century. 86 
Throughout the period focused on in this study, Chinese officials feared that 
tea grown in India would out-compete Sichuanese tea in Tibet.87 In fact, 
                                               
82 Oliver Coales, "Economic Notes on Eastern Tibet," The Geographic Journal 54, no. 4 
(1919): 244. 
83 Gu Xueqiu 顾学裘, "Xikang sheng yaocai diaocha baogaoshu 西康省药材调查报告书," 
(1939) in Zhongguo Zangxue yanjiu zhongxin 中国藏学研究中心 and Zhongguo di er 
lishi dang'an guan 中国第二历史档案馆, eds., Minguo shiqi Xizang ji Zangqu jingji kaifa 
jianshe dang'an xuanbian 民国时期西藏及藏区经济开发建设档案选编, (Beijing: 
Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 2005), 413. 
84 A. Doak Barnett, China on the Eve of Communist Takeover (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1963), 227. 
85 Archibald John Little, Mount Omi and Beyond: A Record of Travel on the Thibetan 
Border (W. Heinemann, 1901), 210; Samuel Pollard, In Unknown China, 114; Theodore 
Roosevelt and Kermit Roosevelt, Trailing the Giant Panda (New York Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1929), 240. 
86 Alexander Hosie, Three Years in Western China, 200-01. 
87 Zhou Taixuan 周太玄. "Xikang shangye gaikuang 西康商业概况," (1947), in JKDZ, 2.
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merchants were still selling tea from Sichuan in the Tibetan lands at the end 
of the Republican period; whether the trade suffered because of new 
competition or any other factor is a question for another study. In any case, 
other goods rose in importance to take the place of wax and any decline in 
the tea trade.  
Many writers mentioned the enormous mark-ups on the price of goods 
going in both directions. They often interpreted this as a sign of 
unscrupulousness: “the Han merchants are sly and devious (jiaohua 狡猾). 
They pay very low prices for the barbarian produce but price their own 
goods at several times their real value.”88 Without taking into consideration 
the formidable transport costs, such comments seem somewhat unfair. 
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that it was possible to become very rich 
through frontier trade.89 The earnings of the men who actually dug the 
medicines, hunted the musk-deer and cut the wood for coffins are also 
reported to have been relatively high.90 
The trade created a large number of labouring jobs and a demand for 
agricultural produce. In 1911, W.N. Fergusson reported that in the busy 
season around 400 coolies per day arrived in Dartsedo carrying tea from 
Ya’an.91 In 1932, Stevenson travelled the same route, which was then still 
host to “an endless chain of human carriers from the lowlands of China.”92 
In 1939, Peter Goullart found it “filled with peasants, both men and women, 
carrying all kinds of things for the barren highlands.”93 Tough though it 
was, carrying goods through mountainous peripheral country could be 
relatively well paid work. The evidence from foreign travelers in Sichuan 
indicates that for strong porters who could carry large loads, wages were 
higher than those earned in labouring jobs in the Sichuan basin.  
                                               
88 Chen Zhongsheng, Xi xing yan yi ji, 7. 
89 See for example, Ren’s biographies of migrants: Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu 
pian, 256-78. 
90 Gu Xueqiu, "Xikang sheng yaocai diaocha baogaoshu," 410. 
91 Fergusson, Adventure, Sport and Travel on the Tibetan Steppes, 226. 
92 Stevenson, "Notes on the Human Geography of the Chinese-Tibetan Borderland," 616. 
93 Goullart, Princes of the Black Bone, 10. 
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In 1877, W. J. Gill recorded that porters earned an average of 3.15 taels 
for carrying tea between Yazhou and Dartsedo, a trip which took 20 days 
with a full load.94 This was roughly 220 copper cash per day. 95 Travelling 
in the 1890s, Archibald Little observed that the Yazhou-Dartsedo trek netted 
between 200 and 300 cash per day at this time as well.96 The rate remained 
roughly stable in the 1910s: Earnest Wilson reported a figure of 200 cash 
per day for the outward journey.97 Demand for transport was much higher 
going from east to west than in the other direction because frontier produce 
(gold, medicine and musk) was easier to transport than the bulky tea 
packages that went west.  This meant that the return journey was generally 
unpaid, but without any goods, porters could make the journey in only a 
quarter of the time of the outward journey.98 Thus 220 cash per day on the 
outward journey meant overall daily earnings for the round trip were around 
175 copper cash per day. 
These rates are much better than those of unskilled workers at the salt 
wells in Ziliujing 自流井 (in Zigong 自贡) in the late nineteenth century, 
who got between 500 and 1,500 copper cash per month.99 Skilled workers 
                                               
94 Gill states that porters earned 1.8 taels for 6 “pau” (i.e. bao 包), and that the average 
porter carried between 10 and 11 pau. W. J. Gill, "Travels in Western China and on the 
Eastern Borders of Tibet," Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London 28 
(1878): 85. 
95 The rate of conversion for silver taels into copper cash varied by place and time, and Gill 
did not record the rates for the times and places he visited. Hosie reported that there were 
1,200 cash to the tael in southern Sichuan, 1,580 in one place in Yunnan, and 1,480 in 
Chongqing. I have simply used the median of 1,200 and 1,580, so it is an imprecise 
conversion but the result is not likely to be wrong by a large margin. Hosie, Three Years 
in Western China, 15. 
96 Little, Mount Omi and Beyond, 216. 
97 Wilson states that the porters were paid 400 cash per “pao” (bao) and that the average 
load was 10 bao. He also gives 20 days as the journey time between the Yazhou and 
Dartsedo. Ernest Henry Wilson, A Naturalist in Western China with Vasculum, Camera, 
and Gun: being some Account of Eleven Years' Travel, Exploration, and Observation in 
the more Remote Parts of the Flowery Kingdom (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1913), 95.  
98 I have assumed that the unburdened return journey between Dartstendo and Yazhou 
could be made in about five days, as the porters that Hosie met required only two days for 
an unburdened journey that took ten days fully laden. 
99 Madeleine Zelin, The Merchants of Zigong: Industrial Entrepreneurship in Early 
Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 125. Zelin’s figures are in 
strings of copper cash. I have assumed that there were 1,000 copper cash per string 
(frequently there were somewhat less, but this does not affect our estimation of monthly 
wages very much). Zelin’s figures are supported by Hosie, who noted that the average 
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got between 2,000 and 4,000 copper cash per month, so even they earned 
less than a porter who made 175 cash per day.100 1910 reports from Nanxi 
南溪 in the south of the Sichuan basin recorded daily wages ranging from 
60 cash, for wood, stone or earth workers (tu-mu-shi gong 土木石工), to 
120 cash for chefs.101 Some of these workers will have received food on the 
job, though it is difficult to know whether this covered all their 
requirements, and how much the porters had to spend on food per day.102 
Food price data for the highlands from this era is patchy and often given in 
currencies that need to be converted at uncertain rates to get prices in copper 
cash, so real-wage comparisons with workers in the Sichuan basin is 
difficult. A very rough estimate would be a daily food expenditure 
in Dartsedo of about 37 copper cash, falling to around half this around 
Ya’an.103 
The descriptive evidence reinforces the view that porters were better off 
than the unskilled saltyard workers at least. Ernest Wilson wrote of the 
porters that “the pay is really good for the country, and it is this extra 
remuneration that tempts so many to engage in this work.”104 Hosie wrote 
that porters who carried salt through the highlands between Sichuan and 
Guizhou (who were paid up to 150 copper cash per day, less than those in 
the western highlands) “are more or less happy at the end of each day's 
weary toil.” 105  By contrast, he felt that the workers at the salt well 
“presented a very worn and unhealthy appearance, and, to judge from the 
                                                                                                                       
wage at the salt wells was between 1,200 and 1,500 copper cash. Hosie, Three Years in 
Western China, 81. 
100 Zelin, The Merchants of Zigong, 125. 
101 Li Zhuxi 李竹溪, Zeng Dejiu 曾德久, and Huang Weihu 黄为虎, eds., Jindai Sichuan 
wujia shiliao 近代四川物价史料 (Chengdu: Sichuan kexue jishu chubanshe,1986), 87. 
102 Ibid., 127. 
103 Porters should have needed to eat 3 shi of barley, or 1.5 of the larger guan 官 shi per 
year. One source puts the cost of a guan shi of barley in Kham at 42 Tibetan yuan or 
about 18.9 dayang yuan in 1915 (JKDZ, 85-86). This should have been about 13.4 taels of 
silver, or 13,400 wen. Divided by 365 days this is 36.7 wen per day. 
104 Wilson, A Naturalist in Western China, 95. It is a little unclear whether by “the country” 
Wilson means China, the countryside or the region he was travelling in.  
105 Hosie, Three Years in Western China, 21. 
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alarming number of beggars in the town, life at the wells must be very 
trying and short.”106 And while Hosie pitied the poorest at the saltyard, in 
general the salt workers were well off compared to those in other 
professions. Madeline Zelin argues that the skilled salt workers, whose 
wages the porters matched or bettered, “did very well indeed” in the late 
Qing.107  
There is less evidence regarding wages in other occupations in the late 
Qing Sichuan frontiers. Zhao Erfeng ordered that migrant craftsmen “are not 
permitted to raise their prices”; presumably because he felt that the prices 
charged by some craftsmen were already quite high.108 
Wages remained high in the Republican period. Ren Naiqiang 
complained about the prices charged by barbers in Dajianlu: 
 
I felt the man’s skill was very poor, and gave him two thousand wen, 
equal to 2 jiao of silver. The man felt it was too little, and when I asked 
for him again he did not return. Another man came, and when he was 
finished we haggled over the price. I gave him three thousand wen, but 
still he looked unsatisfied when he left. […] Someone told me: “[…] 
officials with class (daguan 達官) and big merchants all give one yuan. 
Even the barbarians who use wula to get here give half a yuan.”109 
 
Ren went on to describe several frontier barbers who earned high wages 
despite their limited skill, including one who was employed by the 
magistrate of Kanze on a wage of 30 yuan per month. 110  Arriving in 
Kangding from Shanghai in 1937, Peter Goullart wrote:  
 
[It was] not easy to hire a servant because Chinese did not want to work 
as servants at comparatively small wages and preferred either to do 
small business by going down to the warm valleys for produce or to pan 
for gold in the highlands, or as a last resort to become tea carriers. 
                                               
106 Ibid., 81. 
107 Zelin, The Merchants of Zigong, 127. 
108 Quoted in Chen Yishi 陈一石, "Cong Qing mo Chuan-Dian bianwu dang'an kan Zhao 
Erfeng de zhi Kang zhengji 从清末川滇边务档案看赵尔丰的治康政绩," Jindai shi 
yanjiu 近代史研究, no. 2 (1985): 257. 
109 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 271-72. 
110 Ibid., 272. 
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Tibetans, too, had other interests more lucrative than menial 
employment.111 
 
Goullart was not alone in complaining about the difficulty of finding 
workers. Many government reports also made the same complaint. A 1938 
report from Kongyu in Kangding County noted that a shortage of labour 
was one of the barriers to the greater exploitation of the region’s 
minerals.112 Of course, the normal rules of supply and demand probably 
applied here: had the government been willing (or able) to pay workers 
more than they could have earned as tea carriers, there is no reason to think 
they would not have come. 
Most workers in Kham earned much less than the barber of Kanze. At 
the beginning of the 1930s, Ren Naiqiang recorded that carpenters made 
around half to three quarters of a yuan per day, or .2 taels of silver if the 
employer provided food and lodgings. 113  In 1931, average carpenters in 
Chengdu only earned six yuan plus food per month.114 Ren estimated that 
gathering firewood around Kangding netted around a third of yuan per 
day.115 Even this, therefore, earned about as much as the average monthly 
wage in Chengdu, around 11 yuan in 1931.116   
From the second half of the 1930s there is better and more standardized 
price data for comparisons of real wages in the highlands with those in the 
basin. Table one below shows 1938 grain prices in Chengdu, Ya'an and 
Dartsedo, as well as wages for rickshaw pullers in Chengdu and muleteers 
working between Ya'an and Dartsedo.  I have chosen muleteers as a proxy 
for porters about whom there is less information in this period. In 
                                               
111 Goullart, Princes of the Black Bone, 15. 
112 Ren Hanguang 任漢光, "Kongyu Kaochaji 孔玉考察記 " Kangdao yuekan 1, no. 1 
(1938). Reprinted in Zhao Xinyu and Qin Heping, eds., Kangqu Zangzu shehui lishi 
diaocha ziliao jiyao, 296. 
113 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 251. 
114 Li Zhuxi 李竹溪 and Liu Fangjian 刘方健, eds., Lidai Sichuan wujia shiliao 历代四川
物价史料 (Chengdu: Xinan caijing daxue chubanshe,1989), 323. 
115 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 263. 
116 Zeng Chongbi, "Cause Analysis of Meager Salaries of Sichuan Primary School Teachers 
in the 1930s," Frontiers of History in China 1, no. 4 (2006): 618. 
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comparable regions porters and muleteers seem to have earned about the 
same.117 With a mule, one could make the Yazhou-Dartsedo trip fully laden 
in about half the time, but mules required an investment of around 100 yuan 
in the late 1930s, and had to be provided with fodder.118 Muleteer earnings 
have been estimated using the following data and sources: One 1938 report 
stated that it cost 1.5 yuan per day to hire a mule or horse between Yaan and 
Dartsedo.119 A fully laden mule could make the Yazhou to Dartsedo journey 
in nine days, while the unburdened return journey took only five days. 120 
Thus earnings over the whole trip would have been around .96 yuan per 
day. Fodder and accommodation was provided by inns that, in 1939, 
typically charged between .15 and .2 yuan per mule per night and up to .3 or 
.4 around Kangding where grain was expensive (and for this reason most 
muleteers preferred not to spend nights in Kangding).121 Due to wartime 
inflation, food prices in Kangding in 1939 were on average 60 percent 
higher than the same month of the previous year.122 Therefore, it would be 
reasonable to assume average fodder expenses of around .12 yuan in 1938, 
making overall daily earnings that year around .88 yuan, and monthly 
earnings around 26.4 yuan.  
 
                                               
117 Ch’en, The Highlanders of Central China, 8. 
118 Ren Naiqiang, "Luding kaocha ji," 114. 
119 Zhang Zhiyuan 张志遠, "Xikang keyi kenzhi ma 西康可以墾殖嗎?," Jianshe zhouxun 
建設周迅 6, no. 18-19 (1938): 58-62. In 1939 Gu Xueqiu reported that it cost 2 yuan per 
stage (day) to hire a horse or mule, and 1 yuan for a slower yak (used west of Kangding). 
Ren Naiqiang, also writing in 1939 reported that to have goods transported between 
Ya’an and Kangding cost 18 yuan per 100 jin, and took nine days with fully laden mules, 
which makes the two rates the same for a mule that could carry 100 jin. Given the high 
inflation, these figures are congruent with and confirm the 1938 price. Gu Xueqiu, 
"Xikang sheng yaocai diaocha baogaoshu," 412; Ren Naiqiang, "Luding kaocha ji," 114-
15. In 1939, going from Xichang to Fulin (in Hanyuan) took eight days and cost 12 yuan 
per 100 jin, a rate that makes this journey 25 percent cheaper per day than the Ya’an to 
Kangding journey. However, food costs were much lower in Ningshu (see below); CKSB, 
176. 
120 Ren Naiqiang, "Luding kaocha ji," 114-15. 
121 Ibid. 
122 "Zhan shi Kangding shi wu jia dongtai 戰時康定物價動態," Xikang jingji jikan 1, no. 
5-6 合刊 (1943): 50-51. 
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Cost of rice in Chengdu (yuan / shi dou 市斗).123     1.11 
Cost of rice in Yaan (yuan / shi dou).124     0.94 
Cost of barley in Dartsedo (yuan / shi dou).125   1.96 
Chengdu richshaw pullers' average monthly wage 
(yuan).126 
17.5 
Dou of rice purchased in Chengdu with rickshaw pullers' 
average monthly wage. 
  15.9 
Estimated monthly earnings of muleteers (yuan) working 
between Yaan and Dartsedo. 
  26.4 
Dou of grain purchased with estimated monthly muleteer 
income, using median of Dartsedo and Yaan price (1.45 
yuan per dou).  
  18.2 
 
Table one: Comparison of real wages of Chengdu rickshaw pullers and 
muleteers between Ya'an and Dartsedo in 1938 
  
Table one indicates that porters/muleteers earned about 15 percent more, 
in real terms than rickshaw pullers in Chengdu. It was a relatively small 
difference, and it seems unlikely that this alone could have drawn a man 
from the Sichuan basin to the highlands. Yet for an unskilled but physically 
strong man from around Ya'an, carrying goods west, which also offered the 
possibility of stints on gold-fields or gathering medicine, was probably a 
more likely option than going to Chengdu to haul rickshaws. 
 
                                               
123 Li Zhuxi and Liu Fangjian, eds., Lidai Sichuan wujia shiliao, 385. 
124 Ibid., 386. 
125 This is an estimate using price indexes in Xikang Economy Quarterly and October 1940 
prices as given by the Agriculture Institute. The October 1940 highland barley price was 
87 yuan per 100 jin. The food price index for October 1940 was 771.05 (100 being the 
average of the first six months in 1937). Using the inflation index data for each month in 
1938 to calculate monthly barley prices in that year gives an overall average for the whole 
of 1938 of 13.1 yuan per 100 jin, or 19.6 yuan per shi weighing 150 jin. Xikang sheng 
nongye gaijin suo 西康省農業改進所, "Kangding chengxiang wujia diaocha 康定城廂
物價調查," 1940,  (SCDAG, QZH:249, AJH:33); Xikang jingji jikan 西康經濟季刊, 
1942, no.5-6 combined issue(合刊), 50. Being lighter than rice, barley is less nourishing 
per unit of volume. I have not adjusted the data to take account of this because, firstly, 
muleteers could probably have eaten rice most of the way, and secondly, using the 
median of Dartsedo and Ya'an probably over-estimates their food costs. Prices do not 
appear to have risen in a linear fashion. 
126 Li Zhuxi and Liu Fangjian, eds., Lidai Sichuan wujia shiliao, 396. 
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Trade also created a demand for agricultural produce. Passing through 
Kham in 1926, Paul Stevenson noted that there were two types of Chinese 
settlements in that region:  
 
The more important is represented by the Chinese settlements along the 
great highway that for centuries has provided the link between China 
and Tibet. The size of the settlements and the distance between them are 
determined largely by the requirements of the traffic passing over the 
road […] The second type of Chinese settlement in the region is found 
in the few agricultural communities that have managed to establish 
themselves on the occasional alluvial cones large enough to permit 
irrigated cultivation. The encouragement of agricultural conquest has 
been a definite government policy in recent years, and the old imperial 
title of "Warden of the Marches" is now changed to that of 
"Commissioner of Cultivation." The Chinese agriculturists that have 
taken root in this area, however, are few and far between.127 
 
Ren Naiqiang gave several examples of the former kind of settlement, 
which profited by growing food supplies for the merchants and the 
communities that developed around trade routes and resource extraction 
industries. In 1929, Ren wrote:  
 
In the late Qing dynasty, many Han people came to Dartsedo. […] 
There were not enough vegetables, so peasants arrived to cultivate the 
surrounding hillsides. They made great profits, and the cultivated area 
spread out for ten li around the town.128 
 
Other writers also noted the connection between the arrival of gold-
miners in a certain place and the ensuing cultivation of land around the 
mines. 129  Elsewhere, Ren even referred to such farmers as “market 
gardeners” (ying caipuye zhe 營菜圃業者) rather than as peasants (nongmin 
農民) or “cultivators” (kenfu 墾夫, kenmin, 墾民).130 Ren’s accounts of pre-
twentieth century Han settlements around garrisons in Kham also 
                                               
127 Stevenson, "Notes on the Human Geography of the Chinese-Tibetan Borderland," 601. 
128 Ren Naiqiang, "Kangding xian shicha baogao," 259. 
129 Yin Ziwen 尹子文, "Luhuo gaikuang 炉霍概况," Kangdao yuekan 2, no. 4 (1945): 133. 
130 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 260. 
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demonstrate the same trend.131 
There was not a great deal of unused arable land in Kham; how much 
there was in Ningshu is more of a mystery because no surveys were carried 
out there. However, the key limit on the agricultural sector and the “great 
profits” that could be made in it was not the overall availability of land, but 
by the limited availability of land near markets. The enormous costs of 
transport in the highlands quickly eroded the high returns from farming so 
that as farmers moved away from major markets, returns ceased to be 
competitive with the wages in unskilled labour jobs. This meant that land 
around major markets like Dartsedo was farmed intensively and very 
profitably, but land further away was not.   
Tables two and three below give rough estimates for average yield, 
labour requirements and market value of yield for barley in Dartsedo and 
rice in four Ningshu county towns. A tenant-farmer near Dartsedo who kept 
ten percent of the yield back for seed and paid 30 percent of the yield as rent 
would be able to take an average of .72 of a shi of barley per mu to 
market.132 The .72 of a shi would have sold at Dartsedo for 22.68 yuan. In 
1939, transporting .72 of a shi of grain by mule cost around 2 yuan per 
day.133 In addition to these costs, there was fertilizer, and other marketing 
expenses, like market fees and storage. I have not encountered any evidence 
that permits a precise estimate, but it would be reasonable to deduct a few 
yuan for these expenses.134 Let us say final profits were 18 yuan per mu. If 
each mu required around nine days of labour—the same as what Buck’s 
data indicates was necessary for wheat—and one day per mu for marketing, 
                                               
131 See Ren Naiqiang, "Luding kaocha ji." 
132 Reported rents paid by Han and mixed farmers in Kang vary from around twelve percent 
of output to fifty percent Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 262-63. One 1944 
survey indicated that 81 percent of farmers in Kangding and 42 percent in Luding were 
tenant-farmers (diannong 佃農), with only 1.65 percent and 32.17 percent respectively 
being classified as owner-farmers (zigengnong 自耕農) as opposed to semi-owner 
farmers (ban-zizongnong 半自耕農). Wu Wenhui and Zhu Jianhua, "Xikang tudi wenti," 
21.  
133 Gu Xueqiu, "Xikang sheng yaocai diaocha baogaoshu," 412. 
134 One of the industrial projects in Kangding begun after 1939 was a fertilizer plant, which 
perhaps indicates that—despite the large number of animals—there was a shortage of 
fertilizer in the region. 
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returns to labour were pretty similar to muleteering. 135 Therefore, under 
such conditions, renting and farming land around Kangding was also more 
lucrative than the average waged-labour job in Chengdu.  
 
 Crop 
 Rice Barley Wheat 
Estimated days of labour 
per mu. 
10.3136   8.8137 
Possible average yield per 
mu (market shi 石) 
2.95138 1.20139  
 
Table two: Estimates of labour requirements and yield for barley, wheat and 
rice 
 
                                               
135 By 1939, the cost of hiring a mule had increased (see above) but considering the cost of 
fodder, farming was still more profitable. The amount of labour necessary for a mu of 
wheat is controversial. The nineteenth century Pumao nongzi 浦泖農咨 suggests that 
winter wheat only needed three days of labour per mu in southern Jiangsu. Bozhong Li, 
"Farm Productivity in Jiangnan, 1620-1850," in Living Standards in the Past: New 
Perspectives on Well-Being in Asia and Europe, ed. Robert C. Allen, Tommy Bengtsson, 
and Martin Dribe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 64. Republican period 
Japanese research gave a figure of 7.8 days per mu for the same crop in Hebei, Philip C. 
C. Huang, The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1985), 110. If labour requirements to achieve a yield of 1.2 shi of barley 
per average mu in the highlands were actually less than this, then obviously farming was 
even more profitable.  
136 J. Lossing Buck, An Agricultural Survey of Sichuan Province, China (Chungking: The 
Farmers Bank of China, 1943), 50-54. 
137 Ibid.  
138 Ibid., 4. In this instance Buck’s Sichuan data is reasonably compatible with Li 
Bozhong’s study of southern Jiangsu in the nineteenth century, which estimates average 
rice yields per mu at 2.5 shi; Li, "Farm Productivity in Jiangnan, 1620-1850," 62. 
139 Current Chinese studies of pre-1950s Tibetan agriculture also indicate average highland 
barley and wheat yields per mu of around 83 kg--1240.5 kg per hectare, assuming that 1 
hectare equals 15 mu, 82.7 kg per mu, (Wu Shaohong and Yang Qinye, "Land-Use and 
Agricultural Development," in Mountain Geoecology and Sustainable Development of the 
Tibetan Plateau, ed. Zheng Du, Zhang Qingsong, and Wu Shaohong (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2000), 182). According to Perkins’ figures, the Republican period 
national average per mu yield of barley was around 75 kg Perkins, Agricultural 
Development in China. I have used Perkins’ figure, and assumed that 1 shi of barley 
weighs about 62 kg (calculated according to data from University of Missouri 
http://extension.missouri.edu/publications/DisplayPub.aspx?P=G4020 (accessed 
18/07/10). This source gives barley as 48 pounds per bushel. 1 bushel = 35.24 litres; 1 
pound = .454 kg; 1 shi = 100 litres). 
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County Rice Barley 
 Kangding  31.5140 
 Hanyuan 8.3141  
 Yuesui 24.6142  
 Mianning 20.8143  
 Xichang 12.9144  
 
Table Three: Market price of grain in yuan per shi in various Xikang 
counties in June 1939 
 
However, two yuan per day transport costs would have quickly reduced 
the profitability of farming the further one moved from Dartsedo. Farmers 
who lived more than one day from the town also faced greater marketing 
expenses as they needed to pay accommodation expenses. Beyond this, 
farming could only have been more profitable than muleteering if farmers 
owned their own land and paid land taxes of less than the 30 percent that we 
proposed as a typical rent above, or if the land they farmed was 
exceptionally productive. The advantage of being within a day’s journey 
from Dartsedo is clearly illustrated by the intensity of farming around the 
town. In 1929, Ren Naiqiang reported that most of the arable land in 
Kangding and Luding had already been brought under cultivation, such that 
                                               
140 This is an estimate using price indexes in Xikang Economy Quarterly and October 1940 
prices as given by the Agriculture Institute (see note 123 above). The food price index for 
October 1940 was 771.05; June 1939 was 185.9. October 1940 highland barley price was 
87 yuan per 100 jin. Therefore, the June 1939 price should have been 20.97 yuan per 100 
jin. If 150 jin equals 1 shi, the per shi price would be 31.46 yuan. This roughly tallies with 
a report in Xikang sheng zhengfu gongbao that said corn flour cost 25.33 yuan per 100 jin 
in August 1939.  Xikang sheng zhengfu gongbao 西康省政府公報, no. 9 (1939), 
unpaginated tables. 
141 Prices in this source are given by weight in jin. I have converted them into shi on the 
grounds that 1 shi equals 83 kg (John Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the 
Taiwan Frontier 1600-1800, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 158) and 1 kg 
equals two jin (CKSB, 203).  
142 CKSB, 203. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
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“if the farmers’ sons and younger brothers come, there will be no space for 
them.”145 Photographs of Dartsedo from this time also show that even very 
steep hillsides around the town were cultivated, leaving almost no land 
untilled. 
 
Dartsedo in 1939. Photo by Sun Mingjing 孫明經 (1911-1992).146  
 
Doing the same calculation for a mu of rice in Xichang gives almost 
exactly the same return as Dartsedo. In Yuesui and Mianning, returns from 
rice land were much better still because of the higher price in those 
counties. However, only some of the farmers in these locations had access 
to land suitable for growing rice. The rest grew barley and wheat, which, 
with their much lower yields per mu and lower price per shi, were a much 
less attractive proposition. It was probably for this reason that the Sichuan-
Xikang Survey Report noted that in a village in Yuexi “all of the able-
bodied men have left to work as porters.”147 Of course, as we saw in chapter 
one, from the mid 1930s a lot of farmers in Ningshu grew opium. It is very 
difficult to determine, however, what kind of returns farmers themselves got 
for the opium crop. 
                                               
145 Ren Naiqiang, "Luding xian shicha bagao," Bianzheng,  no. 2 (1929), in Zhao Xinyu and 
Qin Heping, eds., Kangqu Zangzu shehui lishi diaocha ziliao jiyao, 332. 
146 Zhang Ming 张鸣, and Sun Mingjing 孙明经, 1939 nian: zoujin Xikang 1939年：走进
西康, (Jinan: Shandong huabao chubanshe, 2003), 60. 
147 CKSB, 198.  
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In sum, farming in the frontier was also a potentially lucrative 
occupation, but only where farmers had land next to a major market. 
Therefore, the amount of genuinely unused arable land there was in the 
frontier is irrelevant to an explanation of why this territory did not become a 
booming agricultural colony like Manchuria. The high cost of 
transportation, and the existence of well-paid labour jobs explain why the 
Zhao Erfeng vision of relatively large-scale agricultural settlement did not 
materialize. As Ren Naiqiang commented many new settlers in the late 
imperial period abandoned their new lands and went into trade. 148  The 
region’s lucrative resource extraction industries, and the highly profitably 
trade that passed through it, meant that labour was in high demand. This 
pulled wages up to a level where many outsiders commented on how 
expensive they were, which meant that it was not worthwhile for 
households to strike off into the wilderness to seek out new land to farm 
when it was likely they would get better returns working as a porter. 
 
 
Ideological Factors in Migration. 
 
Higher wages for unskilled work than could be had in the Sichuan basin was 
one factor that drew migrants to the frontier highlands in the Republican 
period. In some cases, ideology was important too. From the second half of 
the nineteenth century, increasing migration to the borderlands became a 
standard article on the reformist program of steps necessary to modernize 
China and defend the nation against foreign aggression. Major reform 
figures like Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858-1927) and Liang Qichao 梁啟超 
(1873-1929) championed the cause of Han settlement in the borderlands. In 
the last decade of the Qing, settler-ism had a significant impact on 
government policy in the frontier and resulted in very substantial support for 
migrants who were willing to become farmers in Kham, though the number 
of agricultural migrants remained small. As we saw in chapter three, the 
focus of state policy shifted in the Republican period from encouraging 
                                               
148 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 255. 
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settlement by independent farmers to establishing large state-owned 
agricultural enterprises. Public ownership over huang land was no longer 
enforced. In some places, wealthier migrants might have been attracted by 
this, but it probably restricted opportunities in farming for poorer migrants. 
As demonstrated above, where farmers were not within a day’s journey 
from a major market, they needed low-cost access to land for farming to be 
profitable. It is safe to conclude that, apart from creating a small number of 
jobs on state farms, the Xikang provincial government’s agricultural policy 
did not draw in many migrants. 
Nevertheless, Liu Wenhui and some of his officials may have 
contributed towards migration through their active promotion of positive 
images of the highlands and the kind of life that awaited potential settlers. 
This is an element of Liu’s administration that has been highlighted by 
James Leibold, who discusses a propagandistic play serialized in the journal 
Bianzheng gonglun.149 The play follows the story of a bold intellectual-
turned-pioneer who is committed to “race-state-ism” (guozu zhuyi 國族主 
義) and to doing his bit for the development of the Tibetan lands and 
ensuring that they remain within the Chinese nation. He decides to go to the 
frontier and overcomes many hardships on his journey to Ba’an where he is 
“treated as a messiah-king by a mob of childlike Tibetans” and initiates 
development plans that bring more than one hundred thousand mu of 
wasteland into cultivation.150 On this and other occasions, Liu Wenhui and 
his staff actively promoted positive images of the highland natives and their 
interactions with Han settlers. “The Kham people see their religion as a 
embodying a splendid culture, and they are, in general, a peaceable people 
(pianyu haojing 偏於好靜).”151 Ren Naiqiang wrote that according to the 
“laws of assimilation”, the “Fan” people of Kham would be the easiest non-
Han people in all of China to assimilate.152  
                                               
149 Leibold, Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism, 69-70. 
150 Ibid., 70. (Quotes are Leibold’s words) 
151 Liu Wenhui, "Xikang xiankuang ji Zhao Erfeng zhi Zang zhi shi de 西康現況及趙爾豐
治藏之失得," Xibei wenti jikan 西北問題季刊 2, no. 1-2 (合刊） (1936): 28. 
152 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 219-22. 
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It is difficult to judge the impact of this kind of discourse. There 
certainly were some negative stereotypes to counter. One journal article 
lamented in 1935 that after fall of the Qing:  
 
The Barbarians began to talk of cleansing the land of the Han and many 
settlers (kenfu 墾夫) were killed. To this day, when the people of the 
Interior talk of going to the frontier to cultivate the earth, they see it as 
an ill fated (bu xiang 不祥) matter.153  
 
Staged performances showing migrants facing a more positive reception 
may have gone some way toward balancing such talk.  
Settler-ism did motivate at least a few migration endeavours. Chapters 
one and five introduced the ill-fated Bathang Cultivation Company, 
established by patriotic intellectuals in the 1900s. Though their efforts at 
Bathang ended in disaster they did not abandon the great mission to settle 
the borderlands with diligent farmers. The Company chose a new site on the 
border of Yi territory in Leshan; much closer to home but still ‘frontier’ 
enough to have to make the agreements with the Yi chieftains detailed in the 
previous chapter. Rechristened the Leshan and Pingshan Cultivation Society 
(kenwu gongshe 墾務公社), Peng Jinmen and his associates battled on 
through the Republican period. As they did so, their focus shifted toward 
forestry and away from grain-growing. Its eventual accomplishments were 
modest and very different from what Peng had envisaged in 1906. 
Nevertheless, it demonstrates that the widely held ideological commitment 
to settling the frontier did result in some actual settlement.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Migration to the highlands west and southwest of the Sichuan basin did not 
rival the magnitude of the flow of people into Manchuria, where a booming 
settler population utterly transformed the demographic and ecological 
landscape of the region. Nevertheless, the Han population around Kangding, 
                                               
153 ZYDZ, "Diaocha ziliao," Chuanbian jikan 1, no. 1 (1935): 171. 
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Luding, Yuesui and Hanyuan doubled, or in some cases more than doubled, 
over the first half of the twentieth century. Other places also saw significant 
increases, but a lack of reliable population data prevents estimates of their 
magnitude. This growth occurred at a time of demographic stagnation in the 
region that the migrants came from. Moreover, it contrasts sharply with the 
population decline that took place in the highlands east of Sichuan. In many 
instances, the establishment and survival of Han local governments was not 
absolutely necessary for migration to take place, but it almost certainly 
helped. Gold, valuable medicines and musk drew many migrants. Arrivals 
in the highlands probably dreamt more of become rich through trade or gold 
mining than they did of toiling under the weight of packages of tea on the 
road between Yaan and Dartsedo. I have concentrated on the returns to the 
latter form of labour, because doing so demonstrates that even unlucky 
miners who failed to find anything at all, or who were robbed, could still 
earn better money in unskilled labour than was possible in Chengdu. This 
chapter has also shown that farming could be highly lucrative as well, 
providing that one had land within a day or so of a major market. Beyond 
this, farming was not competitive with jobs such as carrying tea, which 
explains why there was not more agricultural settlement in the highlands. In 
some cases there was probably another motivation besides the high wages of 
the region: the chance to play one’s heroic part in the development of the 
nation. The hopes and anxieties of this grand pioneering endeavour, and 
those of the other twentieth century missions to transform the frontier, are 
the subject of the final chapter.  
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Chapter Seven: Visions of Transformation: Culture and Politics on the 
Frontier, 1905-2010 
 
 
This thesis has been about attempts to transform the frontier, and this final 
chapter examines the way that the nature and agents of change have been 
conceptualized throughout the twentieth century. The first section of this 
chapter continues the theme of the previous chapter, and examines 
representations of Han settlement and the migrants themselves. Leaders and 
intellectuals often saw the settlement by a generation of tough and righteous 
pioneers as critical to the mission of transforming the frontier. However, 
there was also considerable anxiety about the quality of the actual migrants 
and the nature of the change that they brought.  
The subsequent discussion of late Qing and Republican period 
conceptualizations of change is loosely based on the trio of changes to 
frontier society promised by Liu Wenhui’s “Three Transformations Policy 
(san hua zhengce 三化政策). Liu called it a “policy”, but it was more a 
loose sketching of three types of change that he thought needed to happen, 
rather than a series of practical measures. In this respect it was similar to, 
and the formulation was probably inspired by, Sun Yat-sen’s “Three 
Principles of the People” (san min zhuyi 三民主義 ). Liu’s Three 
Transformations were, firstly, “change through enlightened rule” (de hua 德
化 ) (which, as we shall see, was really two transformations in one); 
secondly, “assimilation” (tong hua 同化); and, thirdly, “progress” (jin hua 
進化). It was certainly not only Liu who was concerned with these ideas; 
almost all of the transformations that have been argued as either necessary 
or historically significant in the twentieth century could fit under one of 
these broad headings.  However, they could mean very different things to 
different people, and there has been considerable disagreement about 
whether all three were important and which should be prioritized. Having 
examined the discussion of these topics in the Republican period, this 
chapter concludes with a reflection on how they emerge within present day 
narratives of historical change. 
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Han Pioneers: Agents of Civilization and Progress, or Degeneration?  
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Liu Wenhui promoted the idea of a 
political settler: an upright and competent colonist who, inspired by a sense 
of national mission, would work to transform the borderlands. Ren Naiqiang 
argued that Han settlement was “the best route to the assimilation of the Fan 
[Tibetans]”.154 During the Republican period, “tuobianzhe 拓邊者” (“those 
who push out the frontier”) entered the Chinese language as a translation of 
“pioneer”.155 Zhu Zengyun, an early Republican period magistrate of Dawu, 
referred to the “philosopher” Daniel Defoe, and suggested that lessons from 
Robinson Crusoe could be drawn for his own world building exercise in 
Dawu.156  
However, as the previous chapter also demonstrated, unless you were 
lucky enough have staked out land next to Dartsedo or another key market 
town, farming was less profitable than pursuits such as carrying goods for 
merchants or medicine-gathering, which were inherently mobile. Yet a large 
body of Chinese thought held that a settled lifestyle was the key to a 
peaceful and virtuous one. The Sichuan-Xikang Survey Report outlined a 
fanciful plan for the reform of Yi society, which emphasized that it was 
important for all Yi, even if they had rebelled against the government, to 
own land.  
 
If they are given some settled property (heng chanwu 恒产物 [i.e. real 
estate, land]), they will have settled hearts and minds (heng xin 恒心). 
If they have a settled hearts and minds, the relationship between us can 
be improved.157 
 
As chapter two demonstrated, Zhao Erfeng’s plan for migration focused 
strongly on the development of stable agricultural communities. He 
                                               
154 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 231. 
155 Mo Dehui 莫德惠, "Ningshu zhi Yi zhi wo jian 寧屬治夷之我見," Kangdao yuekan 康
導月刊 5, no. 11-12 (合刊) (1943): 26. 
156 Zhu Zengyun, "Chuanbian zhengxie," 120. 
157 CKSB, 172. 
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prohibited the sale of land, and attached discouraging conditions to the 
subletting of it. Furthermore, medicine gatherers were actually forbidden 
from going to certain places, due to the presumption that they would cause 
trouble with the locals (despite the abundant evidence that Zhao Erfeng and 
his armies caused much more turmoil than small bands of medicine 
gatherers and miners).  
This was an attitude highly reminiscent of the quarantine-ism of the 
eighteenth century, when settlers were more likely to be called “Han evil-
doers” (Hanjian 漢奸), and blamed them for stirring up problems, than 
lionized as the agents of civilization and progress.158 Donald Sutton shows 
that in the early eighteenth century Guizhou, many officials blamed “all the 
troubles of the frontier on these [Han] illegal intruders.”159 Consequently, 
from 1708 all movement across the ethnic frontier in Guizhou was 
forbidden except for the purposes of paying taxes or buying necessities. The 
punishment for violating this rule, or the one against intermarriage, was one 
hundred blows with heavy bamboo and penal labour.  
The pioneering political settler who was the agent of twentieth century 
governments’ development and civilizing missions did not supplant but 
existed alongside the trouble-making Han-evil-doers of earlier times. Chen 
Zhongwei described Han settlers in Xikang thus:  
  
With the encouragement of the government, there rushed in not only a 
crowd of hooligans (liumang 流 氓 ) and ex-convicts, but also 
unemployed workers and regular profit-chasers.160 
 
The same terms—hooligans, ex-convicts and profit-chasers—were used 
by a 1940s General Introduction to Xikang Commerce. 161 Ren Naiqiang 
                                               
158 See Donald S. Sutton, "Ethnicity and the Miao Frontier in the Eighteenth Century" in 
Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China, eds. 
Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2006), 193. Also C. Patterson Giersch, ""A Motley Throng:" Social 
Change on Southwest China's Early Modern Frontier, 1700-1800," The Journal of Asian 
Studies 60, no. 1 (2001): 68. 
159 Sutton, "Ethnicity and the Miao Frontier in the Eighteenth Century ," 199. 
160 Chen Zhongwei, Xikang wenti, 89. 
161 Zhou Taixuan, "Xikang shangye gaikuang," in JKDZ, 221. 
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wrote that in Dartsedo the people were “craftier by nature than in any other 
place.”162 He complained about the brothels and opium dens and concluded 
that “the dregs of Han society were especially prominent (Hanren zhi 
duoluo zhe you duo 漢人之墮落者尤多).”163 A Daocheng official explained 
to Chen Zhongsheng that: 
 
The Han who stay here mostly conduct trade or till the earth. But they 
are all deeply lacking in knowledge and, moreover, most of them are 
criminals or have undesirable social habits. The so-called Han-ization 
(Hanhua 漢化) that they spread among the natives, is also nothing 
more than the spread of vulgar attitude of marketplaces.164 
 
Similarly, Jiang Wuji blamed Han gold-miners and traders for locals’ opium 
addictions in Yutong.165 When the Sichuan Frontier Quarterly mentioned 
that the Pingshan government had begun using convict labour to cultivate 
the land, it informed readers that there were many prisoners there because: 
“Pingshan is located in the borderlands (bianchui 邊陲), and the people’s 
quality is inferior (minxing po lie 民性頗劣).”166   
Chen Zhongwei gave a long list of the kinds of people he wanted to see 
settle in Xikang; a good sign that he was not entirely happy with the kinds 
of people who had migrated thus far. Chen stressed that only the following 
types of people were suitable: 
 
1) Not lascivious, drinkers, users-of-prostitutes or gamblers. 
2) Do not have mental illnesses (jingshenbing 精神病). 
3) Do not have infectious diseases. 
4) Accompanied by wives and families. 
5) Responsible and hard working. 
6) Committed to maintaining public order and the public 
interest. 
7) Possessed of everyday abilities. 
                                               
162 Ren Naiqiang, "Kangding xian shicha baogao, 262. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Chen Zhongsheng, Xi xing yan yi ji, 217. 
165 Jiang Wuji 蒋五骥, "Yutong suoying 鱼通缩影," Kangdao yuekan 1, no. 1 (1938), in 
Kangqu Zangzu shehui lishi diaocha ziliao jiyao, eds. Zhao Xinyu and Qin Heping, 315. 
166 ZYDZ, "Diaocha ziliao," Chuanbian jikan 1, no. 1 (1935): 176. 
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8) Have not been convicted of an offence. 
9) Serious and calm in deed and word. 
10) Articulate.167 
11) Calm and collected. 
 
Ren Naiqiang produced a similar list, as had Zhao Erfeng for candidates 
for his Tibetan language school in Chengdu.168 Chen's notion that it was 
important for settlers to be accompanied by their wives is interesting 
because it clashed with some observers' hope that the government would 
encourage the intermarriage of migrants with locals, a suggestion that we 
shall examine below. 
Discourse that complained about the quality of existing migrants cannot 
have made those who did fit the criteria given in such lists feel particularly 
positive about going to the frontier. Ironically, when Ren Naiqiang came 
across Liu Shaoyao, a migrant who did seem to mostly live up to the profile 
outlined by Chen and himself, Ren’s instinct was to try to take Liu back to 
Sichuan with him. Liu was the nephew of a Nanchong squire (xiangshen 鄉
紳), educated, married, possessed of an “honest and sincere nature” and able 
to speak the local Tibetan language.169 Apparently forgetting that this was 
precisely the type of person he had proclaimed that Xikang needed, Ren 
comments that he “could not see how Liu could have wandered into 
Nyarong”, and that he desired to lead Liu back home. 170 Such was the 
disparity between Ren’s impression of the type of people whom he usually 
met in the frontier and the ideal settler.  
Thus there was a strong tension in Republican period discourse on 
frontier society. A vision of a bold pioneering settler society co-existed with 
a persistent fear regarding the quality of the actual migrants and the 
problems that they were perceived to cause.    
                                               
167 Chen Zhongwei, Xikang wenti, 260. With the last point (yuyan minjie 語言敏捷), Chen 
possibly meant the ability to learn new languages. As far as his fourth point went, the 
eighteenth century imperial state oscillated between allowing and prohibiting settlers to 
bring their wives to frontier regions. See John Robert Shepherd, Statecraft and Political 
Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800. 
168 For Zhao’s criteria see JKDZ, 396. 
169 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 266. 
170 Ibid. 
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De hua 德化: The Case for Virtuous Rule 
 
The critique of the Han presence in the highlands was certainly not reserved 
for lowly gold miners and traders. Many observers argued that the problems 
of the frontier were caused primarily by immoral governance. Indigenous 
leaders did not escape criticism, but blame was also directed mostly at Han 
officialdom. The Guomindang sponsored Sichuan-Xikang Survey Report 
wrote: 
 
[From the late Qing dynasty on], there have been many unethical men 
within Han officialdom, who often used the power of their offices to 
cheat and prey upon the natives. Civil and military officials alike 
combined with the unscrupulous men outside the government to 
develop ways of exploiting the native people. Considering that the 
natives are, by nature, greedy and turbulent, and that they view wealth 
as the most important thing in life, one can well imagine how deep their 
hatred is. This is the cause of the native grievances.171  
 
Ren Naiqiang wrote that “in the years after gaitu-guiliu, the low level 
officials acted autonomously, plundering the wealth of the Kangding people 
in order to fill their own bellies.”172 Material compiled political department 
(zhengzhi bu 政治部) of the Twenty Fourth Army argued that the former 
frontier governors behaved like foreign imperialists:  
 
Frontier governors have never treated the people of the borderlands in a 
just manner. In the minds of the frontier governors, the border people 
are not even fully human; their position is like the black slaves of 
America, or the colonized people of the British Empire.173  
 
The corollary of the belief that misrule had caused the region’s troubles 
was the notion that the solution lay in virtuous governance. Of course, 
leaders who talked about ethics in government did not necessarily lead 
                                               
171 CKSB, 171. 
172 Ren Naiqiang, "Kangding xian shicha baogao," 267. 
173 Guomin geming jun di ershisi jun 国民革命军第二十四军, "Chuan Kang bianwu 
xuanchuan jiyao 川康边务宣传辑要," in Kangqu Zangzu shehui zhenxi ziliao jiyao 
(shang), eds. Zhao Xinyu, Qin Heping, and Wang Chuan (Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 2006), 
300. 
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institutions that actually behaved more ethically than those who did not. 
Nevertheless, the Republican period saw a profusion of discourse on the 
need for a moral reform of government. The first of Liu Wenhui’s “Three 
Transformations” addressed this issue. Liu called the policy de hua 德化, a 
term not of his own invention that is difficult to fully convey in succinct 
English. De 德 means “virtue” or “morality”; hua 化 means “transform”. De 
hua is really a classical contraction that modern dictionaries explain as yi 
dao xing gan hua ren 以德行感化人, “using virtue to transform people”. 
Virtuous example is the pedagogical tool used by the ruler to guide his 
subjects toward a more perfect existence. In practice, de hua suggests two 
transformations: firstly the transformation of the government so that it 
projects an example of virtue. Secondly, the transformation of the 
population in response to the virtuous example set by the government.  
 
[The first transformation] is a policy of effecting change through 
morally enlightened rule (de hua zhengce 德化政策). It stands opposite 
to a policy of effecting change through coercion (weifu zhengce 威服政
策). […] History demonstrates that even though a policy of coercion 
may result in temporary success, as soon as the government’s head is 
turned, crushing failures will emerge, and all the successes will be 
undone. In order to thoroughly break the cycles of revenge, and lay the 
foundations for long-term development, I am determined to replace 
coercion with governance by moral example.174 
 
De hua promised a moral reformation of government that would inspire 
loyalty and positive change where coercive rule had inspired only temporary 
obedience and desire for revenge. 
However, not everybody agreed that virtuous government was really the 
key to solving the problems of the frontier. The supposed inevitability of the 
second transformation proposed by de hua seemed highly questionable to 
some. If the Yi did not “cherish virtue” (huai de 懷德), even the example of 
the most virtuous of governments would not lead to their transformation. 
Many took the view outlined by Liu Yuetian:  
                                               
174 Liu Wenhui, "Jianshe xin Xikang shi jiang 建設新西康十講,," in Kang qu Zang zu 
shehui zhenxi ziliao jiyao (xia), ed. Zhao Xinyu, Qin Heping, and Wang Chuan (Chengdu: 
Shu ba shushe, 2006), 602. 
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The character of the Yi is like that of dogs or goats. They are capricious 
and do not cherish virtue, and therefore can only be ruled through fear 
of force (wei wei er bu huai de 畏威而不懷德).175 
 
Several other writers used exactly the same formulation.176  
There was a vigorous debate on the matter, with de hua proponents 
frequently citing the proposition that the Yi did not love virtue in order to 
refute it. 177  An article in a short-lived Guomindang journal focused on 
Liangshan argued eloquently:  
 
There are those who say that “the Yi do not cherish virtue and can only 
be ruled through force.” But those people should ask themselves 
whether or not they display any virtue for the Yi to cherish?178  
 
The de hua-ists and the wei wei-ists (those who believed that the Yi 
could only be ruled through force) interpreted historical and myth-historical 
precedent differently. James Sheridan has commented that in the 
Republican period the two sword-and-honour Ming historical epics 
Romance of the Three Kingdoms (San guo yan yi 三國演義) and Heroes of 
the Water Margin (Shuihu zhuan 水滸傳) were “particularly influential in 
shaping attitudes […], general views and specific behavior”. 179  Zhuge 
                                               
175 Liu Yuetian 劉躍天, "Zhengli Yanyuan Yi wu chu yi 整理鹽源夷務芻議," Kangdao 
yuekan 2, no. 4 (1939): 22.  
176 For example Chang Longqing, Lei Ma E Ping diaocha ji, 40. 
177 See Zeng Zhaolun, Da Liang Shan Yi qu kao cha ji, 41; Wu Luzhong 吳魯仲, ""Yi wu 
wenti" lungang 『夷務問題』論綱," in Xikang sheng jianshe xie jin hui hui wu nianbao: 
di san ci 西康省建設協進會會務年報：第三次 (Xichang: Xichang Ning yuan yinshua 
gongsi, 1948), 65. 
178 Kang Run 康潤, "Wo duiyu dangqian zhi yi de yijian 我對于當前治夷的意見," 
Daliangshan 大涼山 1, no. 1 (1946): 2. 
179 James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration: the Republican Era in Chinese History, 
1912-1949 (New York: Macmillan, 1975), 100.  Romance of the Three Kingdoms had 
also served as a guide to military and administrative strategy throughout the Qing 
dynasty. Hong Taiji commissioned its translation into Manchu, purportedly so that it 
could serve as a strategy manual for his generals. By his own account, the general 
Eldemboo, who successfully repressed the White Lotus rebellion (1796-1804), was highly 
influenced by the work. Pamela Kyle Crossley and Evelyn Sakakida Rawski, "A Profile 
of the Manchu Language in Ch'ing History," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 53, no. 1 
(1993): 93-94. 
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Liang 諸葛亮, the Three Kingdoms-era (220 to 280 AD) chancellor of Shu 
Han and one of the key protagonists in Romance of the Three Kingdoms, 
was a hero to governors in the Southwest for the way he had successfully 
subdued the rebellious “Southern Barbarians” (nan man 南蠻) and their 
stubbornly recalcitrant leader Meng Huo 孟獲. But there was disagreement 
between the de hua-ists and their opponents about what exactly the lesson in 
Zhuge’s exploits was. According to the novel, Zhuge won the hearts and 
minds of the “Southern Barbarians” (nan man 南蠻) by capturing their 
rebellious leader Meng Huo seven times and releasing him each time 
without punishment. Distilled into the aphorism “take your enemy seven 
times, let him go seven times” (qiqin qizong 七擒七縱), Zhuge’s strategy 
was usually seen as a “hearts-and-minds” approach to warfare and 
governance.180 But the fundamental question for twentieth century officials 
was whether or not this was the reason that the Barbarians had submitted to 
him. Liu Wenhui wrote:  
 
Many people say “the character of the Yi is like that of dogs or goats; 
they can only be ruled through force and have no love of the good.”181 
They point out that when Zhuge Liang campaigned in the south and 
captured Meng Huo seven times and then released him seven times, 
afterwards Meng Huo said “Your Excellency’s divine power and 
prestige (tian wei 天威)182 ensures that the south will not rebel again.” 
                                               
180 In Romance of the Three Kingdoms the “hearts-and-minds” strategy is proposed by Ma 
Su. The Chinese text has “gong xin wei shang, gong cheng wei xia; xin zhan wei shang, 
bing zhan wei xia 攻心為上，攻城為下；心戰為上，兵戰為下” (Luo Guanzhong 罗贯
中, San guo yan yi 三国演义 (Harbin: Heilongjiang chubanshe, 2003), 362.)  Moss 
Roberts translates this as “The enemy’s mind is more important than his city; 
psychological struggle is superior to armed struggle.” (Luo Guanzhong, Three Kingdoms: 
a Historical Novel, trans. Moss Roberts (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 
362.) I am not sure that this conveys the right impression. “Psychological struggle” could 
mean destroying an enemy’s morale through terror. In the story, Ma and Zhuge’s strategy 
is focused on demonstrating superiority but giving the enemy no cause to feel aggrieved 
or hard done by. If it is shorn of any connotation of giving aid to a civilian population, 
“winning hearts and minds” seems a more appropriate translation of gongxin 攻心 
(literally “attack the heart-mind”) in this context. 
181 The words Liu Wenhui uses here are exactly the same as Liu Yuetian’s. 
182 Moss Roberts translates this as “divine prestige”, but for our purposes it is important to 
be aware that wei 威 is the same character as used in the expression “the Yi only can only 
be ruled through fear (wei 畏) of force (wei 威) ”. Wei 威 is used in collocations like weili 
威力 “power, might” and weixie  威脅 “threaten, imperil”; as well as in collocations like 
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He did not say “Your Excellency’s great moral virtue (sheng de 盛德) 
ensures that the south will not rebel again.” [Therefore, many believe 
that] the reason that the southerners did not rebel again was the 
chancellor’s great power and prestige, not his great moral virtue. [They 
argue that] Meng Huo’s words demonstrate that the Yi can only be 
ruled through force, and have no love of the good. […] I do not 
completely agree with this interpretation. Why not? Because, in 
general, the nature (tianxing 天性) of all people is the same. As the 
ancients said “in their nature men are alike (xing xiang jin ye 性相近也
)”183. And also “we are not made of wood and straw, nobody is without 
feeling” (ren fei cao mu, shu neng wu qing 人非草木，孰能无情), 
which also indicates the basic similarity of all humans.”184  
 
“We are not made of straw and wood”, is found in Heroes of the Water 
Margin and indicates that although a person is not showing a certain 
emotion, they are nonetheless feeling it as surely as they are not made of 
“wood and straw”.185 The Yi, like their purported ancestor Meng Huo, did 
not always openly acknowledge the virtue of Liu’s government, but they 
knew about it as much as anyone else with flesh and blood. Liu Wenhui’s 
view here was essentially the same as that argued by Wu Guangyao吳光耀
in the 1920s. Wu had been critical of Zhao Erfeng’s ruthlessness, and 
argued that: 
 
The birds, beasts and insects all have a sense of revenge, and the Yi, 
our own kind, how could they not? Focusing on their hearts and minds, 
Zhuge Liang, was able to end the rebellions of the southerners. He was 
a truly great leader (shen ren 神人).186 
 
                                                                                                                       
weixin 威信 “prestige” and weifeng  威風 “air of importance, dignity”. The sentence 
quoted by Liu here is from Luo Guanzhong 罗贯中, San guo yan yi, 376. 
183 This is from the Analects of Confucius (Lun yu 論語), where the full sentence is “In their 
nature men are alike; in their habits they are different (xi xiang yuan ye 习相远也). (Lun 
yu 論語, 17.2) Or in Simon Leys’ translation: “What nature put together, habit separates.” 
The Analects of Confucius, trans. Simon Leys (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 85. 
184 Liu Wenhui, "Ningshu Yi wu wenti zhi jiantao," 4. 
185 Shi Nai'an and Luo Guanzhong, Outlaws of the Marsh, trans. Sidney Shapiro, 3 vols., 
vol. 1 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1980), 263. 
186 Wu Guangyao 吳光耀, "Xizang gailiu ben wei ji 西藏改流本未紀," in Kangqu Zangzu 
shehui zhenxi ziliao jiyao (shang), ed. Zhao Xinyu, Qin Heping, and Wang Chuan 
(Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 2006), 107.  
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According this interpretation, the barbarians had submitted not because 
of the chancellor’s “power and prestige”, but because Zhuge had not given 
them cause to seek revenge and thereby won over their hearts and minds.  
Interestingly, on all sides, there was a recurring comparison between human 
and animal. For Wu, animals and humans (including both Yi and Han) were 
alike, with the implication that the same methods of pedagogy are 
appropriate for all. The hawkish and racist opponents of Wu’s view also 
founded their argument on a comparison with animals, but one in which 
only the Yi were likened to animals, which put Han in a separate “virtue-
cherishing” category. 
Others who pondered the question of whether force or virtue was 
required for governing the Yi were also drawn to Zhuge Liang, though they 
were not always able to make up their minds about the lesson in the history. 
As an author of a 1946 article in a short-lived Guomindang sponsored 
journal focused on Liangshan mused in his opening lines:  
 
If one asks: “For governing the Yi, what are the merits of coercion (wei) 
and virtue (de)?” one could do a lot worse than to recall Zhuge Liang’s 
conquest of the Southern Barbarians and ask for what reason did he 
adopt the “take your enemy seven times, let him go seven times” 
strategy?187 
 
However, this writer, who used the penname “Random Thoughts”, did not 
have a clear answer, other than to say that de was not the same as “giving 
out salt, wine and cloth”, while wei “might mean the killing of some of the 
most wicked villains”. 188 It was elliptical comment that was probably a 
rejoinder to criticisms that de amounted to bribery and wei indiscriminate 
killing. But more than anything, the writer’s words demonstrate both the 
tendency of Republican period officials to foreground the question of ethics 
in government, as well as the trouble that many experienced believing that 
virtuous rule was really the key to resolving the troubles of the frontier.  
 
                                               
187 Xin kou 信口 ['Random Thoughts'], "Wo shuo wo de 我說我的," Daliangshan 大涼山 
1, no. 1 (1946): 22. 
188 Ibid. 
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Tonghua 同化, Assimilation, and Jinhua 進化, Progress   
 
For those who concluded that the Barbarians could only be ruled through 
force, Liu's second transformation, assimilation (tonghua 同化), was of the 
utmost importance. For believers in the de hua cause, who had faith that the 
ethnic other would respond to virtuous rule, the eradication of ethnic 
otherness was not so critical, but it was, nonetheless, not to be neglected. 
However, many leaders were contradictory and unclear about what tonghua 
actually meant. 
In chapter two, I argued that Elliot Sperling's view that Zhao Erfeng 
wished to “sinicize Kham as far as possible” is not a bad general 
summation, though it is important to recognize that Zhao's regulations 
promoted a specific kind of Chinese society. Just as his settlement policy 
differed from Lu Chuanlin's proposals and the system in place in 
Manchuria, Zhao's ideas about the transformation of indigenous society 
were also clearly distinct from later Han leaders in the Sichuan frontier. 
 A formula from the Book of Rites (Li ji 禮記) that has often been quoted 
in discourse on the governing of non-Han people is: “Put their morals and 
manners in order, but do not alter their customs. Regulate their laws and 
government, but do not change their ways of doing things (xiu qi jiao bu 
bian qi su, qi qi zheng bu yi qi yi  修其教不變其俗，齊其政不易其宜).”189 
Clearly there is some amount of ambiguity as to the line between “morals 
and manners” and “customs”, as well as that between “laws” and “ways of 
doing things.” This ambiguity has allowed these lines to be cited by rulers 
as disparate as the Kangxi emperor (in reference to governing Xinjiang) and 
Liu Wenhui (see below).190 Zhao also riffed on the same formulation, but in 
a way that more clearly suggested policy objectives: “Preserve their 
teachings [jiao 教, translated as “morals and manners” above], but change 
                                               
189 See Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 and Kong Yingda 孔穎達, eds., Li ji zheng yi 禮記正義 
(Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe,1990), 246. 
190 Wang Hui 汪晖, Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de xingqi, shang juan, di er bu: diguo yu 
guojia 现代中国思想的兴起，上卷，第二部：帝国与国家 (Beijing: San lian shu dian, 
2008), 541; JKDZ, 75. 
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their government (cun qi jiao yi qi zheng 存其教易其  政)”.191 Moving 
further away from the terms in the Book of Rites, he went on: “eliminate 
their superstition, send in civilization (shu yi wenming 輸以文明 ), 
strengthen their race (qiang qi zhongzu 強其種族).” 
From a later perspective it may seem astounding that Zhao could have 
wanted to “strengthen” the “race” that he spent so much effort fighting, but 
the comment makes sense in light of Zhao’s understanding of the causes of 
the problems on the frontier. The Qing leaders did not have a strong 
conception of non-Han nationalism within their empire. Revolts were the 
work of particular unruly leaders or foreign imperial powers, both of whom 
led poor and poorly educated commoners astray. Rebellion did not signify a 
desire on the part of ordinary people in a particular population to have their 
own nation-state. Zhao's stated goal of “strengthening their race” is also 
consistent the views attributed to him by Fu Songmu in his great tribute to 
Zhao Record of the Establishment of Xikang Province. Fu's work included a 
series of idealized dialogs in which Tibetan people argue with Zhao, 
contesting that their ways of doing things were better than Han ways that 
Zhao required they adopt. In each case, Zhao hears them out and then 
proceeds to demonstrate the correctness of his policies (and by extension 
Han culture) with such logic and clarity that the Tibetans are forced to 
concede they were wrong.192 Zhao's arguments highlight how abandoning 
their customs would be good for the Tibetans. Ending polyandry would 
allow them to increase their population and become militarily stronger.193 
Ending the religious taboo against mining mountains inhabited by spirits 
would mean more gold for “the printing of Buddhist texts, plating statues of 
the Buddha and for head ornaments for your women.” 194  The 
assimilationism of Zhao and Fu was premised above all on the assumption 
that certain Han practices were simply better than Tibetan ones. Adopting 
them would lead to a stronger and more prosperous society (or “race”) that 
                                               
191 QCBD, 2:488.  
192Fu Songmu, Xikang jiansheng ji, 3:25-39. 
193 Ibid., 30-31. 
194 Ibid., 28, 30-31. 
241 
 
would not be vulnerable to foreign scheming and infiltration or 
manipulation by deviant local leaders. 
Liu Wenhui's tonghua was quite different. He construed it as the 
opposite of what he saw as the flawed historical policy of “segregation” 
(fenhua 分化).195 For Zhao, the key problem had been that wrong-headed 
and “superstitious” Tibetan cultural practice prevented the development of a 
prosperous and civilized society. For most Republican period writers, the 
fundamental challenge was the lack of unity between Han and non-Han 
communities, which led to conflict and “mutual enmity”.196 Tonghua was a 
response to the boundary between ethnicities, not the culture on the non-
Han side of the boundary. This is not to say that Liu was entirely 
unconcerned with that culture. To eliminate the boundary, culture would 
have to be changed in some way. Yet it was far from clear exactly what 
kinds of changes were necessary in any given context, or how far they 
would have to go. 
Heather Stoddard sees a direct link between Liu Wenhui’s tonghua and 
the Cultural Revolution: 
 
[Liu Wenhui] estimated that through education “within ten to twenty 
years the people will have forgotten even the names of the minority 
groups.” Liu Wenhui [...] revealed in this bald statement not only the 
continuing intentions of the Chinese for the complete assimilation of 
Tibet from the start of the twentieth century, culminating in the total 
effacement of all specific cultural identity during the Cultural 
Revolution, but also the enormity of the misunderstanding among 
Chinese of non-Chinese people.197 
 
                                               
195  Liu Wenhui, "Jianshe xin Xikang shi jiang," 602. 
196 Wu Liucun 伍柳邨, "Yimin jiancun chuyi -- wei shixian sanhua zhengce er jianyi de yi 
zhong zhidu 移民建村芻議--為實現三化政策而建議的一種制度," Bianzheng yuekan 
邊政月刊 1, no. 4-8 合刊 (1944): 47. 
197 Heather Stoddard, "Tibetan Publications and National Identity," in Resistance and 
Reform in Tibet, ed. Robert Barnett and Shirin Akiner (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1994), 125.  
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Other historians have also attributed the same claim to Liu.198 The idea that 
people would have forgotten even the names of the minority groups within 
twenty years appears to be slightly misattributed. Barnett reported that a 
general in the Twenty Fourth Army (not Liu Wenhui) made this comment to 
him.199 But I have not encountered any primary source directly linking Liu 
himself to this view. Liu’s own comments on assimilation are inconsistent.  
In one instance, discussing the Yi in particular, he did indeed suggest 
that the complete erasure of Yi identity was necessary. “Only when the Yi 
people have become Han people will the Yi problem be completely 
solved.”200 On one occasion in 1945 he also explained the tonghua policy as 
“in the spirit of ‘using Chinese Civilization to transform the barbarian’ 
(yong Xia yi bian Yi 用夏以變夷).”201 However, Liu did not follow Zhao in 
attempting to prohibit practices such as sky burial. In a speech delivered on 
January 1 1939, he had actually criticized the notion of “using Chinese 
Civilization to transform the barbarian”:  
 
Zhao Erfeng exerted himself with great diligence. However he was 
constrained by the notion of ‘using Chinese Civilization to transform 
the barbarian’, and therefore his administration and policy were 
extremist.202 
 
It was in this speech that Liu cited the Book of Rites on governance of the 
ethnic others on China’s edges. As we saw in chapter six, the governors of 
the twentieth century Sichuan frontier often showed a striking lack of 
                                               
198 June Teufel Dreyer, China's Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National 
Integration in the People's Republic of China (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1976), 37.  
199 A. Doak Barnett, China on the Eve of Communist Takeover (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1963), 224. 
200 Liu Wenhui, "Ningshu Yi wu wenti zhi jiantao," 4. 
201 Quoted in Wang Chuan, "Minguo zhong-hou qi de zhengzhi yu zongjiao: Liu Wenhui 
yu Xikang diqu zangquan fojiao jie 民国中后期的政治与宗教：刘文辉与西康地区藏
传佛教界," in Yijiusanling niandai de Zhongguo 一九三 0年代的中国, ed. Zhongguo 
shehui kexue yuan jindaishi yanjiusuo minguo yanjiushi 中国社会科学院近代史研究所
民国研究室 and Sichuan shifan daxue lishi wenhua xueyuan 四川师范大学历史文化学
院 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2006), 805-06. 
202 JKDZ, 75.  
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knowledge concerning historical engagement with the frontiers. Therefore it 
is uncertain whether Liu had any specific previous citation of this 
formulation in mind (like Kangxi on Xinjiang). But even if he did not, the 
quotation still suggests a very different approach from one that aimed for 
the complete erasure of non-Han culture and identity. On another occasion, 
Liu wrote that if “the existing order” was completely overturned, it would 
be “very difficult for the new order to succeed it”.203 Liu’s stated position 
here was in direct contrast to that of Chen Zhongwei, who argued for a 
“development plan [that was] nothing less that the overturning of all the 
elements of the existing social order.”204 The quotes from Liu above were 
perhaps intended for different audiences, or Liu might have held genuinely 
mixed feelings on the matter. It is also possible that he believed that the Yi 
would have to be completely assimilated because they seemed more 
problematic, while Book of Rites style tolerance of difference could apply in 
Kham.  
On some occasions he was perhaps writing for an audience that included 
indigenous leaders, yet a fondness for Tibetan Buddhism was manifest in 
more than just words. From 1938 he funded the establishment of Wuming 五
明 (“Five Sciences”) Buddhist Colleges in several places in Xikang, the 
largest one being the Western Borderlands Buddhism College in 
Dartsedo. 205  The official purpose of these institutions was to “link up 
Tibetan and Han culture; to integrate politics and education/religion in the 
Kham region; to unite the people’s hearts and minds (tuanjie ren xin 團結人
心); and to consolidate the nation’s rear.”206 To further these aims monks 
from monasteries around Kham were given government stipends and travel 
allowances for periods of study. The curriculum was loosely based on a 
classical Tibetan-Indian Buddhist formula, and was taught by lamas who 
used the colleges’ collections of classical Chinese and Tibetan works.  
                                               
203 JKDZ, 52. 
204 Chen Zhongwei, Xikang wenti, 250. 
205 Wang Chuan, "Minguo zhong-hou qi de zhengzhi yu zongjiao," 809.  
206 JKDZ, 322. 
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Ren Naiqiang’s writing on assimilation demonstrated similar 
contradictions. Citing Newton’s Law of Gravity, he formulated a “Law of 
Assimilation”:  
 
Among two races (minzu) their respective powers of assimilation 
(tonghua li 同化力) are directly related to the level of their culture 
(wenhua chengdu 文化程度), and inversely related to their distance from 
each other.207  
 
The discovery of this principle led him to conclude that the people he called 
“Fan”, the indigenes of the east of Kham, would be assimilated by the Han 
within only ten years, and that with the proper civilizing (jiaohua 教化) 
program, this would be as “easy as turning over one’s hand.”208 However, 
there is a degree of mismatch between this blunt statement and many of his 
practical suggestions for bringing about greater unity between the Han and 
the indigenous people. The latter almost all involve the Tibetan-ization of 
the Han, rather than the Han-ization of the Tibetans. He argued that it was 
necessary for administrative personnel to be able to understand local 
languages. 209  To this end, he suggested the establishment of better 
academies where Han people could learn indigenous languages in a more 
comprehensive way than they had in the past. He praised the Shaanxi 
merchants who had created a Chinese-Tibetan phrasebook, and suggested 
that it be published and made available to Han in Xikang.210 One of the 
abilities he listed as being desirable in new settlers was being able to speak 
the Barbarian (yi 夷) languages, or at least being young and clever enough 
to learn them. 211  Another desirable characteristic was having an 
understanding of Buddhism. Furthermore, he suggested that inns in 
Chengdu should serve Tibetan food and butter tea and have Tibetan-Chinese 
                                               
207 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 234. 
208 Ibid., 221-22. 
209 Ibid., 224. 
210 Ibid., 229. 
211 Ibid., 296. 
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interpretation services in order to encourage more Khampa and central 
Tibetan merchants to visit the Interior.212 
The question of whether assimilation (tonghua) was the same thing as 
Han-ization (Hanhua 漢化) was rarely addressed directly, yet it is clear that 
there was a great deal of uncertainty on this matter as well. On the one hand, 
Han-ization was exactly what some observers prescribed. Wu Luzhong 
wrote: 
 
In our view, the key to solving the Yi problem is the elimination of the 
differences between the Yi and the Han, which is to say that the 
complete Han-ization of the Yi and the abolition of the Yi territories is 
required. On this point there can be no disagreement.213 
 
On the other hand, as we have seen, some critics argued that the Han-
ization being spread by the “criminals” and men with “undesirable social 
habits” whom they believed constituted the bulk of migrants to the 
highlands was nothing more than “the spread of vulgar attitudes of 
marketplace.” If this was the case, the project to reshape indigenous culture 
had to aim a little higher than Han-ization. Perhaps this was the reason that 
Chen Zhongwei conceptualized the transformation of indigenous society as 
the use of “civilization”, rather than “Chinese culture” (Xia 夏) to overthrow 
“barbarism” (yi wenhua hua yeman 以文化化野蠻 ). 214  Chen was 
extraordinarily dismissive of indigenous culture, but almost equally 
impressed with the need to reform Han society. He was a democrat after the 
fashion of Sun Yat-sen, and called for the abolition of the death penalty, the 
emancipation of women, universal free education and health care, and an 
eight-hour day.215  
The connection (or lack thereof) between Han-ization and assimilation 
had practical importance for education policy. Most officials believed that 
non-Han people should attend government-sponsored schools of some form. 
                                               
212 Ibid., 232-33. 
213 Wu Luzhong ""Yi wu wenti" lungang," 70. 
214 Chen Zhongwei, Xikang wenti, 251. 
215 Ibid., 304-05. 
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But whether they should be educated in the same schools as Han Chinese, 
and what status should be accorded to Chinese and indigenous languages 
were matters of debate. Some officials believed—in the tradition of Zhao 
Erfeng—that education should be entirely in Chinese.216 Others advocated 
“Chinese content with Tibetan explanations”; while another group argued 
for full bilingualism. Ren Naiqiang suggested that proposed schools for the 
sons of headmen should teach Chinese language, but that other subjects 
should be in Tibetan. 217  Concerning education in the Yi areas, Huang 
Yanpei considered it vital for teachers to be able to speak local languages, 
and argued that there should indeed be separate schools for Yi and Han 
students, because “their knowledge and habits are all different.”218 
Other commentary that tried to fill out what assimilation and an 
assimilation policy would mean in practice referred to the American ideal of 
a melting pot, from which a “new nationality” (xin minzu 新民族) had 
emerged.219 It was perhaps in this vein that several writers argued for the 
government to adopt measures to encourage intermarriage between Han and 
non-Han.220  In chapter two we saw that Zhao Erfeng gave extra rations to 
soldiers who married Tibetan women. It is unclear whether he did this 
because he wished to encourage intermarriage for assimilationist reasons, or 
because he believed that soldiers who settled down and started families 
could eventually become less dependent on the state for food and wages. 
The Republican period writers who advocated measures to encourage 
intermarriage had unambiguously assimilationist motives. It would 
                                               
216 JKDZ, 394.  
217 Ren Naiqiang, Xikang tujing: minsu pian, 233. 
218 CKSB, 173.  
219 Liu Yuanxuan 劉元瑄, "San hua zhengce yu san min zhuyi 三化政策與三民主義," 
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220  Huang Shuyu 黃樹玉, "Jianshe Xikang ying cezhong Ningshu 建設康西康應側重甯屬
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“eliminate the racial barriers (zhongzu gehe 種族隔閡 ) and create 
harmonious emotional bonds between the Han and Yi.”221 As noted above, 
such proposals conflicted with Chen Zhongwei's idea that Han migrants to 
the frontier should be accompanied by wives from the interior. Biological 
mixing and melting pots might have fostered inter-ethnic ties, but they 
clashed with common notions about what was necessary to maintain good 
order. As far as I am aware, no frontier government in the Republican 
period actually adopted any policy to encourage intermarriage. 
  
Liu Wenhui's third transformation was jinhua 進化, “progress”, which 
he posed against what was, in his interpretation, the historical policy of jimi 
羈縻 , “loose rein governance”. 222  Thus Liu’s idea of jinhua did not 
specifically emphasize the development of infrastructure, which, as we shall 
see below, has often dominated later discussions of progress and modernity. 
Liu’s government built roads and an airstrip at Kangding, but jinhua was 
more than this. If de hua was aimed at the Han authorities, tonghua at the 
boundary between Han and non-Han, then jinhua focused on indigenous 
society, calling for authorities to adopt an interventionist, rather than a 
laissez-faire approach. “A jinhua policy aims to set them in ‘motion’ (qiu qi 
‘dong’ 求其‘動’), while a jimi policy aims to keep them ‘static’ (qiu qi 
‘jing’ 求其‘靜’)”.223  At this point, Liu raised the worry that does not 
seem to have occurred to Zhao when he argued for “strengthening” the 
Tibetan “race”. “It is possible,” Liu wrote “that some people will think that, 
from a Han perspective, the progress of the border people brings certain 
dangers, and that the maintenance of jimi policies would be more stable.”224 
He countered this with a rather perfunctory and obliquely argued point 
about uneducated people not knowing what was good for them. The border 
would be more stable if its ignorant residents were educated enough to 
                                               
221 Huang Shuyu, "Jianshe Xikang ying cezhong Ningshu," 165. 
222 Liu Wenhui, "Jianshe xin Xikang shi jiang," 605. 
223 Ibid., 606. 
224 Ibid. 
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know what was in their best interests. It was here Liu came closest to Zhao 
Erfeng’s paternalism. Yet jinhua was the last and least developed of the 
three hua. Liu did not identify specific elements of indigenous culture that 
would have to go or follow up with a raft of interventionist policy and 
legislation for their replacement with Han customs. 
“Assimilation” and “progress” were powerful concepts in early 
twentieth century Chinese thinking regarding non-Han territory and people. 
But they were ill-defined, and what they would mean in practice was usually 
unclear. Different writers conceptualized them in different and often 
contradictory ways. Proposed policy steps for encouraging “assimilation” 
ranged from offering rewards for inter-marriage to publishing phrase-books 
for Han to learn local languages; from forcing the indigenous people to 
attend Chinese schools, to the establishment of government-funded 
monastic education institutions which would use Tibetan classics in 
instruction. In an important speech on Kham, Liu cited the famous call in 
Book of Rites for frontier leaders not to “alter the customs” of the people 
they ruled, but elsewhere he argued for the vanishing of Yi identity.  
 
 
Xikang in the Late Twentieth and Early Twenty First Century.  
 
The following discussion searches for echoes of Republican period 
discourse in the post-Mao era, returning to each of the themes analyzed 
above to investigate the extent of intellectual continuity and change over the 
second half of the twentieth century. Scholars investigating historical 
Chinese engagement with the south-western highlands often start or finish 
their work with references to present-day resonances of the key themes of 
t heir  subject  mat t er .  Wang Xiuyu conc ludes his t hes is with:  
 
The call of the present government for the “great development of the 
west” (xibu dakaifai 西部大开发) is a call, historically speaking, for 
implementing the late Qing vision with greater intensity.225 
                                               
225 Wang Xiuyu, "China's Last Imperial Frontier," 369; See also: Liu Xiangxiu 刘祥秀 and 
Guo Pingruo 郭平若, "Qing mo tun ken zhengce zai Chuanbian Zang qu de shishi ji dui 
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Nor is it uncommon for officials and institutions working on projects under 
the auspices of the Xibu dakaifa to note the importance of historical 
antecedents of the policy. In 2000, the Sichuan provincial government, the 
Chengdu city authorities and Sichuan University jointly established a 
Western Development Research Centre (Xibu kaifa yanjiu yuan 西部开发
研究院) to do research relating to the Xibu dakaifa policies. An historian, 
He Yimin 何一民 from Sichuan University, was appointed to be the vice-
director of the center, and has subsequently written about development 
policy in the Tibetan regions in the early twentieth century.226  
Continuities between past and present are widely perceived as important 
and relevant, but they have not been examined in detail. This leaves 
comparisons between then and now as little more than garnish for 
introductions and conclusions, despite their widely acknowledged 
significance. Which were the truly enduring ideas of the early twentieth 
century? Which ideas have dissipated? And which have persisted, but 
undergone considerable change?  
 
The Republican period produced dualistic representations of settlers and 
exactly the same duality has been present in later eras when political 
migration returned to the national developmental agenda. The pioneers of 
the Mao era were the zhiqing 知青 , the educated youth who either 
volunteered for or were sent to positions in countryside during the late 
1960s and 1970s. The zhiqing did not only go to frontier regions, but the 
most powerful and enduring representations of them have been set in places 
on the nation’s periphery. Such narratives therefore act as vectors for the 
representation of engagement with frontiers, as well as of the zhiqing. 
                                                                                                                       
huanjing de yingxiang 清末屯垦政策在川边藏区的实施及其对环境的影响," Xizang 
yanjiu 西藏研究, no. 2 (2007): 16. 
226 He Yimin 何一民, "20 shji chu nian Chuanbian Zangqu zhengzhi jingji wenhua gaige 
shulun 20世纪初年川边藏区政治经济文化改革述论," Xinan minzu xueyuan xuebao 西
南民族学院学报（哲学社会科学版）22, no. 6 (2001). He’s main area of interest as an 
historian, however, is the development of Chinese cities. 
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Liyan Qin has given an insightful analysis of two contrasting 
constructions of the zhiqing, as manifest in Wang Xiaobo’s 王小波 (1952-
1997) Golden Age 黄金时代  and Liang Xiaosheng’s 梁晓声  (1949-) 
Snowstorm Tonight 今夜有暴风.227 Liang Xiaosheng’s novel is a narrative 
about heroes, while Wang Xiaobo’s is the tale of a hooligan. The former is 
dominated by the ideology and aesthetics of the sublime. The characters are 
“obsessed with transcending the human, not only in speech and feeling but 
also in action.” 228 The protagonist of the novel sacrifices herself to the 
ideals of the sent-down youth, is impeccably virtuous and remains chaste 
throughout her love affair. In Golden Age, however, the protagonist attempts 
to escape politics. His main goal is sex, and he is attracted to the lifestyles of 
the ‘noble savages’ who live in the mountains of Yunnan where he has been 
sent. 
The same modes of representation exist among memoirs of zhiqing life 
in the Sichuan frontier. An article titled “Old Zhiqing, Old Photos, Old 
Stories” first published in the Liangshan Daily 凉山日报  and later 
republished on several websites, bears many similarities to Snowstorm 
Tonight.  
 
All sorts of feelings and memories welled up in Wang Shaocheng’s 
mind: There were tears and blood, but it was that tumultuous time that 
forged our strong will. The common people are really something! […] 
In most cases, after the zhiqing returned to the city, they kept struggling 
just as they had in the countryside.229 
 
                                               
227 Liyan Qin, "The Sublime and the Profane: A Comparative Analysis of Two Fictional 
Narratives about Sent-down Youth," in The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History, ed. 
Joseph W. Esherick, Paul G. Pickowicz, and Andrew G. Walder (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press 2006), 240-66. 
228 Ibid., 241. 
229 Originally from Liangshan Daily, [original date of publication not given]. Reposted on 
the Liangshan TV site, apparently hosted by Sichuan TV: http://www.zgls.com.cn/ and 
also www.newssc.org. Also on Sichuan Zhiqing Wang 知青网 at 
http://sichuan.bbs1.kwbbs.com/ShowPost.aspx?topicid=571929&ForumID=127545&For
umIndex=1 
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A very different account of zhiqing life in Xichang was written and 
posted on the Internet by someone using the pen-name Chengdu Tanbeng.230 
According to his account, the young Chengdunese in Liangshan were subject 
to a violent and arbitrary but also somewhat loose management regime. 
Youths had a degree of freedom to travel around, and to meet and fight with 
locals and other rusticated youth. On fighting, Tanbengzi comments 
“Liangshan blokes (hao han 好汉); if you haven’t fought, you don’t really 
know each other.” The narrative is replete with kung-fu novel inflected 
description and lines such as: “The ancients say: ‘there is also honour among 
thieves.’ In the world of wanderers, you can’t control your fate.” (ren zai 
jianghu shen bu you ji 人在江湖身不由己).” For the writer, 1970s Xichang 
becomes a kind of semi-mythological wuxia 武侠setting where “in those 
years friendship was really strong.” Ties of comradeship were tight, but 
enmity among foes was correspondingly intense. While Tanbengzi’s account 
of his own friends is highly positive, he portrays zhiqing society as 
dominated by clannishness, theft and group violence. The other rusticated 
youths are much more like the hooligans in Golden Age than the heroes of 
Liang Xiaosheng’s novels or the strugglers in the Liangshan Daily article. 
The two conflicting modes for representing zhiqing life in the frontier 
strongly resemble the Republican era’s twin visions of settler society. There 
is the idea of bold pioneers on a mission of national importance, willing to 
tough it out in a harsh landscape in order to bring about revolutionary 
transformation. This is balanced by a narrative in which the pioneers are 
really hooligans, thriving in a frontier chaos. Granted, the hooliganism of 
the zhiqing is not quite the same as the hooliganism of the “dregs of Han 
society” who aroused disappointment and ire in Xikang officials. Chengdu 
Tanbengzi and Wang Xiaobo give a more positive impression of a wild, 
rough-and-tumble frontier lifestyle than Ren Naiqiang or the county 
magistrates in 1930s Kham did. But they are accounts that come from 
different perspectives. If the hooligans of the 1930s had written narratives 
                                               
230 Chengdu Tanbengzi 成都弹绷子, "Chongfan Daliangshan 重返大凉山", Chengdu 
Tanbengzi Tianya blog 天涯博客, 
http://blog.tianya.cn/blogger/view_blog.asp?idWriter=0&Key=0&BlogName=cdtanbengzi
&CategoryID=283408&page=3&b=1&r=3&nextid=88888888 [accessed 18 May 2011]. 
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perhaps they would have added some element of counter-cultural wuxia 
romanticism as well. 
 
The Chinese Communist Party was part of the same revolutionary 
tradition as the Guomindang and Liu Wenhui, which saw frontier problems 
as the result of immoral governance. Socialist narratives of the history of the 
frontier region have almost always contained a sentence such as the 
following one, from Welcome to Da Liangshan (Zoujin Daliangshang 走进
大凉山 ): “The ethnic discrimination and oppression of minority ethnic 
groups implemented by historical dynasties and the Guomindang ruling 
clique led to profound ethnic barriers.”231 Similarly, a recent article on the 
Long March’s passage through the region states: 
 
The reactionary Guomindang pursued policies of Han Chauvinism (da-
Han zhuyi 大汉主义 ), and did their utmost to oppress our Yi 
compatriots. This led to the development of formidable barriers 
between ethnic groups and intense ethnic conflict.232  
 
Yet now that the Party no longer sees political transformation as the key 
to the further progress of the Chinese nation, the de hua story of history in 
which change was brought by a revolution in politics has also lost ground. 
A recently published book of photographs from Republican era Kham, 
1939: Images of Xikang (1939 nian: zoujin Xikang 走进西康 ), almost 
entirely omits political transformation from its account of frontier history. 
The Long March did not foreshadow the end of “reactionary Guomindang” 
rule; it was merely “a moment’s palpitation” within the timeless existence 
of the ancient village.233 Liu Wenhui is almost monastic-ised. The editor 
writes euphemistically that: “We should say that Liu Wenhui used some 
                                               
231 Xiong Junsong 熊峻松, ed., Zoujin Daliangshan 走进大凉山 (Chengdu: Sichuan minzu 
chubanshe, 2003), 61. 
232 Chen Guoguang 陈国光, ""Yihai jiemeng" de lishi chengji ji xianshi yiyi “彝海结盟”的
历史成绩及现实意义," Zhongyang minzu daxue xuebao 中央民族大学学报 32, no. 6 
(2005): 24. 
233 Zhang Ming 张鸣 and Sun Mingjing 孙明经, 1939 nian: zoujin Xikang 1939年：走进
西康 (Jinan: Shandong huabao chubanshe, 2003), 23. 
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amount of force (haishi yongguo yixie li 还是用过一些力 ) in the 
construction of Xikang during his decades in power.”234 Nevertheless, the 
caption to his photo (below) makes his time in region seem like a hermitic 
retreat:  
 
The expression he assumes shows grace, dignity and poise (yongrong 
雍容); the aggressiveness and drive (ruiqi 锐气) of the years he spent 
seeking to dominate Sichuan has already disappeared.235  
 
 
 
Liu Wenhui at 44. Photo by Sun Mingjing.236 
 
The 1912 conflict between Sichuan governor Yin Changheng and the 
Lhasa government is present only through a poem written by Yin. The 
editors comment that the poem is “More than a little heroic, even if the use 
of ‘barbarian’ [man 蛮] to refer to the Tibetans, which reflects the Han 
                                               
234 Ibid., 64. 
235 Ibid., 65. 
236 Ibid., 65. 
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Chauvinism of the time, is not really appropriate.” 237  Poetic “Han 
Chauvinism” seems to be the most controversial thing that Yin did. Of Zhao 
Erfeng, they write “the reputation of this General, who gained infamy for 
his actions against the Railway Protection movement, was not so bad in the 
Kham frontier.”238 He may have been “not so bad”, but it appears that there 
was nothing particularly remarkable about him either. In general, the book 
portrays late Qing and Republican period Xikang as a tough but benign 
backwater; a sleepy and largely neglected place characterized by distance 
from the kind of revolutionary transformation that was taking place in the 
rest of China.  
 
 
In discourse that diminishes the role of political change in history, it is 
most often the notion of “modernity” (xiandai 现代) that takes over as the 
key rubric for understanding historical change. However, among post-Mao 
historical narratives there are at least two different ways of interpreting the 
nature and causes of modernization, both of which are distinct from Liu 
Wenhui’s jinhua.  
In 2007, a documentary series about the construction of the Chengdu-
Kunming railway aired on Chinese national state television. 239 It seems 
likely that its production had something to do with the 2006 completion of 
another challenging railway in a non-Han territory with a history of unrest: 
the line from Golmud to Lhasa. This connection might explain why the 
documentaries portray the Chengdu-Kunming railway as the sole catalyst 
for all change in Liangshan: a “fifty-year leap into modernity”. The railway 
really did foster greater connections between Liangshan and the outside 
world. But the documentary promotes the notion that before the railway 
such connections did not exist at all. The Yi people are reported to have 
                                               
237 Ibid.  
238 Ibid., 219. 
239 Zhongguo zhongyang dianshitai 中国中央电视台, "Guo shan che: Cheng Kun tielu, 
Zhongguo tielu xiujian de qiji 国山车：成昆铁路，中国铁路修建的奇迹," (China: 
Zhongguo guoji dianshi zonggongsi, 2007). 
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never heard of “China”. One surveyor comments: “They asked all sorts of 
strange questions, like ‘is this place here bigger or is China bigger?’” This is 
suspiciously close to the words attributed to King Yelang 夜郎 in the fable 
from Records of the Grand Historian (Shi ji 史記) about the southern 
Barbarians whose ignorance of the size of the Han empire has literally 
become a by-word for naive self-importance (“yelang zida 夜郎自大”).240 
Some Yi in Liangshan no doubt were ignorant of the broader national 
context. But the documentary makes no mention of the Democratic Reforms 
(Minzhu gaige 民主改革 ): the radical program to restructure of old 
Liangshan society and politics that was launched in 1956.  During that 
movement, some 65 percent of commoners (laodong renmin 劳动人民) in 
Liangshan were reckoned to have been “fully mobilized” (fadong chongfen 
发动充分) and a further 25 percent “relatively mobilized”.241   
Given that political transformation and virtue (de 德) are nonentities in 
the narrative presented by the railway documentary, the question of whether 
or not the Yi cherish virtue does not occur. But here it is not force (wei 威), 
but modern infrastructure that is necessary for ruling the Yi, as the comment 
of one surveyor demonstrates.  
 
When the train pulled into the station, an old Yi grandma kneeled down 
by the tracks. ‘The shenxian’s here’ she said, because the front engine 
was draped in flags, and on the front was Chairman Mao’s image. 
 
Political power is evident, but in this case it is (literally) tied to and 
legitimized by the creation of physical infrastructure, not certain 
conceptions of morality. It is the government’s capacity to deploy industrial 
machinery that inspires loyalty from the Yi. According to the documentary 
the construction of the railway led the Yi to sing a folk-song with the refrain 
“thank you, big brother”. Having thus won over the natives, the train sparks 
the great transformation of Yi society; in the same way that virtuous rule 
does in the de hua narrative.  
                                               
240 Sima Qian 司馬遷, Shi ji 史記 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987), 2996. 
241 Xiong Junsong, ed., Zoujin Daliangshan, 68.  
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In the case of other cultural productions, de hua remains evident but is 
combined with infrastructural-modernity in ways that suggest that the latter 
might be much more significant than the former. Figure one below shows a 
painting by one of China’s most successful artists, Wang Weizheng 王为政 
(1944—), of the “Yihai Alliance” (Yihai jiemeng 彝海结盟 ); a pact 
between the Long Marchers and an Yi chieftain. 242  
The work was part of a 2005 project organized by the China Painting 
and Calligraphy News (Zhongguo shuhua bao 中 国 书 画 报 ) to 
commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the Long March. The whole 
series went into space on board the Shenzhou 6 spacecraft, and was sold at 
auction after its return to earth to raise money for schools along the route of 
the Long March. On its own, the painting suggests the continuing 
importance of the idea of an historical moral transformation of politics. It 
conveys the orthodox vision of enlightened, post-de hua form politics and 
society: a social order characterized by a fastidious commitment to equality 
between Han and non-Han, and a chummy closeness between ruler and 
subject. Moreover, its creator is a serious, independent and highly respected 
artist, not an anonymous producer of propaganda.  
 
 
 
                                               
242 Biographical information from Beijing Fine Arts Academy website: 
http://www.bjaa.com.cn/my/81/2008_12_26/1_81_2542_0_0_1230268432816.html# 
(accessed 2 August 2010). 
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Wang Weizheng’s painting “The Yihai Alliance”, from Wang Weizheng’s 
website. 243 
 
Media constructions of the events surrounding the paintings, however, 
suggested an ambivalence about the importance of the paintings’ subject 
matter. News articles made much of the Long March theme, but treated it 
quite differently from the article quoted on page 252, which castigated the 
immoral rule of the Guomindang. In reporting on the space-paintings, the 
Long March has no moral dimension. What mattered was its “spirit of 
optimism” (leguan zhuyi jingshen 乐观主义精神 ) and “heroic will” 
(yingxiong qi 英雄气).244    
Other contemporary narratives also downplay the historical importance 
of a transformation in politics in favour of model of change that could be 
called “modernization”. In the following cases, however, physical 
infrastructure and new technology like the Chengdu-Kunming railway or 
Shengzhou 6 is not at the core of the authors’ conception of modernization. 
Instead, modernization means a new kind of economy. 
One work that presents this view is a novel called Chen’ai luoding 尘埃
落定 (“When the Dust Settles”) by Alai 阿来 (1959-), a Tibetan writer who 
mostly writes in Chinese.245 The novel is told from the perspective of the 
‘wise-idiot’ son of a tusi family in Republican period Kham. The book is 
replete with prophecies and images that suggest the total destruction and 
remaking of the characters’ world. “Who would come after the chieftains? I 
couldn't see that; what I did see was the chieftains’ estates crumbling to 
                                               
243 Painting taken from Wang Weizheng’s website: 
http://wangweizheng.artron.net/main.php?pFlag=exhibi&aid=A0005885 (accessed 2 
August 2010).   
244 Bobao yishu wang 博宝艺术网, ""Fei tian di yi tu" Changzheng wanli tu 18 ri zai 
Chengdu paimai “飞天第一图”《长征万里图》18日在成都拍卖 "  
http://news.artxun.com/bimo-483-2414565.shtml. (accessed 2 Aug. 10). 
245 “When the Dust Settles” is my translation of the Chinese title. The novel has been 
translated into English by Howard Goldblatt and Sylvia Li-chun Lin with the title Red 
Poppies.  
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dust, leaving nothing behind after the dust settled.”246 This appears to be a 
good thing. The world of the chieftains’ estates, as imagined by the novel, is 
a nasty one, where torture and other forms of abuse are commonplace. 
However, the real force behind the coming transformation is not a political 
revolution but the transition to a market economy. 
Guomindang and Communist soldiers make brief appearances in the 
story for apparently no other reason than to give a token nod to the idea of 
change through political revolution. The “White Han” play their part by 
looking down on the Tibetans and inciting ethnic conflict. The “Red Han”, a 
righteous “army of the poor” appear destined for something more positive 
and substantial, though there are hints that they may not be entirely good 
news either. 247 “And if the Red Han won the civil war, I heard that they 
wanted even more to stain every piece of land in that colour they 
revered.”248 The omens are not too ill though. Whatever the coloured Han 
armies do, they will only be a temporary curtain-raiser for what the book 
suggests is the main historical transformation to come: the development of 
the open, market economy. A large part of the book focuses on the 
protagonist’s establishment of a marketplace on the border of his father’s 
territory. When his puzzled, commercially illiterate father asks him what it 
is, the narrator responds: 
 
I told [my father] that the border town was not his summer palace, that 
it belonged to a future no one could see clearly. In that future all the 
estates would be gone and this would be a new place, one that would 
grow bigger and more beautiful, belonging to an age without 
chieftains.249  
 
Despite a brief acknowledgement of the political revolution, Alai is telling 
his readers that the true revolutionary force is the marketplace. 
                                               
246 Alai, Red Poppies, trans. Howard Goldblatt and Sylvia Li-chun Lin (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 2002), 373-74. 
247 Ibid., 411-12, 28. 
248 Ibid., 392. 
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A 2006 article on Danba in the Chinese National Geographic 
(Zhongguo guojia dili 中国国家地理) by journalist Yu Jian 于坚 is similar. 
Like Alai’s Kham, Yu’s Danba is on the cusp of a great transformation that 
is economic rather than political in nature. Writing about Danba in 2006 and 
promoting the same thesis, Yu has the choice of either dealing with the 
political revolution and then proposing that economic change has been (or 
will be) more significant, or ignoring political change completely. He opts 
for the latter approach. “As far as every historical modernization movement 
went, the Southwest native region was either too late or completely missed 
out.”250  The reader gets the impression that the “old world” (gu dai 古代) 
persisted throughout the twentieth century.  
 
Only at the very end of the twentieth century, when modernization had 
already become the mainstream of the nation’s life, and the diversity of 
the Chinese traditional world was steadily disappearing under the 
standardization of modernism, did people suddenly discover that in a 
few places in China’s west, always considered backwards and isolated, 
the spirit, life and culture of the old world had still preserved some of 
its startling innocence, richness and simplicity.251   
 
Without the political revolution of socialism, there is only the 
commercial revolution prophesied by Alai. For Yu this great transformation 
is led by tourism and threatens to occur only at “the very end of the 
twentieth century”. In contrast to Alai, who views the coming 
transformation as essentially a good thing, Yu is more circumspect. He 
worries about the potential impact of modernization on traditional Tibetan 
life, and muses that 'backwardness’ does not have to be a negative thing.252 
A Han writer like Yu might have more freedom to wonder about the 
drawbacks of transformation than Tibetans like Alai. Alternatively, Alai, 
who is also editor of the Chengdu-based Science Fiction World (Kehuan 
                                               
250 Yu Jian 于坚, "Danba: Hengduan shan zhong de lishi huohuashi 丹巴：横断山中的历
史活化石," Zhongguo guojia dili 中国国家地理, Dec. 2006, 141. 
251 Ibid., 140-41. 
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shijie 科幻世界) magazine, is perhaps genuinely less attached to romantic 
vision of vanishing simplicity-and-spirituality.   
 
In the Communist era, the terms “tonghua” and “Hanhua” used in 
reference to the minorities became somewhat politically incorrect, though 
they continue to be used in unofficial discourse. One of the most common 
terms replacing them in formal language is ronghe融合  (melding, 
integration), which signals more of a gradual, benign “melting pot” idea 
(though policy created to achieve this aim was not necessarily more benign). 
Rather than change wrought by bold, patriotic leaders and pioneers, the term 
suggests an impersonal process, in which politics is hidden. Ronghe is a key 
concept in Images of Xikang, and is virtually the only form of historical 
transformation depicted by the book. “Ronghe” occurs throughout the text in 
instances like the following comment on a picture of a Provincial Tibetan 
Primary School: “[The students] are all wearing long Chinese gowns, which 
one could see as an example of the ronghe of Tibetan and Han peoples.”253 
To their credit, the editors recognize that ronghe also involved the Kham-
ization of Han people as well.254  
However, while this book demonstrates the power of the idea of 
“melding” in the present day, many other contemporary representations of 
minority and ethnically-mixed communities are eager to qualify 
acculturation, and stress that, despite appearances, cross-cultural influence 
has been rather limited. Yu Jian writes:  “Even people in the most remote 
valleys can communicate in Chinese, but this has definitely not influenced 
the Bon faith that is the original religion of these mountains.” 255  Yu 
qualifies the effects of inter-ethnic relationships in the same way: “in terms 
of the blood (xueyuan 血缘) of its people, this region was one of the most 
mixed (hunza 混杂) in China, but also the most pure (chuncui 纯粹).”256 
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This ostensibly meaningless statement suggests a need to see past ronghe 
and envisage non-Han communities as existing in some kind of pure form, 
uninfluenced by the outside world. This amounts to a strong denial of the 
historical significance of ronghe.   
A couple of related factors are responsible for this. Firstly, whatever one 
calls it, the cultural integration of non-Han and Han is easily the most 
controversial form of frontier transformation. Minority elites, who had been 
nurtured in the nation’s Minzu (Nationality) universities since the 1950s, 
have been active in resisting the notion that their people should or will 
inevitably assimilate into the Han majority. As Stevan Harrell and Li 
Yongxiang note: “[minority historians] are, in a very political sense, writing 
culture against culture, constructing a new version of China in which they 
are no longer just the bit players or the afterthoughts.”257 Discussing what 
he calls the New Yi History (or the Yi Culture School), Harrell observes 
that: “the greatest motivator is cultural and ethnic pride”; its aim is to say: 
“Enough of insults, enough of relegation to the sidelines and the footnotes; 
for themselves at least and for anyone else who will listen, the Yi will assert 
their worth.”258  
In the southwest, many minority communities have become significantly 
involved with tourism. This certainly includes Danba, named by the Chinese 
National Geographic, as one of the “six most beautiful old townships (gu 
zhen 古镇)” in China. As Tim Oakes has observed in Guizhou, minority 
villages that become tourist destinations often downplay or discourage signs 
of Han influence in order to satisfy tourists that they are, indeed, the 
authentic repositories of the mysterious minority cultures that tourists 
expect. One villager commented in an interview with Oakes that:  
 
We wear our traditional Miao clothes, the embroidery, the long robes. 
We don’t wear Han clothes when receiving guests. All the clothes are 
hand made, hand dyed; we grow the cotton ourselves, spin the thread. 
We build these traditional houses. […] All the foreigners who come are 
happy, they like our clothing very much. I know. They tell me. We play 
                                               
257 Stevan Harrell and Yongxiang Li, "The History of the Yi, Part II," Modern China 29, 
no. 3 (2003): 364.  
258 Ibid.: 385-86.  
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the lusheng; the Han play the erhu. We use different rhythms and 
sounds with our drumming than the Han, different dances. It’s our 
tradition; we’ve always been different from the Han. […] We’re the 
true Miao (women zhen Miao 我们真苗)” he said. “We don’t celebrate 
Spring Festival or any other Han festival. Zhouxi has its lusheng 
meeting during Spring Festival because they’re not true Miao; they’ve 
been Hanified (Hanhuale 汉化了). Here, we only celebrate true Miao 
festivals, such as chixinjie, popojie, Miaonian, and jizujie, the grandest 
of them all.259 
 
In the mindset of a tourist desiring to experience minority culture, the 
less the group in question has been influenced by Han culture, the more 
‘authentic’ they are. The speaker above specifically mentions foreign 
tourists, but Chinese tourists also expect a slice of Otherness, unmodified (at 
least in certain superficial ways) by the culture they left at home. For such 
communities there is a commercial motivation for people to neglect 
histories of contact and integration, and focus instead on timeless traditions 
and civilizational essences.  
Finally, the state itself has moved away from the idea that identity is 
flexible. Discussion of cultural change and the notion of increasing Han 
influence on the minorities are still very much alive. But official discourse 
no longer believes in the possibility of a person changing ethnic identities, 
or that there is such a thing as mixed identity. Ren Naiqiang’s “Creole” 
hunzazu 混雜族  category has no equivalent in contemporary official 
research, or much traction within popular culture either. 260  Nor do the 
notions of “cooked” (shu 熟 ) and “raw” (sheng 生 ) ethnic-other. 
Imperialistic though these categories were, they conveyed the idea that 
identity is flexible, and that people may be orientated at a certain point 
along a spectrum (in this case Han/civilized to non-Han/uncivilized), rather 
than in mutually exclusive blocs (like Han or Tibetan).  
 
 
 
                                               
259 Tim Oakes, Tourism and Modernity in China (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 
200-01.  
260 Ren Naiqiang, "Kangding xian shicha baogao," 262. 
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Conclusion  
 
This chapter has examined the twentieth century life of certain key ideas 
about change in frontier society, and in a couple of cases their death as well. 
We have seen that throughout the century, the politicized settler has been an 
important topic of discourse, and has been surrounded by the recurring 
patterns of representation. According to many representations, the zhiqing of 
the Mao era lived the dream of Republican era leaders who called for a 
generation of tough, capable and patriotic pioneers. But throughout the 
twentieth century there has also been considerable suspicion directed at 
migrants. In addition to being the heroes who tamed the frontier wilderness, 
they have been seen as the trouble-makers who made the frontier wild. In 
the revolutionary political traditions, no lesser volume of suspicion has been 
directed at frontier governors. Liu Wenhui, the Guomindang and the 
Communist party all blamed Han misrule for frontier conflict, and called for 
a moral reformation of government that would inspire virtue and loyalty 
from the population. The idea of de hua has remained important in some 
narratives of history. But with the end of the revolution, or more accurately, 
the rise of non-revolutionary politics, narratives of history have tended to 
downplay or completely omit the story of a great political transition. Instead 
they have focused on some species of modernization—either techno-
infrastructural or economic—as the key driver of change in the highlands.  
The most controversial form of change has been the “assimilation”, or in 
milder, more politically correct language, the “melding” of ethnic groups. 
Yet whatever term is used, leaders have found it difficult to articulate a clear 
conceptualization of what this would really mean. Zhao Erfeng, who did not 
use the term tonghua very much, attempted to make the Tibetans adopt 
certain aspects of Han culture, primarily because he believed in the 
superiority of those cultural practices. By adopting them, Tibetan society 
would be stronger, richer, less susceptible to foreign imperialism and more 
able to support the superior form of administration that Zhao wanted to 
establish. For Liu Wenhui, assimilation was, in the first order, a response to 
the problem of a division between Han and non-Han that created conflict, 
rather than a response to the backwardness of non-Han culture. To a certain 
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extent Liu’s idea of “progress”, jin hua, echoed Zhao Erfeng’s cultural 
policies, though it was the least clearly articulated of all Liu’s “three 
transformations”. This is not to say that Liu was always an altogether milder 
and more tolerant leader than Zhao. The Yi (if not the Tibetans) would have 
to give up being Yi in order for the conflict between Yi and Han to end 
completely. Like the idea of a moral transformation of politics, the notion of 
ethnic integration is to this day at the heart of some understandings of what 
has happened in recent history. Yet in others it is only just about to happen; 
or, indeed, may never occur. 
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Conclusion 
 
  
To tie together the arguments presented in the chapters of this thesis, I pose 
several broad questions about the nature and causes of transformation in the 
Sichuan frontier. Firstly, in what sense did Zhao Erfeng and Liu Wenhui 
aim to sinicize the highlands? Secondly, in what ways and to what extent 
did parts of Kham and Liangshan become more similar to other parts of 
China in the first half of the twentieth century? Thirdly, to what extent was 
the environment a key factor that shaped the course of events? Fourthly 
when were the key moments of transition; and, fifthly, what factors best 
explain them? 
 
 
Chinese Highlands? 
 
The photographer Zhuang Xueben 庄學本  (1909-1984), who is justly 
famous for the photos he took in the Xikang region in the 1930s, 
commented that “the scenery at Bathang is as beautiful as that in Jiangnan, 
and because of this the town is known as ‘Suzhou beyond the pass’”.1 And 
in the accounts of most historians, the aim of Zhao Erfeng and Liu Wenhui 
was precisely to transform the highlands west of the Sichuan basin into 
something that was as similar as possible to an idealized world of Han 
civilization of which Suzhou is so emblematic. Yet any view that they 
merely aspired to recreate a proto-typical “Han society” in the highlands is 
incomplete.  
In Zhao Erfeng’s vision, the indigenous people would learn Chinese, 
stop polyandrous marriage, adopt the Qing regulation hairstyle and replace 
sky burial with Han burial customs.2 However, his plan for settlement was 
                                               
1 Ma Naihui 马鼐辉, Wang Zhaowu 王昭武, and Zhuang Wenjun 庄文骏, eds., Chenfeng 
de lishi shunjian: sheying dashi Zhuang Xueben 20 shiji 30 niandai de xibu renwen 
tanfang  尘封的历史瞬间：摄影大师庄学本 20世纪 30年代的西部人文探访 
(Chengdu: Sichuan minzu chubanshe,2005), 245. 
2 QCBD, 1:95-103.  
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firmly within the tradition of the state agricultural colony (tun 屯) and did 
not constitute a vision for the recreation of Han society as it actually existed 
anywhere in the interior. Settlements would be state controlled communities 
in which land was parcelled out to civilian or soldier farmers who had 
perpetual use-rights, but no right to sell or buy land. Settlers would work 
their own plots and have a direct relationship with the state bureaucracy so 
there would be no landlord class. Zhao’s Kham administration directed 
migrants toward particular locations, and prohibited them from going to 
others or freely engaging in pursuits such as digging medicines. Such a 
society would be fundamentally different from that which existed in the 
lands within the traditional sphere of Chinese civilization. It was a vision 
informed by several factors. In addition to Zhao’s priorities as a military 
leader, there was the influence of the late imperial Chinese statecraft belief 
that expanding cultivation was the best way of increasing wealth. Also 
important was the greater degree of scepticism Zhao held regarding the 
potential of the Kham environment than some of his memorials let on.    
Liu Wenhui’s policy did not reveal the same urge to control migration 
or shape frontier society according to a particular ideological vision, but 
neither did he show Zhao’s eagerness to import Han culture. Liu wrote 
contradictory things about “assimilation” and whether or not “Using 
Chinese Civilization to transform the barbarian” was a good thing. But in 
general, his discussion of assimilation tended to focus more on the need to 
break down the boundary between the Han and non-Han worlds than on 
problematizing culture on the non-Han side of the boundary, which was at 
the core of Zhao’s culture policies. Liu articulated a go-slow approach to 
change in indigenous society: “If the existing order is completely 
overturned, it will be very difficult for the new order to succeed it”.3 There 
were no regulation hair-styles or proscribed burial practices under his rule, 
and he patronized indigenous Buddhist tradition, albeit within what were in 
theory highly controlled institutional environments. The cultural policies of 
the Liu Wenhui-era were more like those of the 1980s than the 1900s or the 
Mao era.    
                                               
3 JKDZ, 52.  
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These caveats aside, to what extent did the highlands in the west and 
southwest of Sichuan become more similar to and integrated within the Han 
Chinese world in the first half of the twentieth century? There was an 
increase in the Han population in Kangding and Luding, and small Han 
communities grew in various places further west. In Liangshan, there were 
more Han people in Yuesui at the end of the Republican period than there 
had been at the beginning of the twentieth century. In other parts of 
Liangshan, however, such as Zhaojue and Leibo there were less. The 
evidence indicates that one of the major demographic trends in Ningshu was 
increasing ethnic segregation. Ethnically mixed people and organizations 
still existed; examples are ‘Electric’ Leng and Deng Xiuting, who was 
usually identified as Han but could speak Yi and allegedly had “Yi blood in 
his veins”.4 Nevertheless, the intense conflict that broke out in many places 
in the late 1910s made it more difficult to venture into the territory of the 
ethnic other. Han and Yi abandoned land on the edges of their settlements, 
creating a huang no-man’s-land in between increasingly estranged 
communities. Thus from a demographic perspective, a few places in Kham 
became somewhat more similar to Han China, and some of Ningshu’s “Han 
territories” probably became more homogeneously Han. But the Han 
presence in many parts of Liangshan dwindled.  
In its basic form, local government in some communities in Kham and 
Ningshu became more similar to that in interior China. In last five years of 
the Qing, the Zhao brothers established county governments and Chinese 
schools across Kham and in some parts of Liangshan. Their fate in the 
Republican period was mixed. Some county authorities effectively 
disappeared for the entire Republican era. Anthropologist Li Shaoming 
described the situation in Zhaojue: “The county governor of Zhaojue didn’t 
dare live there; he stayed in Xichang. Zhaojue’s county government existed 
in name only; in reality it didn’t do anything.”5 The same comment could be 
made of places like Derge or Sershul in Kham. In other places, Han-
                                               
4 Zeng Zhaolun, Da Liang Shan Yi qu kao cha ji, 41; "Ningshu diaocha baogao huibian", 
junshi men, 59; zhengsu men, 27. 
5 Li Shaoming 李绍明, "Sichuan minzu diqu minzhu gaige de lishi huigu 四川民族地区民
主改革的历史回顾," Xinan Minzu Daxue xuebao (renwen sheke ban), Jan. 2008, 36. 
268 
 
dominated regional and local state institutions experienced a decade of 
weakness, though often not complete collapse, from the late 1910s, when 
the occupation of Sichuan by the Yunnanese army led to budget cuts in 
frontier defence and a re-focusing of efforts away from the frontier. Han-
dominated state authorities began to recover from the mid-1920s under the 
reign of Liu Wenhui. Even after losing the Sichuan basin to Liu Xiang’s 
forces in 1933, the rump of Liu Wenhui’s Twenty Fourth Army still had the 
capacity to disarm militias in Ningshu and defeat the well-armed Panchen 
Lama's field office in distant Kanze. In the 1940s, in places such as Drango 
and Nyarong there was a balance of power between Han magistrates and 
indigenous authorities. Around Kangding, Dawu and Yuesui, Han authority 
was more robust. At the end of the Republican period, Barnett thought Liu’s 
forces compared favourably to other armed forces in China. The relative 
success of Han dominated institutions in these parts has not been 
highlighted by much of the existing literature because it was so much more 
limited than what officials had hoped for. Yet in these places Han governors 
were more important than they had ever been before, and this degree of 
authority achieved at a time of civil war and, between 1937 and 1945, 
Japanese occupation of the east of China.      
However, Han-dominated county and regional government authority 
did not herald a trend toward the end of regional diversity and the 
incorporation of territories into an undifferentiated Han political system. 
While county and regional governments, the Twenty Fourth Army and 
organizations such as the Agricultural Institute were based on templates 
taken from Interior China, the policies created by these bodies, and their 
relationships with other elements of society, were thoroughly shaped by 
local environments and older institutions. Chapter four showed the influence 
of the wula corvée labour tax on politics in Kham. The problems created by 
the tax led one coalition of officials to argue for the creation of a state-
owned organization that would provide pack-animals for government and 
military transport. There were two attempts at establishing such an 
institution, but both failed, probably because they were under-resourced. 
Nevertheless, efforts in this area had an important impact on the Kham 
landscape because they led to the establishment of an enormous ranch which 
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continued to exist even after the transport organizations were wound up. 
Other officials, those who were more suspicious of state-enterprise and less 
convinced of the need to circumvent indigenous leadership argued for the 
corveé to be retained but ameliorated with regulation. This approach 
required a deeper engagement with indigenous leadership and communities 
than would have been necessary had the efforts to establish an alternative 
transport institution been successful. It also meant that the development of 
governing institutions in Kham followed a different path from that in 
northern China. There, according to Prasenjit Duara, formal government 
proliferated together with an extraneous layer of leadership that performed 
tax collection services for the government but was not under its control. In 
Kham, the amount of corvée labour that could be extracted from roadside 
households was often too limited for distinct and non-integrated authorities 
to grow simultaneously without cannibalizing each other. In some cases, 
this led to conflict between corvée-levying authorities, and in other cases, it 
led to a minute division of the tax base between them       
Chapter five demonstrated that Ninshu was different again. Here the 
key problem was neither the lack of corvée labour (as in Kham) nor the 
proliferation of go-betweens in the space separating the formal government 
and villages (as in northern China), but on the contrary the severing of ties 
between local government and a class of go-betweens. Since the Tongzhi 
reign (1861-1875) Han governments recruited Yi mercenaries to keep the 
peace on the ethnic frontier zone. Like Duara’s entrepreneurial brokers, 
these Yi security contractors existed largely outside the control of the 
governments they served, though they were required to send leaders to 
specially designated “Yi guardhouses” as security. This system collapsed 
around 1917 when the Han local garrison commanders ran out of money to 
pay them, probably because the Yunnanese occupiers of Sichuan withheld 
funds from the Sichuanese military. The sudden unemployment of 
significant numbers of mercenaries precipitated the bloody conflict that Han 
sources called the “Yi scourge”. By the mid-1920s relative peace and 
stability had broken out in most places, though tension and sporadic fighting 
continued and exercised a powerful influence on Ningshu’s political 
environment for the rest of the Republican period. The redevelopment of 
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leadership in the social space between Han governments and Yi 
communities was a cause of increasing stability rather than state involution 
leading to the impoverishment of villagers. So while the old frontier order in 
Kham and Ningshu underwent considerable change, and in many ways the 
regions did become more integrated with external political structures, local 
factors continued to play a decisive role in determining the nature and 
agendas of local government.  
 
 
The Extent of the Influence of the Environment 
 
There is a temptation to highlight the impact of the environment, 
particularly on the events in Kham. Climate obviously determines the limits 
of agricultural settlement, but this dissertation has also highlighted the 
effects of the high cost of transport imposed by mountainous terrain. The 
amount of genuinely free arable land in the highlands at the beginning of the 
twentieth century is difficult to calculate with the sources used by this study. 
But even if there had been a lot of unused arable land, enormous transport 
costs made crop farming on land more than a couple of days journey from a 
major market a less profitable activity than carrying goods for merchants 
who trafficked tea to the Tibetan lands, and musk and medicine back east.  
In The Art of Not Being Governed, James C. Scott puts geography and 
its effect on transport at the heart of his thesis, arguing that topographical 
difficulty prevented the establishment of effective state power in highland 
Southeast Asia before the development of a raft of technologies such as all-
weather roads and flying machines.6 In some respects, the history of Xikang 
appears to support his thesis. After all, Han-dominated governing 
institutions only controlled a small part of the territory within Xikang 
province. Even there, Han authority required big subsidies from the national 
government, as well as, in Liu Wenhui's case, the historical accident that the 
region could produce a commodity that lowlanders wanted but were 
                                               
6 James C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland 
Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 11. 
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prohibited from manufacturing. Transport was not such a critical problem in 
Liangshan, but mountains still inhibited Han government power. Many 
discussions of military campaigns against the “Yi scourge” mention the 
difficulties caused by the terrain for armies sent to battle the Yi.7  
To overcome the logistical problems posed by mountainous terrain, 
most pre-oil age imperial polities adopted corveé labour systems when they 
moved into highland territory. This was characteristic of the Qing and other 
post-Mongol empires in central Asia, the Spanish in the Andes and the 
British in the southern Himalaya and Kashmir. 8  In all these regions, 
imperial state-building ambitions put great pressure on the highlanders who 
performed the corveé, to an extent that could ultimately undermine imperial 
economic goals. At precisely the same time as Zhao Erfeng declared that 
there would be no wula without payment in Kham, British officials made 
similar pronouncements in Uttarakhand and Kashmir. 9  As in Kham, 
however, repeated attempts at regulation failed to prevent officials’ 
continued conscription of labour for transport at levels that caused 
significant hardship in mountain communities.10  
Yet topography did not determine everything. This much has already 
been shown by the way that officials in Kham came up with different 
solutions for the wula problem, each with distinct implications for the 
further development of Chinese authority in the highlands. Developments in 
the British Himalaya and foothills were also quite different from in Kham. 
In the southern Himalaya, opposition to the British use of corveé (called 
begar and utar) was widespread, well organized and came at the same time 
as Gandhi’s non-cooperation movement. There were more than 146 anti-
                                               
7 Yang Minghong, "Lun Qingdai Liangshan Yi qu de tusi zhidu yu gaituguiliu," 94. 
8 For the British use of corveé labour in the Himalaya, see: Shekhar Pathak, "The Begar 
Abolition Movements in British Kumaun," Indian Economic Social History Review, no. 
28 (1991): 261-62; Kenneth Iain MacDonald, "Push and Shove: Spatial History and the 
Construction of a Portering Economy in Northern Pakistan," Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 40, no. 2 (1998): 292. 
9 Pathak, "The Begar Abolition Movements," 265. 
10 Ibid., MacDonald, "Push and Shove," 293. 
272 
 
begar meetings in Uttarakhand in the first four months of 1921.11 There 
were also differences between the British and Chinese administrations: the 
Commissioner for Kumaun (one of the two sub-regions of Uttarakhand) saw 
the territory that he was in charge of as (in Pathak’s paraphrasing) “a small, 
hot part of a vast country.”12 I have not encountered a record of a Chinese 
regional government official in Kham saying anything comparable. Perhaps 
the latter were too far removed from the Chinese central government to 
adopt such a perspective, or perhaps they were more wedded to a view of 
Kham as a key strategic region on the route to Tibet. The British repression 
of protest against begar was harsh, but in 1921 provincial officials 
calculated that it was not worth continuing the fight for their right to corveé 
labour for transport in a territory they themselves viewed as not particularly 
important. In that year, begar was abolished and in the following year the 
government of India spent more than 160,000 rupees on hiring porters for 
officials travelling in the hills. 13  Hence, throughout the fringes of the 
Himalaya the environment gave rise to a set of common problems, and there 
were some similarities in the processes by which lowland-based 
governments extended their authority in the highlands. But the final 
outcomes depended on local political and institutional contexts.    
    
 
Innovation in Governance 
 
When did the key moments of political innovation occur in the Sichuan 
frontier and what sparked them? As we saw in chapter two, some historians 
have argued that there was something inherently modern about Zhao 
Erfeng's vision for the future of the frontier. Zhao certainly aimed to 
transform the highlands, but there was little in his planning or action that 
was really outside Qing precedent. The removal of local leaders who upset 
                                               
11 Ramachandra Guha, The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in 
the Himalaya (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 112. 
12 Pathak, "The Begar Abolition Movements," 267. 
13 Guha, The Unquiet Woods, 112. 
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the court or rebelled against its plans; the establishment of agricultural 
colonies and schools; payment for conscripted labour; and the use of foreign 
technology; these were all things that frontier governors of the eighteenth 
century had done as well. The view that Zhao’s aspirations were 
fundamentally modern can be sustained only if we are willing to see 
modernity within aspects of the early and high Qing traditions of 
governance on which he mostly drew.  
This has become a relatively common notion within China scholarship, 
though as Zhang Yongle has observed with reference to Wang Hui’s 王
暉  The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought (Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de 
xingqi 现代中国思想的兴起): 
 
The modernity or ‘early modernity’ he seeks in Chinese history is an 
open possibility rather than a structured project. The only thing we 
know about its meaning is that it involves the emergence of new 
pathways, not the replication of any version of modernity confected in 
the West.14 
  
This prompts Zhang to wonder whether there is “any further content left to 
the term ‘modern’?”15 In Zhang’s view, Wang Hui uses the term “modern” 
primarily as an expedient, so that Western readers are not tempted to regard 
the China of his work as “traditional”. If this is indeed the primary reason 
for retaining the term “modern”, it is doubtful whether twenty-first century 
scholarship will be as captivated by the concept as twentieth century 
historiography was. 
In any case, there is no indication that Zhao saw himself as a political 
innovator or made any claims to have devised new modes of frontier 
governance. There is nothing in Zhao’s writing comparable to Liu Wenhui’s 
remark that the Three Transformations policy was a “new policy for the 
government of the frontier peoples (bianmin 邊民) […] different from all 
previous policies.”16 A lot of what Liu described in his introduction to the 
                                               
14 Zhang Yongle, "The Future of the Past: On Wang Hui's Rise of Modern Chinese 
Thought," New Left Review, no. 62 (2010): 54. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Liu Wenhui, "Jianshe xin Xikang shi jiang," 597.   
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Three Transformations Policy was really just an old-fashioned concern for 
demonstrating virtuous rule, influenced by his reading of Ming chivalric 
novels and combined with an acknowledgement that Zhuge Liang-esque 
enfeoffment of duly submissive native leaders would not do in an era that 
demanded the integration of the border peoples into a united Chinese 
citizenry. De hua and tonghua together was an awkward and arguably 
somewhat unusual combination, but Liu did not invent either of these 
concepts any more than Zhao discovered the idea of getting rid of tusi and 
establishing state agricultural settlements. Yet Liu clearly wished to be seen 
as an innovator in the field of frontier governance in a way that was not 
important for Zhao Erfeng.   
Liu’s claim to have discovered a new way of ruling the borderlands is 
also at odds with much scholarship that suggests that the Republican and 
Socialist periods were not eras of enduring innovation in the actual practice 
of frontier governance. James Millward suggests the core aim and elements 
of migration policy to Xinjiang in the early years of the People’s Republic 
were not very different from during the Qianlong reign.17 Thomas Cliff adds 
that the great changes to the institution of the military-agricultural colony, 
“more dramatic than any […] in its 2,200-year history”, occurred in the 
1990s and 2000s.18  
However, while Liu Wenhui overstated the novelty of the “Three 
Transformations”, there were a couple of genuine breaks with tradition 
under his rule. State-owned corporate organizations became the key units 
for highland agricultural development in the 1930s. This was an important 
move away from the Qing model of settlement. Qing tun colonies varied in 
the degree to which they aimed to restrict the movement and activity of their 
inhabitants, and as noted above Zhao intended the Kham administration to 
exercise a high degree of control over the settlements that he founded in the 
highlands. Nonetheless, migrants in the Qing era had permanent rights to 
specific plots of land that they managed independently as tenant-farmers. In 
                                               
17 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 251. 
18 Thomas Matthew James Cliff, "Neo Oasis: The Xinjiang Bingtuan in the Twenty-first 
Century," Asian Studies Review 33, no. 1 (2009): 103. 
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the Republican period, settlement by tun gave way to settlement by state-
owned enterprises that hired waged labour and were managed by an 
Agriculture Institute that was directed by technocrats, two of whom had 
agronomy qualifications from foreign universities. It may be that, with 
closer examination and comparison, Republican era innovation may reveal 
itself to be just as significant as that of the post-Mao reform era, if not more 
so.    
Yet another major change of the Republican period actually limited the 
development of most state-owned agricultural enterprises. Apart from the 
Taining ranch, the state farms operated by the Agriculture Institute rented 
land from private landlords, even when the land was listed as “wasteland”, 
which in theory belonged to the government. Liu regime’s respect for 
landlords’ property in this instance was probably related to the growing 
importance of the deed tax, which gave local government an incentive to 
issue title to huang land. The rising significance of taxes on livestock also 
made it less reasonable for local governments to see uncultivated land as, 
prima facie, unproductive. Republican period tax innovation aimed to 
increase government revenue in order to expand the capacity of government 
at all levels. Thus two innovations in government practice, both apparently 
aimed at enlarging government, nevertheless pulled in different directions. 
The new revenue systems meant that local-government decision making 
could work against the development of the new agricultural development 
strategy. This serves as a warning against seeing an overall coherence, or 
patterns of mutual-reinforcement, within historical development, even when 
the source of such developments is connected. 
After 1949, the deployment of air-power and fleets of trucks radically 
altered local political contexts, but much remained the same in the field of 
culture production. Han migrants continued to be represented as both world-
building pioneers and hooligans. The idea of a moral transformation in 
politics leading to a transformation of society continued to be articulated. 
Despite this, doubts remained as to whether virtuous rule was really 
historically relevant or not, though the source of the doubt changed from 
concern about whether or not the Yi responded to virtue, to an unstated 
disaffection from the idea of political transformation. Something like 
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“assimilation” or “integration” remains of utmost importance for many 
commentators, though there are continued doubts about the nature and 
outcome of the process. 
 
One of the questions identified at the beginning of this thesis was 
whether global, regional or local (clearly these are not categories that have 
natural definitions, but they are useful as heuristics) factors tell us more 
about why the changes outlined throughout have occurred. The new political 
calculus brought on by the arrival of combustion engines, not examined in 
this thesis but foreshadowed clearly enough, is one instance in which the 
transformation of the Sichuan frontier was a local manifestation of a global 
pattern of change caused by a revolution in transport technology. Aside 
from this, I do not generally find it persuasive to argue that events should be 
understood primarily as part of global developments, or responses to stimuli 
outside China. The danger of a British annexation of Tibet was a spur to 
action, but one that strengthened a pre-existing argument for imposing the 
administrative system of Han society in the non-Han southwest. The revolts 
against Chinese authority in 1905 appear to be a better explanation for 
Zhao’s campaigns than arrival of the British in Tibet, to which Xiliang’s 
initial response was rather weak. Moreover, the British invasion of Tibet 
cannot explain moves to remove tusi from Liangshan. As noted above, Zhao 
was more influenced by Chinese traditions of frontier governance than 
Western imperialism, though there were resemblances between the two that 
were the result of different administrations facing similar problems. 
Yet the events in the southwest in the 1900s clearly do belong to a 
larger pattern of change. From the 1880s, the Qing court moved to establish 
the Chinese administrative system, settler colonies and elements of Han 
culture in all the territories that had previously been conceptualized as 
separate and distinct components of the empire from the Han lands. Why 
this shift occurred is not well understood. Gong Zizhen 龔自珍 (1792-1841) 
argued in an 1820 essay that the sinicization of Xinjiang was an investment 
that would end the region’s dependence on subsidies and even allow it to 
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“give up wealth to benefit the centre”. 19  But it seems unlikely that the 
reforms that came to all frontiers at the end of the dynasty were really 
motivated above all by a rational calculation of what was in the empire’s 
best economic interests. For, though Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 (1823-1901) 
famously (and thus far accurately) predicted that Xinjiang would never be 
other than a drain on the centre’s finances, there was not as much analysis of 
economic costs and benefits as one would expect if this had really been at 
the heart of court decision making.  
Wang Hui argues that Gong Zizhen’s conceptualization of “China” 
eliminated the Great Wall as a natural boundary between Chinese 
civilization (Xia 夏) and the exterior world of the Barbarian (Yi 夷).20 Wang 
suggests that this conceptual move was due to a group of statecraft thinkers’ 
promotion of the idea of the empire as a Great Unity (da yi tong 大一統) 
based on (Confucian) protocols (liyi 禮儀), rather than a polity segmented 
on the basis of a set of racial identities. 21 This served as a subtle critique of 
Manchu ethnic segregation and privilege that disadvantaged the Han 
scholars. If Gong Zizhen’s argument for the provincialization of the territory 
beyond the Great Wall was related to a view of the empire that developed as 
a response to the disadvantaged position of Han literati under Manchu rule, 
then it is possible to imagine the provincialization of Xinjiang and Tibet 
occurring without the arrival of the Europeans. The onset of European 
imperialism in Asia may still have acted to speed up the process and 
convinced doubters of the value of acting, but the powerful internal dynamic 
cannot be ignored.  
The move towards state-owned enterprises in the Republican era was 
certainly not confined to Xikang either. Morris L. Bian has traced the 
origins of the Chinese state-owned enterprise system to the 1930s, arguing 
that crisis sparked by the Japanese invasion led to the transformation of the 
                                               
19 Quoted in Millward, Beyond the Pass, 241. 
20 Wang Hui, Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de xingqi, shang juan, di er bu: diguo yu guojia, 
603. 
21 Ibid., 570. 
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“mental models of institutional environments”.22 This process entailed the 
development of new organizational forms, including the danwei 單位 
(“work unit”), which became central to the socialist reorganization of 
Chinese society. This case is well argued, though the influence of the 
Japanese invasion on events in Xikang should not be overdrawn. Of all the 
province’s state-owned agricultural enterprises, the Taining ranch was the 
largest and had the most enduring impact, and this was because of local 
factors unrelated to the Japanese. 
The tax innovations of local and regional Han governments in the 
Republican period came from a financial tool-kit used by authorities 
throughout China as they attempted to build capacity and undertake more 
and different kinds of work. To this extent, here too the Han authorities in 
the highlands followed a broader pattern of change that unfolded across the 
country. Yet as Elizabeth Remick has shown with reference to Hebei and 
Guangdong, different authorities favoured different tools and used them 
differently, with divergent implications for the development of local 
government and its relationship to society. 23 Whether or not there were 
other parts of China in which the rise of taxes on land title and livestock had 
an impact comparable to that in Xikang is a question worthy of future 
research.  
The Han governors in the highlands were part of a broader world of 
Chinese politics and were affected by the major trends within that world. 
Yet the history of government in the highlands in the first half of the 
twentieth century is not a story of the ‘state’ as a discreet entity that was 
‘built’ as part of a national mission, and which having been thus built, 
obtained an agency of its own. Rather this dissertation has shown how 
government officials’ social roles—that is, what they did and how they 
related to the people around them—were shaped in the intersection of 
ideology (drawn from a diverse Chinese cultural milieu) with concrete and 
distinct local challenges that varied significantly between regions. For all 
                                               
22 Morris L. Bian, The Making of the State Enterprise System in Modern China: The 
Dynamics of Institutional Change (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 
14. 
23 Elizabeth J. Remick, "The Significance of Variation in Local States," 408-09. 
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that the likes of Zhao Erfeng had ideological preferences heralding from an 
evolving Qing tradition, in his own time and after, local officials’ agendas 
were powerfully moulded by attempts to solve local problems. These 
included: how to raise more revenue from the society and ecology 
immediately around them; how to efficiently arrange for the transport of 
people and things from place to place; and how to deal with conflicts caused 
by the end of historical institutions and relationships. Given that such 
challenges varied significantly, it was not surprising that local governors’ 
pronouncements on matters such as assimilation of the indigenous, moral 
governance and modernity were often at odds with one another and not 
always thoroughly thought out.  
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Glossary of names for places and peoples 
 
Alternative names and spellings for places in this thesis  
 
Current Chinese Qing Chinese Republican 
Chinese 
Romanizations of 
Indigenous names  
Liangshan Yi 
Autonomous 
Prefecture 凉山彝
族自治州 
 
Ningyuan 
Prefecture 
 甯遠府 
Ningshu 甯
屬 
n.a. 
Kangding 康定 
 
Dajianlu  
打劍爐  
 
Dajianlu  
打劍爐 
 
 
Darstedo / 
Dartsendo /  
Dhartsendo 
 
Batang 巴塘 
 
Batang / Baan 巴
安1  
Baan 巴安 Bathang 
Litang 理塘 
 
Litang / Lihua 理
化 
Lihua 理化 Lithang 
Ganzi 甘孜 
 
-- -- Kanze /  
Garzê / 
Kandze  
 
Daofu 道孚 
 
-- -- Dawu 
Jiulong 九龙 
 
-- -- Gyaisi 
Dege 德格 
 
-- -- Derge 
Changdu  昌都 
 
-- -- Chamdo 
Shiqu 石渠 
 
-- -- Sershul 
Xinlong 新龙 
 
Zhandui 瞻對 / 
Zhanhua 瞻化  
Zhanhua 瞻
化 
Nyarong 
Luhuo 爐霍 
 
-- -- Drango 
Baiyu 白玉 
 
-- -- Pelyül 
Yuexi 越西 
 
Yuesui 越嶲 
(some sources 
give 
pronunciation of 
second character 
as xi, others sui)  
Yuesui 越
嶲 
 
                                               
1 The Chinese names of Bathang and Lithang were changed by Zhao Erfeng 
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Chinese language ethnonyms  
 
Term  Late Qing/ Republican 
Period meanings 
Current meaning.  
夷 Yí  (1) ‘Non-Han’, somewhat 
derogatory, often translated 
as “Barbarian” in English. 
In this sense, it included 
people identified as “Kang”, 
“Fan”. Also used to refer to 
Europeans in the Qing 
period. 
(2) (More common in 
Republican period). Chinese 
language ethnonym for the 
indigenous people in 
Liangshan / Ning region. In 
this sense, it excluded 
groups such as the “Fan”, 
“Kang”. Sources disagree as 
to how derogatory Yi 夷 
was in this sense.2 
 
Meaning (1) is obsolete, and 
the notion of “Non-Han” is 
covered by the referent 
“minority ethnic group” 
(shaoshu minzu 少数民族). 
Meaning (2) is semi-
obsolete; the character was 
changed in the 1950s to the 
homophonous neutral and 
non-connotative 彝 Yí (an 
ancient term for a kind of 
wine or sacrificial vessel, no 
longer used in the modern 
period).  
  
蠻 Man (1) ‘Non-Han’, derogatory, 
often translated as 
“Barbarian”. Common in 
Qing texts, but less so in the 
Republican period.  
 
Obsolete.  
猓猓 Luoluo Insulting ethnonym for 
indigenous people in 
Liangshan / Ning region 
(also called Yi 夷/彝). 
Derives from self-
identification, but written 
with insulting ‘dog’ radical
犭. 
 
 
 
Obsolete.  
                                               
2 Peter Goullart reported that an Yi person told him: “Although the Chinese call my people 
the Lolos, we dislike it intensely as it is a derogatory appellation and even its Chinese 
character carries an indicator which means “beast”; we may be savages, but nobody likes 
that to be said to his face […] The proper name for us which we use is Yi” Goullart, 
Princes of the Black Bone, 117. Most Republican period Chinese sources use yi 夷, but a 
couple report that it was an insulting term; see: Xikang sheng canyihui 西康省參議會. 
"Linshi canyihui, di yi ci hui huibian 臨時參議會第一次會匯編," 1940, (SCDAG, QZH: 
204, AJH: 14), section 8, 13b.  
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倮倮 Luoluo Modified version of猓猓, 
written with ‘human’ 
radical 亻 rather than the 
‘dog’ radical 犭. But still 
said to be insulting.  
 
Obsolete. 
彝 Yí   (Not used in Qing or 
Republic) 
Ethnonym for indigenous 
people in Liangshan/Ning 
region. Not insulting. 
番、蕃 Fan (1) Used in the medieval 
Chinese name for Tibet, 
tufan 吐蕃 (sometimes said 
to be pronounced tubo). Not 
used as a contemporary 
toponym during the period 
of this study. 
(2) Used as an ethnonym to 
refer to Tibetans, similar to 
modern usage of Zang 藏 as 
an ethnonym.  
(3) Used as an ethnonym to 
refer to people in Kham 
deemed to be non-Tibetan 
but related to Tibetans, 
often in the compound 
Xifan 西番/蕃. Confusingly, 
this translates as “West 
Fan”, even though there are 
no “East Fan” and they 
people referred to by this 
name live to the east of their 
purported Tibetan relatives.  
 
Obsolete.  
康 Kang A transliteration of the 
Tibetan place name 
‘Kham’; the eastern part of 
the Tibetan world. In 
Republican period Chinese 
discourse, Kang ren 康人, 
“Kham people” was used as 
an ethnonym for the natives 
of Kham.  
Used informally, often in 
compounds like Kang qu 康
区, “Kham region”; Kang 
ba 康巴 (transliteration of 
Tibetan Kham pa “Kham 
person”. Kang ba is 
sometimes mistakenly taken 
to be a transliteration of a 
geographic term, and used 
as a ‘native-ized’ alternative 
to Kang qu). Kang 康 does 
not occur in the name of a 
formally recognized ethnic 
groups and, in 
administrative place names, 
only in Kangding 康定. 
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藏 Zang A transliteration of the 
Tibetan place name 
‘Tsang’; the region 
encompassing Lhasa. In 
late-Qing and Republican 
Chinese Zang usually 
referred only to people 
living in what is now the 
Tibetan Autonomous 
Region (called “Central 
Tibet” by Western 
Tibetology). Thus it did not 
refer to Kham natives. 
 
Used as an official 
ethnonym in roughly the 
same way as the English 
“Tibetan”, to include natives 
of the Tibet Autonomous 
Region (Xizang zizhi qu 西
藏自治區) as well as those 
of Kham and Amdo 
(Qinghai) 
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